COURCELETTE.
Immediately after the battle of Beaumont Hamel, Lieut.-Colonel Ian
Stewart, D.S.O., left the Division. Colonel Stewart had been chief staff
officer to the Division through all those months in which it was
learning the art of war, and in which many battalions were for the first
time blooded in active operations.
During this period the amount of work which Colonel Stewart carried out,
and the careful thought exercised by him on behalf of the Division to
lessen the difficulties of all and to raise it to the high standard that
it reached, was indeed vast. It was therefore a matter of great
satisfaction to the Division to hear that his services had been rewarded
by promotion to be Brigadier-General, General Staff of the XIIIth Corps.
It must also have been equally satisfactory to Colonel Stewart that the
Division should have proved its worth at Beaumont Hamel before his
service with it came to an end.
Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Dick Cunyngham, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders,
succeeded Lieut.-Colonel Ian Stewart as G.S.O. 1. Lieut.-Colonel Dick
Cunyngham will always remain to those who came into contact with him the
ideal of what a staff officer should be. He had a wide sympathy with the
regimental officer, and understood his difficulties thoroughly. He had,
moreover, an unruffled temperament, which enabled him to keep a clear
head and think quickly and correctly even in the most adverse
circumstances. The speed with which he would write a long and intricate
operation order in clear and unambiguous language was a definite asset
to the whole Division, and largely eliminated that confusion which is
so liable to occur during the fluctuations of a modern battle. "Dick,"
as he was familiarly known, was certainly one of the chief pillars on
which the efficiency of the Division rested.
The whole Division was now out of the line, lying in the area
Arquèves-Rancheval-Hedauville-Varennes-Forceville-Lealvillers. It was
not, however, to be allowed to rest, for on 25th November the 153rd
Brigade began its march to Ovillers Huts. The following day the 154th
Brigade moved to Aveluy, and the 152nd Brigade to Bouzincourt and
Senlis. It was then learnt that the Division was immediately to take
over a peculiarly unpleasant sector.
On the 27th the 153rd Brigade relieved the 12th Canadian Brigade, 4th
Canadian Division, in the Courcelette sector. This sector extended from
the dyke valley just west of Le Sars to the western of the two roads
running from Courcelette to Miraumont. The Dyke Valley in particular,
and the whole area in general, were painfully open to observation from
tree observation-posts in Loupart Wood. This wood was perched on the
summit of a commanding upland. There was hardly a square yard in the
Divisional sector which was not overlooked from some portion of it.
Moreover, the enemy made the fullest use of his observation. Even single
men were frequently sniped by howitzers and field-guns to such an extent
that movement in the forward area by day became out of the question.
The ground taken over by the Division had been captured by the Canadians
a few days previously. The conditions could not have been worse; the
limits of human endurance were all but reached. The whole area had been
ploughed up by shell-fire to such an extent that the vegetation had
completely disappeared. The rain, which had been the cause of the
frequent postponement of the attack on Beaumont Hamel, continued day
after day. The whole country-side had in consequence been transformed
into unending acres of treacherous and, in some places, dangerous mud.
It was no uncommon thing for men to sink up to their waists and for
horses to be drowned. By December the mud had become saturated with
water to such an extent that it became necessary to issue ropes as
trench stores to enable men who had become bogged to be extricated.
Moreover, the earth had become so disintegrated by the shocks of the
continuous bursting of shells that trenches could not be cut in it. No
sooner had they been dug than the sides fell in and filled them again.
The front and support line troops thus lived in shell-hole posts. In a
few cases these were connected to one another by what had once been
trenches.
The condition in which the men lived in these posts defeats imagination,
and needs to have been seen to be appreciated. They could not move by
day. Their only seat was the oozing fire-step; if they stood up they
gradually sank into the mud; even ration-boxes and duck-boards used as
platforms soon became submerged. The conditions of sanitation were
ghastly, the possibilities of cooking were non-existent, and from dawn
till dusk the troops were cut off from communication even with the next
post.
Trench feet became an epidemic, frost-bite occurred frequently. In some
cases old wounds reopened, as they did in the days of scurvy. In
December dysentery appeared. The wastage amongst the troops became
serious, and a general air of depression settled down over the Division.
In fact, General Harper once confessed that he had never seen a man
smile east of Pozières.
One of the great problems of the Courcelette sector was the difficulty
of finding one's way to the forward area. All movement being restricted
to the hours of darkness, and the whole country-side being a featureless
abomination, working parties, runners, reliefs, and ration parties were
continually losing their way, and wandering through the mud until they
had become exhausted.
