THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES.
On 7th June the Division arrived in the neighbourhood of Eperleques,
near St Omer, the 152nd, 153rd, 154th Brigades being allotted the
Tilques, Houlle, and Nordausque areas respectively. This district was a
properly constituted training area, administered by the headquarters of
the Second Army, in which troops were allowed full liberty of manœuvre,
and in which there were no restrictions as regards the digging of
practice trenches, &c. Moreover, it contained first-class classification
ranges up to 600 yards in length, with all the necessary appliances.
This was the first occasion on which the Division had occupied an area
in which adequate arrangements for training existed.
Musketry was vigorously continued, and competitions were organised,
which showed that the shooting had considerably improved, as, indeed, it
was bound to do where facilities for practice were available.
In addition, the tactical training of the Division advanced another
stage. It had frequently been exercised in the attack behind the
barrage, and in the consolidation of a captured position, and could be
relied upon to perform these two tasks well. The Divisional commander,
therefore, next concentrated on training the platoons how to overcome
local resistance by the aid of their own fire power.
Each platoon was taught that, if it came under the fire of a machine-gun
or a pocket of riflemen, it was useless to lie halted in the zone of the
hostile fire, and that by engaging the point of resistance frontally by
one or more sections the remainder under cover of their fire could work
round to the flank and overcome it.
In the light of subsequent events, it turned out that no form of
training could have been more appropriate, as the salient feature of the
third battle of Ypres proved to be the concrete pill-box, impervious to
the field-artillery barrage, which in many cases could only be subdued
by the individual action of the platoons opposed to it.
The successful manner in which, as will be seen, the Division overcame
the pill-boxes can be directly ascribed to this form of training.
On 12th June the 51st was transferred to the XVIIIth Corps, and on the
15th General Harper was informed by the Corps commander, General Sir F.
I. Maxse, that the Division would shortly occupy a portion of the Ypres
salient, from which it would take part in a great attack.
The situation in the salient as summarised in the commander-in-chief's
despatch was as follows: "The positions held by us in the Ypres salient
since May 1915 were far from satisfactory. They were completely
overlooked by the enemy; their defence involved a considerable strain
on the troops occupying them, and they were certain to be costly
to maintain against a serious attack, in which the enemy would
enjoy all the advantages in observation and in the placing of his
artillery. Our positions would be much improved by the capture of
the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge and of the high ground which extends
north-eastwards for some seven miles, and then turns north through
Broodseinde and Passchendaele."
In operations beginning on 7th June the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge had
been captured, so that at this date, 15th June, the capture of the
Passchendaele Ridge remained as the ultimate objective to be attained.
The front allotted to the Division lay due north of Ypres. It was not a
pleasant sector, as, in spite of the capture of Messines, the salient
still remained sufficiently pronounced for shells to arrive in the
front-line trenches from the right rear.
The trenches, such as they were, consisted of breastworks. The front
line in some places did not afford cover from view, while in others the
thistles and wild mustard on the parapet had been allowed to grow so
high that men on the fire-steps could not see over them.
The support line consisted of a few earthworks, resembling grouse butts,
and fortified farms, while the reserve line was composed almost entirely
of the latter.
There were about half a dozen shell-proof dug-outs in the Divisional
sector, one at Turco Farm and one at the Willows, both having to be
abandoned owing to the shell-fire they attracted. The C.R.E. reported on
these dug-outs: "They are shelled extremely heavily always on the
slightest provocation and often with none." Two other dug-outs, one at
Lancashire Farm and one at Foch Farm, were good, and were retained as
battalion headquarters.
About 2000 yards behind the front line ran the Canal de l'Yser. In the
banks of this canal lived a large population--reserve companies,
battalion headquarters, pioneers, sappers, R.A.M.C., and brigade
headquarters. There was hardly a square yard of the canal bank
unoccupied. This vast population lived in every type of non-shell-proof
residence, from splinter-proof elephant shelters to the worse kind of
"Bairnsfather" shack, which did not even keep out the rain.
As regards the enemy's defences, nothing could be seen beyond his front
line. This was sited on the crest of a small rise known as the High
Command Redoubt, which, though its height was really insignificant,
owing to the flatness of the surrounding country, overlooked the whole
of the British trench system as far as the canal bank. The only other
feature in the enemy's lines which could be observed were the tops of
the trees of Kitchener's Wood.
In the preparations for the attack three separate factors required
consideration--a tangled mass of derelict trenches and earthworks had to
be transformed into a jumping-off place for a great battle; the troops
had to be trained to attack a position that they could not see; the
artillery had to cut countless belts of wire that could not be observed
from the ground.
As regards the first problem, the Division was fortunate in having
acquired as its C.R.E. Lieut.-Colonel J. Gibson Fleming, D.S.O., R.E.
Lieut.-Colonel C. F. Rundle, D.S.O., who had been transferred as C.R.E.
to an Army Corps, had been succeeded at the end o£ 1916 by
Lieut.-Colonel H. W. Weekes, D.S.O., who in his turn had gone sick.
Colonel Fleming then joined the Division just before the battle of
Arras, but almost on the day of his arrival was wounded by a premature
from one of our own guns. He, however, returned to duty in time to
organise the work on the consolidation of the chemical works, and to
arrange the pontoon ferries on the river Scarpe.
