THE PERIOD OF APPRENTICESHIP.
It was some ten weeks since the Division had heard its first shot fired.
Up to the present it had, indeed, experienced war. It had, however, been
employed throughout either in actual battle or in consolidating a battle
front in particularly trying circumstances. It had, therefore, had
little time or opportunity to collect its thoughts and profit by its
experiences.
During the next few months it was given the opportunity it required, and
it will be seen that these months were profitably employed by all ranks.
This period may be called the Division's apprenticeship to war.
In this connection it must not be forgotten that, in spite of its late
successes, there was a time when the Highland Division was what can best
be described as "green." That this was the case is no reflection on the
spirit which animated the men or the manner in which the troops had been
trained by their commanders. Under the conditions of modern warfare it
could not have been otherwise.
Lord French writes of the newly-arrived Territorial Divisions: "At
first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they
improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a
thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at."
The manner in which the Division "trained on" and developed from
apprentices into skilled tradesmen was most creditable, both to the men
and to those responsible for their education in the ways of war.
One difficulty that must always exist with inexperienced troops,
particularly non-regular troops, is the question of discipline. To
maintain discipline in the circumstances of peace does not present a
tithe of the difficulties which are encountered in times of war. The ill
effects of the lack of discipline in peace conditions are evident to
all. War, on the other hand, produces fresh and unexpected
circumstances, in which experience alone can teach how efficiency is
dependent on rigorous adherence to discipline, often in apparently
trivial matters. This was felt by the Highland Division, in common with
many others, in numerous ways.
In a Division in which the officers and men of the various companies and
battalions are recruited from the same villages or towns, and are known
to one another intimately in civil life, the enforcement of the rigid
discipline demanded by war will always be a difficult matter, until
experience has shown the necessity for it.
Officers and N.C.O.'s have first to appreciate the degree to which they
must exercise command over their men, if the military machine is to
stand the test. They must also learn that the efficiency of the troops
under their command is dependent on the manner in which they supervise
the daily life and actions of their men, and on the amount of
forethought they exercise on their behalf.
Owing to inexperience, delay in reliefs, entailing much fatigue to the
men, the miscarrying of working parties, entailing the loss of valuable
time, were in the early stages frequent. Further, in spite of continual
warnings, men light-heartedly ignored the enemy, and were constantly
being killed by enemy snipers through wilful exposure. There were cases
of men asphyxiating themselves in their dug-outs with the fumes of their
own coke fires through want of the necessary precautions.
The diaries of senior officers contain frequent references to instances
in which they found the enemy working in daylight in full view,
unmolested, through want of initiative on the part of local commanders.
Occasions were not unknown when troops in the line evinced what has
since become known as "wind."
However, the Division recognised from the first that it had much to
learn, and an organised effort was made to help the men to profit by
experience in the shortest possible time. To this effort the men
responded admirably.
Junior officers and N.C.O.'s gradually acquired the necessary habit of
true command over their men. The men were quick and ready to discover
that the better disciplined a unit is, the more efficient it is, the
less it suffers from the actions of the enemy and the conditions of war.
They learnt, too, that the best-disciplined battalion is the most
comfortable and the most contented.
As Lord French writes: "Each unit learned by degrees its own relative
place and position in the great Divisional machine. Enthusiasm was
raised in the idea engendered in all ranks that they formed part of
a great engine of war, furnished by their own country and immediate
neighbourhood."
In the early stages of its apprenticeship the Division first took part
in a series of unsuccessful attacks. Subsequently it passed many weeks
in areas in which trench-mortaring and mining--the two forms of trench
warfare most trying to men's nerves--were considerably in evidence.
Nevertheless, in spite of their inexperience and of this unfortunate
beginning, the men at all times remained in good heart and retained a
high standard of morale.
By August 1915 the Division had so successfully overcome its earlier
difficulties that it was selected to instruct the 18th Division, newly
arrived from England, in trench warfare. Subsequently the 22nd Division,
32nd Division, and afterwards the 36th Division, were also attached to
the Highland Division for tours of instruction in the line.
Throughout this period the rivalry between the Territorial and New Army
Divisions was acute. The men had a strong impression, further
accentuated by the fact that the Division did not take part in the
battle of Loos, that since they were a Territorial Division, the higher
command would never employ them as a complete Division in a major
operation. In this belief, after General Harper had taken over command
of the Division, they began to call themselves Harper's Duds, asserting
that the Divisional sign, H.D., was formed from the initial letters of
these two words.
On 27th July 1915, orders were issued by the Xth Corps for the 51st
Division to take over the lines from near Becourt to the river Ancre
near Hamel, relieving the 22nd Division of the XIth French Corps.
On the night 30-31st the 152nd Brigade took over the left sector from
the 116th French Regiment. On the following night the right sector was
taken over by the 154th Infantry Brigade, who relieved the 22nd French
Territorial Regiment, and by the 153rd Brigade, who took over a portion
of the right sector from the 44th French Brigade.
