THE BATTLE OF ARRAS.
On 11th February the Division took over the left sector of the XVIIth
Corps front from the 9th Scottish Division, and was disposed as follows:
the 152nd Brigade in the line, with brigade headquarters at Marœuil; the
154th Brigade at Ecoivres and Bethonsart, with headquarters at Acq. The
153rd Brigade was at Frévilliers, and was employed entirely in finding
Corps working parties.
The sector taken over extended from Bogey Avenue east of Roclincourt to
Old Fantome Trench, just west of the Arras-Lille road. The Division had
thus returned to familiar ground.
Preparations were at once begun for an attack on a large scale. From now
onwards, up to the signing of the armistice, the Division was to be
continuously engaged in major operations, with the exception of the few
months in which it held the line between the battle of Cambrai in
November 1917 and the German offensive in March 1918. As it was once
put, for the next two years the Division was in a permanent state of
being in a battle, or preparing for a battle, or coming out of a battle.
On this occasion the general plan of the Allied armies comprised a
series of offensives on all fronts. The rôle of the British was to
attack the enemy troops occupying the salient, into which they had been
pressed as a result of the Somme battle, between the rivers Ancre and
Scarpe.
Both shoulders of this salient were to be attacked simultaneously, the
Fifth Army operating on the Ancre, while the Third Army attacked from
the north-west about Arras. Further, to quote from Sir Douglas Haig's
despatch: "The front of the attack on the Arras side was to include
the Vimy Ridge, possession of which I considered necessary to secure
the left flank of the operations on the south bank of the Scarpe. The
capture of this ridge, which was to be carried out by the First Army,
also offered other important advantages. It would deprive the enemy of
valuable observation, and give us a wide view of the plains stretching
from the eastern foot of the ridge to Douai and beyond. Moreover,
although it was evident that the enemy might by a timely withdrawal
avoid a battle in the awkward salient still held by him between the
Ancre and the Scarpe, no such withdrawal from his important Vimy Ridge
position was likely."
The rôle of the Highland Division was to capture the southern shoulder
of the Vimy Ridge in conjunction with the Canadian Corps on the left and
the 34th Division on the right.
It was clear that an attack against a position of such great natural
strength and tactical value as the Vimy Ridge would only be successful
if the most careful and elaborate preparations were made.
As far as the Highland Division was concerned, these preparations took
three forms--the preparation of the British trenches for offensive
operations, the preparation of the enemy's trenches for assault, the
preparation of the troops for the attack.
As regards the first much work was, as usual, necessary. The thaw, after
a long period of intense frost, reduced the trenches to an appalling
condition of mud. The overlay of loamy clay which covers the chalk in
the Arras sector, when thoroughly wet, is of a bad texture for purposes
of digging. It has such adhesive qualities that on many occasions during
this period the earth could not be thrown off the shovel. The men
working in the trench had to throw their shovels with their load of
earth clear out of the trench, as had been the case in the Aveluy
sector. Thus, the keeping open of the communication trenches and the
opening up of the assembly trenches, which in any case were in a most
desperate state of dilapidation, was a heavy task.
As regards the preparation of assembly trenches, it was decided to form
up the leading waves in the foremost old French trench. This trench had
been evacuated owing to the danger from enemy mines when the Highland
Division was holding this sector in 1916.
The trench was reconnoitred throughout its length, and it was found to
have fallen in to a depth of about four feet, and to have been
completely filled in with entanglements of barbed wire. There was,
further, a fairly strong wire entanglement in front of it. The saps
connecting this trench to the present front-line trench had all been
completely blocked when they joined the existing front line, and had
also been wired up throughout their length. A large amount of work was
therefore required to clear this trench so that the troops could occupy
it for assembly. It was, however, decided to do no work in it beyond
removing the barbed wire from it so as not to attract the enemy's
attention.
The whole area was found to be very deficient of dug-outs suitable for
headquarters. Three new brigade battle headquarters had therefore to be
tunnelled as well as some additional battalion battle headquarters and
regimental aid posts.
Machine-gun positions had also to be constructed for guns firing in the
machine-gun barrage during the attack, and accommodation had to be
provided for their crews.
The Divisional area also contained an insufficiency of artillery
positions, particularly of forward positions required by the guns firing
in the barrage. Considerable preparations had therefore to be made by
the artillery.
The system of buried telephone cables was also incomplete. In fact, it
was only completed in time for the engagement by concentrating every
available man on this work.
As regards the preparations of the enemy's position for the attack, the
chief consideration was his wire entanglements, which had been erected
in profusion.
Those which were to be encountered in the first phase of the attack,
being on the western slopes of the Vimy Ridge, were visible, and could
be cut by the artillery with direct observation.