Colonel Fleming was not only possessed of untiring physical energy
himself, but he had in a great degree the faculty of instilling energy
into others. He was, in fact, adept at what can best be described as
"getting a move on." To him was entrusted the responsibility of
preparing the Divisional sector for the coming operation, and for this
purpose he moved, on 15th June, with the three field companies, R.E.,
and the 8th Royal Scots to a camp just north-east of Poperinghe.
The Royal Engineers and pioneers, and similarly the Divisional
artillery, were seldom allowed the same periods of rest out of the line
as the infantry. It is true that they did not suffer the same number of
casualties as the infantry, as they were not required actually to
accompany the advancing waves in the attack; but they carried on for
long periods in the line during active operations with little or no
opportunity of settling down to a period of comfortable quarters and of
facilities for training.
Owing to the wet nature of the ground, it was decided that the digging
of assembly trenches could not be undertaken. Work was therefore
concentrated on building up the front line to give cover from view, and,
as far as labour would permit, on the construction of a parados to it.
Battalion battle headquarters were constructed immediately behind the
front line, elephant shelters sunk flush into the ground with a strong
burster course of broken stone on the top of them being used. The
communication trenches were improved to give covered access to the front
line, and, where necessary, were diverted to avoid particularly shelled
areas such as Turco Farm. As the daily bombardments of our lines became
more intense, the trenches were continually being blown in, and the work
of repairing them became increasingly heavy.
In addition to this work, accommodation had to be provided for the
maximum number of men in the canal bank. Unfortunately, the canal area
allotted to this Division contained the high-level broad-gauge railway
causeway and the low-level causeway adjacent to Bridge 4, both of which
excited great interest and attracted very heavy shelling from the
Boches, who made every endeavour to destroy them by bombardment. Bridge
4 was broken so frequently that in July it was decided that it could not
be kept open for wheeled traffic, and that the low-level causeway alone
would have to be used. Both banks of the canal in the vicinity of these
causeways were involved in these bombardments, with the result that much
of the work expended on the erection of shelters was destroyed.
During the whole of this period, two field companies, R.E., and the 8th
Royal Scots lived in the canal bank, subjected to heavy and continuous
shelling, including a lavish use of gas. Throughout the month of July
there was barely a single evening in which they were not heavily
bombarded.
As regards the preparation of the troops for the attack, it can safely
be said that no troops have been given a better opportunity of training
for a particular operation than was the Highland Division in this
instance.
General Maxse, the Corps commander, took the greatest interest in the
training, visiting each brigade and lecturing to all the officers. Large
training areas were hired, and so that officers and men might form some
impression of the German position, which they could not see, a large
model was made, about the size of four tennis courts, in which hills,
valleys, streams, houses, roads, woods, trenches, &c., were all
accurately represented by models. Platforms were then erected at
intervals round it, from which officers could point out to their men the
appearance of the area which they would traverse during the operations.
In some battalions each platoon made similar models in the orchards
round their billets, showing all the features in the area allotted to
their companies for the attack.
An exact replica of the German trenches was also marked out with
tracing-tapes on the training ground full size, in which every known
trench and farm was represented. The troops were then practised on this
course until they could find their way to their objectives according to
plan, without any officers taking part in the exercise. The men were
also carefully trained in the manner in which each post was to dig
itself in during consolidation, and how to pile the earth as it was
excavated, so that it at no time obscured their field of fire to their
front.
The attack was not delivered until 31st July, so that the Division was
given six weeks in which to make its preparations. During this period
the plans for the operation, as well as the training of the troops, were
perfected down to the minutest details.
In consequence, when the day arrived there was a feeling of confidence
in all ranks that, providing the artillery could effectively cut the
numerous wire entanglements and that the weather was reasonably good,
nothing could prevent them from reaching their objectives. Indeed, with
six weeks to prepare for the capture of a limited objective, had it been
otherwise the Division would have been greatly at fault.
On 22nd June the 152nd and 153rd Brigades moved to the St Momelin and
Lederzeele training areas respectively, and Divisional headquarters to
Lederzeele. On the night 22-23rd June the 153rd Brigade took over the
Divisional front from the 29th Division, remaining under the command of
the G.O.C. of that Division.
The sector at first was reasonably quiet; but as the preparations for
the attack began to come to the enemy's notice, his activity increased
daily, and finally became intense.
There were two areas in particular to which the enemy artillery paid
constant attention: the first was the belt of country running from
behind Turco Farm to behind Lancashire Farm, known as the Willows; the
second was the canal bank. The bombardment of these two areas was both
frequent and violent, and it was often impossible for parties of men to
pass through them without running the risk of suffering serious
casualties. As the German was at this time fairly active in the air, he
could direct his artillery to good purpose. As a result, the crowded
canal banks received a large daily ration of shell of all calibres up to
11-inch. The casualties were heavy, and there were several unfortunate
cases of heavy shells bursting within crowded shelters and destroying
all their inmates. In fact, the canal bank at times became almost a
shambles, and as an unhealthy residence was only surpassed by the Happy
Valley in the days of High Wood.
During one of these daily bombardments of this area, a shell burst in
the doorway of the headquarters dug-out of the 5th Gordon Highlanders
near Turco Farm. Fragments from the back-blast of the shell came in
through the doorway, killing 2nd Lieutenant A. S. Milne of the 5th
Gordon Highlanders, and wounding four trench-mortar officers who were
holding a conference there, including Captain Gillespie, the Divisional
trench-mortar officer.
