THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE--BEAUMONT HAMEL
The village of Beaumont Hamel and the surrounding country was admirably
adapted by nature for defence. The village lay on low ground at the
meeting-point of several of the rolling uplands which are the
characteristic feature of Picardy. The slopes of these uplands were
gradual, and so provided large areas on their reverse side which were
entirely free from observation from the ground. Further, they were
intersected by numerous sunken roads, which provided every facility for
the construction of dug-outs, where reserves could be concealed and
protected from bombardment.
The chief centres of resistance lay in the village itself and in the now
celebrated "Y" Ravine. The village, which the guide-books tell us was
famous for its manufacture of powder-puffs, contained vast caves and
cellars capable of containing many hundreds of men, in addition to the
countless concealed dug-outs with which the German invariably
strengthened all ruined buildings occupied by him.
The "Y" Ravine, so called on account of the resemblance of its shape to
the letter Y, was a deep ravine with almost precipitous sides. It lay
with its two arms pointing like antennæ towards the British lines, some
300-500 yards south of the village.
It ran from the Station Road, a road entirely screened from observation
which led from the village to the river Ancre, to the Front Line. It was
honeycombed with dug-outs, and was crossed by numerous trenches. Its
garrison could thus be reinforced either from the Station Road or from
any of the neighbouring trenches.
It was therefore a place of tremendous strength, and obviously one which
would be extremely difficult to clear of the enemy.
From the centre of Beaumont Hamel there ran in a north-easterly
direction the Waggon Road, deeply sunken, riddled with dug-outs, and
protected at its southern end by a large chalk-pit of most forbidding
appearance.
The German position to be attacked by the Highland Division was
traversed by two valleys running east and west, one being the "Y" Ravine
and the other containing the old Beaumont Road, which traversed the
village and met Station Road and Waggon Road at the chalk-pit mentioned
above.
These two valleys were linked together by a highly-organised system of
defence. The Germans had occupied the same trenches since the early days
of the War. With their characteristic efficiency they had laboured to
render their position as nearly impregnable as human energy and
ingenuity made possible. Their trenches were at a great depth, and were
lavishly provided with dug-outs. Of these, some contained two
underground stories; all of them had several entrances, one in
particular having eleven. The trenches were also connected from front to
rear by numerous tunnels, so that reinforcements could be sent forward
along underground passages proof against any bombardments.
In addition, the whole position was heavily and skilfully protected by
strong wire entanglements throughout.
In fact Beaumont Hamel, after the disastrous attack on it on 1st July
1916, had come to be regarded, by British and Germans alike, as almost
impregnable.
So much was this the case that the original plans for this coming attack
assumed that the Beaumont Hamel position could not be taken frontally,
and contemplated engaging it only in front and turning it from both
flanks.
In preparing for the attack the destruction of the wire entanglements
was one of the first considerations. In many places, owing to the
undulations of the ground, this presented considerable difficulty, as
direct observation could not be obtained.
Even with the wire cut the attack could only be considered a difficult
operation. The enemy was afforded such protection from his dug-outs
that success was likely to be dependent on the attacking troops keeping
close on the heels of the barrage. The artillery could not be expected
to do more than drive the enemy to ground.
Following the barrage closely was, moreover, in this case a difficult
operation, as in few cases were the trench lines parallel. Thus the
keeping of direction was certain to require skilful leading. The
elaboration of the trench system also entailed a very careful detailing
of objectives to the different bodies of troops, and an exact knowledge
of what these objectives were.
Wire-cutting was begun by the artillery and the 2" trench-mortars on
20th October, and was carried on continuously until the day of attack.
Every precaution was taken to ensure that this was successful. Patrols,
often accompanied by artillery officers, inspected the wire protecting
the enemy front lines every night.
Maps were made daily, in which the portions of the enemy wire which
could be observed were shown in one of four colours, a separate colour
being used to denote the varying conditions of the wire--_i.e._,
satisfactorily cut, partially cut, damaged, and intact. These maps were
submitted daily to Divisional Headquarters, and were passed on to the
gunner officers responsible for the wire-cutting.
The results were beyond expectation, and the success of the attack was
in no small measure due to the skilful manner in which the artillery
destroyed the entanglements. Not only was the wire under observation
shot to pieces, but concealed belts of wire, whose existence was only
discovered from the study of air photos, were so damaged as to give the
infantry a free passage through them. Strands of cut wire lay in heaps
resembling haycocks throughout the trench area.
The general scheme for the attack was as follows: The Reserve Army, as
the Fifth Army was then called, was to attack and establish itself on
the line Miraumont-Beauregard Dovecot-Serre. Cavalry were to be held in
readiness to exploit their attack in the direction of Achiet-le-Petit
and Achiet-le-Grand. The IInd Corps was to attack south of the river
Ancre, the Vth Corps north of the river.
The Vth Corps consisted of five Divisions: the 63rd Division on the
right, the 51st Highland Division and the 2nd Division in the centre,
and the 3rd Division on the left, with the 37th Division in reserve.
The 51st Division was to capture Beaumont Hamel and push forward between
the converging flanks of the 63rd and 2nd Divisions as far as Frankfurt
Trench between Glory and Leave Avenues. The 63rd and 2nd Divisions were
then to continue the attack, and join their inner flanks east of the
51st Division, thus pinching the latter out of the front line of attack.
General Harper was urged to attack with his three infantry brigades in
line. He did not, however, consider that an attack launched in such
strength and unsupported by a complete unit of reserve was justified. He
therefore decided to attack with two brigades in line. It will be seen
that the success of the attack and the length of time the Division was
able to continue in the line after the attack bears ample testimony to
the accuracy of General Harper's judgment in this respect.