The Divisional artillery, with six batteries of the 18th Division
attached for instruction, moved into the line in relief of the French
artillery on the nights 2-3rd, 3-4th, 4-5th August.
The taking over from the French, both from a military and from a social
point of view, was satisfactory in every way. The details of the handing
over were complete, and the arrangements made by the French commands and
staffs excellent.
It was a considerable relief to all to find trenches cut deep in the
chalk or loam, in place of the hated breastworks. The French system was
also extensive, and contained numerous communication trenches and trench
shelters. There was not, in consequence, the same exposed feeling which
was attached to the Festubert and Laventie trenches.
The French troops were Bretons. Their great traditions as fighters
produced immediately a bond of sympathy between them and the
Highlanders. The Highland dress and the pipes evoked great interest and
admiration in the French soldiers and in the inhabitants of the
neighbouring villages, which lost nothing from the fact that the
Highland Division was the first British Division to serve in that part
of the country.
During the relief the French officers and men did their utmost to help
our troops. Their hospitality was unbounded. Indeed, the excellent
manner in which the French officers messed, even in the line, was the
cause of considerable surprise to the British officers.
When the relief of the French troops was complete and they were marching
away to take their place in the line in Champagne, the pipers and
drummers of various units accompanied them for several miles of their
first day's march. The Bretons, having themselves pipes of a kind, were
delighted, and the manner in which they refreshed the pipers during the
march clearly showed their gratitude.
Willie Lawrie, the famous pipe-major of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, composed a pipe tune in honour of this event, known as the
"Pipers of Bouzincourt," and another called "The 8th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders farewell to the 116th De Ligne."
A copy of the tune was sent to Lieut.-Colonel V. Arnoux, commanding the
116th, from whom the following reply was received:--
11^e CORPS D'ARMÉE, 22ND DIVISION,
43RD BRIGADE.
AU BIVOUAC,
_le 10 Novembre 1915_.
Le Lieut.-Colonel ARNOUX, Commandant le 116th Regiment
d'Infanterie à Monsieur le Lieut.-Colonel DOUGLAS BAIRD,
Commandant le 1/8 Argyllshire Highlanders.
No. 1 Objet au sujet
d'une marche militaire.
MON CHER CAMARADE,--J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser reception
de la marche pour cornemutes composée par le corne-musier
major de votre bataillon, et jouée par vos cornemutes et
tambours le matin de la relève du 116th de Ligne dans le
secteur de Thiepval Authuile.
Au nom de tous mes officiers et soldats je vous prie
d'agréer mes vifs remerciements. Tous ont gardé au 116th le
meilleurs souvenirs de cette marche dont le rhythme et
l'harmonie melancolique evoquaient les mélodies du pays
natal.
Je l'ai confiée à mon chef de musique qui s'occupe de vous
composer une marche appropriée à notre musique sur la thème
de la vôtre.
Cette harmonie de nos deux marches militaires sera un
souvenir et un gage de plus de la bonne amitié qui unit nos
deux regiments et nos deux armées dans la même ardeur vers
la victoire commune.
Veuillez agréer, mon cher Camarade, l'expression de mes
souvenirs les meilleurs et les plus devoués.
V. ARNOUX.
General Baumgarten, commanding the XIth French Corps d'Armée, remained
in command until 5th August, when General Bannatine-Allason took over
from him, with his headquarters at Senlis. General Baumgarten
subsequently called on General Bannatine-Allason to express his delight
with the manner in which the taking over had been carried out without
any hitch in spite of the difficulties which arose from the difference
of language.
The new sector proved to be both interesting and instructive. Many
problems arose while the Division held this portion of the line which
required solution, and which, as it turned out, were all solved
satisfactorily.
The front was looked upon by the French as a quiet one, with the
exception of a section of the line adjacent to the Albert-Bapaume road
known as the Ilot. This ground had been captured by the French in a
brilliant advance, and on this account, though of little tactical
importance, continued to be held. Subsequently, after the Division had
been relieved in this portion of the line, the troops were withdrawn
from it. There can have been few places on the Western front where the
distance separating the Allied and the German lines was less, as in the
Ilot the breadth of the No Man's Land was in some places no more than
ten yards. The opposing trenches were thus well within bombing range,
and the locality was a running sore to both sides.
The sector did not remain a quiet one for long, and throughout the
Division's occupation of it every effort was required to prevent the
enemy from gaining the upper hand.
The most acute problem was the enemy's activity in mining. When the
sector was taken over from the French, the situation in this respect was
anything but good. No British tunnelling companies being available,
French engineers remained in charge of mining operations. This was an
unsatisfactory arrangement, and the work of countermining made little
progress, while the efforts of the enemy were fully maintained.
