THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME--HIGH WOOD.
The Division entered the area of the Somme battle under bad auspices. It
undoubtedly required a rest before it could be expected to reproduce its
true form. On the 21st of July it received orders to take over the line
on the same evening. On the 22nd it received orders to carry out an
attack. Moreover, this attack, for which the Division was given less
than twenty-four hours to prepare, was to be delivered from the point of
a salient. There was, in fact, a general impression throughout the
Division when they left the Somme area that their efforts had not been
attended by a reasonable chance of success.
As far as the Highland Division is concerned, the tactical feature with
which this phase of the Somme operations is primarily associated is High
Wood. This wood, the highest point in Picardy, is perched on the summit
of a large upland flanking the road, which, passing between the two
Bazentins, leads from Contalmaison to Longueval.
Between the two Bazentins is the road junction where the road through
the Mametz valley strikes the Contalmaison-Longueval road.
During previous operations, in which the 7th Dragoon Guards and the
Deccan Horse had participated, the whole of High Wood had been captured.
The enemy had, however, regained a footing in it. When the Division
arrived in this area the German line ran through Guillemont, through
Delville Wood north-east of Longueval, through High Wood, but on the
reverse slope of this aforementioned upland, north of Bazentin-le-Petit,
and between Contalmaison and Pozières.
The enemy did not, however, hold sufficient of High Wood to secure
observation of the country south-west of it, with which the Division was
primarily concerned.
Of this section of the front the portion taken over by the Division at
one time or another during its tour at duty in the line ran from a point
about half-way between Longueval and High Wood to Bazentin-le-Petit
exclusive.
The Divisional area was traversed throughout its length by the road
which ran from Becourt-Becordel-Fricourt, south of Mametz Wood-Bazentin,
and on to Longueval.
The Mametz Valley, through which this road ran, was familiarly called
the Happy Valley. The valley, with the possible exception of the
Chemical Works at Roeux, has probably stamped itself more on men's minds
than any other topographical feature with which the Division came in
contact. In Happy Valley was situated the headquarters of the brigade in
the line, and of the supporting brigade itself. In addition, the
advanced dressing station and many batteries were also located in it.
Running as it did towards the apex of a salient the enemy could
concentrate a tremendous weight of artillery against it. Thus, when he
was bombarding it with his maximum intensity, shells used to arrive from
the direction of Leuze Wood in the right rear, and from Gueudecourt and
Courcelette frontally, and from behind Pozières on the left.
This valley was the only line of communication through which every
relief, every round of ammunition, and every ration had to pass on their
way to the line, not only for the Highland Division but for several
neighbouring Divisions.
Portions of the valley were under observation from balloons, while
throughout its whole length the clouds of dust raised by the continual
stream of wheeled traffic disclosed to the enemy any considerable
movement that was taking place in it.
The enemy shelled Happy Valley mercilessly day and night, an intense
barrage of high explosive, air bursts and gas shells being placed
completely across it at irregular intervals, and moved backwards and
forwards, up and down it.
[Illustration: MAP II.--HIGH WOOD, JULY 1916.]
For the most part the only protection the residents in the valley had
against shell-fire were slits cut in the ground covered with
waterproof sheets or corrugated iron. By degrees, however, more and more
German dug-outs were discovered, until shell-proof accommodation was
ultimately found for almost all.
The valley was traversed day and night by a constant stream of traffic.
The infantry used overland tracks well clear of the road, and marched in
platoon or section groups. All wheeled traffic was, however, restricted
to the single road, so that periods of great congestion often occurred.
When the German barrage opened, men, animals, and motor vehicles broke
into their best speed. Great columns of white dust, due to the intensity
of the summer heat, rose up, choked everything, and made seeing a matter
of difficulty. Guns and limbers moved at a stretch gallop, lorries
bounded from shell-hole to shell-hole, and every effort was concentrated
on getting out of the zone involved in the barrage with as little delay
as possible.
The heavily-burdened infantryman on his way to and from the line,
however, carried too much on his back to make him think of doubling. He
used to plod along at his regulation three miles an hour, trusting that
his luck would take him through.
It was no uncommon sight to see direct hits scored on gun-teams,
limbers, and groups of infantry. When the barrage ceased and it was
possible to take stock of the result, appalling scenes were often
disclosed. Teams with their riders lying in a heap, ammunition dumps on
fire, riderless and driverless horses and waggons bolting in all
directions, and coming down in the midst of old wire entanglements, were
daily spectacles in the Happy Valley.
At each pause in the barrage all haste was made to complete the work of
succouring the wounded and collecting the dead, and filling in the
latest shell-holes in the road before it reopened.