The later stages of the attack were, however, planned to pass over the
ridge and reach the plains beyond it. The wire to be encountered in this
phase of the attack was, therefore, on the reverse slope of the Vimy
Ridge, and could only be seen from the air.
Unfortunately, at this period the German air service established a
marked superiority over our reconnaissance machines. In a single period
of twenty-four hours, three R.E. 8's (reconnaissance aeroplanes) were
crashed within full view of a single brigade headquarters, one of them
being hunted right down to the ground, where it overturned, with both
its occupants wounded.
At this period the policy of the Higher Command was to wait till a new
type of aeroplane was completed, and then definitely and suddenly to
take command of the air. This superiority, of which the Germans were
successfully deprived, as planned, on the opening of the offensive, was
due to the arrival in this part of the line of the "circus"--that is,
the squadron commanded by Baron von Richthofen--which included the
picked fighting pilots of the German air service. The aeroplanes used by
this squadron were painted red, with yellow or pink bellies, and gave to
laymen, at any rate, an impression of amazing efficiency.
In consequence of this temporary superiority in the air, the
wire-cutting on the reverse slopes of the ridge could seldom be
successfully carried out. It was, however, at this period that the now
famous 106 or instantaneous fuze arrived in the country. This fuze burst
its shell instantaneously when the fuze-cap touched the ground. As a
result, the explosion occurred before the shell had time to bury itself
in the earth, and its full force was therefore felt above ground. The
effect of this shell on wire was devastating, and an accurate shot would
blow a gap clean through an ordinary entanglement. So much was the
energy of this shell spent on the surface of the earth, that even heavy
howitzer shells left craters little bigger than wash-hand basins.
The plan was that no action should be taken which was likely to warn the
enemy of an impending attack until as late as possible. Therefore in
February and the early part of March wire-cutting was only carried out
in conjunction with raids.
As regards the preparation of the troops for the attack, much time had
already been spent in teaching the lessons gained at the battle of
Beaumont Hamel to the new drafts which had since arrived. General
Harper had been continuously developing his theories on the application
of tactical principles to the conditions of modern warfare. Possessed of
great gifts of imagination and powers of deduction, he was in this
respect always in advance of his time. He therefore spared no pains to
train the Division in the practice of his theories. He achieved this
object to a certain extent by lectures to officers and men, but more
particularly by informal discussions. He regularly visited units in the
line and out, and seldom left without having discussed some tactical
principle, explained his views on it, and impressed all with their
soundness. What the General thought to-day the Division thought and
practised the following week.
The main principles on which General Harper based the training of his
units and planned his attacks at this time may be summarised as
follows:--
1. That the objective of all offensive operations must be to envelop the
enemy--_i.e._, hold him in front and attack him in flank.
2. That the fullest use must at all times be made of mechanical
weapons--_i.e._, guns, machine-guns, trench-mortars, &c. The minimum use
of infantry; to rely for success on the weight of infantry, either in
attack or defence, was to ensure unnecessary casualties.
3. That troops must always be in depth; they must neither attack nor
defend in one or two dense lines of men, but in a succession of
well-extended lines.
He also made a point of impressing on all that a leader without
personality will achieve nothing.
Though the application of these theories may not at this time have
reached its full development, the problems connected with them had
certainly been considerably discussed before the battle of Arras took
place.
The 152nd and 154th Brigades were detailed for the original attack, it
being the custom of the Division for the brigades to take part in the
initial operations of a new battle in turn. The German trenches on the
battle fronts of the two brigades were therefore taped out exactly
according to scale in the vicinity of the billeting areas. The men were
then continually practised in the attack over the taped-out course. The
18-pounder barrage was represented by men with signalling flags and by
the pipers, under the command of an artillery officer. Hostile
machine-guns were indicated by the drummers. The attack was practised so
often that the men obtained a thorough knowledge of the distances from
one objective to the next, of the length of the pauses in the barrage,
and the trace of the enemy's trenches.
Various raids which were carried out preparatory to this attack had
brought out some valuable lessons concerning the close combat. In these
raids it had become clear that the blind leap into a trench was not a
sound policy. Not only were the German trenches in many places of a
great depth, but they also contained many straight lengths of trench
covered by a machine-gun mounted on the top step or a dug-out cut in the
side of a traverse. These machine-guns were sited so as to fire straight
along the trench as soon as any attacking party had leapt into it.
Considerable pains were therefore taken to train the men not to rush
blindly at their objective, but to come up on to the parapet properly
extended ("carrying a good head," as the General put it), and shoot down
all the garrison of the trench that were visible before they entered it.
The men were therefore constantly practised in assaulting reserve
trenches near Villers Chatel, in which targets were placed representing
the trench garrisons. On reaching this trench each man fired five live
rounds at the targets. A good many rounds ricochetted into the adjacent
parts of France, but fortunately no damage appears to have been done to
the local inhabitants. On the other hand, the men rapidly began to
acquire the right instincts for engaging the Germans in close combat.