In this period the enemy also considerably developed his activity with
high-velocity guns and with aerial bombing, the hutted camps in rear of
the trench area, in which the reserve battalions were accommodated,
Poperinghe, and the various dumps, all receiving an increasing ration of
bombs and high-velocity shells. The value of this form of activity was
at once evident, as by a careful employment of high-velocity guns and
aircraft, it can be ensured that troops resting behind the line are
denied a reasonable night's sleep, and their efficiency can in this
manner be considerably impaired.
On 8th July Divisional headquarters moved to a camp in rear of the
trench area, and the G.O.C. 51st Division took over command of the line.
While the 152nd and 153rd Brigades were carrying out their tour-of duty
in the line, little change in the situation took place, beyond the
introduction of mustard-gas by the enemy. This was the most diabolical
form of gas produced during the war. Death from its fumes was a
prolonged agony ending in suffocation. Post-mortem examinations of its
victims revealed the fact that all their organs from the throat to the
abdomen were ulcerated throughout. The health of men who survived its
effects was often permanently impaired, while externally, particularly
in those portions of the body where perspiration is most profuse, the
gas raised large blisters, which gradually chafed into open sores.
Fortunately, the British mask was found to be absolutely proof against
the effects of this gas. It was, however, found to be most persistent in
its effects; the liquid contained in the shells became absorbed in the
earth and continued vaporising for many hours. As a result, men who were
working or living in an area that had been gas-shelled were often
infected by the fumes many hours after the shelling had subsided. In
some Divisions in the Ypres sector casualties from mustard-gas reached
alarming proportions.
After the 154th Brigade had taken over the line, the character of the
enemy's activity changed for the worse. He continued his constant
bombardments of the canal bank, and at the same time persistently
shelled the forward area, no doubt in the hope that he might knock out
any attack that was impending by overwhelming the troops with shell-fire
in their assembly trenches.
Some of those bombardments were of great violence, on one occasion 200
trench-mortar bombs being fired into the trenches on one battalion
front.
On 28th July a Chinese attack was carried out at 5 A.M. by the
Divisional artillery. A Chinese attack consists in passing a moving
18-pounder barrage across the enemy's trenches exactly as if an attack
had begun, except that no infantry take part. The troops in the front
line make a considerable noise and hoist dummies on to the fire-step.
The German sentries then give the alarm, and as soon as the barrage has
passed the garrisons leave their shelters and man their fire-steps. The
barrage is then suddenly brought back on to the trenches, and is upon
the Germans before they have time to regain their shelters. This is
excellent medicine, and after he has been treated to a Chinese attack
two or three times, the enemy rather hesitates to man his fire-steps
immediately the barrage has passed. Thus, when the day of attack
arrives, our infantry, if they can keep close on the heels of the
barrage, have an excellent opportunity of "chopping him in cover." The
exposure of the dummies, which have the appearance of troops mounting
the parapet, also compels him to disclose the position of his
machine-guns, which he normally keeps secret until an infantry attack
has begun.
By July 15 each infantry brigade had carried out a tour of duty in the
line, so that officers and men had all been given an opportunity of
studying the area from which the attack was to be launched. On that date
the infantry was therefore all relieved and moved back for training,
though the command of the sector still remained in General Harper's
hands.
As regards the area to be attacked, the width of frontage allotted to
the Division was slightly over 1400 yards. The enemy's defences
consisted of a front system, including front, support, and reserve line
trenches, some 300-500 yards in depth, supported by fortified farms and
concrete blockhouses.
About 800 yards in rear of the front system lay a deeply wired line of
trenches, supported in front and rear by more fortified farms and
blockhouses. This line was known to the Germans as the Stutzpunkt line.
To the rear, again, lay further numerous blockhouses and fortified
farms. In all cases the blockhouses, as opposed to the farms, which were
marked on the map, were not known to exist until they were actually
encountered during the operations.
At a distance varying from 1500 to 2000 yards in rear of the Stutzpunkt
line lay the Steenbeek, a river which in normal conditions, such as on
the morning of the battle, was fordable, but which was liable after rain
to rise suddenly and become a serious obstacle, as it did on the
afternoon of the battle.
One thousand five hundred yards beyond the Steenbeek lay a
strongly-wired line known as the Langemarck-Gheluvelt line.
From the High Command Redoubt in the German front system the ground
falls gradually down to the Steenbeek with no pronounced irregularities.
Immediately in rear of the Stutzpunkt line and just east of the
Divisional right boundary, lay a large copse, Kitchener's Wood, while
the whole area was dotted throughout with numerous spinneys and small
orchards.
The main objective of the Division, known as the Green line, was the
river Steenbeek, but two companies were detailed to cross the river
after its capture and establish bridgeheads on the northern bank, the
actual distance to be traversed by the troops detailed for the capture
of these bridgeheads being 2600 yards on the right, and 3200 yards on
the left.
[Illustration: MAP VI. THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES: ADVANCE TO THE STEENBEEK,
31ST JULY 1917.]
The attack was divided into four stages, three definite intermediate
objectives being selected. These were:--
First objective--the Blue line. This included the enemy's front system.
Second objective--the Black line. The Stutzpunkt line, with its
supporting farms and blockhouses.
Third objective--the Green line. The line of the river Steenbeek.
Fourth objective--one company post at Mon du Rasta, 200 yards beyond the
Steenbeek, on the right front; and one company post on the military
road, a similar distance beyond the river, on the left front.