In this valley the conduct of the Royal Army Medical Corps was superb.
Other troops could at least make some effort to make their way out of
the danger zone as fast as possible, but the bearers of the field
ambulances and the regimental stretcher-bearers could not. They slowly
pushed their wheeled stretchers from the Crucifix at Bazentin to the
dressing station, heedless of the shell-fire and their own security,
and careful only to evacuate the wounded with the minimum of discomfort
to them.
Similarly ambulance car-drivers could not join in the helter-skelter for
security on the road to Fricourt. Day and night they plied slowly along
the damaged road with their burden of wounded, returning again and again
through the valley as soon as their cars had been cleared.
Had the Germans in those days been in possession of the instantaneous
fuze which bursts its shell before it has had time to bury itself in the
earth and thus lose much of its missile effect, this road could have
been made almost impassable. Happy Valley, with its dust and its flies
and its stench of half-buried animals and men, will remain to all who
knew it an ineffaceable memory.
The trench lines taken over by the Division consisted of odd, narrow,
and shallow trenches which had gradually evolved from the connecting of
posts in which troops had dug themselves in during previous engagements.
By means of saps running into High Wood from the trench dug along its
southern and western edge, a footing was held in the wood. Between High
Wood and Delville Wood the British trenches were hidden from the Germans
opposite them and _vice versa_ by the crest line of the upland.
To the left of the wood the trench lines, which were not continuously
connected up, curved in a south-westerly direction towards
Bazentin-le-Petit, leaving the wood as the apex of an acute salient. In
this section of the front the trenches seemed to fulfil no tactical
requirements. There was no depth to the defensive system; the trenches
were little more than knee-deep, and were choked with dead. Work on a
single communication trench--High Alley, running from the Crucifix at
Bazentin to High Wood--had been begun. The Germans held a strong redoubt
in the eastern corner of High Wood. In this corner the contours were
such that there was a depression in the ground similar in shape to a
saucer. The Germans had fortified this saucer, and garrisoned it with
machine-guns, mostly sited so as to fire to a flank. They could thus, by
firing eastwards from this redoubt, rake No Man's Land in direct
enfilade. By firing westwards, they could place an enfilade barrage of
low trajectory bullets which swept the rides through the wood. This
redoubt was surmounted by wire entanglements, the tops of the pickets
being just visible when looked at frontally and from our foremost saps.
Passing through the north-east corner of the wood was a strong switch
line, which ran from Flers through High Wood towards Martinpuich. This
was a well-dug, heavily-traversed trench protected by wire, but during
this period had no completed dug-outs in it. Air photos, however, showed
where work on the shafts of several dug-outs had been begun.
The whole of this area had been the scene of repeated encounters, as the
ground amply testified. In the undergrowth of the wood, and in the
standing corn which covered the whole area, lay the dead of many
different regiments.
The result was that, owing to the scorching summer weather, the troops
in the line lived in an atmosphere of pollution and in a positive
torment of bluebottle flies. In one sap in particular, as one moved
along it the flies rose in such clouds that their buzzing sounded as the
noise of a threshing-machine. In this sap the sentries could only
tolerate the conditions by standing with their handkerchiefs tied over
their mouths and nostrils.
By 3 A.M. on 22nd July, the 154th Infantry Brigade had completed the
relief of the 33rd Division. The 13th Brigade of the 5th Division were
on their right, and the 57th Brigade of the 19th Division on their left.
Of the 154th Brigade two battalions held the line, the remaining two
being in support and reserve in Bazentin-le-Grand Wood and
Bazentin-le-Grand.
The Divisional artillery were in position in the open, the personnel for
the most part living under tarpaulin shelters. Some batteries were in
the Mametz Valley, while others were on the high ground south of
Bazentin-le-Grand. It is difficult to determine who were most to be
sympathised with--the gunners who lived alongside their guns, or the
drivers who had to pass two or three times a day through the Happy
Valley with ammunition. The batteries in positions in the valley itself
probably lived in circumstances which could not have been more hazardous
and unpleasant.
The 153rd Brigade in support occupied the area about the south-east
corner of Mametz Wood and Caterpillar Wood. The 152nd Brigade in
reserve bivouacked between Fricourt Wood and Mametz Wood.
At dawn on the 23rd the Happy Valley barrage, about which the Division
had received no information, opened with great intensity. The 153rd and
152nd Brigades were seriously involved in it, and suffered considerable
casualties. The 152nd Brigade was immediately fallen-in and marched
westwards towards Fricourt, ultimately moving to bivouac in the vicinity
of Becourt-Becordel. The 153rd Brigade extended its area so as to
diminish the number of casualties.