On the 22nd August the 179th Tunnelling Company, R.E., arrived in the
area and relieved the French engineers. It had by this time become
evident that a very considerable effort would be necessary to check the
enemy's mining if it was to continue possible to hold the existing
front-line trenches. The 179th Tunnelling Company had only a strength of
300 men with which to take over from the 500 men which the French had
employed in the sector. It was therefore decided to reinforce the
tunnellers by attaching to them infantry who in civil life had been
skilled miners.
Sixty miners from each infantry brigade were accordingly added to the
tunnellers. The efforts of the tunnelling company thus reinforced, by
dint of working continuous shifts day and night, proved equal to the
task, with the result that superiority as regards the mining situation
ultimately passed to the British.
It was, however, only after a severe struggle that this result was
obtained. The discharging of mines and of camouflets--small discharges
used for blowing in the opponent's galleries--were almost of daily
occurrence.
Mine warfare played so large a part in the trench warfare of 1915, 1916,
and 1917, and so affected the daily life of the soldier in the trenches,
that a description of what it means to those engaged in it may not be
out of place.
In the first instance, success in mine warfare is dependent on the
tunnelling company. By their efforts it is determined whether our troops
are to be blown up by the enemy, or whether it is the enemy who is to
meet this fate. To secure protection for the troops listening galleries
have to be driven at various points along the front, so that the enemy's
galleries can be located by sound, and the element of surprise can then
be eliminated. The tunnellers who listen in these galleries are equipped
with instruments by which the enemy can be heard working. If he is
close, he can be heard by the ear alone. In chalk, a good medium for the
carrying of sound, he can be heard working, without the aid of
instruments, many feet away. If he is heard still using picks or
shovels, it is known that he has not driven his gallery as far as he
intends, and that there is therefore no immediate prospect of his
blowing. If, on the other hand, he is heard tamping--_i.e._, packing in
his explosive--it is known that his work is nearly completed, and that
his mine will in a few hours be ready for exploding. In the latter case
two alternatives are available, either of which may be adopted to
protect the troops from the effect of his blowing. First, if we have a
gallery sufficiently close to his, we may blow a small mine or
camouflet, designed either to destroy his gallery or so to disintegrate
the soil by the explosion as to make further tunnelling impossible. If a
camouflet is impracticable, the only other alternative is to evacuate
the area which it is estimated will be affected by the explosion.
In some cases the tunnelling company were able to destroy his galleries
by camouflets when they were actually being worked, and thus bury the
tunnellers and their spoiling parties. On these occasions the tunnelling
company were always highly elated, as they took a professional pride in
scoring off their real opponents the tunnellers, and considered this a
far finer achievement than blowing up a trench full of mere infantrymen.
The Germans also adopted the same tactics, and continuous warfare
between the tunnellers of both sides raged underground. Though the
tunnellers, when once in their galleries, were free from the attentions
of snipers, trench-mortars, and shells, yet their own form of warfare
was hazardous and dangerous enough. When the galleries of the opposing
sides were close, it was never known whether a gallery had not been
located and might not at any moment be blown in, all the men working in
it being crushed or suffocated.
On occasions a British and German gallery would meet, and hand-to-hand
fights with picks and crowbars underground would ensue, which had to be
fought out in darkness in the narrow tunnels.
The danger from natural gases, with all the attendant difficulties of
rescuing men overcome by the fumes, was constant. Falls of earth and
chalk, possibly due to some heavy explosion above ground, might also
occur, which might bury the worker or cut him off from the exit of the
gallery.
It must be remembered that the tunnellers were not highly trained
soldiers in their early manhood, but professional miners, often men of
middle age, who had in many cases come to France straight from the pits
at home. They were, indeed, a splendid breed of men, and the infantry
owed much to them. There is little question but that they were far
superior to the German tunneller. The latter was often a cunning worker,
but the British tunneller could always be relied on to beat him for
pace. It may also be added that the tunnelling companies all contained
an appreciable number of Scottish miners.
Mine warfare affects the infantry in several ways. First, it
necessitates their finding an enormous number of carrying parties to
assist in getting rid of the spoil, as the excavated earth or chalk is
called. The infantryman never liked this work, as, among other things,
it made his clothing, particularly his kilt, extremely dirty. It also
appeared unending. However, he was reasonably contented with it if he
had the satisfaction of occasionally seeing the German trenches and
dug-outs hoisted into the air.
The question of finding working parties is, however, a minor
consideration for the infantry when compared with the possible effects
of the explosion of a German mine. This usually occurred either as
darkness fell or during the night. Though warning might have been given
by the tunnellers that a mine was to be expected, yet the explosion
always appeared to come as a surprise. To a man standing up in the
vicinity of an explosion the first sensation was a feeling that he had
been struck on the soles of the feet by a heavy beam. This was
immediately followed by the opening up of the earth and the issuing
forth of a belch of flame, capped with a great rolling cloud of smoke
and followed instantaneously by a deep muffled roar.