It was after these raids, to which reference is made later, that General
Harper in an increasing degree emphasised in training his troops the
necessity for fighting with their wits, and not by a mere display of
seeing red and brute courage.
During the period in which the Division held the line prior to the
attack few incidents worthy of note occurred. The enemy employed
"oil-can" trench-mortars and aerial darts freely, in his usual wooden
way of shooting--at the same place, at the same hours daily--without
doing much damage.
He had, however, one successful shoot, when snow was on the ground. A
machine-gun team living in a concrete dug-out in Bidot Trench lit a
fire inside it. In consequence the snow quickly melted from the top of
it, and it stared out a squarish black mass in the midst of the snow.
The Germans were quick to observe this, and bombed it with "oil-cans." A
direct hit was scored, the dug-out collapsed, and the machine-gun team
was wiped out. This incident afforded a good example of one of the many
precautions that must necessarily be taken if snow is not to disclose
occupied portions of the trenches.
Sniping was also prevalent. In the left sector there was a particularly
good German sniper. It was his custom to start work just after dawn when
the sun was rising behind his back. In the morning mist, to persons
facing the sun, observation appeared bad; on the other hand, they
themselves were clearly visible when looked at by a person with the sun
behind him. The troops facing east were therefore inclined to expose
themselves, having a false sense of security. In this manner
Lieut.-Colonel W. MacL. Macfarlane, D.S.O., H.L.I., commanding the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, was killed by this sniper. A few days later
another officer was killed in the same place, also just after dawn,
probably by the same German. Lieut.-Colonel Macfarlane was the third
Seaforth commanding officer to be killed in this sector.
When the wire-cutting necessary for certain big raids began, the Germans
became very free in the use of their artillery. In fact, in the
fortnight preceding the attack, when numbers of men were employed in the
trenches both cable-burying and filling dumps, the sector became a most
unpleasant one. Many of the communication trenches, badly enfiladed by
enemy artillery, were continually bombarded, and movement in the trench
area became a hazardous occupation.
During the preparations for the Arras battle, in another part of the
front a most important event occurred. Between Soissons and Arras the
enemy voluntarily retired. His rearward movement began about 24th
February, and extended almost as far north as the village of Thilloy les
Mouflaines. News of this retirement reached the Division at about 11
P.M. on 24th February, and orders were at once issued to the 152nd
Brigade to patrol their whole front and see if the enemy showed any
signs of withdrawing. He was, however, found to be maintaining his
usual alertness.
This withdrawal considerably reduced the potentialities of this phase of
the spring offensive. Instead of attacking from the Ancre northwards,
simultaneously with the advance of the Third Army from the north-west,
the Fifth Army had now to follow up the retiring enemy, and to dig
itself in in front of the Hindenburg Line to which the enemy had
withdrawn.
The Hindenburg Line system, which subsequently became well known to the
Highland Division, had been very strongly fortified and sited with great
care and skill, so as to deny all advantages of position to any force
attacking it.
The enemy had thus already escaped from the great salient which it was
hoped to nip off during the forthcoming operations. He was now
established in the south of Arras in a position considerably stronger
than that which he had vacated.
As regards the sector held by the Division, the only other noteworthy
incidents during the period of preparation for the attack were a
succession of raids.
These raids were carried out for two purposes: to obtain information
concerning the enemy's garrison and defences, and to inflict the maximum
amount of damage to his defences in view of the coming operations. The
battle of Beaumont Hamel had disclosed how strongly the German could
fortify himself in a chalk soil. The trenches which the Division was to
attack, supported as they were by the commanding ground of the Vimy
Ridge, comprised a most formidable defensive system. It was therefore
arranged that raids should be carried out on a large scale on both
brigade fronts, so that serious damage could be done to the
entanglements and dug-outs, prior to the launching of the offensive.
The first took place on 5th March, the raiding party consisting of 11
officers and 303 other ranks of the 6th Gordon Highlanders. The plan was
to assault and capture the German front and support line on a frontage
of 485 yards, and to remain in occupation of them for a period
sufficient to allow time for the destruction of both the garrison and
the dug-outs.
Nine gaps were cut in the German wire on the frontage of attack by the
artillery and the 2-inch mortars, the latter firing 1137 rounds during
the process.
Gaps were also cut, as a feint, along the whole Divisional front. The
raid therefore ensured that a considerable amount of damage would be
done to the enemy's defences prior to the big attack.
The raiders were divided into squads of 1 N.C.O. and 8 men, each officer
commanding a group of three or more squads. Each squad had a particular
section of a particular trench given to it as its objective. Air
photographs were carefully studied, and where dug-outs could be located.
The squads detailed to deal with them carried either 20 lb. charges of
ammonal or phosphorus bombs and tins containing one gallon of petrol.