The 153rd Brigade was detailed to attack on the right, the 152nd Brigade
on the left, with the 154th Brigade in reserve.
Two distinct objectives for the attack were selected. The first, the
Green line, included the Station Road and the village of Beaumont Hamel.
The second objective, the Yellow line, was the portion of Frankfurt
Trench mentioned above. A further objective east of the Yellow line was
given to the 63rd and 2nd Divisions.
In the attack on the Green line, three intermediate objectives were
selected, known as the Pink line (the German front line), the Blue line
(the German second line), the Purple line (the German third line).
Each of these lines had a separate wave detailed for its capture
composed of units from the following battalions:--
Front line: 7th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Blue line: 7th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders.
Purple line: 7th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 5th
Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Green line: 7th Gordon Highlanders, 6th Black Watch, 6th
Seaforth Highlanders (in two waves).
The bulk of the machine-guns of the Division were massed in Trench 86
near the Bowery, a small rise in the shape of a tumulus just east of
Auchonvillers. From this position an intense barrage was to be fired,
moving forward from the German third line through the Green line and
across the western slopes of the high ground east of Beaumont Hamel.
This barrage was designed to prevent the enemy from using long-range
machine-gun fire against the attacking waves, and to hamper the movement
of his reserves. In both these respects it proved effective.
This was the first occasion on which the Division had employed
machine-guns to fire an overhead barrage during the attack. The men were
accordingly specially warned that the enormous volume of bullets passing
over their heads would sound as if they were only a few inches above the
crowns of their steel helmets, whereas in reality there would be a
margin of safety of many feet. This warning proved to be a sound
precaution when the barrage was first to be experienced, since the
bullets seemed unpleasantly close and might have otherwise created
despondency and alarm.
The trench-mortar batteries were also fully occupied, and were
continually employed in wire-cutting and assisting the raids and trench
bombardments.
The attack was originally planned for 24th October, but owing to the
weather a succession of postponements took place. The first postponement
was until 30th October; on 25th October a further postponement of
forty-eight hours was ordered. On 29th October the date of the attack
was changed to 5th November. Later, it was again postponed to 9th
November, and again to 10th November. On 7th November information was
wired that the attack was indefinitely postponed. On 10th November it
was ordered to take place on 13th November. On 11th November the hour
for zero--that is, the hour at which the infantry advance begins--was
selected as 5.45 A.M.
The weather, which was responsible for these postponements, could not
well have been worse. The country had become water-logged owing to
excessive downpours of rain. Continual mists and the absence of wind
prevented the rain from being absorbed in the atmosphere. The ground
thus remained sodden, the roads were reduced to a pulp, and tracks and
paths became lost in oozing mud of the consistency of porridge.
In fact, the state of the ground had become so bad that a small raid
which took place on 11th November failed because the raiding party found
it a physical impossibility to keep up with a very slow-moving barrage.
Not an officer or a man could move a yard at the double.
The results of this spell of bad weather were such that for a period not
more than four lorries daily per Division were allowed on the roads, for
fear that the foundations of the road would disappear permanently into
the abyss of mud beneath them. The inconvenience caused to "Q" by this
unavoidable restriction was immense, but the ingenuity of the
quartermaster's staff, as usual, overcame the difficulty with marked
success.
The repeated postponements, though very trying to the men's nerves,
proved in reality a blessing. The plan was that the attack should be
preceded by a four days' bombardment, including a lavish use of gas
shells. The result was that in many cases the first and, in some cases,
the second day's bombardment had been fired before the postponement took
place. They, therefore, had to be repeated when a fresh date for the
attack had been selected. In consequence, the German positions were
continually being subjected to a bombardment of intense violence. The
enemy thus received a far larger ration of shells than would have been
the case if the attack had taken place on the date selected in the first
instance. Moreover, these bombardments not only assailed the Germans
frontally from batteries in positions west of Beaumont Hamel, but also
in enfilade from positions south of Beaumont.
In the period of preparation for the battle a considerable amount of
labour was required to keep the trenches fit for traffic. In the
low-lying land which separated the various chalk downs, the soil was a
red loam. In consequence, whenever it rained, the sides of the trenches
fell in great flakes like miniature avalanches. The water was also very
slow to soak into the ground. Thus large sections of communication
trenches became knee-deep and even waist-deep in liquid mud. When it is
remembered that all munitions, rations, water, tools, &c., required for
the battle had to be carried on the backs of men through these trenches
to the forward dumps, it will be appreciated what a burden of discomfort
and toil the conditions due to the weather imposed on the troops.
A considerable amount of work had also to be done on the construction
and extension of dug-outs for reserve troops and headquarters. The
successive postponements, however, enabled this work to be
satisfactorily completed, and in consequence the casualties sustained in
our own trenches during the battle were negligible. In one portion of
the area a chalk cliff some forty feet in height lent itself admirably
to tunnelling operations. Enough head-cover was provided without the
necessity of making chambers to dug-outs at the foot of a long flight of
stairs. Full use was made of this feature, and many dug-outs were hewn
in it, as well as a large vault capable of holding a company, secure
from the heaviest artillery.
This feature lay at the foot of the reverse slope of a large chalk
upland, and was thus entirely hidden from enemy view. Looked at from the
reserve British lines, it appeared as a great white scar on the
landscape, and was an obvious centre of activity. It had in consequence
been christened the "White City." It ran northwards for some
considerable distance, and was put to similar uses by neighbouring
brigades on the left of the Division.
An attempt was made to blow an assembly trench for the troops detailed
for the attack on the Green line by means of tubes of ammonal buried in
a shallow trench cut through the surface of the soil. The ammonal was
discharged successfully, but the results were disappointing. The
disintegrations in the soil caused by the explosion, coupled with the
rain, produced conditions of mud that rendered the trench which the
explosion had created impassable.
