TRAINING AND REORGANISATION--THE LABYRINTH.
The Division was now out of the line for the first time under General
Harper's command, and the latter lost no time in instructing officers
and men in a form of attack which at the time was employed by no other
Division.
Past experience, emphasised by the battle of Loos, had made it evident
that to hold captured ground against the inevitable counter-attack, the
attackers have not only to compete with the enemy actually manning the
assaulted trenches. They must, in addition, dispose themselves at the
end of the advance in a manner which enables them to resist the
counter-attacks which will inevitably be delivered by the enemy's
reserves. In the past, the objectives of the attack had not been
sufficiently clearly defined, with the result that the forward movement
frequently came to an end with some bodies of troops far in advance of
others, and all in a state of disorganisation. The foremost troops were
thus left exposed, holding insufficiently consolidated salients, and
disposed in a manner which prevented command being adequately exercised
over them. The result was that the enemy was able to employ his fresh
reserves against the tired and disorganised troops holding these
salients. His counter-attacks, organised so as to be delivered both
frontally and from the flanks, were in consequence frequently
successful.
It thus followed that Divisions which in the early phases of an attack
had carried out a brilliant advance, were subsequently in the later
stages often overwhelmed and severely cut up.
It had, further, been the custom in the past for the same body of troops
to be ordered to fight its way through a succession of trench lines or
defended localities. Thus, as the action progressed, the attack became
weaker and more disorganised through casualties, and so increasingly
lost its driving power. At the same time, when the forward movement came
to a standstill, no organised bodies of troops were left suitably
disposed to hold the ground gained.
The plan of attack adopted by the 51st Division was designed to
eradicate both these sources of failure. It was realised that if
counter-attacks were to be defeated, the advance must be made in a
series of clearly-defined bounds. Each bound was to be made good before
the operations for the capture of the next began.
Further, the idea was to employ a fresh body of troops for each bound.
Thus, when the troops detailed for a particular bound had reached their
objective, they remained on it, and disposed themselves in the most
suitable manner to hold the ground they had gained against
counter-attacks. A fresh body of troops then passed through them and
made good the next bound, consolidating in their turn the ground gained.
This form of attack became the sealed pattern for all attacks carried
out by the Highland Division, and was largely responsible for the many
outstanding successes of the Division.
Gradually as the war progressed and the Division achieved one success
after another, its value became apparent, and it eventually became the
stereotyped form of attack in the majority of the Divisions in France.
During this period, apart from the training of units under their own
commanders, Divisional schools of instruction were formed to give
individual training to officers and N.C.O.'s. A Divisional grenade
school was formed, at which 13 officers and 260 other ranks were put
through a course every week. At this course instruction was given in the
Mills bomb, which had now replaced the former types of improvised bomb.
A Divisional school for infantry was also opened at Villers-Bocage under
Lieut.-Colonel D. Baird, commanding the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders. At this school 20 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s attended a
series of fourteen-day courses. The object of this school was to
increase the powers of command of the senior officers and N.C.O.'s, and
to improve their knowledge of tactics.
A show-ground was also laid out, where the best methods to be adopted in
trench warfare could be demonstrated. Here also types of trenches
suitable to the varying natures and conditions of ground were
constructed for purposes of instruction.
On 8th February the course of training was interrupted by the move of
the Division to the Daours area, with a view to taking over from the
30th Division, on the sector on the north bank of the Somme. The orders
for this relief were, however, cancelled on the 18th February, and the
Division moved back to the Flesselles area.
During this period the composition of the Division underwent
considerable alteration. The three Lancashire battalions left the
Division on 3rd January 1916 to join the 55th (West Lancashire)
Division.
The 6th Scottish Rifles joined the 33rd Division. They were met again
later by many of their former comrades of the Highland Division in High
Wood in July and August 1916.
These four battalions were replaced by the 4th and 5th Black Watch, the
4th Seaforths and 4th Camerons. Brigadier-General C. E. Stewart, Black
Watch, was placed in command of this brigade, and it retained the title
154th Infantry Brigade.
In February 1916 further changes took place; the 4th and 5th Black Watch
were posted to General Headquarters, and the 4th Camerons to the Base.
These three battalions were replaced in the 154th Infantry Brigade by
the 9th Royal Scots, the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders.
All the battalions in the reconstituted 154th Infantry Brigade had
landed in France some months before the remainder of the Division, being
posted to various regular brigades as an additional battalion.
Thus, as regards the infantry, the original composition of the Highland
Division was restored, with the exception of the 4th Cameron
Highlanders, the 6th Gordon Highlanders, and the 9th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders.