To make matters worse, when the Division took over the sector there were
no wire entanglements created, so that there was always a reasonable
chance of men who were lost wandering into the German lines, as it was
difficult to discover when one was in No Man's Land. This, indeed,
happened several times, while similarly lost Germans were more than once
found wandering in our lines. In fact, prisoners were taken in this
manner on six different occasions.
The Division, therefore, had many problems to face on its arrival in
this area. At first an attempt was made to link up the front line posts,
wire them in, and dig communication trenches leading up to them.
The whole area was further littered with the unburied dead and with
salvage of every kind.
The troops in the reserve line had in a few cases dug-outs, which had
been discovered in Regina Trench--a famous trench captured by the
Canadians a few days previously.
The reserve battalions were little better off than those in the line.
They were for the most part quartered in disused gun-pits and
Bairnsfather villas, proof neither against shell-fire nor the weather.
The artillery were in a similar plight; their gun-pits were constantly
flooding, and the movement of wheeled transport became impracticable.
All gun ammunition had therefore to be brought to the gun emplacements
on pack-saddles, eight rounds only being carried on each horse. Journey
after journey with the pack animals had therefore to be made by the
gunner-drivers, with the German field-guns doing their best to aggravate
the conditions.
The Division took over this sector within a few hours of leaving another
battle front. The men had been given little or no opportunity of resting
and recuperating after a severe engagement. The result was that their
vitality was low, and that their powers of resistance were not at their
best. They in consequence suffered considerably more from the adverse
conditions than would have been the case with fresher troops.
Every method of constructing trenches was tried, and pumps were employed
to keep them dry. The results were, however, always the same. No sooner
was a trench dug to a depth of three feet than water began to rise in it
and the sides fell in. Trenches had therefore to be given up, and
overland tracks took their place. For this purpose duck-boards or wattle
tracks were laid, the routes being marked out with tracing-tape or posts
and wire until such time as the track was completed.
As regards protection for the troops against the weather, it was evident
that if men were to be left lying for many hours exposed to the weather
in shell-holes the wastage from sickness would be appalling. A
considerable effort was therefore made to provide the battalions both in
the line and in brigade reserve with weather-proof accommodation.
For the troops in the line the Divisional engineers designed a highly
satisfactory form of shelter, composed of corrugated iron elephant
shelters sunk below the level of the parapet of the trench or
shell-hole. The material for each shelter could be carried up to the
line by ten men, and could be completed in a day and night's work. When
completed it accommodated a section post.
Large elephant shelters were made for reserve battalions in the sides of
sunken roads, while all troops that could be spared were moved back to
the camps in the back areas.
Thus, after three weeks, conditions had been materially improved. During
this period, however, there was a snap of sharp frost. For a while this
dried up the mud and much improved the situation; but, as is always the
case, the thaw which followed seemed to render the mud, if possible,
more all-pervading than had been the case before the frost came.
Meanwhile the "Q" staff had been making every effort to alleviate the
sufferings of the men. A gum-boot store had been established at
Pozières, with sufficient boots for the whole brigade in the line. There
was, however, a continual wastage of these boots, as, though they
reached almost up to the hip, many of them were sucked off the men's
legs in extricating themselves from the mud. It was found that these
thigh boots and the kilt did not make a good combination. The boots had
to be worn underneath the kilt, with the result that the top edge of the
boot, rubbing against the bare thigh, used to chafe the men and cause
septic sores. In consequence, the kilt was for the time being abandoned,
and six thousand pairs of trousers were issued to the men.
A soup-kitchen was also established outside brigade headquarters. Here
the Divisional master-cook, an old Hussar, used to issue hot soup to
working parties and reliefs on their way to and from the trenches. The
master-cook was shelled in his kitchen on most days of the week; but
beyond asking for a party to repair it when it had sustained any damage,
he made no complaints. His services to the Division on this and,
indeed, on many occasions were invaluable.
Efforts were also made to provide the men with hot meals in the line.
The portable hot-food containers issued for this purpose proved too
heavy a burden for a man to carry over two thousands yards of water,
shell-holes, and slippery mud, and they had to be abandoned.
In place of them the men were issued with Tommy Cookers, small tins of
solidified alcohol on which they could heat their own food. Tins of
meat-and-vegetable rations were on this account made the permanent issue
for troops in the line. Each man was thus able to heat for himself a
really good and nourishing stew, even if he lived in a shell-hole and
had no previous knowledge of cooking. This system proved very
satisfactory, and the number of hot meals a man could have during a day
was only limited by the number of Tommy Cookers that could be obtained.
Ingenious quartermasters therefore discovered means of improvising Tommy
Cookers, and making them in large numbers for their battalions. This in
itself was a great improvement for the men, and it became no longer
necessary to live from dawn to dusk with nothing but cold meat and
biscuit to eat and with cold water to drink, as had been the case when
the sector was first taken over.