During the fortnight preceding the attack patrolling and raiding were
carried out with great activity, both with a view to gauging the
strength of the resistance likely to be encountered and to inspect and
damage the enemy's wire. This activity disclosed the fact that the
German was employing knife-rests[5] made either of heavy timber or of
iron, to fill the gaps caused by our artillery and trench-mortars in his
entanglements.
Knife-rests are not easily damaged by shrapnel sufficiently to give the
infantry a free passage through them. Efforts were therefore made to
locate the places where they were in use, and to destroy them with 4·5
howitzers.
The fire of enfilade machine and Lewis guns was then employed to prevent
fresh knife-rests being put in position to replace those which had been
damaged. Twenty thousand rounds of S.A.A. were frequently fired in a
single night for this purpose.
At the end of October it was realised that these knife-rests were being
employed by the enemy in most formidable numbers, and were becoming a
serious proposition.
A number of Bangalore torpedoes were therefore made and carried up to
the trenches. Raiding parties then carried these torpedoes into No Man's
Land with them, and blew gaps in the rows of knife-rests. On 1st
November a particularly good raid of this nature was carried out.
Lieutenants Booth and Carnie of the 6th Gordon Highlanders with a party
of men placed four torpedoes under the enemy knife-rests. These were
exploded, and after a short interval the officers led the party through
the gap caused by the explosions. They then exploded four more torpedoes
under the next double rows of knife-rests. The party returned without a
casualty, and reported that still a third row of knife-rests existed
beyond the last one they had damaged.
Raiding parties had also been employed to enter the enemy's trenches to
gain identifications--that is, to return with evidence as to what units
were holding the line in front of the Division.[6]
On 26th October both the 6th Black Watch and the 7th Gordon Highlanders
of the 153rd Brigade entered the enemy's front line, the latter
capturing a prisoner of the 62nd Regiment. On the same night the 7th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of the 154th Brigade made a similar
attempt, but could not find a passage through the enemy's wire. In the
raid of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, Lance-Sergeant Morrison killed four
Germans and disarmed a fifth, who was taken prisoner. At this point
Sergeant Morrison had expended all his ammunition and bombs, and was
faced by two more Germans with fixed bayonets. Appreciating the
situation, Private Louis Thomson rushed past Sergeant Morrison and
killed the first German with his entrenching tool. He then picked up the
fallen German's rifle and with it killed the second. For this exploit
both Sergeant Morrison and Private Thomson were awarded the Military
Medal.
On 29th October a patrol of the 154th Brigade entered the enemy's front
line and proceeded to his second line, which they found protected by an
impassable belt of knife-rests. This patrol encountered none of the
enemy. The absence of the Boche on this occasion proved rather
disconcerting. In consequence, the 4th Gordon Highlanders and the 9th
Royal Scots carried out further raids. In each case they found the enemy
holding the trenches in strength, and were unable to effect an entrance.
This was partly due to the fact that the ground was so sodden that the
troops found it a physical impossibility to keep up with the barrage.
A further raid attempted on 4th November by the 6th Gordon Highlanders
also met with strong resistance, and made no progress. It was therefore
almost impossible to form an impression of the strength in which the
enemy was holding his line.
On 31st October a deserter entered our lines. He was a miserable
creature, described officially as "undersized and of poor physique." He
stated on examination that the battalion was holding a front of only 700
yards, and that the rifle strength of the four companies was about 180
each. His statement, if it was accurate, meant that the enemy was
holding the position in considerably greater force than was probable. In
view of his apparent poverty of intellect, it was considered that his
evidence was unreliable. It, however, transpired during the attack that
his statements were not exaggerated, and that the enemy was indeed very
thick on the ground.
The final preparations for the attack consisted in forming dumps of
ammunition, water, rations, &c., sufficiently far forward to enable
carrying parties to take forward supplies to the advanced troops after
the capture of the enemy's position.
This was a heavy task, as the following figures of supplies which were
carried through the water-logged trenches and placed in the brigade
dumps testify:--
Small arms ammunition 400,000 rounds.
Mills grenades 23,000
Petrol tins of water 1,600
Rations 4,800
Stokes bombs 7,500
Very light cartridges 8,000
On one night alone one brigade had 34 waggons and 150 men employed in
bringing forward material for these dumps.
By the time the attack took place sufficient stores had been accumulated
to render it unnecessary for any waggons to be employed in the forward
area on the night after the battle. This was a great advantage, as the
enemy was always liable during a battle to make a lavish use of
high-velocity guns and gas shells to harass our communications.
Some days prior to the day of the battle, the troops in the line
witnessed an attack on a fairly large scale delivered against the famous
Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts. These were situated just below the crest on
the northern slopes of the Thiepval Ridge, of which a magnificent view
could be obtained from many places in the Beaumont Hamel sector. The
spectacle certainly had an encouraging effect on all who saw it. The
barrage appeared excellent, and several waves of infantry could be seen
following it apparently without difficulty. Subsequently parties of
German prisoners could be seen moving back to the rear.
These two redoubts were notorious for the strength of their defences,
and had figured largely in recent communiqués, yet as far as could be
judged they were captured behind the barrage exactly according to plan.
This attack therefore gave a most practical example of the possibilities
of the 18-pounder barrage when closely followed by the attacking
infantry.
The assembly of the troops prior to the attack on the 13th was an
arduous performance, some of the battalions being billeted in the
Forceville area some five miles from the front line.
At 9 P.M. on 12th November the march to the position of assembly began,
the last battalions being reported in position at 4.30 A.M. A halt of
three-quarters of an hour was made _en route_, between Mailly-Maillet
and Auchonvillers, and tea was served to the men from the field-kitchens
there.