During the same month changes were also made as regards the organisation
of machine-guns. The infantry battalions had joined the Expeditionary
Force each equipped with two machine-guns under the command of the
battalion machine-gun officer. In July 1915 the battalion machine-gun
section was increased by an additional two guns.
In January 1916 a machine-gun company of sixteen guns was affiliated to
each brigade. These companies were formed by the amalgamation of the
four battalion machine-gun sections in each brigade, Captains Hardie,
Calder, and Board commanding the companies of the 152nd, 153rd, and
154th Infantry Brigades respectively.
In the early part of 1916 the trench-mortar situation was greatly
improved. Three 2-inch trench-mortar batteries were formed by the
Divisional artillery. These mortars fired the 60-pound bomb already
described known as the "Donald Dinnie." They were still considerably
inferior to the German trench-mortars in range, but they constituted a
considerable advance on all previous experiments. Their chief faults lay
in their liability to misfire, and in their frequent inaccuracy, due to
the boxes containing the component parts not being water-tight.
When the "Donald Dinnie" did burst on its target, the effect was
gratifying. The retaliation they almost invariably drew from the enemy
was the best evidence of their efficacy, and made the duty of serving
the mortars an extremely hazardous one.
In May 1916 a light trench-mortar battery, consisting of four Stokes
mortars, was formed for each brigade. The Stokes gun proved the most
satisfactory British light trench-mortar invented, and remained the
weapon of the light trench-mortar batteries throughout the war.
On 1st March 1916 orders were received for the Division to march
northwards and take over from the 23rd French Division of the XII^{me}
Corps d'Armée in a sector north of Arras, now known to history as the
Labyrinth. This move was due to the necessity for the British to take
over more line from the French. The object was to free as many French
Divisions as possible for the defence of Verdun, against which the
German was delivering his great attack.
Preliminary reconnaissances of the new line by senior commanders and
their staffs began on 3rd March. The first troops moved off to the new
area on 6th March. During the march, the Division staged in the
Beauval-Candas area and the Frevent area. Finally, Divisional
headquarters opened on 12th March at Duisans, General Harper taking over
command of the line at 8 A.M. on that date.
The march to the new area is chiefly memorable to those who took part in
it from the fact that much of it was carried out in a blinding
snowstorm, with all its attendant discomforts.
The cold was intense, and was severely felt by parties proceeding to
carry out preliminary reconnaissances in motor lorries and by the troops
as they arrived each night in new billets.
The Division, after its six weeks period of rest and training, was at
the top of its form, and presented a most soldierly appearance. It had
profited considerably from its training, in spite of the fact that it
had been handicapped by spells of bad weather.
This was the last period of rest of more than ten days' duration which
the Division was to have until the following January.
The new sector extended roughly from the ruined village of Roclincourt
on the right to the ruined village of Neuville St Vaast (exclusive) on
the left. The front line trenches were some thousand yards east of these
two villages.
This country had been the scene of tremendous fighting when the French
had advanced along the Lorette ridge and attacked the Vimy heights in
conjunction with the British operations at Loos.
Here the French had made considerable progress, much of it yard by yard,
after bitter fighting. Their gains, however, had not all been held. The
fighting had been of so desperate and stubborn a nature that French and
Germans had repeatedly dug themselves in close proximity to each
other. As a result, the whole sector consisted of an unintelligible maze
of trenches, aptly called by the French the Labyrinth.
The country in rear of the lines contained many villages now well known
to the Highland Division--the ruins of Ecurie, Anzin, Marœuil, Bray,
Ecoivres, Mont St Eloi. This area can almost be called the spiritual
home of the Highland Division in France, since it occupied it for three
months in 1916, five months in 1917 during the battle of Arras, and
returned there in May 1918. From May onwards it remained in that part of
the world, with the exception of a brief interlude in Champagne, and
from it began its victorious advance which culminated with the
Armistice.
In this sector the whole country-side was overlooked by the enemy in an
astonishing degree. He occupied the famous feature known as the Vimy
Ridge, of which the highest point just north of Thelus reached the
height of 135 metres. His foremost trenches were on the outlying spurs
of the Ridge, while the trenches taken over from the French were in the
low-lying ground at the foot of these spurs.
The enemy thus possessed all the advantages of close observation over
our lines; while, in addition, from the upper slopes of the Ridge, he
obtained a magnificent panoramic view of the whole of the areas in rear
of the British trench systems. On a clear day he could see from Thelus
as far westwards as the road running from Habarcq to the
Hermaville-Arras road.