In actually defining the objective lines on the map, the question of the
various farm buildings to be encountered had to be taken into
consideration. It was not known whether the enemy had incorporated them
into his system of defence. However, to leave nothing to chance, it was
assumed that this had been the case, and, further, that they had been
fortified with concrete.
It was therefore decided to arrange the attack so that all farm
buildings not more than 200 yards in advance of the main objectives
should be assaulted under the barrage without any pause after the
capture of each objective. It was thus ensured that no bodies of the
enemy would be left undealt with who might interfere with the troops
forming up for the assault of the next subsequent objective, and
disorganise the attack by their fire before the troops were properly
under way. Thus in front of each main objective a dotted line was drawn
on the map including all such farms, &c. These lines were known as the
Blue outpost line and the Black outpost line.
The assumption that the farms had been fortified with concrete was
confirmed on 29th July by Lieutenant F. C. Jack, R.F.A., who, with an
orderly, carried out a daring reconnaissance in broad daylight. This
officer penetrated into the German lines in two places for about 200
yards depth, and reported that Hindenburg Farm and some other farms were
apparently still undestroyed. As they had been hit repeatedly by heavy
howitzer shells and much damaged externally, it was evident that
concrete had been used in large quantities.
The Division attacked on a two-brigade front, the 152nd Brigade being on
the right and the 153rd on the left. Each brigade attacked on a
two-battalion front, the leading battalions taking as far as the Blue
line inclusive, the remaining two battalions taking up to the Green
line.
In this attack Lieut.-Colonel H. G. Hyslop, D.S.O., commanding 7th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, commanded the 153rd Infantry Brigade.
On 17th May 1917, Brigadier-General D. Campbell, C.B., after having
commanded the 153rd Brigade in the field for over two years, had
returned home for a well-earned period of rest. General Campbell will
always be remembered by those who served with him for his unfailing
courtesy to all, and for the evenness of his temperament, no matter how
adverse the circumstances. With his departure the Division lost the last
of its earliest Brigadiers who had guided it through its infancy and
adolescence.
General Campbell was succeeded by Brigadier-General Alistair Gordon,
C.M.G., D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders. General Gordon had been seriously
wounded in the early days of the war, and had, after his recovery, been
employed as a Brigadier-General on the Staff at the War Office. In the
short period that he served with the Division, it became evident that
had he survived a distinguished career would have awaited him.
On the day before the battle General Gordon and his brigade-major, Hugh
Lean of the Highland Light Infantry, while walking round the trenches,
were struck by the same shell, Lean being killed and General Gordon
mortally wounded.
Lean had always been unlucky. Very early in the war he had been severely
wounded, for a time losing his sight. At Arras he received a severe
scalp wound from the same shell that killed the brigade intelligence
officer with whom he was walking. He, however, gallantly remained at
duty. In his next tour in the line he was struck a severe blow on the
elbow by the nose-cap of a bursting shell, but again remained at duty.
A few days before going into the line on the last occasion, in
conversation he expressed a definite opinion that he would be killed in
the coming operations, as indeed he was.
Colonel Hyslop, who at the last moment assumed command of the 153rd
Brigade, had been the first regimental officer to land in France with
the Expeditionary Force, and had the unique record of having served with
a battalion continuously from the date of landing.
Opposed to the Highland Division, and holding a slightly more extended
front, was the 23rd (Reserve) Saxon Division, in process of being
relieved by the 3rd Guards Division. The Guards had already taken over
the rear lines up to the Black line, and were actually carrying out the
relief of the front systems when the attack was launched. The enemy held
the trenches with four battalions from the front line to the river
Steenbeek inclusive, and with five battalions in reserve north of the
Steenbeek.
For this attack the Divisional artillery was reinforced by the two
brigades of the 11th Divisional artillery and by two army brigades, the
77th and the 282nd. These six brigades were divided into two groups of
three brigades each, one group under the command of Lieut.-Colonel L. M.
Dyson, D.S.O., covering the 152nd Brigade; the other, under the command
of Lieut.-Colonel M. M. Duncan, C.M.G., covering the 153rd. A brigade of
artillery covered each of the four battalion frontages, while the
remaining brigade in each group covered the whole brigade front. This
plan gave one 18-pounder gun to every twelve and a half yards of the
front.
One hundred and twelve machine-guns were available for this attack, as a
fourth machine-gun company, the 232nd, had now joined the Division, and
forty-eight guns from the 11th Division were also placed at the disposal
of the 51st. Of these, sixty-four fired three successive barrages,
covering the ground in front of the Blue, Black, and Green lines.
Sixteen were placed under the orders of the Brigadiers for purposes of
consolidation, and thirty-two were kept in reserve.
As the attack was launched 206 drums of burning oil were projected from
mortars on the enemy's support and reserve lines, while to discourage
the enemy further 150 shells filled with thermite were thrown at Fort
Caledonia in the German reserve line three minutes after zero. There
seemed to be rather a mediæval touch about the employment of drums of
burning oil; but according to the statements of prisoners who
experienced it, it appeared to have been as effective as ever.
One squadron of the 1st King Edward's Horse and eight fighting tanks,
with one supply tank, were also placed at the disposal of the Divisional
commander.