In spite, however, of all the arrangements made, the men did not recover
their vitality, and the wastage remained immense. A system of relief was
therefore introduced by which battalions held the line for only
forty-eight hours each. They were also given twenty-four hours complete
rest before going into the line and after coming out. This system had an
immediate effect on the health of the men.
Further, on 11th December it was arranged that the whole Divisional
front should be held by two battalions, each battalion being on a one
company front. These front-line companies were reinforced by two Lewis
guns of the remainder of the battalion manned by nucleus crews. As
company strengths had by this time fallen to about fifty to sixty men,
this meant that the line was extremely lightly held. So much was this
the case that a German machine-gunner, who was returning to his
emplacement with filled water-bottles and had lost his way, wandered
right through our lines, and was captured by some machine-gunners close
to brigade headquarters. These machine-gunners were the first British
troops he had seen.
Operations in the line, apart from combating the mud and water, were
confined to sniping. When the Division first took over the line the
Germans showed themselves in a most daring manner. The 153rd Brigade
took full advantage of this in their first few days in the line, Colonel
Cheape's battalion claiming eleven hits in one day. After this the
Germans unfortunately became very much shier, and the bags fell off
considerably.
Brigade reliefs in this sector were a sore trial to the men. Apart from
the exhaustion caused by the conditions in which they lived, the
struggle through the mud from the line to brigade headquarters was in
itself a heavy task for a man in battle order.
Added to this, the continual standing in mud and water and the prolonged
wearing of gum-boots caused the men's feet to become so swollen and soft
that a march of even a few thousand yards became a physical
impossibility to many of them. It was therefore necessary to bring
motor-buses along the Albert-Bapaume Road to Pozières. Here, as the men
straggled in, the loads were made up and driven off to Wolfe Huts, near
Ovillers, where the men spent the night.
For many hours after the relief was completed, stragglers would come
limping along in ones and twos to the embussing point, coated from head
to foot in mud, with a three days' growth of beard on their faces. They
were a depressing spectacle. Their exhaustion was in some cases so great
that many of them would lie at the roadside in these winter nights wet
through, and fall asleep often when another half-mile would have carried
them to the buses, to daylight, and to a warm hut. War has certainly
lost much of its romance since going into winter quarters went out of
fashion.
To the rank and file Courcelette will remain as a nightmare. Though the
men in the shell-holes may have been too obsessed by the beastliness of
their conditions to appreciate the fact, yet on few occasions can the
administrative services of the Division and its commanders have
exercised more thought on their behalf. Nothing that could have been
done to alleviate their sufferings was left undone; much was done which
would not have occurred to a less efficient staff.
Left to himself, the Jock, exhausted as he was, was in danger of sitting
down and doing no more than saying, "Isn't this b----y?" He was right;
it was what he called it, and General Harper, who had visited the men in
their shell-holes, knew that it was so. But he knew also that so long as
the men remained passive it would become still more so. He therefore
insisted that the men should either be in complete rest, or should be
working their utmost to improve the conditions. On no account was the
merely passive and reflective attitude to be adopted.
During this period Colonel A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., who had come out with
the Division, and after leaving it for a short time had returned to it
as chief administrative staff officer, and Major J. L. Weston, D.S.O.,
were responsible for the "Q" services of the Division. The latter had
also come out with the Division, and subsequently succeeded Colonel
Moir, remaining as A.A. and Q.M.G., 51st Division, until a few months
from the armistice.
Colonel Moir seconded General Harper's efforts to keep the Division
going in a most effective manner, and it was largely due to his
administrative ability that the Jocks ultimately went back to rest with
sufficient powers of recuperation left in them to recover their old form
after a nineteen days' rest behind the line.
Colonel Moir was, in turn, admirably served by Major Weston, whose
unwearying devotion to his Division and unfailing good temper made him
an ideal "Q" officer.
Great as was the wastage owing to sickness, casualties owing to enemy
action were few. This was owing to the small number of men employed
holding the line. The total in killed, wounded, and missing for the
months of December and January amounted to 4 officers killed, 15
wounded, and 1 missing; and to the men, 86 killed and 333 wounded.
Amongst the killed was Captain Lauder of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, son of the famous Scottish comedian. He was shot while
moving from one front-line post to another in the early morning.
Amongst these casualties, twenty-five were caused by a single 4·2 shell
at Tulloch's Corner. This shell burst amongst a working party of the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders, killing the officer and 3 men, and wounding 21
other ranks.
On 12th January the Division was relieved by the 2nd Division.