The ammonal was to be used to blow in the dug-out entrances, while the
petrol was to be hurled down the stairs, followed by the phosphorus
bomb, which caused the dug-out to catch fire. Unless some such measures
were taken, in a raid in which the troops could only remain in
occupation of the German trenches for a limited time, the Boches could
remain secure in their dug-outs until the raiders had departed. The
ordinary Mills bomb had little effect in a dug-out containing several
chambers, while the men would have little chance of succeeding had they
attempted to enter an unknown dug-out and deal with the enemy below
ground.
The raid was a complete success, every squad with the exception of four
reaching its objective. One officer and 20 other ranks of the 2nd
Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment were captured, and 66 dead were
counted in the enemy trenches apart from those who succumbed in the
dug-outs. The total casualties to the 6th Gordon Highlanders were 6
officers and 48 other ranks, of whom many were only lightly wounded.
Eight Stokes bombs, 660 lb. of ammonal, 16 tins of petrol, and 164
phosphorus bombs were thrown down the dug-outs. Many entrances were
destroyed, while several were observed to be still burning twelve hours
after the raid. The wire was found to be badly damaged, and the trenches
much destroyed from the bombardment.
The raid impressed on all ranks that the Bavarian is a magnificent
fighter. Lieut.-Colonel J. Dawson, D.S.O., commanding the 6th Gordon
Highlanders, who was responsible for the details of the raid, reported
as follows: "A stout resistance was offered in every part of the area,
men in the open trench resisting chiefly by bomb-throwing, while the
firing of rifles and throwing of bombs took place from every occupied
dug-out. Until this was discovered, several casualties were inflicted
on men passing dug-out doors. The sound of the explosion of Mills
bombs thrown down the stairways had not died away before rifle-firing
and bomb-throwing up the staircase was resumed, and silence was not
obtained until the mobile charges of ammonal were exploded. Isolated
snipers hung on until knocked out, and one machine-gunner, who was
ultimately killed and his gun destroyed, was firing from in front of
the German second line before our men had withdrawn from that trench.
In only one single instance, where five men came voluntarily from a
dug-out, were surrenders made, and in most cases pockets held out until
all were killed."
The German battalion involved had only come into the line six hours
before this raid took place. The fine fight put up by the Bavarians in
these circumstances was therefore highly creditable to them. It showed
how well the line must have been handed over by the outgoing battalion,
and what a sound system of defence existed.
The fullest value was made of this enterprise. A map was prepared from
the information given by the raiders, which showed every feature in the
sector of German trenches concerned. Further, many lessons were learned
as regards trench fighting. It was found that close-range shooting was
considerably employed by both sides. The Germans appeared to rely to a
large extent on enfilading short lengths of their trenches from
loopholes cut in the traverses, and from the entrances to deep dug-outs
cut in the sides of the traverses. As these doorways were not visible
until the troops were almost abreast of them, they created a difficult
situation. The raiders found that this could best be met by remaining
outside the trench and shooting or bombing the enemy from above. These
tactics proved highly successful.
The raiders were moved by lorry after they had left the trench area to
Haute Avesnes, where they were inspected with the rest of the battalion
by Sir Douglas Haig and General Allenby.
On 17th March a bold experiment was tried, the same raid being repeated
by the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. It was hoped by this means
to complete the utter destruction of the section of trenches raided, and
to lower the Bavarians' _morale_ before the great attack. The strength
of the party was increased up to 13 officers and 378 other ranks. The
time the raiders were to remain in the hostile trenches was also
lengthened, so as to enable the work in hand to be thoroughly completed.
The party took over with it 1618 Mills bombs, 87 20-lb. charges of
ammonal, 164 phosphorus bombs, and 41 tins of petrol. Of these, 4
ammonal charges, 8 phosphorus bombs, and 2 tins of petrol were allotted
to a certain dug-out known to be used as an officers' mess and offices.
This raid was accompanied by an intense bombardment and creeping barrage
similar to that of the 6th Gordon Highlanders. The Stokes guns alone
fired 2497 rounds.
On this occasion the raiders met with, if anything, severer fighting
than had the 6th Gordon Highlanders. The wire had on one flank either
been repaired or the party had made a slight error in their direction,
so that on this flank the barrage was lost, and the troops had to
complete their advance to the trench without its protection.
The raid was, however, successful, most squads reaching their objective
and overcoming all resistance encountered. Our casualties amounted to 8
officers and 102 other ranks, of whom, as before, many were only lightly
wounded. The casualties appear heavy--and, indeed, were heavy--but it
must be borne in mind that in any trench fighting in which bombs are
freely used, a number of lightly wounded men is an inevitable result.
The enemy, suspecting that another raid might be attempted, had
reinforced his trench garrison, and was in considerable strength. In
consequence, he suffered serious losses.