The artillery had begun the cutting of the enemy wire on the 16th July,
and for a fortnight were firing with great intensity, their average
daily expenditure being 3500 rounds by the 18-pounders, 1000 rounds by
the 4·5 howitzers, and 400 rounds by the 2-inch trench-mortars.
Naturally this great activity on the part of the gunners drew
considerable retaliation from the enemy; nevertheless, they carried out
their task with a precision that was little short of amazing when the
fact is taken into account that they had to work entirely by aerial
observation.
The concentration of the troops in the assembly trenches was a matter
which required elaborate arrangements. On the night of the 28-29th the
two brigades took over their battle fronts each with four companies,
the remainder of the troops moving up to the trenches on the night
before the battle. "To ensure secrecy, it was impossible, owing to
the enemy's activity in the air, to move from the camps in which the
brigades were assembled before 8.30 P.M. There was thus barely time for
the attacking force to arrive in its position of deployment before zero
hour. It was therefore necessary to eliminate by careful arrangement
all likely causes of delay. To avoid loss of direction, overland routes
to the entrances of the communication trenches were marked out by
stakes and tapes. Men who had been made familiar with these routes were
employed as guides. Police were also posted at all junctions of tracks
and of trenches, to ensure that in the event of gas being encountered
the men would adjust their respirators as quickly as possible and
continue their march. The troops were also instructed that in no
circumstances was the march to the position of deployment to be delayed
by enemy action. Previous to the attack this march had been rehearsed
in the dark by bodies of troops both with and without respirators, so
that it could be ensured, in selecting the zero hour, sufficient time
was allowed for the operation. A hot meal was issued at the place of
assembly, and soup and tea were issued from hot-food containers at the
positions of deployment."[7]
These arrangements proved adequate. The hostile artillery was
exceptionally quiet, and the assembly was completed without incident.
At 3.50 A.M., 31st July, the third battle of Ypres opened. At that hour
the sky was covered with clouds, and in consequence there was little
natural light. However, the burning oil thrown on the enemy lines by the
trench-mortars at zero hour illuminated the whole front. The troops had
little difficulty in forming up under the barrage, except that the
numerous water-filled shell-holes made the maintenance of direction and
of proper extensions no easy matter. The going was also very heavy.
The enemy's artillery did not open in reply to our barrage for some ten
minutes, and fell on and in rear of the old British front line. The
leading battalions were, from right to left, the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders, the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the 7th Gordon
Highlanders, the 7th Black Watch. These four battalions advanced to the
Blue line without a check. The trenches were found to have been almost
obliterated by the artillery. Some of the farms had been so demolished
by shell-fire that they could not be located until the sun was above the
horizon. The gunners had, indeed, carried out their tasks.
Points of resistance being scattered rather promiscuously about the
area, in the half-light it did not always happen that the German
garrisons were dealt with immediately as the barrage lifted. The Jocks,
however, in this and in their next battle, were at the very top of their
form, and showed extraordinary initiative. Whenever a point of
resistance disclosed itself, it was attacked immediately by the troops
in its vicinity with great dash--not, however, by wild frontal expensive
charges, but by the skilful use of ground and their weapons, in
accordance with their training. In fact, as infantry fighters they
completely outclassed the Germans, and by using their Lewis guns and
rifle grenades with considerable effect they promptly swamped every
party of the enemy which opposed them.
In the two attacks carried out by the Division in the third battle of
Ypres, the Germans, in spite of the strength of their defences and of
the splendid resistance they offered, utterly failed to prevent the
Jocks from reaching their final objective. It was no doubt on this
account that they published the fact that at this time they considered
the 51st the most formidable Division on the Western Front.
In the advance to the Blue line the 7th Gordon Highlanders had probably
the most serious minor encounter in the capture of Hindenburg Farm.
Under cover of rifle grenades and Lewis guns the farm was captured, ten
Germans being killed and wounded, and an officer and twenty-two men
being captured. The 7th Black Watch were opposed by the remnants of a
more elaborate trench system than other units, but they swept through
them with "unco precision," and reached their objective with the other
battalions.
The Blue line was thus captured according to plan, and consolidation was
well advanced before the troops detailed for the capture of the Black
line passed through it on their way to form up under the barrage.
By 5.15 A.M. orders were given for two batteries to move forward to more
advanced positions.
So far some 400 casualties had been sustained, including 3 officers
killed and 8 wounded. Many of the enemy were killed in the assault, or
found lying dead in their trenches, and some 100 prisoners had been
taken.
In the advance to the Black line after the capture of the Blue line, the
character of the fighting changed. Up to this point the attack had been
directed against a trench system badly damaged by shell-fire and only
thinly held.
From the Blue line onwards the enemy was in greater strength, and his
system of defences was mainly composed of isolated fortified farms and
of reinforced concrete blockhouses with double walls, cellars, and wide
machine-gun loopholes. The Black line had been so seriously damaged by
the artillery that it did not in itself present a serious obstacle; on
the other hand, the concreted farms and blockhouses were almost intact.
These were particularly troublesome between the Black line and the Black
support line.
In this phase of the advance the condition of the ground was appalling,
the movements of the infantry being seriously handicapped by the mud,
which made it impossible for them to move out of a walk.
The order of battle of the troops detailed for the capture of the Black
and Green lines from right to left was as follows: 6th Gordon
Highlanders, 6th Seaforth Highlanders, 5th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Black
Watch.