Huge fragments of earth and chalk, some weighing a ton or more, with
wire entanglements, trench-boards, dug-out timbers--all were hurled many
feet into the air. There followed a sensible pause, and then for some
seconds the falling débris would come pouring down. This in turn was
followed by a mist of dust which continued to float in the air for many
minutes.
If the explosion had occurred under an occupied portion of the trench,
the men in the area which was transferred into the crater were either
immediately buried or else hurled many feet into the air in the sheet of
flame and smoke, often to descend back into the crater crushed, bruised,
burnt, and almost invariably dead. Others in the immediate vicinity of
the explosion were crushed in their shelters or buried in the trenches
by the collapse of their sides. Men further away, in their turn, were in
danger of being killed or mutilated by the falling débris of stones and
chalk which whirled down from a great height into the trenches. The
result was a scene of horrible desolation. Nothing remained intact.
Trenches with their garrisons were obliterated. The positions where
posts had once been could only be determined by rifles or limbs
projecting through the upturned earth. At times, the heaving of the
earth showed where some buried man, still alive, was struggling to
extricate himself. The whole air was fetid with the sickly stench of
high explosive.
Mine warfare was, indeed, the most trying ordeal to which troops holding
trenches were exposed.
Next to mining, the most nerve-racking form of trench warfare was
provided by the trench-mortar. Towards the latter end of August the
enemy began to make a considerable use of these weapons. In consequence
the trenches were frequently severely damaged, and many casualties were
sustained. The British trench-mortars were in these days only in their
early experimental stages; moreover, difficulty always existed in
obtaining sufficient ammunition for them to be of any real service.
The enemy, on the other hand, appears to have had an unlimited supply of
ammunition for mortars of a considerably heavier calibre and longer
range than ours. At this time his commonest types were those that
discharged the "oil can" or "rum jar" and the aerial torpedo. The "oil
can" was little more than a tin canister about nine inches in diameter,
filled with high explosive, and fitted with a time fuze. In those days
it was fired from a smooth-bored wooden mortar, and in consequence
turned over and over in its flight, and was therefore not particularly
accurate. The explosion was, however, terrific, devastating to wire or
trenches, and most trying to the nerves of any one who had to live in an
area in which they habitually burst.
The aerial torpedoes had a fixed propeller which kept them from turning
over in the air, and were in consequence a more accurate projectile.
Their effects were if anything worse than those of the "oil can."
The Division had attached to it one 1-1/2-inch mortar battery and a
4-inch mortar battery for which ammunition was available only in small
quantities. On 2nd September, a 2-inch trench-mortar battery arrived,
though its ammunition did not join it till 7th October.
The 2-inch trench-mortar fired a bomb exactly similar in shape to the
hammer used in Highland games in "throwing the hammer." For this reason
it was known to the troops as "Donald Dinnie." It was also known as the
"Plum Pudding" or "Football." It was on this account that an English
brigade-major was once heard to confess that he had always thought
"Donald Dinnie" was Scots for plum pudding.
The "Donald Dinnie" was an excellent projectile when it burst in the
right place. Sometimes, however, it did not burst at all, while at
others it burst within a few feet of the mortar. Again, the mortar
frequently misfired. Trench-mortaring was rather a game of chance in
those days, with the odds slightly against the man firing the mortar.
In the early days of the "Donald Dinnie" its long iron handle, with a
diameter of two inches, was firmly fixed to the bomb. On occasions this
handle was blown tremendous distances by the explosion, and more than
once fell in the British trenches, causing casualties to the garrison.
There was thus no adequate weapon with which to counter the German
trench-mortars. He was therefore able to do considerable damage to our
trenches and troops, more or less, with impunity.
It was in consequence necessary to institute a system of artillery
retaliation, by which a certain number of rounds were fired back at the
enemy by howitzers for every trench-mortar round he fired. Howitzers of
various calibres up to 6-inch as well as the field-guns took part in
these retaliatory shoots, according to the ammunition supply. As this
became more liberal, this system tended to check the enemy's
trench-mortar activity, particularly when, by careful observation, the
positions of his trench-mortar emplacements were located, and the
retaliation was brought to bear actually on the offending mortars.
The enemy could, however, bombard certain sections of trenches so
systematically that he was able to obliterate them. This was
particularly the case opposite La Boisselle and in an area known as the
Salient. The latter received so much attention as to become untenable,
and on 1st December it was evacuated, a retrenchment being dug and
occupied behind it.
During these trench-mortar bombardments, it had been discovered that
the French shelters, having only three or four feet of cover, were not
shell-proof. They were, in fact, death-traps, as they gave the men a
false sense of security. In consequence, during a bombardment men would
crowd into them to take cover, and should a trench-mortar bomb then
strike one of them, it was blown in and all its occupants were killed.