The raids were of great value to the battalions which carried them out,
as both were destined on "the day" to pass over the same area as they
had raided. The enemy's wire and trenches had been reduced to an almost
irreparable condition. The men had had a further experience of
following the creeping barrage, which had been fired without a fault,
and had given him the greatest confidence. The artillery, including the
64th Army Brigade R.F.A. attached to them, had twice fired a barrage
over a portion of the front to be covered by them in the battle.
The raiders expressed themselves as delighted with the shrapnel barrage.
The men again reported that they were able to wait in the remnants of
the enemy's wire entanglements while the barrage was still on his front
line.
Moreover, the heavy work of clearing the old French trench, in which the
troops for the main attack were to assemble, had also been completed at
least on one battalion frontage.
The disadvantage that came from these raids was that the casualties had
been fairly heavy, and affected chiefly one company in each battalion.
Thus, when the day of attack came, these companies contained an undue
proportion of inexperienced reinforcements.
On 31st March the 6th Black Watch raided a small salient in the left
brigade front with two parties, together totalling 2 officers and 50
men. Preparatory to this raid, and also as a blind to the two raids
described above, much wire had also been cut on this brigade front. In
spite of this, one of the parties was unable to effect an entry into the
enemy's trenches. The second party was, however, successful, but the
trench was found to be only lightly held. Two dug-outs were bombed, six
men were killed, and the 2nd Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment was
identified as still holding the line.
It had now become clear that if the Division was to be opposed in the
big attack by these Bavarians, it would meet an enemy who would offer
the maximum of resistance. It therefore was a matter of first importance
to ensure that the men fully understood that success would depend on the
speed with which they reached the enemy parapet after the barrage had
left. It may be said that there would be a race for success. While the
barrage was on the trench, the Bavarians would be on the dug-out step,
and the Highlanders would be waiting from seventy to a hundred yards
short of the trench. As the barrage lifted the race began. Would the
Bavarian reach his fire-step and open fire on the Highlanders, or would
the Highlanders reach the parapet and shoot the Bavarian down before he
could man his trenches?
The men learnt to appreciate this fact, and all developed the fixed
determination that they would stick close to the barrage whatever else
might happen. The result was that when the day came in the first phase
of the battle the issue was never in doubt.
The plan of the attack was as follows: A frontage of just over 3000
yards, gradually increasing up to 4000 yards, was allotted to the
Highland Division. The depth to which it was hoped the attack would be
carried was 5500 yards. The 152nd Infantry Brigade was to attack on the
right, the 154th Brigade on the left; on the right of the Division the
34th Division carried on the attack, and to the left the Canadian Corps.
The Highland Division was the left flank Division both of the XVIIth
Corps and of the Third Army.
The attack was divided up into three main objectives, known as: First
objective, the Black line; second objective, the Blue line; third
objective, the Brown line; while there was a further objective towards
which his attempts, if successful, were to be exploited, known as the
Green line.
Before reaching the Black line in all parts of the front, three lines,
and in some places four lines, of hostile trenches had to be overcome,
as well as numerous communication trenches which contained dug-outs.
Between the Black line and the Blue line, as far as the 152nd Brigade
was concerned, lay only two lines of trenches, of which one was in close
support to the other. In front of the 154th Brigade the country between
the Black and Blue lines was intersected by numerous communication
trenches, which led into a central redoubt. In addition, a heavily-wired
fire trench traversing the whole brigade front passed through this
redoubt.
In consequence, on the left there was little chance of a straightforward
attack behind the barrage being completely successful, as it could not
be accurately foreshadowed where, in the maze of trenches, resistance
was most likely to be met.
[Illustration: MAP IV.--CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE, 9TH APRIL 1917.]
Between the Blue line and the Black line there were no organised
defences, except the communication trenches and a few sections of
fire trench connecting one communication trench with another.
The Brown line itself consisted on the left of two heavily-wired fire
trenches containing numerous dug-outs. On the right, however, the work
had not been completed, and consisted of a section of unfinished fire
trench, with a deep sunken road running behind and parallel to it.
On the whole Divisional front the advance to the Blue line lay over a
considerable forward slope; beyond the Blue line it continued over a
large plateau, finally dropping down on to the Brown line on the reverse
slope beyond the plateau.
Prior to the attack a considerable amount of gas was employed against
the enemy. Livens projectors, a form of smoke which discharged a
cylinder of gas a considerable distance, were chiefly employed. On one
occasion on the Divisional front, Mr Livens, the inventor of these
projectors, observed their effect from an aeroplane.
Four-inch Stokes mortars were also extensively used for firing gas
bombs. In fact, the enemy was gassed on 4th April, 5th April, and 8th
April, over 600 drums of gas being discharged into the trenches.