It was later discovered that numerous shell-proof dug-outs existed in
and about Mametz and Fricourt Woods. Apparently no organised
reconnaissances of this area had been made, for had this been the case,
and had the location of these dug-outs been made known to the Division
on its arrival in the area, many unnecessary casualties would have been
avoided.
The day on which the relief was concluded, 22nd July, the Division
received orders to carry out an attack during the coming night. The
objectives given were the north-east and north-west edges of High Wood
and the switch trench from the north-east of High Wood to a point five
hundred yards north-west of it.
The 154th Brigade was detailed to carry out this operation. As a
preliminary the redoubt at the eastern corner of High Wood was to be
seized at 10 P.M. in conjunction with the left brigade, 5th Division.
The main attack on the German switch line was timed to take place at
1.30 P.M.
The troops engaged in this attack had little or no knowledge of the
enemy's dispositions. They had barely completed the relief by dawn on
the previous night. During the day movement was restricted and
patrolling impossible. Thus when the attack was launched at 10 P.M.,
circumstances had afforded the attackers no opportunity of studying the
ground, or of forming any detailed plan of action. Added to this the
wood was such that the trees prevented a shrapnel barrage from being
effective. Further, the "going" within the wood, owing to shell-holes,
brambles, dense undergrowth, and wire entanglements, was extremely
bad--so bad, in fact, that even many weeks after its capture, to walk
from one end of the wood to the other was a laborious process demanding
considerable physical effort.
The attack was therefore delivered with an ineffective barrage with
which the men were unable to keep up. The result was that the enemy had
little inducement to take cover. He was thus able with his machine-guns
and riflemen, whom he posted at night in the woods in advance of his
trench lines, to defeat the attack completely and inflict heavy losses
on the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 9th Royal Scots.
At 1.30 A.M. the main attack was delivered, but it met with no better
fate. The volume of fire, particularly from the machine-guns in the
redoubt, was so intense that no progress could be made. The men had
advanced to the attack with great gallantry, but the cross-fire opposed
to them rendered success impossible. Morning found them back in their
original line, but seriously depleted in numbers.
The day was spent in improving the trenches and in connecting by a
trench the southern edge of High Wood with the Windmill north of
Bazentin-le-Grand. Both the troops in the line and the brigade in
support were heavily shelled during the day, lachrymatory shells and 5·9
howitzers being used profusely.
During the night work was continued on the trench joining High Wood and
the Windmill, and in High Alley. By the end of the night the latter was
negotiable for traffic to within sixty yards of the wood. The following
day the former of these two trenches was heavily and accurately
bombarded.
At 7.30 P.M., 24th July, the enemy launched a surprise attack against
High Wood and against the left company of the 154th Brigade. For some
time the situation was obscure, but by 10 P.M. the artillery had been
asked to slacken. It subsequently transpired that our line remained
intact, and that the German attackers were falling back.
During the attack the enemy again barraged the new trench mentioned
above extremely heavily. He also bombarded High Wood and set it on fire.
By 11.30 P.M. the situation was completely in hand, and work in the
trenches was resumed.
Meanwhile orders had been received that the 154th Brigade was to relieve
the left battalion of the 5th Division, and thus extend its front
towards Longueval. This relief was completed by 6 A.M., and gave the
brigade a frontage of some 2500 yards to hold.
On 25th July the enemy bombarded Mametz Valley and Fricourt Wood in a
most savage fashion with guns of all calibres. This bombardment opened
at noon, and continued until 6 P.M. It was the worst experience of
shell-fire which the residents in Happy Valley encountered during the
Division's sojourn in the Somme area. Much material damage and many
casualties resulted.
At 9.20 P.M. the 4th Seaforth Highlanders delivered another attack
against the German redoubt. It, however, met a worse fate than its
predecessor. An intense machine-gun fire was opened on the British
trenches at the moment when the attackers were mounting the parapet. The
troops suffered such losses from this fire that the attack never
materialised.
This operation roused the enemy considerably, and he shelled the forward
area throughout the night. In this bombardment he used a considerable
number of shells containing phosgene gas. This was one of the earliest
occasions on which this form of gas was used. It was particularly
insidious, as at first it did not cause any inconvenience, and its smell
was not offensive, being similar to that of sweet apples.
Meanwhile the brigade in support had been kept fully occupied. The
intense heat created a great demand for water for the first-line troops.
The water supply in the forward area was, however, non-existent, so that
a dump of petrol tins of water had to be formed in the Happy Valley.