Moreover, south of the Scarpe, Observatory Ridge stared down at
Roclincourt and Ecurie.
The French, to neutralise his facilities for observation, had
constructed communication trenches of what seemed interminable length.
These ran from Anzin, Marœuil, and Mont St Eloi to the fire trenches,
none of these villages being within two miles of the front line. The
labour of walking along these trenches, all cut on a very winding
pattern, was severe. It, however, fortunately transpired that the French
in constructing trenches of this length had either flattered the enemy's
vigilance, or that his vigilance had subsequently diminished, as it
proved unnecessary to walk inside the trenches, certainly for the first
three-quarters of a mile.
The enemy did, however, keep a sharp look-out for movement on the roads
within range of his artillery. He had, shortly before the Division
arrived, killed a French regimental commander who took the liberty of
riding on horse-back along the Arras-Bethune road.
These long communication trenches were admirably dug by the French
Territorials, who had constructed them, and were still standing and in
daily use when the Division returned to this sector in February of the
following year.
In the British lines the defended village of Ecurie, about 100 metres
above sea-level, afforded a good view of Thelus and of the enemy's
defences at a distance of from 400 to 500 yards behind his front line.
Observation of his front-line trenches could in most places only be
obtained from observation posts in the forward area.
The relief of the French 23rd and 24th Divisions of the XII^{me} Corps
d'Armée was completed by 14th March. It was carried out during a
blizzard of great severity, which continued for forty-eight hours.
During this period the troops could do no more than remain where they
had been placed by their guides, or misplaced as the case might be.
During the relief and, in fact, until the blizzard abated, officers and
men had only a hazy idea as to where they actually were. Similarly
commanders were ignorant of the position of their troops. All three
infantry brigades were in the line--the 154th Brigade on the right in
the vicinity of Roclincourt, the 152nd in the centre, and the 153rd on
the left.
When the weather cleared, it was found that the Division had taken over
from the French an unintelligible tangle of trenches dug in what can
only be described as a vast cemetery, in which the earth in many places
barely covered the dead.
The sector was also honeycombed with mines from end to end, the enemy
apparently being complete masters of the mining situation. In fact, his
supremacy in mining had become so complete that, immediately prior to
the relief, the French had drawn up a scheme for evacuating the front
line except for lightly-held outposts. The plan they had intended to
adopt was to recast the scheme of defence and construct amidst the
existing network of derelict trenches a new support and reserve line.
The scheme had been completed, and was on the point of being put into
execution when the Highland Division took over the sector. The
Divisional commander decided to continue with this policy. The
construction of the new scheme of defences necessitated a vast amount of
work, and was only fairly complete three months later when the Division
left the sector.
This alteration in the siting of the trenches demanded the construction
of an enormous number of dug-outs. It soon became evident that without
these the daily casualty list must be heavy. Not only was the artillery
activity considerable, but the German had also concentrated in this
sector every type of trench-mortar which had been evolved, and was
extremely free in his use of them.
The mining was of a more savage nature than had been the case in La
Boisselle, and in many instances resulted in serious infantry fighting.
The mines were, as a rule, blown by the enemy with two objects. If the
breadth of No Man's Land was not considerable, they were frequently
blown with a view to destroying our trenches with their garrisons. If,
however, the breadth of No Man's Land was great, or his system of
defensive galleries were good, he would blow his mines in No Man's Land
with a view to occupying them as a line of observation and snipers'
posts. By the frequent blowing of this type of mine, he was able to
cover his front with a screen of craters which denied the British
observation of his front line, and created for him a chain of commanding
mounds along our front.
In some cases, if the crater formed by a mine explosion was some
distance from the British front line, no infantry action would follow.
If, however, a mine was blown under a British trench, it was usually
accompanied by an enemy raid, which was planned to enter our trenches
during the confusion caused by the mine and surprise the surviving
garrison. If, on the other hand, it was blown in No Man's Land close to
the British front line, it was necessary at all costs to prevent the
enemy from occupying it. Thus in the two last cases heavy infantry
fighting often occurred. In the latter case, the object of these actions
was to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the crater. If he
did so the position was serious, for the crater became a permanent
menace to the security of our lines. Where the ground might have been
flat, a large hollow mound had now arisen. If the enemy established
himself on the British side of the mound (_i.e._, the near lip, as it
was called), he might construct sniping-posts which would dominate the
trenches. Should he only establish himself on the far lip, he still was
able, by working around the lip of the crater towards the flank, to
shoot down into our trenches in enfilade.