The bombardment of the enemy's lines began in earnest on 4th April, and
from that date wire-cutting by the artillery and 2-inch trench-mortars
became intense. The trench-mortar batteries carried out their daily task
of wire-cutting with the greatest gallantry, as the Germans developed an
intense dislike to them, and retaliated on them heavily with artillery
whenever they opened fire.
On more than one occasion the artillery fired rehearsals of the creeping
barrage, which, as far as could be observed, were very accurate. These
practice barrages disclosed the fact that, as soon as they were opened,
the enemy could put down a heavy bombardment of 4·2 and 5·9 howitzers on
to our front line in about two minutes.
Some batteries of 9·45 mortars had also been placed in positions from
which they could deal with particular centres of resistance on the
German lines. It was when in charge of one of these mortars that
Sergeant Gosling, R.F.A., won the first Victoria Cross for the Division.
A mortar was fired, but the charge was faulty, and though the shell left
the gun, it fell only a few feet in front of the emplacement. Sergeant
Gosling immediately sprang from the emplacement, drew the shell from the
ground, into which it had buried its nose. He then unscrewed the fuze
and threw it away before it could detonate the shell. The fuze was set
for seventeen seconds, so that by the time Sergeant Gosling had reached
the shell and drawn it from the ground, it was a question of only a few
seconds before it would explode. The sergeant had, however, the presence
of mind to take a fuze-key from his pocket, unscrew the fuze, and thus
save the lives of the detachment.
The following day a shell landed in the emplacement and killed the
entire detachment, with the exception of Sergeant Gosling, who at the
time happened to be elsewhere.
About 1st April a high-velocity gun came into action against Marœuil,
with some most unfortunate results. One shell burst amongst a working
party of the 6th Black Watch as they were returning their tools at a
dump, killing and wounding some twenty of them.
On the evening before the battle a shell from this gun burst in a Nissen
hut used as a company officers' mess, and killed two and wounded two
officers from one company of the 5th Gordon Highlanders.
During the week before the battle some improvement had taken place in
the weather, and the condition of the ground was reasonably good for the
time of year.
In spite, however, of the improvement in the weather, the mortality
amongst horses, one of the features of the preparations for the Arras
battle, continued. Horses dead and dying, not from wounds but from
debility, were in these days one of the commonest sights. The horses of
the Division were in fairly good condition, and few of them were lost.
Those of army brigades of artillery and other units who had been in
action on the Somme during the winter were, however, in a pitiable
condition. The reduced rations which were then all that was available
were insufficient to keep horses in hard work fit, the results being
that they were in no condition to resist the effects of cold and mud. It
was no uncommon sight to see a horse in harness drop down and die from
sheer exhaustion, while the carcases of dead horses lay in numbers on
the sides of the roads and tracks.
Assembly began on 7th April, the night being fine with a bright moon. On
the right brigade front the relief was carried out without any delay.
This proved most fortunate, for at 4 A.M. the enemy put down an intense
barrage of 5·9's and 77's on the front of the right battalion. So heavy
was the bombardment of the communication trenches that, had this been
the night of the final assembly, the rearmost troops would probably have
been unable to reach the assembly trenches.
The enemy continued very active with his artillery all the following
day, obviously being in a suspicious frame of mind. When, therefore, the
hour for the completion of the assembly arrived, our artillery heavily
countered all his known battery positions with gas and high explosive,
with the result that the troops reached their positions without any
interference from his guns. Had the artillery not taken this precaution,
he would doubtless have repeated the bombardment of the previous night,
and greatly prejudiced the chances of success.
The arrangement of the assembly required careful planning. Seven double
waves were to be assembled for the attack; there was, in consequence,
little shell-proof cover in which to place the troops detailed for the
capture of the later objectives. Moreover, the trenches in the forward
area had been subjected to a considerable amount of artillery and
trench-mortar fire, and had thus become shallow and open-mouthed, and
afforded little cover to their occupants.
At least two double waves had, therefore, to remain in the open for some
considerable time before their turn to close up with the barrage
arrived, and were in consequence liable to suffer severely from the
enemy S.O.S. barrage.
On the right the 6th Gordon Highlanders and 6th Seaforth Highlanders,
and on the left the 9th Royal Scots and the 4th Seaforth Highlanders,
led the attack. The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders were detailed for the attack on the farther
objectives on their respective brigade areas. The 5th Gordon Highlanders
from the 153rd Brigade were allotted to the 152nd Brigade as a reserve.
On the extreme left of the attack the 4th Seaforth Highlanders had a
small but difficult operation to perform in the first instance. The
Divisional boundary on the left was the Lille Road, which crossed the
enemy's trench system at the apex of a prominent salient. The 4th
Seaforth Highlanders, opposite the southern shoulder of the salient, had
to attack due north, while the direction of attack for the remainder of
the Division was due east. The carrying out of this operation had to be
so timed that the salient had been dealt with before the succeeding
waves could move forward on to the attack on the German second and third
lines, otherwise they would have come under enfilade fire from their
left flank in the first stages of their advance.