From this dump all the water used in the forward area was carried by the
supporting brigade. Similarly, with no light railways in repair, every
round of S.A.A. bombs, trench-mortar ammunition, Very lights, barbed
wire, screw pickets, &c., had to be carried forward by man power. The
result was that practically every man in the supporting brigade made at
least one journey daily from the dumps at the south-east corner of
Mametz Wood to the forward dumps in rear of High Wood. The labour thus
entailed, coupled with the fact that the supporting brigade lived in a
heavily-shelled area with insufficient dug-out accommodation, meant that
the troops had lost much of their fighting efficiency before they went
into the line. In the circumstances there was, however, no alternative.
On the 26th July the 153rd Brigade relieved the 154th Brigade, and the
152nd Brigade moved forward to the support position. This relief was
considerably interrupted by a further lavish use of phosgene by the
Germans.
The work of consolidating and digging more trenches south and south-west
of the wood was continued, as until touch in the front line could be
obtained on the left, that flank was in the air.
On the 27th the forward area and the supporting brigade (152nd) in
Mametz Valley were heavily shelled all night. This shelling was intense,
it being estimated that two shells per minute burst in the area close to
brigade headquarters alone throughout the night; 77 mm. gas shells were
primarily used, but 5·9's were also from time to time employed freely.
As a result of this bombardment the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders alone sustained eighty gas casualties.
During the following day the 153rd Brigade co-operated in an attack on
Longueval by rifle and machine-gun and Stokes mortar fire. They,
however, took no part in the infantry action.
During the night 27-28th July, connection in the front line was
established about 200 yards north-east of the Bazentin Windmill by the
6th Black Watch with the 29th Division. For the first time in this
sector a continuous line of defence was presented to the enemy.
The 153rd Infantry Brigade had carried out a number of patrols. They had
already had three days in which to reconnoitre the enemy's position and
study the lie of the land when they received orders to attack the
enemy's line from half-way between Delville and High Woods to the
western edge of High Wood.
Patrols had located the enemy as occupying various positions, and these
were subjected to bombardments during the forty-eight hours previous to
the attack. At this stage in the war the shooting of the heavy howitzers
had not reached that pitch of accuracy to which it afterwards attained.
Nor was the liaison between the infantry and the Corps artillery as
close as it became later. These causes and faulty observation made the
shooting somewhat erratic at a place where very exact shooting was
necessary. To these bombardments the enemy usually replied by shelling
the Mametz Valley and the infantry in the line.
The attack was launched at 6.10 P.M., and to the east of the wood
proceeded some distance. However, on topping the rise in the middle of
No Man's Land, the troops came under a very severe machine-gun fire, in
which the accursed redoubt on the eastern corner of the wood, as usual,
played a prominent part.
In the wood itself the advance was again checked by enfilade machine-gun
fire, and the result of the action was much the same as it had been in
the case of the 154th Brigade.
The net gains were, however, an advance of 200 yards on the right and
centre, and of 70 yards in the wood. The men maintained themselves in
their new positions in the wood for some time. Finally, however, owing
to the intensity of the enemy's bombardment, they withdrew to their
original positions.
The right and centre consolidated their new position in posts, and held
their gains.
Orders were meanwhile issued for the attack to be resumed at 9.45 P.M.
These orders were, however, not received at Divisional headquarters in
sufficient time to enable them to be transmitted to the attacking
companies before the attack was due to start. No further action
therefore took place.
The 31st July was remarkable for a violent bombardment of the country
between Bazentin-le-Grand and Mametz Wood, which was practically
continuous throughout the day.
On 1st August, the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 153rd, and the
154th Brigade moved forward to the support brigade area. It had now
become quite clear that no good purpose could be served by ordering the
Division to carry out any further local attacks. There was no reason to
suppose that such attacks would meet with any more success than their
predecessors. The 152nd Infantry Brigade was therefore instructed to
adopt a vigorous policy of peaceful penetration. By that is meant that
the policy was to be the acquisition of more ground by digging and by
minor operations, without the delivery of any set piece attack involving
a large number of troops.
Orders were thus issued for as much ground as possible to be gained in
High Wood by sapping forward. Progress was also to be made between High
Wood and the Divisional right boundary, by digging-in posts in advance
of the existing front line during the night, and ultimately connecting
them up into continuous trenches.
The actual labour of digging in the wood was considerable, as beneath
the soil there lay a tangled mass of thick roots, in many cases too
stout to be severed by a spade. The work, therefore, was slow and
arduous, axes and billhooks having to be employed as well as picks and
shovels. The enemy, however, paid little attention to the working
parties.