On 21st October it was therefore decided to provide fresh dug-out
accommodation for the whole garrison. The tunnelling company, as has
been explained, was strained to its utmost to keep pace with the mining
situation. The construction of the dug-outs was therefore entrusted to
the 8th Royal Scots, who had joined the Division as the Divisional
Pioneer Battalion on 25th August 1915. Fresh calls were made on the
infantry for skilled miners, who were attached to the 8th Royal Scots.
Work was carried on day and night, and the greatest exertions were made
to provide the Division with shell-proof shelters with the minimum of
delay.
These dug-outs were designed to give 10 to 12 feet of head cover.
Charges of 60 lb. and 100 lb. of gun-cotton were exploded on the roofs
of dug-outs of this depth, and the shock of the explosion was
successfully resisted.[4]
Attempts were made to construct dug-outs by digging deep pits and then
roofing them in with layers of material calculated to burst shells; but
this was found to take more time than was required to construct a
dug-out by tunnelling.
While the mining and the construction of dug-outs was being carried on
as intensively as possible, an enormous amount of spoil (excavated earth
and chalk) was accumulated. The disposal of this spoil became a very
serious problem. Chalk cannot be scattered broadcast except at a
distance from the shaft-heads, as its presence would disclose to the
enemy that work was in progress and draw shell-fire. The accumulation of
spoil was thus very difficult to dispose of, and frequently the trenches
became almost impassable owing to the heaps of sandbags full of chalk
stacked against their sides waiting to be emptied. The usual method of
disposing of this spoil was to dump it into disused trenches and
shell-holes. These, however, were soon filled, and it became evident
that elaborate arrangements must be made beforehand for dealing with the
spoil whenever operations entailing excavations on a large scale are
planned, otherwise vast accumulations will be formed.
In this sector it was therefore necessary to establish a
carefully-organised system of spoiling parties to keep pace with the
output of the tunnellers and pioneers. It was only thus that it could be
ensured that the intensive mining and dug-out construction would not be
checked owing to delays in dealing with the excavated earth.
Large numbers of men had thus to be found daily for this work, with the
result that there was little labour available for the ordinary duties of
trench maintenance. As long as the weather remained fine, difficulty was
not experienced on this account. Subsequently, however, when the weather
changed, the whole Division was taxed to its utmost to keep the trenches
in a condition which rendered them passable to troops.
This was particularly difficult in the sector between La Boisselle and
Thiepval. Here above the chalk was a deep overlay of clay. Thus, when
towards the end of the year there was a heavy fall of rain and
subsequently of snow, the country in this area became water-logged, and
in consequence the sides of the trenches were continually collapsing.
This was partly due to the fact that the trenches constructed by the
French were cut with perpendicular sides. Trenches of this pattern stood
well enough in fine weather or where cut in chalk, but when cut in clay
could not withstand the additional pressure which the weight of absorbed
rain-water brought into play. The result was that throughout this
portion of the sector the sides of the trenches fell in, and they became
merely shapeless ditches knee- or waist-deep in mud and water. Water and
mud, too, flowed down the stairs of the dug-outs unless dams were
carefully made, while the "Bairnsfather" type of shelter collapsed on to
its occupants at least once with fatal results.
The nature of the soil was such that revetment was of little avail. Even
machine-gun pits revetted with close-lagged timbers--that is to say,
with their walls supported by a continuous lining of thick
planking--caved in. The result was that the struggle with the elements
almost took precedence over the struggle with the enemy. The carrying
out of reliefs became a question of many hours, and entailed great
exhaustion to the troops. The labour required for trench maintenance was
far in excess of the resources of the Division. Attempts were made to
dig out the trenches with their sides at a slope of 6/1, which would
enable them to stand in spite of the incessant pressure on their sides
due to the absorbed water. The soil was, however, of such a nature that
digging in its sodden state imposed an immense physical strain on the
men. Not only was the weight of the mud on the shovel considerable, but
the mud adhered to the face of the shovel and could not be flung clear
of the trench. In consequence, the men often had to hoist the shovel
with its load out of the trench, leaving the earth to be scraped from
the shovel by a man working above ground.
In spite of the increasing labours of the men, as long as the wet
weather continued it was only possible to keep the trenches sufficiently
open to enable troops to pass along them with difficulty. In some cases,
notably in Campbell Avenue, even this was not possible, and the trench
became temporarily unfit for use. Subsequently the frost came, and the
labours of trench maintenance, to the delight of all, suddenly ceased.
The sides of the trenches stood as though they had been carved out of
wood. Officers and men began to take a fresh outlook on life. For the
first time for many days they went dry-shod, and began to forget the
unpleasant feeling of a mud-sodden kilt chafing the back of the knees,
and of muddy water oozing between the toes at every step.