By 4 A.M. on 9th April all troops were assembled. The bombardment had
continued through the previous day except during two intervals of half
an hour each, which were arranged to enable the Flying Corps to
photograph the results of the gun-fire.
It was maintained throughout the night, and at 5.30 A.M. the attack was
launched, supported by an intense artillery and machine-gun barrage.
Thus began an action which developed into a true soldiers' battle, in
which the Highland infantrymen fought the Bavarian for possession of the
field. Perfect as the artillery barrage was, the course of events was
such that in numerous instances, in all parts of the battle area, the
infantry from one cause or another were unable to keep up with it, and
fought out the issue with their own weapons.
On the left the 154th Brigade carried all their objectives as far as the
Black line, according to plan, though they were engaged in some stiff
fighting. The 4th Seaforth Highlanders carried out their initial
operation with complete success, and opened the way for the rest of the
advance, as had been arranged.
The 152nd Brigade, however, met with difficulties from the start. The
6th Gordon Highlanders, attacking the trenches they had raided, reached
all their objectives behind the barrage. On their left the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders experienced some heavy fighting both in the second and third
German lines. Indeed, so strong was the resistance encountered by the
6th Seaforth Highlanders that when the 5th Seaforth Highlanders
attempted to advance through them to form up under the barrage, they
found them still engaged with the enemy. The 5th Seaforth Highlanders
had no other alternative than to join in the mêlée and help to clear the
ground for their own advance.
The German fought magnificently, and was well supported by his
artillery. In front of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders he had evacuated his
front line, and was thus able to bombard it without danger to his own
troops. In consequence, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders suffered some
casualties from shell-fire before they reached their second and third
objectives.
The casualties thus sustained caused gaps in the attacking waves, which
enabled the enemy to man his machine-guns effectively after the barrage
had passed.
Each machine-gun that thus came into action required a separate minor
operation on the part of the infantry to subdue it.
The following figures, compiled by General Burn, illustrate the nature
of the fighting:--
"The 6th Seaforth Highlanders lost 326 officers and men in capturing
the Black line.
"One company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders detailed to capture the
Blue line suffered 90 casualties before reaching the Black line.
"A second company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, detailed for the
Blue line, had used all its rifle grenades before reaching the Black
line.
"Only one officer of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, detailed for the
capture of the Blue line, reached it; the remainder were all either
killed or wounded."
It will thus be seen that in the centre success was only achieved by the
gallantry and determination of the officers and men engaged.
Two tanks had been allotted to the Division to assist the infantry
advance, but they were both out of action before they had reached the
leading infantry, and so did not in any way contribute to the success of
the attack.
The advance of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and of the 8th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders had been considerably interfered with in an
unexpected manner. As the troops for the Blue line were crossing the
Black line, an enormous explosion occurred. As a result a number of men
were buried and several killed in both battalions. It was assumed that
the Germans must have intentionally exploded a Minenwerfer bomb store,
as shortly after the explosion six Germans voluntarily emerged from a
dug-out. These men were assumed to have been responsible for this
disaster, and were immediately killed.
Eight hours and forty-eight minutes after the attack had been launched
the 152nd Brigade had captured the whole of the Blue line, and were in
touch in it with the 154th Brigade.
On the 154th Brigade front, though the Blue line was captured throughout
the front, the fighting had been severe. The 4th Gordon Highlanders had
sustained such serious losses in their fight for the Swischen Stellung
that, in consequence, their two remaining companies were sent forward to
consolidate the Blue line.
Meanwhile the Canadians on the left hand had been completely successful
in their advance, and were pushing on exactly according to plan, while
the 34th Division on the right was also reported to be holding the Blue
line.
The capture of this line had been most materially assisted by the
initiative of Captain Saulez of "D" Battery, 64th Brigade R.F.A. He
observed from his observation-post a German machine-gun in action at the
junction of a communication trench and the Blue line, holding off the
infantry advance. He therefore telephoned to his own battery, and turned
a section of howitzers from firing on the barrage on to the machine-gun.
By this means he put the gun out of action, and enabled the infantry to
continue their advance. Captain Saulez' shooting was admirable, and his
action undoubtedly saved the infantry from many casualties.
Unfortunately, he was himself killed in the later stages of this battle,
a shell bursting in a trench shelter in which he was lying.
At 3.15 P.M. the enemy was turned out of a line known as Regiment Weg,
which ran in rear of the Blue line opposite the 152nd Brigade front.
Meanwhile the 154th Brigade had pushed on towards the Brown line, and
were reported to have reached Tommy Trench at 1.40 P.M.