On the right the 6th Gordon Highlanders reached the Black line with
little difficulty. A machine-gun in rear of Ascot Cottage checked the
advance for a short time; the infantry, however, hailed a passing tank,
which joined in the action, the cottage being carried and twelve Germans
being killed or captured.
Similarly the 6th Seaforth Highlanders captured the Black line behind
the barrage except in the neighbourhood of Macdonald's Farm and
Macdonald's Wood. Here a considerable engagement took place. Two
platoons, whose real objective was the northern edge of Macdonald's
Wood, first tackled the farm; while a platoon of the 6th Gordon
Highlanders, which had been ordered to the Black line to gain touch with
the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, realising the situation, joined in the
fight and engaged the enemy in Macdonald's Wood with enfilade rifle and
machine-gun fire. Tank G 50 also arrived, and promptly fired six shells
into Macdonald's Farm. These shells, arriving in company with a storm of
bullets and rifle grenades, proved too much for the Germans, who
surrendered. Seventy prisoners were taken, many dead lay round the farm,
and a 4.2 howitzer and two machine-guns were captured.
On other parts of the front of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders between the
Black and the Black outpost lines some fighting took place, and much
gallantry was displayed. In one instance two privates captured four
Germans and a machine-gun which had been firing on their platoon, one of
the privates alone killing six Germans in the process. This battalion
also cleverly captured Canister Trench, a trench running at right angles
to the line of advance. A half-platoon entered it at each end, and then
fought along it until they met in the middle, having wiped out its
entire garrison.
The 6th Black Watch on the left of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders had
severe fighting in clearing the Black and Black outpost lines. Of the
battalions engaged on the Divisional front, the 6th Black Watch
sustained most casualties, 9 officers and 292 other ranks. This
battalion had suffered considerably in the half-hour before zero while
lying assembled immediately in rear of the old British front line, and
again while waiting for the barrage to move forward from in front of the
Black outpost line. In this position the men were swept by a
machine-gun firing from Gournier Farm. Accordingly, when the barrage
lifted, No. 1 platoon made at once for this farm. By working round its
flanks from shell-hole to shell-hole they rounded it up, taking two
machine-guns and twenty prisoners, and later a field-gun. By 6.40 A.M.
the Black outpost line was captured on the whole battalion front.
The 5th Gordon Highlanders met no defended farms during their advance to
the Black line, but machine-guns had been posted in front of the line in
strong concrete emplacements. These were vigorously assailed, and by the
skill and gallantry of the men were speedily silenced. In one of these
encounters 2nd Lieutenant Maitland, commanding "C" Company, performed a
conspicuous act of bravery. Seeing a machine-gun firing from a
shell-hole, he advanced alone, moving from shell-hole to shell-hole
until he had worked round to the flank of the gun. He then rushed into
the emplacement, shot two of the team, and clubbed a third with the
butt-end of his rifle, capturing the gun. This officer was,
unfortunately, shortly afterwards wounded.
Severe fighting occurred on the right flank of the 5th Gordon
Highlanders, where a pocket of Germans resisted stubbornly. Lieutenant
J. Rutherford, adjutant of the 6th Black Watch, seeing that the advance
was checked at this point, organised the troops at hand, both Black
Watch and Gordon Highlanders, and, supported by a Stokes mortar,
advanced from shell-hole to shell-hole against the flank of the Germans.
The troops held up meanwhile opened a heavy fire on the enemy, who,
seeing themselves engaged both frontally and from a flank, gave up the
contest and surrendered. The trench they had occupied was found to be
choked with enemy dead, most of whom had been killed by bullets. About
100 prisoners were taken in this local action.
By 7.45 A.M. all arms, in addition to the infantry, were moving forward.
The first batteries were now in action just in rear of the old British
front line. The Stokes guns were up ready to support the fighting
troops, as they had, indeed, already done.
The machine-guns, which had been ordered to move up to the Blue line to
fire in the later stages of the barrage, had also begun their advance,
though many were delayed owing to the men finding great difficulty in
carrying their loads through the mud.
The 8th Royal Scots had also begun work on a road and a trench across
the old No Man's Land.
The fighting round the Black outpost line was still in progress when the
barrage moved forward to the Green line. In consequence, troops whose
real objective was the Green line became involved in the fighting both
at Cane Wood and Macdonald's Wood on their way to form up under the
barrage.
In spite of this the whole line managed to defeat the Germans who were
still holding out, overtake the barrage, and advance behind it.
On the right the 6th Gordon Highlanders reached the Green line at 7.50
A.M. with little opposition, and began to consolidate about 250 yards
south-west of the Steenbeek. German low-flying aeroplanes, however,
shortly arrived, and took stock of their positions. The company
commander, guessing what their business was, as soon as they had gone,
moved his front line 100 yards forward and his support line 100 yards
back. He thus had the satisfaction of seeing the position he had
originally occupied thoroughly well shelled, while his own lines
entirely escaped the bombardment.
This battalion had captured in its advance to the Green line 4 officers,
130 other ranks, 3 machine-guns, 2 trench-mortars, and 2 anti-tank guns,
its losses being 6 officers and 130 other ranks. Curiously enough, the
company which reached the Steenbeek only lost 2 men killed and 19
wounded during the whole period that it was engaged in these operations.