But this short-lived return to dry trenches only accentuated the
miseries of the inevitable thaw, for the last state became worse than
the first. Not only did the clay trenches on which so much labour had
been expended collapse _en bloc_, but the action of the frost on the
chalk made it crumble. In consequence the chalk trenches collapsed
universally. The entire trench area became a ruin. The situation was
such that strong measures alone could deal with it. The mining could not
be discontinued, as this would involve too serious a risk. All other
work was, however, stopped, and the 8th Royal Scots and the Reserve
Brigade were all employed on restoring order out of this most appalling
chaos. Even with this amount of labour available, as long as wet weather
with short intermittent periods of frost alternated, more earth and
chalk fell into the trenches day by day than could be cleared out in a
day by the available working parties.
Apart from the mining operations, the construction of dug-outs, and the
creation of entanglements, little new work was carried out in this
sector. The French had already begun a system of defence in depth. This
was worked upon and improved. The only important new work undertaken was
the construction of the corps reserve lines, known as the Bouzincourt
Switch, which ran from Martinsart to Bouzincourt and across the river
Ancre to Albert.
In this reserve line there were constructed what are believed to be the
first concrete "pill-boxes" made either by the Allies or the Germans on
the Western Front. These were formed of walls of reinforced concrete
five feet thick, with loopholes through which machine-guns could fire.
After the British lines had been driven back by the great German
offensive in March 1918, these pill-boxes were situated in or about No
Man's Land, and were on several occasions struck by direct hits. They
were, however, undamaged, and, it is hoped, played the part with success
for which they were intended.
During the period in which the Division was in this sector, great
progress towards efficiency was made by the Divisional artillery. By the
time they had arrived in France mobile warfare was for the time being in
abeyance. This was a distinct advantage to Territorial gunners, as the
conditions of service in peace time afforded them few opportunities for
training for warfare of movement. They had, however, devoted a
considerable amount of study to technical gunnery. Consequently, they
had less ground to make up than would have been the case if they had
been engaged in a war of movement.
Their training at home had, however, been carried out under difficult
conditions, and when they arrived they still required considerable
training as units. This was mostly carried out in the line, as from
the time of its arrival in France the artillery was practically
continuously in action until early in 1916. In spite of this they
made great progress. An artillery brigade commander describes them as
follows: "By the end of their first year they were good; by the end of
their second year they were better; and by the end of their third year
they were first-class field artillery,--very mobile, very quick, and
full of initiative."
On the 31st August the 15-pounders were replaced by 18-pounders, to the
great relief of all concerned. The 15-pounders had always suffered from
a very restricted supply of ammunition. What ammunition they had was so
erratic as to be a positive danger to our own troops. The gunners also
had not had the opportunities at home of becoming complete masters of
their weapons. The result was that the artillery, working in these
adverse circumstances, did not at first enjoy the confidence of the
infantry. However, their work in this sector went far towards inspiring
in the infantry full confidence in their gunners.
Preparations for the battle of Loos brought to the Division for the
first time a fairly liberal supply of ammunition. This was to be
employed for the purpose of wire-cutting and bombardment as a feint to
the big attack farther north.
On 23rd September 600 rounds (18-pounder) were issued, and on 25th
September a further 1200 rounds, an unheard-of amount in those days.
The use of the artillery became less rigid than had been the case during
the first few months at the front. On 8th November an 18-pounder gun was
run up during the night to Coniston Street, about 800 yards behind the
front line. From this position, as soon as there was sufficient light,
thirty-six rounds were fired at an enemy sap, on which work was in
progress, at a range of 1200 yards.
On 15th December experiments were made in wire-cutting with 4·5
howitzers. One howitzer fired at a range of 800 yards with percussion
shrapnel and was most successful, a lane being cut right through the
belt of wire.
The following extract from the Divisional war diary for 28th August may
be quoted as a typical instance of the enterprise shown by the Division
as regards the use of artillery during this period:--
"The repair of the parapets damaged by our mines of the 28th had been
constantly hindered by enemy rifle grenades, large trench-mortar
bombs, and aerial torpedoes. The last two sorts of bombs, having a
very large charge, had reduced the front and support line trenches
opposite La Boisselle (where most of our mine shafts are) to such an
extent that passage along them had been dangerous. Only one 1-1/2-inch
mortar battery was available to reply, as the 4-inch battery had no
ammunition. Sanction was obtained for the expenditure of 5-inch and
6-inch howitzer and 18-pounder ammunition to keep down the enemy's
fire, and enable a day working party to work on the demolished
trenches. Work was continued all day with only eight casualties."
On 28th November 1915 three 18-pounder batteries of the Lowland Brigade
were brought into action, bringing the Divisional artillery up to
establishment.
An advance was also made in this sector in machine gunnery. Eight
machine-gun emplacements were made, fitted with traversing mountings for
indirect fire. These mountings were designed by Captain S. J. L. Hardie,
machine-gun officer of the 152nd Brigade, and made by the Divisional
Supply Column.
By this means aimed indirect fire was brought to bear by day or night on
localities known to be constantly used by the enemy.