The length of time required for this march was due to the deplorable
state of the roads and communication trenches, and to the weight carried
by the men. In addition to battle order equipment, each man carried on
him at least two Mills bombs, a pick or a shovel, and two days'
preserved rations. Moreover, numbers of aeroplane flares, Very light
pistols and cartridges, phosphorus bombs, &c., were distributed
throughout the different platoons.
Owing to the mud in the trenches movement was largely carried out over
the open. The attention of the enemy was not, however, attracted, and
there was little artillery fire before zero.
So many troops had to be assembled that it was necessary for the leading
companies to be in position several hours before those that were to be
the last to assemble. Further, to ensure that the assembly was completed
up to time, orders were issued for the troops to be ready in their
appointed positions one hour before zero.
This allowed a good margin in which to make up for any delays which
might be caused by gas-shelling or bombardments occurring during the
advance to the assembly trenches.
During this period a covering screen of troops, who were not detailed to
take part in the first phase of the attack, lay out in No Man's Land to
prevent German patrols from approaching our trenches and discovering
that assembly for an attack was in progress.
This period of waiting in assembly trenches for the hour of zero to
arrive is one of the most unpleasant ordeals which a soldier has to
endure. On this foggy November night the troops arrived with their kilts
and hose-tops sodden with water and mud. The duck-boards in the assembly
trenches were in many places under water. The fire-steps on which men
sat, or the parapets and parados against which they leant huddled
together for warmth, were exuding moisture and occasionally land-sliding
into the trenches, bringing down in their fall a multitude of telephone
wires, over which men stumbled and tripped for the remainder of the
night.
Rifles and Lewis guns needed the greatest care to prevent them from
becoming clogged with mud and unserviceable. Silence was enforced and
smoking forbidden, for fear that the arrival of a large force of men in
the front line--a sure indication of an impending attack--might be
disclosed to the enemy. Men were forbidden also to use their
water-bottles before zero hour, partly because the need for water would
become acute later during the battle, and partly on account of the noise
which a half-emptied water-bottle is capable of producing, particularly
when silence is most desired.
During this anxious and seemingly endless vigil, the morale of even the
boldest depreciates. The most unimaginative loon, particularly if it is
not his maiden fight, knows that there are many men assembled with him
who in an hour or two will see the dawn break for the last time. The
stoutest-hearted cannot help reflecting on what his own fate is to be,
and on the odds for or against his being hit; if hit, will the wound be
a "cushy" one, or will he, in the next few hours, be transformed from an
able-bodied soldier into a permanent cripple or a dead man?
These are not pleasant reflections, particularly when the solace of
speaking and smoking is denied.
As a rule, when the assembly is complete there is too much congestion
for officers and N.C.O.'s to move about amongst their men. Then walking
along the trench is like passing to one's seat in the centre of the
stalls after the curtain has gone up; in the darkness the floor seems
carpeted with feet, and one stumbles along what appears to be a narrow
passage with its walls bristling with projecting knees.
The time spent in the assembly trenches hangs heavily. The throats of
the men get dry, partly because they are told they must not cough, and
partly perhaps for other reasons. In these circumstances men have a
peculiar desire to cough, just as a congregation has towards the end of
a long and tedious sermon. If one man begins, the rest take it up. The
noise thus made appears deafening. To obviate this, petrol tins of water
and tea in hot food-containers have been dumped about the assembly
positions, so that men may from time to time moisten their mouths and
throats. Further, a tot of rum is served to all. Rum played a great part
in the war. It produces a marvellous and immediate effect, dispelling
depression, creating warmth, and stimulating the morale. Even the
staunchest teetotallers will drink rum with avidity in the assembly
trenches.
There is a further disquieting thought which occurs during this period,
particularly to commanders. Will the enemy discover that our foremost
trenches are packed solid with humanity, that almost all our eggs are in
one basket? Has that infernal listening machine overheard details of the
day and hour carelessly spoken over the telephone, in spite of the many
orders on the subject? If he discovers we are here, he will produce what
he pleases to call annihilating fire, in which he concentrates his guns
and trench-mortars on our assembly position.
When he has been successful in doing this, the results have been
indescribable. Each shell that falls into the trench bursts in the midst
of a closely-packed group of men. The members of the various
headquarters therefore anxiously listen for any signs of an enemy
bombardment, and are only relieved of their anxiety when the arrival of
zero hour is denoted by the opening of the British barrage.
The reserve troops of the two leading brigades were safely accommodated
in deep dug-outs, secure from any bombardment which the enemy might open
in reply to the attack.
The 154th Brigade in reserve lay at Mailly-Maillet Wood, out of the
range of field howitzers, their headquarters being at the Café
Jourdain.
The signal for zero hour was to be the explosion of a mine. In the
attack that had been launched against Beaumont Hamel on the first day of
the Somme offensive, a mine had been exploded just short of the enemy's
front line. As the attack had failed, the enemy had been left in
complete possession of this mine. He had fortified it with dug-outs and
made considerable use of it both as an observation-post and as a
position for snipers. Arrangements had therefore been made to run out
another shaft and lay a fresh charge in chambers constructed below this
crater.
At 5.45 A.M. this mine was successfully exploded, and the artillery
opened an intense bombardment of the German position. At this time dawn
had only just begun to show signs of breaking. The darkness was further
accentuated by a fog, similar to a typical London November fog, which
did not lift throughout the day. This fog was a definite asset to the
attack, as, though it made the maintenance of direction more difficult,
it concealed the movements of the attackers, and prevented the enemy
gunners from seeing the artillery signals fired by their infantry. The
result was that the hostile artillery barrage on the British front line
and in No Man's Land was ragged, and did not open with any intensity
until 6.15 A.M. In consequence, the losses from hostile artillery fire
in the assembly trenches and while the troops were crossing No Man's
Land were negligible.