It was suggested that the Germans, by some peculiar method of tamping
(_i.e._, packing the explosive in the chamber), used to blow his craters
with the far lip higher than the near lip. Thus, if he only established
himself on the far lip, the near lip, being lower, did not obscure his
view to the front; conversely the view from the near lip, if occupied by
the British, was obscured to the front by the higher far lip. Whether
his craters were formed in this manner from accident (_i.e._, the lie of
the ground) or from design is not clear. The fact remained that an
examination of many craters in the Neuville St Vaast area proved this to
be the case.
These crater fights often developed into considerable minor operations
involving many casualties. They almost always took place in the dark,
and were an unpleasant ordeal for all concerned.
The crater, still smoking from its base like a miniature volcano; the
stench of the fumes; the whiteness of the freshly-turned chalk standing
out in the darkness, produced a setting which intensified the normal
horrors of battle.
When the German blew a mine he, of course, knew the hour and the place
at which the explosion would occur. He knew also from the depth of his
gallery and from the amount of explosive used how close to the spot his
assaulting troops might assemble without fear from the falling débris.
He was also able to assemble dumps of loophole plates, prepared and
portable obstacles, bombs, &c., close to the scene of operations. The
troops might or might not have been warned that a mine was to be
expected in a certain area.
In these circumstances he therefore started with the odds considerably
in his favour; and yet, as will be seen, as far as the Highland Division
was concerned, he seldom met with the success he anticipated.
His plan was to form up his consolidating party as close to the place
where the crater was to be blown as was safe. He then blew the mine, and
simultaneously opened a barrage of artillery, trench-mortars, and rifle
grenades, &c., on the two flanks and on the British side of the crater.
He thus hoped to deny to our troops access to it. Under cover of this
barrage he then rushed his assaulting parties up to the crater, and
attempted to consolidate posts both on the near and far lips.
Immediately, therefore, that a mine was blown, parties had to be
organised to rush to the crater and seize at least the near lip. These
parties had, of course, no previous knowledge as to the time at which
the mine was to be exploded. They were also liable to be temporarily
disorganised in the general confusion caused by the explosion. Thus, as
a rule, when the crater fighting began, the enemy was already on the
near lip before our parties were fairly on the scene.
A closely-contested fight would then ensue with bombs, Lewis guns, and
rifles, and would continue until the enemy had been ejected at all
events from the near lip. Posts would then be established on it, and a
sap would be dug connecting the posts to the foremost British trench.
In these encounters casualties were frequently heavy, as the parties had
often to pass through a heavy barrage, followed by their bomb carriers.
The latter were employed in large numbers, as in this form of warfare
several hundred bombs were often thrown in one night.
On first taking over, the mining situation was obscure. The French
tunnellers had been withdrawn, leaving only old French Territorials to
man the listening galleries. These veterans considered this duty _très
dangereux_, as indeed it was.
In consequence, the period was marked by a constant state of anxiety as
to what portions of the line were safe from the possibility of being
blown up at any moment.
However, on the arrival of the British tunnelling companies, which were
again largely reinforced by the coal miners in the Division, accurate
information was soon obtained as regards the enemy's underground
activity. The defensive galleries were first perfected, so that timely
warning could be given of any mine that he was likely to explode. By
this means camouflets could be used to hinder his progress. Subsequently
it became possible to take the offensive, and mines were blown to
destroy his crater positions and trenches.
Later, when heavy calls were made upon the German troops to sustain the
fighting on the Somme, they were compelled to relax their efforts in
this sector, with the result that the British tunnellers established a
marked superiority over them.
As soon as the aforementioned blizzard had cleared and commanders could
find out the disposition of the men, it became evident that the ground
in the forward area was far too thickly held. Orders were in consequence
issued for the line to be thinned immediately. Small sectors of disused
trenches were dug out to accommodate the surplus men temporarily while a
more detailed scheme of defence could be formulated.
The advisability of this measure was soon proved, as from 24th March
mines were continually being exploded under or in close proximity to the
front line. A typical case occurred on 26th March, when at 2.30 A.M. the
enemy fired two mines simultaneously, one on the left of the 152nd
Brigade, the other on the right of the 153rd.
These explosions were followed by a heavy bombardment of our front and
support trenches with shrapnel, all types of trench-mortar bombs, and
rifle and machine-gun fire. A party of about eight Germans then advanced
towards the crater in the 153rd Brigade area, but were driven back by
two officers and a party of grenadiers. Our losses were severe: 4
officers (1 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 missing) and 74 other ranks (14
killed, 24 wounded, and 36 missing). In addition, there were 24 other
ranks suffering from shock. Of these, one company of the 6th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders lost 2nd Lieutenant M'Neil and 4 men killed, 5
wounded, and 15 missing. The missing were those unfortunate men who were
buried by the falling earth. Of these two craters, the one on the right
proved to be seventy yards in length.