On the right it was considered likely that, as there was no cover, the
enemy would interfere considerably with digging operations. An apparatus
was therefore employed, known as the Bartlett Forcing Jack. The Bartlett
Jack was designed to drive iron pipes loaded with tin canisters of
ammonal (containing two lb. of ammonal per foot run) through the ground
at a depth of from four to five feet. When a sufficient length of pipe
had been driven into the ground in the required direction, the charge
was exploded. The explosion blew a fissure in the ground which served as
a trench. In this instance the labour of carrying the pipes and ammonal
up to the line, and of working the task, proved incommensurate with the
results obtained. This was particularly so when it became evident that
considerable liberties could be taken by working parties without
interference from the Boche.
On the night 3-4th August General Burn decided to employ a considerable
working party and boldly "jump" a trench some 200 yards in front of the
existing front line. That is to say, instead of sapping forwards and
digging "T" heads at the ends of the saps for the posts to occupy, and
finally connecting the "T" heads together so as to form a continuous
trench, a continuous fire trench was dug in the first instance during
the night, and occupied by a garrison at dawn. Subsequently
communication trenches were cut to connect this trench with the support
line, Seaforth Trench.
The Germans thus on 4th August woke to find that the whole of the
Divisional front line, exclusive of the wood, had advanced some 200
yards towards them.
When the Division was relieved on 7th August, more than half High Wood
was in our hands and consolidated. The redoubt in the eastern corner
was, however, as formidable as ever. To the right of the wood the line
had been advanced some 300 yards, while to the left the position had
been so consolidated that there was no gap in the lines, and the flank
was properly secured.
In addition, High Alley, 1000 yards in length, had been cleared out and
made into a first-class communication trench by the 8th Royal Scots.
Further east they had also dug a completely new communication trench
called Thistle Alley. The digging of these trenches was a considerable
task, as the soil for the most part consisted of chalk containing
countless large flints or gravel, so that every spadeful had to be
loosened by the pick before it could be thrown out of the trench.
On 7th August the 152nd Brigade was relieved by the 100th Brigade, 33rd
Division. Owing to the intensity of the enemy's shelling of the valley
at night, it was decided for the first time to carry out the relief in
daylight. In spite of some apprehension caused by three German
aeroplanes flying low over the lines while the relief was in progress,
the experiment proved highly successful. The 152nd Brigade, in fact, did
not sustain a single casualty during the operation.
On 8th August the Division remained in bivouacs near Meaulte, in
glorious weather. In the evening the "Balmorals," the Divisional troupe,
using the tail-board of a lorry as a stage, gave a performance in the
open air, which was attended by practically the entire infantry of the
Division. It is doubtful if, in the whole of their highly successful
career, any performance given by the "Balmorals" was more appreciated
than this one.
The Division had passed from sixteen days of continuous and
unsatisfactory strife to an unexpected haven of rest, set in the midst
of corn-lands during harvest-time.
It was a real refreshment for the men to sit in the cool of a
delightful summer evening and listen to "Stanley" and "Gertie," both of
whom rose to the occasion admirably.
So ended the first offensive operations in which the Division had been
employed as a whole unit. The results had been disappointing and
dispiriting to all. Over 3500 casualties, including more than 150
officers, had been sustained in two fruitless attempts to carry a German
position which remained intact, in spite of many attacks by a succession
of Divisions, until 15th September. The Germans had shown that High Wood
could not be taken hurriedly by a direct frontal attack.
Three months later General Harper was able to show that the much
stronger position of Beaumont Hamel could be stormed frontally after
careful preparations and with adequate artillery support.
High Wood was finally overcome by a mine, which shattered the redoubt,
and by tanks, which on this occasion were employed for the first time in
the Great War.
The mine referred to above was suggested by General Pelham Burn on the
morning of 5th August as being the least costly means of subduing the
redoubt. His suggestion was at once adopted. Tunnelling officers
reported at brigade headquarters the same evening, the actual mining
operations beginning on the following morning.
It was most satisfactory to those engaged in High Wood to visit it after
the German withdrawal in the Somme area, and see in place of the saucer
in which the German redoubt was situated a vast crater. Many graves were
in it and round it, and arms, equipment, and ammunition lay scattered
about it. In fact, it had all the appearance of having admirably served
its purpose.
On the 9th August the Division, less the artillery, which remained in
the line, entrained at Edgehill and Mericourt, and was moved to the area
Longpré-Pont Remy. The following day it again entrained, and began to
move into the Blaringham area.
High Wood now stands in the centre of a vast cemetery. There is barely a
portion of ground of the size of a tennis court in all that country-side
which does not contain the graves of one or more British soldiers. In
the wood itself stand memorials erected to the memory of the fallen of
many Divisions which were shattered there. The Highland Division was not
by any means the only Division which failed to capture a natural
fortress situated at the apex of a salient.