The infantry had crept close to the barrage before it had lifted, so
that when it moved forward they succeeded in entering the trench at most
points. Indeed, so close did they get to the bursting shells that many
of them reported that they were waiting on the outskirts of the remnants
of the enemy's entanglements while the barrage was still down in the
Boche front line. The 6th Black Watch pressed forward so close to the
barrage that they sustained some casualties from it.
The two right companies of the 7th Gordon Highlanders took the first
line without difficulty. They continued keeping close up to the barrage,
each successive wave capturing its objective, until they had occupied
the Green line according to the programme. These two companies could not
have carried out their task in a more exemplary manner. Throughout this
advance on the right flank touch was maintained with the left of a Royal
Marine Light Infantry battalion of the 63rd Naval Division.
On the rest of the front the attack bore no resemblance to the
traditional form of attack as pictured in the illustrated weeklies, or
demonstrated by the bayonet-fighting expert. There was no wild charge of
Highlanders with flying kilts and glittering bayonets. On the contrary,
it was carried out at the rate of an advance of twenty-five yards per
minute. As the barrage lifted off a trench, the troops made their way
into it as quickly as they could, but a steady double was the most that
they could manage. In many cases even that was found impossible.
The men floundered in the dark in mud over their ankles; the weight they
carried was enormously augmented by the moisture that their clothing had
absorbed and by the mud which glued itself to their kilts and which
clung to their boots; the ground was ploughed up into a sea of
shell-holes half filled with water; stooks of cut strands of wire and
overturned knife-rests lay everywhere. Forward movement of any kind
called for considerable physical effort; to charge was out of the
question. In some places men even became bogged up to their waists, and
were unable to extricate themselves from the morass, until parties of
German prisoners could be organised to dig them out.
Let two teams dressed in battle order play football in the dark on a
ploughed field in a clay soil after three weeks' steady rain, and the
difficulties of the attacking troops might then in some measure be
appreciated.
The left of the 7th Gordon Highlanders and the right of the 6th Black
Watch were delayed in their advance by machine-guns from the south of
the "Y" Ravine. The German garrison on the point of this salient was
thus able to man the front trench, and beat off our attack at this point
by the volume of their fire. Here the enemy maintained himself for
several hours. Being in a position from which they obtained splendid
observation both to the north and south, they made communication with
the forward troops who had swept on, on either flank extremity,
difficult.
[Illustration: MAP III.--BEAUMONT HAMEL, 13TH NOVEMBER 1916.]
A gap had also been caused in the centre of the next battalion
through wire just south of the crater, which had been screened from
observation by being uncut.
On the left of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, the 8th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders had received a temporary check caused by
machine-gun fire on their extreme left, and had suffered heavily. The
remainder of the battalion had, however, pressed forward on the flanks,
captured the guns, and enabled the advance to be continued to the third
German line.
By 7.50 A.M. it was reported that troops of both brigades had reached
the third German line, and many prisoners had been taken, but pockets of
Germans were still holding out in various points in the first and second
lines. These pockets were, no doubt, formed by parties of the enemy who
had come up into the front line out of the various underground tunnels.
Casualties had been unduly heavy, as the state of the ground had proved
in places so bad that the troops had been unable to keep up with the
barrage.
At this hour the position in the village was obscure. The 153rd Infantry
Brigade had employed all its reserves in its endeavour to carry the "Y"
Ravine, where a party of the enemy, estimated at from three to four
hundred strong, was offering a most gallant and successful resistance,
all attacks to overcome them being beaten off.
Two companies of the 4th Gordon Highlanders from the Divisional reserve
were therefore ordered forward and placed at the disposal of General
Campbell. Meanwhile General Burn had ordered forward a company from the
reserve battalion (6th Gordon Highlanders) to fill the gap caused in the
ranks of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders by uncut wire. This company
successfully entered the German second line, but was unable to debouch
from it owing to machine-gun fire from the German third line. Two
bombing squads from the 6th Gordon Highlanders were therefore sent
forward to clear the front. These squads were extremely well handled by
their leaders, and by attacking the machine-guns in the third line from
the flank succeeded in capturing 2 officers and 51 men. This action
enabled the whole of the right battalion to reach the Green line. Two
other bombing squads were also ordered forward from the 6th Gordon
Highlanders to bomb southwards, so as to clear the left flank of the
6th Black Watch. It was not, however, until dusk that all resistance in
this area was successfully overcome.
The 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were meanwhile consolidating
the Green line in touch with the 2nd Division on their left.
At this time little news could be obtained by headquarters of the 153rd
Brigade, as all their runners were killed or wounded by Germans still
holding out in the trench system. The situation was therefore obscure
except at the "Y" Ravine, which was known to be held by the enemy. The
two companies 4th Gordon Highlanders were therefore ordered to supply
three bombing parties to work inwards towards the "Y" Ravine, one from
the north and two from the south.
The 5th Gordon Highlanders, who had followed in support of the leading
battalions south of the salient, were fighting with elements of the 6th
Black Watch and the 7th Gordon Highlanders for the German second line.
In front of the salient parties of men who had been held up had returned
to the British front line. These men were collected by Lieut.-Colonel T.
M. Booth, D.S.O., commanding 6th Black Watch. He at once sent out
patrols to locate exactly where the enemy was holding out, and on the
information thus obtained organised a fresh attack against the "Y"
Ravine.