On 31st March another mine was fired by the Germans on the front of the
153rd Brigade, with the loss of 1 officer wounded, 6 other ranks killed
and 3 wounded. The explosion of this mine was also followed by an
intense bombardment by weapons of all natures. A party of Germans then
entered a sap. Of these one approached a Jock who had survived the
explosion, and pointing his rifle at him, said, "Hands up, Englishman!"
The infuriated Jock threw a Mills bomb at the German, having failed to
remove the safety-pin, and shouted, "Scotsman, you ---- bastard." The
bomb struck the German full on the forehead and felled him. He was
captured, and subsequently died in the casualty clearing station from a
fractured skull.
The 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were particularly unfortunate
as regards mines, and by the 10th April had already experienced six
mines on their fronts.
On 28th April four mines were exploded in front of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders and 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The resultant
casualties to these two battalions were 6 officers wounded at duty, 12
other ranks killed, 75 wounded, and 30 missing, believed buried. The
explosions of these mines were followed by a forty-five minutes' intense
bombardment. The Divisional artillery, however, opened a barrage on the
enemy's lines opposite the newly-formed craters with such rapidity that
he was unable to employ his infantry. Throughout the whole period the
manner in which the artillery supported the infantry in this form of
warfare was admirable, and gave the latter great encouragement.
The explosion of mines became of such frequent occurrence that the
troops became very expert in rapidly seizing and consolidating craters.
Dumps were made at frequent intervals along the front containing all the
materials required for consolidation. In a short time the troops could
be relied on to establish themselves on the near lip, however
unexpectedly a crater might be blown. This was largely due to the
gallantry and initiative of the junior officers, on whose skill and
leading success in these enterprises was dependent.
Demonstrations were given in consolidation, and a platoon for each
front-line battalion was ear-marked for the consolidation of any mine
crater which might be blown on the battalion's front.
A natural concomitant to mining was sniping. The lip of a crater affords
an excellent post from which to snipe, particularly when, as was the
case in this sector, the ground sloped from the German position towards
the British. The trenches on this sector were also particularly open.
After the enemy positions in this sector had been captured by the
Division in April 1917, an examination was made of the German crater
posts. It was astonishing to see to what an extent he could look down
into the British trenches. It was realised at the time that men walking
along the trenches were often under observation, and, indeed, the
casualties from sniping proved that this was so. It was not, however,
appreciated till later to what a degree men in the trenches,
particularly the communication trenches, were visible to the Germans. In
some places even the duck-boards at the bottom of the trenches were in
enemy view.
The result of this situation was that at first the enemy made a
considerable bag by sniping; Colonel Campbell, commanding the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders, was killed by a sniper the day after the Division
had taken over the line. Within a fortnight his successor was killed in
a similar way.
However, the Highland Division, with a number of stalkers and gillies in
its ranks, had probably the best material the country produced from
which to make snipers. After a short period devoted to organisation and
training, the snipers of the Division soon obtained a superiority over
the enemy. It, however, always remained a sector in which the greatest
care had to be exercised in looking over the parapet or in moving
amongst the saps and forward boyaux. Enemy snipers were continually
shattering periscopes with rifle shots.
In the Labyrinth the Division made its first organised raids. These
raids consisted in heavily barraging a certain area, then at a given
moment the barrage lifted off certain portions of this area and allowed
the assaulting infantry to enter it. The barrage remained down on three
sides of the area to protect the attackers who entered it from the
fourth side from interference from without while they were destroying
the Germans within. This form of barrage, originally first employed by
the Germans, was known as the Box Barrage.
The two most successful raids which took place during this period were
those carried out by Lieutenant E. A. Mackintosh of the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders (since killed in action), and Captain Herd of the 6th Black
Watch. The former was in consequence awarded the Military Cross, and the
latter the D.S.O.
Raids subsequently became of such frequent occurrence that want of
space forbids description of them all. Certain raids have, however, been
selected for description, which will be dealt with later.
These raids in particular brought to light certain facts concerning
German trench construction. The German trenches did not resemble the
small ditch-like trenches commonly seen at schools of instruction and
training grounds. They can better be compared to the marker's gallery in
a rifle range. They were ten to eleven feet deep, with the sides for the
most part revetted with planks. To get into them was not easy; to get
out of them still less easy; while evacuating the wounded from them was
a matter of very considerable difficulty. In fact, in the case of
Mackintosh's raid, it is doubtful if his wounded could have been brought
back to our lines at all had not a sally-port through which the more
severely wounded were carried been discovered.