In this advance Private G. I. M'Intosh of the 6th Gordon Highlanders
performed an act of conspicuous gallantry, for which he was awarded the
Victoria Cross. Machine-guns across the Steenbeek were firing on his
company. Private M'Intosh, entirely on his own initiative, crossed the
stream alone under fire, armed with a bomb and a revolver. Working round
to the rear of the emplacement he hurled his bomb into it, killing two
Germans and wounding a third. He found two light machine-guns, which he
brought back with him.
On the left of the 6th Gordon Highlanders, the 6th Seaforth Highlanders
had detailed one company to cross the river Steenbeek and establish a
post at Mon du Rasta, and three platoons to dig in on the Green line.
These troops passed through the Black outpost line while fighting was
still in progress, and joined in the reduction of Macdonald's Wood.
The advance thus continued without incident until the platoons were
approaching the Green line. At this point they came under a heavy rifle
and machine-gun fire from the opposite side of the river. Lewis guns
therefore swept the farther bank, a tank was called up to give covering
fire, and the Green line platoons were thus enabled to dig themselves in
as arranged. The company for Mon du Rasta, finding all bridges and the
river bank swept by hostile machine-gun fire, dug in 100 yards from the
stream and awaited an opportunity to cross.
Meanwhile the 6th Black Watch had, after some stiff fighting, overcome
the numerous blockhouses and fortified farms that they encountered, and
had captured a number of prisoners. The behaviour of this battalion was
magnificent, as every advance it made was carried out in the face of
obstinate resistance. The platoons for the Green line were first engaged
in the Black outpost line, particularly about Cane Wood. They next
captured Rudolf Farm with 20 prisoners, and later, in conjunction with
platoons of the 5th Gordon Highlanders, a blockhouse near François Farm
with 3 machine-guns, 4 officers, and 40 other ranks. The Green line
platoons, though greatly reduced in numbers, finally reached their
objective and dug in.
At 10.30 A.M. Lieut.-Colonel T. M. Booth, D.S.O., commanding the 6th
Black Watch, made a reconnaissance of the Green line. Appreciating that
it was then possible to rush men across the Steenbeek, he collected
thirty to forty men of "D" Company, and led them with few casualties
across the river by a bridge just north of the Military Road. He then
disposed them in four posts north of the road, and a message was sent
back to the cavalry at Gournier Farm that the posts were successfully
established across the stream.
As this was to be the signal for the squadron of the King Edward Horse
to advance and patrol north of the Steenbeek, the men mounted, moved
forward, and deployed in front of the Palace Farm. On reaching a line
150 yards from the stream, they suddenly came under heavy machine-gun
fire, and immediately suffered such losses in men and horses that any
attempt at a further advance was out of the question. They therefore dug
in under orders of Colonel M'Donald of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, in
a position which covered Mon du Rasta.
It was at this moment that Sergeant Edwards, 6th Seaforth Highlanders,
performed one of several acts of conspicuous gallantry for which he was
awarded the Victoria Cross. Major Swan, commanding the squadron of King
Edward Horse, fell wounded. Sergeant Edwards went out under heavy fire,
dressed the officer's wounds in a shell-hole, and helped him back into a
trench. He had already led his platoon against a machine-gun in
Macdonald's Wood and wiped out the team. He had also, though wounded in
the arm, alone stalked and killed a sniper. The following day Edwards
was wounded in the leg, but refused to leave his platoon.
The 5th Gordon Highlanders were also by this time established on the
Green line. They had overcome two strongly-defended posts--the
blockhouse near François Farm, in conjunction with the 6th Black Watch,
as already described; and Varna Farm, in conjunction with troops of the
38th Division.
In each case the men "dribbled" towards their objective--that is, they
worked their way individually from shell-hole to shell-hole, and by this
means were able to reach the flanks of the point of resistance opposing
them. So skilfully did they carry out this manœuvre that the German
machine-gunners could not check their advance, and in both cases the
garrisons surrendered before the Gordon Highlanders had closed with
them, a number of dead being found in the neighbourhood of the captured
posts. This battalion took 7 officers and 160 other ranks (excluding
wounded) prisoners, and 10 machine-guns; while they lost 1 officer
killed, 7 wounded, and 58 other ranks killed, 171 wounded, and 7
missing.
Two tanks had by this time arrived on the Green line, and patrolled it
for about two hours, engaging any targets that offered, and thus
protecting the infantry from the enemy's activity.
Between 3 and 4 P.M. in the afternoon the enemy put down a heavy barrage
on the Black outpost line, and the infantry began advancing on the left
flank towards the Steenbeek. This attempted counter-attack, however,
failed, the lire of rifles, Lewis and machine guns sending the enemy
running back, and causing him many casualties. Taking advantage of the
disorganisation caused by the failure of this enterprise in the enemy's
dispositions north of the Steenbeek, the company of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders, reinforced by two platoons of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, dashed across the stream, seized the bridgeheads opposite
Ferdinand Farm, and rushed Mon du Rasta. Posts were then established at
Mon du Rasta and Mon Bulgare. These were next reinforced by a Stokes
mortar which was pushed across the stream, and which was soon in action,
firing thirty rounds on parties of the enemy on the road running
north-east from Mon du Rasta.
The 6th Seaforth Highlanders had now also occupied their farthest
objective. This battalion had captured during the day 2 officers, 276
other ranks, a 4·2 howitzer, and 9 machine-guns, and had sustained the
following casualties: 3 officers killed and 7 wounded, 38 other ranks
killed and 174 wounded, and 21 men missing.