Colonel Booth arrived with this party just as Lieutenant Leslie of the
6th Black Watch, by a most gallant action, had gained an entrance at the
point of the "Y" Ravine. He was immediately followed by Colonel Booth
with forty men and a Lewis gun, and by parties of the 5th and 7th Gordon
Highlanders who had been hanging on to the occupants of the "Y" Ravine
all the morning.
During all this time a party of about a hundred of the 6th Black Watch
and 5th and 7th Gordon Highlanders were in the centre of the "Y" Ravine,
where they had been surrounded by Germans who had emerged from dug-outs
and tunnels and pinned them to their ground by machine-gun fire. As soon
as Colonel Booth and Lieutenant Leslie arrived and a bombing action had
begun, these men began bombing outwards from their position, and cleared
the whole ravine up to the third German line.
General Campbell then ordered the 4th Gordon Highlanders to advance to
the Green line. This operation was carried out without opposition, the
6th Black Watch in the Third German line joining in the advance.
On arrival in the Green line, the 4th Gordon Highlanders learnt that the
7th Gordon Highlanders had not only reached the Green line according to
plan, but had continued their advance 250 yards beyond in the direction
of the Yellow line. At this point they encountered and captured fifty
Germans. In this advanced position they remained for some considerable
time, but as no troops came to support them on either flank, they
finally withdrew to the Green line. Every runner that had been sent back
by these companies to report their position was either killed or wounded
in attempting to pass through the German trench system.
Even after the capture of the Green line on the whole Divisional front,
isolated pockets of the enemy continued to offer resistance,
particularly on the south-western edge of the village. Here a belt of
marshy country, just east of the mine crater, had been found impossible
to cross owing to the depth of the mud. The result was that the Germans
in this area were not put out of action until troops from the reserve
had moved round the northern edge of the marsh and attacked them in
flank.
At 10.30 A.M. two tanks were sent forward to clear up isolated pockets
of the enemy still holding out in the village. This was the first
occasion on which the Division had co-operated with tanks. The condition
of the ground was, however, such that the tanks only just reached the
German front line. By the time they had travelled this distance they had
built up great mounds of mud under their bellies, which prevented their
further advance.
One of the tank officers, incidentally a Scot, refused, however, to be
prevented from joining in the fight. He therefore made some captured
Germans carry his Hotchkiss guns and their ammunition up to the Green
line, where he joined in the consolidation.
The attack on the Yellow line, apart from the individual effort of the
two companies of the 7th Gordon Highlanders, never took place. The
fighting had been so severe that, by the time the leading troops reached
the Green line, the barrage had been lost irretrievably. Moreover, the
troops detailed for the capture of the Yellow line had been considerably
involved in the fighting for the Green line, and were too reduced in
number for an attack unsupported by an artillery barrage to have any
chance of success.
Later in the day orders were given for the 153rd Brigade to renew the
attack on the Yellow line; they were, however, subsequently cancelled,
as the Corps commander had decided to renew the attack on the following
day.
Towards the evening two companies of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders were placed at General Burn's disposal. The two companies of
the 6th Gordon Highlanders which had not as yet been employed were
therefore ordered to march up the Beaumont Road at dusk and occupy and
consolidate the Green line.
The night was spent in consolidating and reorganising. At 2.30 A.M. on
the night 13-14th orders were issued for the attack on Munich Trench to
be resumed at 5.45 A.M., the remaining two companies of the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders and two companies of the 9th Royal Scots
being placed at General Burn's disposal for the purpose.
The headquarters and the remaining two companies of the 9th Royal Scots
were placed at the disposal of General Campbell. During the night a
telephone message, spoken over a faulty wire, was misunderstood, and the
attack was cancelled instead of being postponed. When this error had
been discovered, a fresh attack was initiated, in which the 7th Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders carried out a most successful bombing
operation up Beaumont Alley and Leave Trench, and occupied Munich
Trench. This attack, hastily improvised as it was, was admirably and
gallantly executed, and was a complete success. Subsequently, however,
the Argylls could not maintain themselves in their exposed position in a
trench almost obliterated, and withdrew to Leave Alley.
On the night of the 14th the 2/2 Highland Field Company, R.E., and one
company of the 8th Royal Scots dug a new trench 150 yards west of Munich
Trench. This trench was named New Munich Trench, and was occupied by a
garrison before dawn.
During daylight on the 14th, the 4th Gordon Highlanders took over the
whole of the Green line on the 153rd Brigade front, the 6th Black Watch
returning to Mailly-Maillet Wood. On the 152nd Brigade front the 6th
Gordon Highlanders similarly took over the whole of the Green line, the
5th Seaforth Highlanders and the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
being withdrawn to Mailly-Maillet, and the 6th Seaforth Highlanders to
the old British trench area.
At 9.50 P.M. on 14th November, General Burn was ordered to prepare an
attack in conjunction with the 2nd Division, the frontage of attack of
the 152nd Brigade being that portion of Frankfurt Trench between Leave
Avenue and Glory Lane. At 5.30 A.M. orders were received that the attack
was to take place at 9 A.M.
The attack was made by two fresh companies of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, who had relieved the troops in New Munich Trench
during the night. One company of the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders was in support.
The 2nd Division formed up with its right on the Waggon Road at least
500 yards in rear of New Munich Trench. The lifts of the artillery
barrage of the 51st Division were therefore arranged to suit the major
attack by the 2nd Division. It was placed, in the first instance, in
Munich Trench, and subsequently lifted on the Frankfurt Trench by bounds
of fifty yards. These short bounds in the barrage were arranged so as to
allow the 2nd Division time to come up into line.
When the attack was launched, it was found that the enemy was no longer
holding Munich Trench, so that it was occupied without difficulty.
However, after passing Munich Trench, the attackers ran into our own
barrage, and suffered severe losses sufficient to disorganise the whole
attack. This unfortunate incident was due to the impetuosity of the men.