On 21st May the enemy became extremely active. The Divisional artillery
were heavily bombarded during the afternoon and evening with
lachrymatory shells, as also were the communication trenches. At the
same time the trenches of the 25th Division on the left of the Highland
Division, and of the 47th Division, were intensely bombarded. Marœuil,
Anzin, and Mont St Eloi were also shelled during the night, as well as
several villages in rear of the 25th and 47th Divisional areas. At
Marœuil an 8-inch shell burst in the 152nd Brigade headquarter office
within a few seconds of the clerks having left it for the cellar,
completely wrecking it, and killing the staff captain's two horses,
which were tethered outside it.
This bombardment culminated in a successful hostile attack, the enemy,
with apparently little difficulty, attaining his object and establishing
himself firmly on the western slopes of the Vimy Ridge.
The cause of his success was due to the fact that he succeeded in
secretly concentrating a large force of artillery with which to support
his attack. He then subjected all the trenches involved to a bombardment
of an intensity which in those days was considered unparalleled. The
garrisons of the trenches attacked were almost completely without the
protection of shell-proof dug-outs, and the defenders were thus for the
most part killed or wounded by the bombardment before the infantry
attack was launched.
At this juncture the Divisional sector was considerably increased; in
fact, the Division took over the whole front of the XVIIth Corps. This
extension was caused by the necessity of withdrawing troops from this
part of the line preparatory to the Somme battle.
The 152nd Brigade was withdrawn on 23rd May, the 153rd and 154th
Brigades extending their brigade sectors so as to include the area
previously held by the 152nd. On the nights 1-2nd June and 2-3rd the
152nd Brigade moved northwards and relieved troops of the 25th Division
in the Neuville St Vaast sector.
To conceal from the enemy the fact that the whole Corps front was held
by the Highland Division alone, the kilt was no longer worn by the
troops in the line, khaki trousers being issued instead.
The situation in the new sector taken over by the 152nd Brigade was a
curious one. The extreme left of the enemy's attack on the Vimy Ridge
rested on the left boundary of the new sector. Thus on the brigade left
boundary in the front and support lines the British and the Germans
occupied the same trenches, sandbag bombing-stops alone separating them.
In some cases the British held communication trenches while the Germans
occupied the trench into which the communication trench led,
bombing-blocks again separating the two forces.
Across these blocks lively exchanges of bombs and rifle grenades
spasmodically occurred. The distance separating the opposing sides was,
however, so small that artillery and trench-mortars could be used by
neither owing to the danger of short rounds inflicting casualties on
friends as well as foes.
In these circumstances the left flank in the front and support lines was
very unprotected and presented to the enemy a "raw edge." It was an
uncomfortable situation, as there appeared to be every prospect of the
enemy's developing his initial success by a flank attack delivered
southwards from the area into which he had penetrated.
The feeling of apprehension on this score was accentuated by the fact
that if he supported this attack with a similar concentration of
artillery, the absence of shell-proof dug-outs in the Neuville St Vaast
sector would ensure for him success. In these circumstances the
artillery would have had an easy task, as this sector was completely
overlooked by a high crater called Broadmarsh, from which the Germans
obtained magnificent observation of the whole Divisional left front.
Broadmarsh crater was an awe-inspiring feature that appeared to follow
one with its eyes wherever one went. It was like a volcano that might
erupt at any moment, and played a prominent part in every minor
enterprise which took place in its vicinity.
In these adverse circumstances it became clear that the only way a
hostile attack against the Neuville St Vaast sector could be defeated
was by employing to the full every day's grace which the enemy gave.
A defensive flank was therefore sited and its construction begun, so as
to round off the defences where the troops were in closest contact to
the enemy and present to him a continuous front rather than an edge. The
digging of a reserve line was also put in hand, and the construction of
a large number of shell-proof dug-outs begun.
In actual fact the enemy made no further attacks, but he maintained a
continuous activity with artillery and trench-mortars. Later, after the
Somme battle had begun, the calls made on the German troops compelled
him to relax his efforts considerably. The feeling of tension was thus
appreciably lessened, though the sector could at no time be described as
a quiet one.
During this period of anxiety the situation was made still more
difficult by a snap of bitterly cold weather in June, which had followed
a period of violent rain-storms. The result was that a number of cases
of trench-feet occurred in midsummer, when all materials and stores used
for the prevention of this complaint had been handed in as no longer
required.