The operation had thus been a complete success; each platoon was on the
objective to which it had been detailed, machine-guns and Stokes guns
were in position, and the work at consolidation was well advanced.
Later it was found necessary to withdraw the posts on the north bank of
the Steenbeek. The enemy had counter-attacked the 6th Black Watch at
3.45 P.M., 4 P.M., and 4.30 P.M., but in every case the battalion had
held their ground and broken up each attack. At a low estimate eighty
Germans were killed and wounded by rifle and Lewis gun fire during these
actions. At 6.05 P.M., after a heavy bombardment, including a lavish use
of gas shells, a further and more serious attack was delivered. Owing to
the casualties they had sustained in the previous attacks and to the
withdrawal of troops on their left, the 6th Black Watch were forced to
return to the south bank of the Steenbeek, where they again dug in.
Meanwhile the posts of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders and the 8th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders at Mon du Rasta and Mon Bulgare were in
danger of being isolated. Not only were their flanks in the air, but
also, owing to heavy rain which had set in during the early afternoon,
the Steenbeek was being transformed from a fordable stream into a
rushing torrent.
It was therefore decided to withdraw the outlying posts and hold only
the bridges. Thus at the end of the day the Steenbeek divided the
opposing forces.
In each phase of the operations the infantry advance was closely
followed by the other arms of the service in exact accordance with the
prearranged plans, with the result that before nightfall the whole of
the captured area had been powerfully organised.
By 12 noon four batteries of artillery were in action in and about the
old No Man's Land. Eighteen machine-guns were in position in the Black
line in time to answer an S.O.S. signal in the afternoon, while sixteen
other machine-guns were established in their prearranged positions
during the day, with a good supply of ammunition. The 152nd Machine-Gun
Company's barrage guns alone were able to fire 20,000 rounds in answer
to a single S.O.S. call.
The engineers had also performed a number of tasks. By the afternoon
they had constructed posts at 23 Metre Hill, Cane Avenue, and von Werder
House. They had repaired the Pilkem Road up to the 5 Chemins Estaminet,
and Boundary Road as far as Kempton Park, so as to be suitable for
wheeled transport. They had also made a track across No Man's Land which
joined up with an old road at Below Farm. They had, in addition,
constructed a water-supply point at Lancashire Farm with a track
connecting it to the nearest road.
Rations for the following day were dumped at the Black line by 7 P.M., a
fact which provides an illustration of the remarkable work done by the
Divisional pack-train under the command of Captain Smith of the 51st
D.A.C. This train consisted of 328 mules. The first pack-loads of
ammunition were on their way to dumps at Hurst Park and Gournier Farm
three hours after zero. Throughout the day ammunition, sandbags, Lewis
gun drums, Very light cartridges, water, and rations were carried
forward in a continual stream.
Only one mule was hit during these operations, an instance of the
benefit which results from carrying out a task of this nature quickly
and in daylight during the comparatively undisturbed hours which always
occur behind the fighting line during an actual attack. At this period
the enemy's artillery is too preoccupied in trying to check the
attacking infantry to pay much attention to the activities that may be
going on in rear of the attack.
Throughout the battle little trouble was experienced as regards
communication. A cable-tank had carried signal gear to a prearranged
dump between Sandown and Hurst Park. Wires were then quickly laid to the
battalion headquarters which were established in various fortified
farms.
A message-carrying dog sent from the Green line during the engagement
reached its destination two days later, minus its collar and message.
As was usually the case when the Division carried out a trench-to-trench
attack, rain fell heavily during the night. In many cases men were
flooded out of their trenches and had to lie in the open. Throughout the
whole captured area movement became a matter of the greatest difficulty.
Luckily the enemy suffered equally, and remained quiet.
The troops on the Green line, however, remained in good heart, and
reported the situation as "water two feet deep, but spirits very high."
The eight tanks which supported the attack in some cases did valuable
work; their doings, briefly summarised, were as follows:--
G 49 stuck in the Blue line; G 41 stuck 200 yards beyond the Blue line;
G 51 reached Kitchener's Wood; G 44, 45, and 52 reached the Green line
after having dealt with several machine-guns. G 50 reached Varna Farm
after several engagements with machine-guns. G 42 reached the Black line
and worked along it.
The 152nd and 153rd Brigades had each gone into action with the
approximate strength of 80 officers and 2700 other ranks. Their
casualties totalled 52 officers (32·5 per cent) and 1516 other ranks
(28·07 per cent).
As opposed to this, 15 officers and 624 other ranks, 2 field-guns, 4
trench-mortars, and 29 machine-guns were captured, many enemy killed and
many machine-guns and trench-mortars destroyed.
This attack can be summed up as the neatest and cleanest performance
which the Division had carried out. It was delivered against the Germans
while their fighting efficiency was still unimpaired, and while their
numbers were still unappreciably diminished. Moreover, it was delivered
against a position hidden from view, which had been deliberately
fortified during the preceding years with every artifice the ingenuity
of the Boche could devise, and contained the concrete barrage-proof
farms and the entirely unexpected concrete blockhouses.
The success, indeed, was so complete that, even after the battle was
over, nothing which would have been an improvement in the plans of
attack suggested itself.
During the afternoon and evening of 1st August the 154th Brigade, which
had as yet not been employed in the operations at all, relieved the
152nd and 153rd Brigades, and remained in the line until 8th August,
when the whole Division was relieved.