After the capture of the Regiment Weg, the 152nd Brigade were unable to
continue their advance, as they were held up by Germans holding Elect
Trench, which was situated about half-way between the Blue and Brown
lines.
At 6.30 P.M. a message was received that the 154th Brigade had reached
the Brown line, and were in touch with the Canadians at Commandant's
House. At the same time the 34th Division reported that they were not in
the Brown line. Orders were therefore issued for the 152nd Brigade and
the 103rd Infantry Brigade of the 34th Division to assault the Brown
line under cover of darkness.
The 5th Gordon Highlanders, who had been placed at the disposal of the
152nd Brigade, were detailed for this attack.
It was carried out at 5 A.M., and was a complete success. In conjunction
with troops of the 103rd Brigade (34th Division), two companies of the
5th Gordon Highlanders advanced in a double wave, each rank being
extended to ten paces. The attack was planned to be in the nature of a
surprise, and was therefore not accompanied by an artillery barrage. The
whole of the objective was captured. Some thirty dead Germans were found
in the position, and fifty or more prisoners were captured in a redoubt
known as the Maison de la Côté by the 103rd Brigade.
A curious situation now arose, as the 5th Gordon Highlanders on the
Brown line could not get into touch on their left with the 154th
Brigade. In fact, they were continuously being fired on with rifles and
machine-guns from the Brown line to the north of them.
It subsequently transpired that the officer of the 154th Brigade who had
reported that he was holding the Brown line was really in Tommy Trench,
several hundred yards west of the Brown line, which was still occupied
by the enemy on the 154th Brigade front.
General Hamilton therefore ordered the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders to initiate bombing attacks against each flank of the Brown
line. These and subsequent attacks were, however, all held up by heavy
machine-gun fire.
Later the 5th Gordon Highlanders made an attempt to rush a machine-gun
post in front of the Brown line, which was located on a small knoll on
their left flank urgently required for purposes of observation. By this
time, however, snow had fallen, and men moving above ground had become
highly visible, with the result that the enterprise failed, two
sergeants and an officer being killed.
This battalion had been most unfortunate. It had not only lost four
officers of one company at Marœuil, as already described, but it had
also two officers killed by a chance shell in Roclincourt on the morning
of the 9th. In addition, the company commander who led the night attack
on the Brown line was killed, while in this last operation yet another
officer was killed.
The 7th Gordon Highlanders were now moved into the forward area, and one
company was placed under the orders of the 5th Gordon Highlanders. This
company took over from the 103rd Brigade on the night of 10-11th April
from the frontage between the Maison de la Côté and the railway.
By this time snow lay thick over the battlefield, with the result that
the whole terrain was transformed. Familiar landmarks and tracks had
disappeared, and it had become a matter of considerable difficulty for
officers and men to recognise their position on the ground. On the night
of the 11-12th orders were received that the heavy artillery would cut
the wire in front of the Brown line, and that the 154th Brigade would
then renew the attack behind a creeping barrage and assisted by a tank.
The 5th Gordon Highlanders and 152nd Machine-Gun Company were ordered to
assist this attack by flanking fire. It was also decided to send forward
Stokes guns to the front line held by the 5th Gordon Highlanders to
bombard the Brown line from a flank. Captain Amos of the 152nd
Trench-Mortar Battery therefore went forward to select suitable gun
positions, and found that the enemy were no longer holding the Brown
line on the immediate left flank of the 5th Gordon Highlanders.
Shortly afterwards, one of the Divisional observers, Corporal Mitchell
of the 6th Gordon Highlanders, reported that he had made his way into
the Brown line, and that it was unoccupied. He had found the electric
light still burning in the dug-outs, packs and equipment neatly stacked,
and unopened parcels and unfinished meals lying on the tables. Patrols
from the 154th Brigade also returned with similar reports.
The Brown line was then occupied without opposition, and the 9th Royal
Scots and the 7th Gordon Highlanders pushed forward towards the railway.
On the night of 11-12th April the 2nd Division relieved the Highland
Division in an intense blizzard.
So ended the first phase of the battle of Arras.
The Division had finally reached all its objectives after some Homeric
fighting. The losses had been heavy, but not heavier than an attack
against so formidable a position held by such expert fighters would lead
one to expect. Numbers of the enemy had been killed, and many hundreds
taken prisoners. Large captures were also made of machine-guns,
trench-mortars, and material and equipment; while on the whole battle
front several Bavarian Divisions had been knocked out.
In fact, the blow sustained by the enemy had been so great that after
the relief the 2nd Division were able to carry out a substantial advance
and occupy the village of Bailleul unopposed.
On 12th April Divisional headquarters opened at Hermaville. The troops
were, however, given a bare forty-eight hours in which to rest, clean
up, refit, and reorganise before they were again called upon.