The weather, combined with the constant work on trench construction and
the continual mine explosions and bombardments, proved very wearing to
the men. At this period, with all three brigades employed in holding the
line, the men were in the trench area for twenty-one days and at rest
only for seven every month. The result was that, when the Division was
ordered to the Somme, they had, owing to the constant strain, become
thoroughly tired and stale. Indeed, in the Labyrinth and Neuville St
Vaast sectors, trench warfare, as far as the Highland Division was
concerned, reached its zenith of intensity. A great effort was required
from all ranks, first to reduce the superiority which the enemy had
established, later to reduce the balance so that the superiority
gradually passed to the British. There was no feature in trench warfare
in which, during the period immediately following the relief of the
French, the enemy did not hold the advantage. The mining situation, the
sniping, the absence of dug-outs, all produced acute problems which
demanded immediate solution if disaster were to be avoided.
His observation of our lines in this sector was probably unparalleled in
the British zone. He employed in large numbers rifle grenades and
trench-mortars of every calibre with astonishing accuracy. Finally, he
added to the troops an additional embarrassment by his capture of the
Vimy Ridge.
The enemy, the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, proved themselves throughout
worthy opponents, ready and eager to profit by any weakness displayed
opposite to them. This Division is remembered for an act of courtesy of
a kind seldom associated with the German people.
A certain Private Robertson of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was captured
in a sap-head after having made a gallant attempt to defend himself, in
spite of a fractured skull. The following day a number of undetonated
rifle grenades were fired into the British lines stating in English that
the gallant soldier Private Robertson, Seaforth Highlanders, had died of
his wounds and had been buried with full military honours in the
cemetery at Rouvroy.
In spite of the strength of the opposition the men showed excellent
spirit throughout, having carried out many good raids, and having
repulsed with losses numerous hostile raids, nor was a square yard of
ground lost.
On Saturday, 24th June, an intense bombardment started at some distance
to the south, and lasted throughout the day and night. This was the
opening of the preliminary bombardment of the great Somme offensive. It
continued incessantly until 1st July, when the attack was launched.
Rumours of every kind began to circulate round the trenches, and much
speculation arose as to whether and when the Division would be given an
opportunity of taking part in the battle.
During this period the artillery carried out periodical bombardments of
the enemy's trenches, with the idea of making him think that an attack
in this sector was imminent. In this they seem to have been successful,
for each night the Germans fired intermittent short hurricane
bombardments on the front and support and communication trenches,
presumably with a view to preventing the assembly of attacking troops.
These bombardments were extremely heavy while they lasted; but, thanks
to the large number of dug-outs which had by this time been completed,
they inflicted little loss on the trench garrisons.
On 27th June arrangements were begun for the attachment of the 60th (2nd
Line London Territorial) Division to the Highland Division for a period
of instruction in the line. The news of the arrival of the 60th Division
was welcomed by all ranks, as it was looked on as a sure indication that
the Division would be relieved and would move to the Somme battle.
It had been arranged that as soon as the 60th Division were ready to
take over the line, the Highland Division should be moved to the back
areas for a period of much-needed rest and training before proceeding
southwards.
Possibly, with its later experiences of battle fighting the Division
might not have been so anxious to hurry off to take part in a great
attack. In these days, however, apart from the battle of Festubert, it
had not been employed in an offensive. Officers and men were therefore
anxious that the Division should be given an opportunity of operating in
an attack as a complete unit.
The 60th Division began their attachment on 30th June. This was carried
out first by individual officers and N.C.O.'s, then by sections, by
platoons, by companies, and finally by battalions. On 13th July the
brigades of the 60th Division began taking over from the brigades of the
Highland Division. On 14th July General Bultin, G.O.C. 60th Division,
assumed command of the sector.
This system of instruction meant that there were reliefs of some kind
being carried out every night. These were greatly hampered by the
sudden intense bombardments to which the enemy subjected the British
trenches. In consequence, casualties were frequently heavy. In one
brigade sector alone over sixty casualties were sustained during a
single night.
As a parting gift to the Germans on the last day the Division was in the
line, the 5th Gordon Highlanders raided the enemy's trenches, bombed his
dug-outs, and killed several of the garrison.
On 14th July the Division moved by motor lorry to the
Doullens-Lucheux-Baudricourt area. The popular supposition amongst the
troops was that they were bound for a rest area. On the 15th the move
was continued by march south to the area Bernaville-Candas-Hem.