In this period few events occurred which call for detailed description.
The explosion of mines was of frequent occurrence, and in several cases
the trenches sustained damage and losses were incurred. On the 12th and
20th August the French tunnellers were successful in destroying sections
of the enemy's trenches with mines, but on the latter date the mine also
did considerable damage to the British trenches.
In September preparations for the battle of Loos began. The Third Army
was not involved in this attack. Efforts were, however, made to lead the
enemy to anticipate an offensive in this sector, so as to make him
unwilling to transfer reserves from this front to the scene of the
actual operations.
Accordingly on 21st September work was begun on preparing the sector for
attack. Sap-heads and forming-up places were constructed, while the
artillery carried out wire-cutting and bombardment.
On 25th September the combined British and French attack was launched at
Loos. On the 26th preparations for attack were discontinued in the
Divisional sector. On the 27th the allowance of ammunition was reduced
to the minimum requirements necessary for retaliation.
During the sojourn of the Division in this part of France bombardments
of villages in the back areas occurred fairly frequently--Henencourt
(Corps Headquarters), Aveluy, Authuille, Albert, and Martinsart all
receiving attention.
The enemy was particularly lucky with one heavy shell which he fired
into Authuille on 29th November. It burst close to a working party of
the 5th Seaforths, who had just fallen in to draw tools from a dump, and
wounded 26 of them, including 2 officers.
On 18th September Martinsart was bombed by a hostile aeroplane, in those
days a most unusual occurrence.
On Christmas Day a curious exchange of compliments took place with the
enemy. On Christmas Eve he sang carols; this was at once stopped by the
Divisional artillery. He then came out of his trenches to fraternise;
this was also stopped by the Divisional artillery. He retaliated by
shelling Albert; the Division on the right immediately shelled
Courcelette. The enemy then shelled Aveluy; the gunners replied by
shelling Pozières. The enemy had the last word, for he then shelled
Martinsart, where he hit a horse, a mule, and a limber loaded with
grenades, which fortunately did not burst.
While the Division was in this sector various other New Army Divisions,
as has been mentioned, were attached to it for periods of instruction in
the line. The men did not fail to make the most of the fact that they
had been selected as instructors for the rival organisation, the New
Armies, and it was a matter of great satisfaction to them to find that
they had been chosen for the work.
On 2nd August the Divisional artillery had taken over from the French,
and taken into the line six batteries of the 18th Division, who were
attached for instruction. The artillery were particularly jealous of the
18-pounders with which their pupils were armed, while they were still
equipped with the obsolete 15-pounder. The same night the 53rd Infantry
Brigade Group, 18th Division, also moved into the line to begin a period
of attachment to the 51st Division for instruction in trench warfare.
Other units of the 18th Division followed, and carried out similar
periods of instruction in the line.
On conclusion of this attachment, when the 18th Division took over
a section of the line from the 51st, Major-General F. I. Maxse,
commanding the 18th Division, wrote the following appreciative letter
to General Bannatine-Allason: "I must write you a line to say how
grateful my Division is for the great assistance we have received from
yours. General Ross has done more to help us than I have experienced
from any other G.O.C. He not only left officers behind to put us up
to local tips on his sector, but he told off his best snipers to put
our snipers on to the Huns, which they successfully did. My people all
swear by the 51st Division. May we long soldier together."
General Maxse became a great friend of the 51st Division, particularly
when, in 1917, the Division carried out two most successful operations
under his command as Corps commander in the third battle of Ypres.
In September the 65th Infantry Brigade Group and a brigade of artillery
of the 22nd Division carried out its period of instruction in trench
warfare attached to the 51st. Later in the same month officers of the
36th (Ulster) Division were similarly attached. In December the 32nd
Division was instructed in the same manner, and finally relieved the
51st in this sector.
On 24th September 1915 General Bannatine-Allason gave up command of the
Highland Division. He had for some time been in indifferent health. The
strain of the past four months, in which he had commanded the Division
during its first experiences of war, had been severe, and the General
therefore felt that he could not either with justice to himself or to
his Division continue in so responsible a position until his health was
sufficiently recovered.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL R. BANNATINE-ALLASON, C.B.]
He therefore returned to England, and was given command of the 61st (2nd
Line South Midland) Territorial Division. During the period of his
command of the 2nd Line Highland Division, the General despatched over
15,000 men and over 3000 horses to the front. Most of these men were
sent as reinforcements to the 51st Division, so that he still materially
contributed towards the successes of the Division. From this fact, and
from the fact that under his command the Division was first initiated
into the ways of war, General Bannatine-Allason is still known in the
Highlands as the "nurse" of the 51st Division.
General Bannatine-Allason was succeeded by Major-General G. M. Harper,
C.B., D.S.O., who was promoted from the command of the 17th Brigade, 6th
Division, to the command of the Highland Division.