Their previous training had been to follow a barrage which moved forward
by bounds of a hundred yards. No blame, therefore, rests with the
artillery, the over-anxiety of the men to gain their objective being the
sole cause. Only a few individuals managed to reach Frankfurt Trench.
While this action was in progress, the right of the 2nd Division had
lost direction, and had come up in rear of the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, reaching Leave Avenue to the west of Munich
Trench.
In these circumstances it was decided not to renew the attack without
further artillery preparation.
This attack was an unfortunate conclusion to what had otherwise been a
successful series of operations. Had the 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders succeeded in capturing Frankfurt Trench, their position "in
the air" on a 300 yards front would have been a precarious one, and a
source of embarrassment to the artillery when called upon to bombard the
remainder of the trench.
To ensure success, it would have been advisable to have made certain
that the 2nd Division's line of attack was abreast of the 51st
Division's before a further advance against Frankfurt Trench was made.
The chances of success would also have been greatly increased if the
whole attack had been carried out by a formation under one command.
During the day of the 15th, the 154th Brigade took over the whole battle
front from the 152nd and 153rd Brigades.
The 51st Division took no further part in active operations, although it
continued to hold New Munich Trench until 17th November, on which date
the foremost positions were taken over by the 32nd Division.
* * * * *
The battle of Beaumont Hamel was the foundation-stone on which the
reputation of the Highland Division was built. General Harper's
leap-frog system of attack had been proved; his attack with two brigades
instead of three had been fully justified, and an experience had been
gained from which the future training of the Division was evolved.
The whole position up to and including the Green line had been captured
with over two thousand prisoners and a vast amount of material in a few
hours. Moreover, had the positions of the Divisions on the flanks been
less obscure, an advance to the Yellow line could have been undertaken
with every prospect of success.
The satisfactory results of these operations may be put down to the
following causes:--
First, to the resolution and gallantry of the officers and men. In spite
of heavy losses and of the appalling state of the ground, they pressed
on to their objectives with the greatest determination. In many cases
the barrage was irretrievably lost. The resistance of a courageous and
cunning enemy, protected by the strongest field defences that experience
could devise, had then to be overcome by the superior fighting qualities
of the infantry soldier alone. The manner in which he overcame this
resistance was in accordance with the highest traditions of the Highland
regiments.
The artillery played no small part in this battle. The heavy gunners had
demolished the enemy's trenches in an exemplary manner. In the village
of Beaumont Hamel there was barely a square yard that was not torn up by
shell-fire. The deep dug-outs alone escaped destruction, and even in
their case many entrances were blown in. A German battalion headquarters
sustained three direct hits, all of which went through the roof. In one
case two layers of reinforced concrete and one layer of tree-trunks had
been penetrated. In the enemy front line machine-gun emplacements, made
of concrete over a metre thick, were in many cases wrecked.
Both the destruction of the wire and the accuracy of the barrage further
strengthened the great confidence of the infantry in the Divisional
artillery. It was the first occasion on which most of the troops had
followed an artillery barrage. Those who were able to keep up with it
could not speak too highly of its accuracy.
The decision to have no preliminary bombardment immediately before the
attack proved to have been a wise one. Such a bombardment would only
have served to warn the enemy of our intention to attack. As it was, the
infantry began their advance the moment the artillery opened. They were
thus able to assault the front line within a few seconds of the barrage
having lifted. The enemy was in consequence to a large extent taken by
surprise, and large numbers of them were captured before they had had
time to leave their dug-outs.
The enemy had, however, this advantage. It could not be told whether a
shaft was the entrance to a dug-out or to a tunnel connecting two lines
of trenches. As a result, it was difficult to ensure that any particular
trench would remain cleared of Boches. The large traversed dug-outs
were also difficult to clear up. A Mills bomb did not seem to have much
effect on their occupants. A phosphorus bomb, however, bolted eighty-six
Germans in all stages of undress out of a single dug-out.
The machine-gun barrage appeared to have been very effective. The 7th
Gordon Highlanders reported a considerable number of German dead between
the Green and Yellow lines who are believed to have been caught in this
barrage. The machine-gunners who went forward with the attacking waves
also executed their tasks admirably.
Vickers guns were in position in the German front line within half an
hour of zero. One gun-team had some close-range fighting with revolvers
and bombs, and captured seventeen prisoners, not, however, before the
section officer had been wounded and a sergeant killed.
Vickers guns were assigned definite roles in the consolidation and were
placed in depth throughout the captured area. Several guns took up
advanced positions well east of the Green line.
The light trench-mortar batteries fired in the initial barrage,
according to all reports, with considerable accuracy. Subsequently two
mortars were placed at the disposal of each battalion commander to be
employed to assist the advance when required. In the attack on Frankfurt
Trench on the morning of the 15th, four Stokes mortars of the 152nd
Trench-Mortar Battery fired in the preliminary bombardment. These
mortars carried out their task extremely well in difficult
circumstances. They did not leave brigade headquarters until 3 A.M., but
by 6 A.M. they were dug into their positions with 20 rounds per gun in
the emplacements.
Among the prisoners captured were two battalion commanders with their
staffs complete. These were captured by 2nd Lieutenant G. V. Edwards of
the 6th Seaforth Highlanders and Lieutenant W. D. Munro of the 8th
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, both since killed in action. These
officers had been detailed to lead their platoons straight to certain
points which had been marked as battalion headquarters on a captured
map. The result of this plan was that the battalion commanders were
rounded up and captured before they had had time to exercise any
influence on the battle by the use of their reserves.