All doubts were dispelled on the 20th, for the Division then entrained
at Candas and detrained at Mericourt. While passing through Amiens, it
was interesting to pass several trains going westwards, packed with
battle-soiled soldiers, all in the very best of spirits. They were a
Division coming out of the Somme battle to rest and refit. Many of them
wore captured German pickelhaubers. Apart from the raggedness of their
appearance and their stubbly beards, they looked at the top of their
form. One always felt that it was spectacles such as these which gave
the war correspondent that erroneous theory to which he adhered so
fixedly throughout the war, that soldiers like "going over the top," and
do so full of jests and wreathed in smiles.
From Mericourt the Division marched to the Ribemont-Meaulte area,
parties being sent in advance to reconnoitre the line.
On 21st July orders were received that the Highland Division would
relieve the 33rd Division in the line north-east of Fricourt during the
coming night.
Just prior to the arrival of the Division on the Somme, two officers
joined it who, second only to General Harper, were most responsible for
the high standard of efficiency which it attained. These were
Brigadier-General L. Oldfield, D.S.O., R.A., and Brigadier-General H.
Pelham Burn, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders. The former was appointed C.R.A.
in place of Brigadier-General M. J. MacCarthy, C.M.G., who left to take
up a new appointment. The latter assumed command of the 152nd Infantry
Brigade in place of Brigadier-General W. C. Ross, C.B., who took up an
appointment at home, and later commanded a brigade in Salonika.
General Ross's departure from the 152nd Infantry Brigade caused the
deepest regret to all ranks. He had been intimately known in peace time
to many of the officers, N.C.O.'s, and men whom he now commanded in war.
He was secretary of the Territorial Force Association for his county,
and he had commanded his brigade since November 1914. General Ross had a
personality which won for him the friendship of all who came in contact
with him. The Highland soldier had become one of his first interests,
and he possessed a great knowledge and understanding of him. Further, no
one could fail to admire his natural courage. General Bannatine-Allason
has described him as spending many hours, both by day and night, in
crawling round the most exposed saps and dangerous places in his sector.
General Ross spent so much of his time amongst his men that he was a
familiar figure to them all, while he knew numbers of them by name, and
in many cases knew also their parents, families, homes, and employers.
General Oldfield was not only a scientific gunner of the first order,
but also rapidly developed a commanding knowledge of infantry tactics.
This knowledge enabled him, in conjunction with General Harper, to draw
up the artillery plans for attack and defence, so that in all operations
the infantry were directly supported by the maximum energy of his
artillery covering them. The successes of the Division were in no small
measure due to the effective manner in which the two arms co-operated.
General Oldfield was continually moving towards artillery perfection. He
set a very high standard to his officers, to which they admirably
responded. In the later stages of the war, his energy as a commander had
resulted in the Divisional artillery having reached a high degree of
efficiency. They could improvise a barrage in a shortness of time which
surprised many artillery commanders from other Divisions. They had,
further, become extremely mobile, and were possessed of extraordinary
initiative. Later chapters in this book will show how General Oldfield's
officers not only handled their guns with great skill, but also, as a
result of his teaching, were able in emergencies to take command of
disorganised detachments of men and fight equally skilfully as infantry
officers. During General Oldfield's command, all infantry commanders had
complete confidence both in the artillery and in the artillery
arrangements.
General Burn was at the time of his appointment the youngest Brigadier
in the British Army, being thirty-four years of age. Later in the war
there were several younger, but prior to the Somme fighting the day of
the young Brigadier had hardly come.
He is perhaps best described by a Jock, who said, in speaking of him,
"They a' have their fads, and his fad is effeeciency."
General Burn had abundant experience of warfare in the front line. He
had served as Adjutant, Staff-Captain, and Brigade-Major, and had
commanded three separate battalions.
It can safely be asserted that he spent every moment of the day, and
much of the night, in thinking how he could increase the efficiency of
his command and how he could do damage to the enemy.
His vast experience enabled him to grasp details which actually were
far-reaching in effect, but which to a man of less experience might have
appeared trivial or have passed unnoticed.
In every direction, even in the smallest points, he accepted only one
standard--namely, the highest; nothing less was tolerated. He spared
himself no pains to attain this standard. Holding these principles as
strongly as he did, it is natural that he found it frequently necessary
to check officers and N.C.O.'s. They, however, bore him no ill-will for
this, and officers were frequently heard to say, "You can't argue with
P.B. when he strafes, because he's always right."
To those who served with General Burn he will always stand out as a man
who possessed in full the essential qualities of the perfect soldier.
While the Division was in this sector the 6th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders left the 152nd Brigade, being posted to the 5th Division as
pioneer battalion, their place being taken by the 6th Gordon
Highlanders, who had landed in France in 1914, and had seen considerable
service with the 7th Division.