Divisional headquarters moved to Marieux, the 152nd Brigade to
Beauquesne, the 153rd Brigade to Puchevillers, and the 154th Brigade to
Rubempré. The Division then marched to the Buigny-St Maclou area west of
Abbeville, arriving there on 16th January, having staged in the
Bernaville and St Riquier areas.
At the time that the sector was handed over to the 2nd Division, a vast
change had been wrought in it. A system of defence had been put into
force which reduced the number of defenders to a minimum. Shelters had
been provided for the whole trench garrison. Dug-outs were nearing
completion, one in the East Miraumont Road being capable of holding two
companies. Overland routes had been marked out, laid, and
notice-boarded. Large numbers of elephant shelters had been erected for
the reserve battalions, so that men not actually holding the line were
able to obtain adequate rest in fair comfort. The whole front had been
wired so as to have at least one belt to protect the garrison of the
front line from hostile raids. A vast amount of material had been salved
and put into use. All dead had been buried except those lying in the
actual trench area.
Considering the conditions this is a fine record of work. Though the
infantry contributed to it in some degree, it must be said in justice to
the Royal Engineers and pioneers that theirs was the lion's share. The
efforts which these units made to ameliorate the conditions for the
infantry were magnificent. That the sickness and wastage was not
greater, and that the whole conditions of life materially and visibly
improved, was mainly due to the enterprise, energy, and endurance of the
three field companies and the 8th Royal Scots.
The Division was, however, now at its lowest ebb. It had been in the
line for a year, including two very trying periods of mine and trench
warfare, plus the fighting in July and August on the Somme and the
battle of Beaumont Hamel. It was considerably reduced in strength, and
had lost heavily in company commanders and N.C.O.'s. A period of at
least a month's rest was considered essential in which to train the new
drafts and restore the fighting efficiency of the Division. It was
therefore with some misgiving that it was learnt that on 30th January
the 8th Royal Scots and the 1/1 and 1/2 Highland Field Companies, R.E.,
had proceeded to Arras to work in the Third Army area. This could have
only one meaning.
The rest lasted exactly nineteen days, as on 5th February the Division
moved to the Barilly area _en route_ to join the Third Army.
The Buigny-St Maclou area was not a good one. Training-grounds were
difficult to obtain, while in many villages the billets were
indifferent. They consisted for the most part of mud-plaster barns,
verging on a state of collapse, and with unpleasantly ventilated walls.
Since this was the coldest period experienced in France during the Great
War, the men suffered considerably. An intense frost set in, which
continued almost without interruption up to the last days of February.
On some nights twenty-four degrees of frost were registered. In
consequence, both work and recreation were greatly hampered, and it was
extremely difficult to provide warmth for the men at nights. Where men
were housed in the mud-plaster barns there were numerous cases of
frost-bite, the men's knees suffering in particular.
Thus the recollections of the first nineteen days' rest which was
vouchsafed to the Division since it first went into action are not as
pleasant as might be imagined.
When the march to Arras began, the effects of the frost were felt still
more acutely. The march lasted six days, the route lying across a
country of hills and valleys, including many steep ascents and descents.
The result was that, as in many places the roads were little better than
sheets of ice, the transport had the greatest difficulty in carrying out
the march. In consequence, field-kitchens and cooks' carts often arrived
several hours after the men had reached their billeting area. This was
attended by considerable discomfort to the troops, as they were
dependent on the kitchens and the cooks' carts for their next hot meal.
The cold was also felt considerably more "on trek" than in ordinary
circumstances, as the men, since they were changing their billets
daily, had no time or opportunity to make their quarters comfortable.
The difficulties of this march reached their climax at St Pol.
Water-mains had in many places burst, and flooded the roads with several
inches of water, which had frozen into hard ice. In consequence, the
steep descent into, and the equally steep ascent out of, the town became
barely negotiable. In fact, it was only by employing large numbers of
men with drag-ropes and additional teams that the transport could make
its way through the town. Blocks occurred in the road which checked the
columns, often for considerable periods, and which kept the men
shivering in the roads and delayed them from reaching their billets
until late in the evening.
Indeed, it was hard to believe during the last three months that one was
in what the railway advertisements call "Sunny France." One had lived in
fogs which were a match for London, and mists and rain which compared
favourably with the Western Highlands, and degrees of frost, wind, and
snow which could hardly have been improved upon in Caithness. There
were, however, no winter quarters in this war in Gaul. The men lived as
hard a life as could well be imagined; and though it would not be true
to say they thrived on it, they endured it in an exemplary manner. One
requires to have wintered in "Sunny France" in canvas tents, open-work
barns, and "Bairnsfather" shacks on perhaps one hot meal a day to
appreciate the hardships and discomforts of winter warfare.