The headquarters allotted to Lieutenant Edwards for capture was situated
in an enormous cave. Some 300-400 prisoners surrendered to his party in
the first instance, but as his platoon was by this time considerably
reduced in numbers, he was compelled to hand them over to troops of the
Naval Division under the command of a chaplain. It was, however,
undoubtedly due to Lieutenant Edwards that these men took no part in the
battle.
The leading of these two platoons was admirable. The exact manner in
which their instructions were carried out considerably upset the enemy's
defensive arrangements.
The captured booty included weapons of all kinds, with the exception of
artillery, as well as large magazines of ammunition. In addition, a
large canteen containing tinned beef from Monte Video, Norwegian
sardines, cigarettes (including Wills' Gold Flake), cigars, and many
thousand bottles of excellent soda and of beer fell into the hands of
the Jocks and was much appreciated. For many days afterwards the Jocks
were to be seen walking out smoking large cigars with evident
satisfaction.
Further, a piano, some ladies' dancing slippers, silk stockings, and
petticoats were also found, but there was no evidence to show whether
they belonged to a German lady or to a local Boche "Gertie."
A light trench-mortar battery officer also captured the whole of the
German incoming mail.
The casualties sustained by the Division during the month of November
amounted to 123 officers killed, wounded, and missing, and 2355 other
ranks. For modern warfare these were not heavy, particularly when
compared with the number of prisoners captured during the operations. It
must, however, be borne in mind that at the time of the battle the
battalions were extremely weak in numbers. The casualties during the
action represented 45 per cent of those who took part in the attack.
The results of the capture of Beaumont Hamel were far-reaching. It was
undoubtedly the loss of this stronghold and its immediate effects which
largely determined the German High Command to evacuate in the following
spring the salient formed in their lines during the battle of the Somme.
The artillery arrangements made for this battle introduced for the
first time that liaison with the heavy artillery which, as far as the
Division was concerned, continued until the end of the war, and was of
the greatest value to the infantry. For this the Division is mainly
indebted to Brigadier-General R. P. Benson, C.B., C.M.G., commanding the
Vth Corps Heavy Artillery.
On 19th November the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 154th Infantry
Brigade. The 5th Seaforth Highlanders formed into two composite
companies, and the 6th Gordon Highlanders took over the Green line. The
6th Seaforth Highlanders and the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders,
each formed into two composite companies, took over the old British
trench system. On completion of this relief the 152nd Brigade came under
the orders of the 32nd Division.
This tour of duty was uneventful, the enemy carrying out no infantry
action. He was, however, at times fairly active with his artillery,
particularly against the village of Beaumont Hamel and the Green line.
The weather, however, remained bad, dense fogs continuing day after day,
so that the enemy had little chance of locating our positions.
During this tour of duty an immense amount of salvage work was carried
out. The whole battlefield was cleared of arms and equipment; old dumps
were moved forward so as to be available for use in the consolidation of
the Green line. Large parties were also employed in collecting the dead,
and loading the bodies on to waggons, so that they might be buried in
the British cemeteries at Mailly-Maillet or Auchonvillers. Parties were
also employed in burying the numerous skeletons which lay scattered
about the old No Man's Land. These were the remains of the troops who
had taken part in the unsuccessful attack on Beaumont Hamel on 1st July.
The flesh had been devoured from the bones by the rats, which swarmed in
thousands, and made their homes in the empty trunks. Six hundred and
sixty-nine of these skeletons were buried on the front of the 152nd
Brigade alone--an unpleasant task, and one which had a considerable
effect on the highly-tried nerves of some of the men.
On 23rd November an operation was arranged by the 32nd Division with the
object of relieving 5 officers and 120 of their men who had been
isolated and surrounded in Frankfurt Trench. They had made their
position known by attracting the attention of a British aeroplane.
Later, several of these men made their way back to our lines at night,
and reported that the position of the party was desperate. They had few
bombs, and depended for rations on what they could recover from the dead
at night. The only water they had to drink was obtained from
shell-holes. They, further, had several severely wounded men, who
required immediate attention if their lives were to be saved. In support
of this operation the 6th Gordon Highlanders were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to move in case the enemy were to
counter-attack.
The attack was timed to take place at 3.30 P.M. It, however, failed in
its object, the attackers being unable to do more than gain a footing in
Munich Trench. In consequence, the isolated party, after a most gallant
and prolonged resistance, were compelled by the circumstances to
surrender.
On the morning of the 24th the 152nd Brigade was relieved by the 7th
Division. A dense fog enabled the relieving troops to march by parties
up the old Beaumont Road into their positions, with their company
officers still mounted.
Lieut.-General Sir E. A. Fanshawe, K.C.B., commanding the Vth Corps,
summed up the part played by the Division in the battle of the Ancre as
follows:--
"The 51st Division leaves this Corps to-morrow to take a place in
another part of the line, and although this postpones a well-earned
rest, it is also a sure sign of the very efficient state of the
Division that it should be called upon to do this by the army after its
recent splendid fight.
"It is evident from the newspapers that all the world looks upon the
capture of Beaumont Hamel as one of the greatest feats of arms in the
war, and to those who know the ground and the defences it must ever be
a marvellously fine performance.
"I can only hope that the good-bye which the Vth Corps now wish the
51st Division is for a short time, and that the good luck may be for
many years to come."
One of the Jocks summed it up more briefly in the single sentence,
"Onyway, they winna ca' us Hairper's Duds noo."
The spirit of the men in this battle is exemplified by a certain Jock
who was found lying in a shell-hole in advance of the Green line, with a
shattered leg, forty-eight hours after he had been hit. He was asked by
the medical officer if no one had come near him, and he replied, "Aye, a
German Red Cross man came up to me." "Surely he attended to you," said
the M.O. "Attended to me?" replied the Jock, "I flung a boom at the
blighter."