General Harper, during his period of command, inspired all ranks with
such confidence that it is difficult to express the high regard in which
he was held by the Division.
The success and consequent reputation gained by the Highland Division
can be attributed to the happy combination of the particular qualities
of the commander and his troops, and to the brilliant manner in which
the directing genius of the former was seconded by the genius for
fighting of the latter.
No better selection of a commander could have been made for the
Division, and no Division could have better suited the particular
qualities possessed by the new commander. Experience has since proved
that General Harper understood the ways and means of defeating the
German in a manner which was probably unequalled, and certainly never
surpassed on the Western Front. Further, he possessed such gifts as an
instructor as enabled him to train his Division in these ways and means
in a manner which set a standard to the British armies in France.
On their part, under General Harper's command, the Highlanders proved
that they possessed qualities which enabled them to respond to training
in a degree which few other troops could equal.
The result was that General Harper, having formulated principles
applicable to every phase of attack and defence, was able to imbue his
whole Division in their training with these principles. In consequence,
during active operations, officers and N.C.O.'s could be relied on to
lead their men intelligently in any circumstances in accordance with
tactical methods in which they had already been exercised in their
training.
The relief of the Division by the 32nd Division began on 23rd December,
and was completed by 2nd January 1916. After the relief, the Division
moved to the Flesselles area, coming under orders of the Ist Corps.
Their time in the line, beginning as it had done on 30th July 1915, had
been long and arduous. The men were in consequence beginning to show
signs of becoming stale. Though there had been no infantry action beyond
a few encounters between patrols and a small bombing raid carried out by
the 154th Infantry Brigade on 2nd January 1916, yet the conditions had
been far from pleasant.
Great strides had been made by the enemy in trench weapons, the range,
calibre, and accuracy of his trench-mortars, and the numbers in which
they were employed, having considerably increased. His rifle grenades
had also been improved, and were used with increasing frequency. The
mining situation, as has already been pointed out, had at one time been
serious, though it never led to the same serious infantry fighting which
occurred later in the Labyrinth. The want of shell-proof cover had been
considerably felt; the burden of work imposed on the Division when the
trenches collapsed had been almost insupportable. The general conditions
of trench life during this period are admirably summed up in Sir Douglas
Haig's despatch, dated 29th May 1916, as follows:--
"Although the struggle in a general sense has not been intense, it has
been everywhere continuous....
"The maintenance and repair of our defences alone, especially in
winter, entails constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy combine
to flood and destroy trenches, dug-outs, and communications; all such
damages must be repaired promptly under fire, and almost certainly by
night.
"Artillery and snipers are practically never silent, patrols are out in
front of the lines every night, and heavy bombardments by the artillery
of one or both sides take place daily in various parts of the line.
Below ground there is continual mining and counter-mining, which, by
the ever-present threat of sudden explosion and the uncertainty as
to where and when it will take place, causes perhaps a more constant
strain than any other form of warfare.... In short, a steady and
continuous fight has gone on day and night above ground and below it."
It will be appreciated from the above that, though many of the days
under review were described in the official communiqués as "quiet days
on the Western Front," the quietude was not always apparent to those who
lived within the range of the enemy's activities.
The absence of depression amongst the men in these adverse circumstances
was, however, constantly remarked on, and throughout the Division
remained in good spirits.
Colonel Ian Stewart reports an incident which bears witness to the
imperturbability of the men even in the Ilot, the storm centre of the
mining activity. Colonel Stewart was crawling round the front line with
General Ross, in such close contact to the enemy that they dare speak
only in whispers for fear of provoking a shower of rifle- or
hand-grenades. As they came round a sandbagged traverse they found a
Jock sitting on his fire-step, smoking the inevitable cigarette and
reading 'Pearson's Magazine,' quite oblivious to his proximity to the
enemy.
Colonel Stewart, shortly after arriving back at Divisional Headquarters,
received a telephone message from General Ross informing him that he was
just going up to the line to investigate a mine which had been exploded
almost in the exact spot where the Jock had been reading 'Pearson's.'
The fate of the said Jock was not recorded.
The Division had profited considerably by their prolonged tour in the
same sector, and had completed its education in trench warfare in a most
thorough manner. The men had learnt trench-craft, that art which enables
them to keep the enemy constantly on the alert and at the same time to
protect themselves by their wits from avoidable casualties and
discomforts.
They had also had time to acquire that sixth sense which a short spell
of the war gave to all the fighting troops, of working, walking, and
fighting in the dark. They had become good snipers, and experienced
trench workers. They had learnt valuable lessons regarding such
questions as the influence of the nature of the soil on trench
construction, the organisation of working parties, the disposal of mine
spoil, &c.
In fact, the Division was most fortunately placed. After a long
experience of close contact with the enemy, it was now to be given a
period in which time would be available to collect and crystallise its
thoughts on the problems of defence and to be trained by General Harper
in the principles of the attack.