ARRIVAL IN FRANCE--FESTUBERT.
On 13th April 1915 telephone instructions were received from the War
Office that the 1/1 Highland Division was at once to be prepared for
service overseas. The following day information was received that the
battalions which had already been sent overseas would be replaced by the
6th and 7th Black Watch, and by four Lancashire battalions--the 1/4
Battalion King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1/8 Battalion the King's
Liverpool Regiment, 1/4 the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 2/5
Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers.
By 18th April these battalions had all joined the Division. On 29th
April orders were received that the Division would entrain to
Southampton and Folkestone for Havre and Boulogne during the next few
days.
By 5th May the journey had been completed without any unusual incidents,
and the Division was concentrated in billets in the area Busnes, Robecq,
and Lillers, and formed part of the Indian Corps (Sir James Willcocks)
of the First Army (Sir Douglas Haig).
As soon as the Division had completed its concentration in the First
Army area, General Sir Douglas Haig paid it his first of many visits.
The assistance which the Division received from Sir Douglas Haig and the
First Army Headquarters Staff while finding its legs during its first
days in France was invaluable.
At this period the general situation on the Western Front was as
follows: The second battle of Ypres, prepared by the first discharge of
asphyxiating gases, had begun on 22nd April, and was to continue with
great intensity for over a month.
During the early part of this period the French were preparing an attack
to be launched on 9th May between Arras and the right of the British
lines. The First British Army, having been ordered to support this
operation by an attack, had issued instructions directing the IVth Corps
against the German position in the neighbourhood of Richebourg
(south-west of Fromelles), and the Ist and Indian Corps against the
German trenches between Givenchy and Neuve Chapelle. These attacks as
planned were accordingly delivered on 8th, 9th, and 10th May 1915. They,
however, met with little success. It was therefore decided that the
First Army should concentrate on the southern point of attack, and renew
the operations on 12th May. This attack was subsequently postponed until
the 15th owing to low visibility.
In the attack on the 15th the Indian Corps, owing to the strength of the
enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoue, again
failed to make progress. The 2nd Division of the Ist Corps, however,
captured the enemy's first and support lines. On the following day, the
7th Division on the right of the 2nd Division successfully captured
several second lines of enemy trenches, and these two Divisions
continued the advance on the day after as far as the Le Quinque
Rue-Bethune road.
On 19th May the 2nd Division was relieved on this front by the 51st
Division.[1]
On the 25th, the object of these operations having been attained, orders
were given for Divisions in the line to act defensively and consolidate
the ground won.
These operations were attended by serious casualties, but, to quote Sir
John French's despatch, they assisted in securing the brilliant
successes attained by the French forces on the right, not only by
holding the enemy on this front, but by drawing off a part of the German
reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces east of
Arras. In this battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a
strongly-fortified position, and ground was won on a front of four miles
to an average depth of 600 yards.
From the above summary it will be seen that the 51st Division was
initiated to the ways of war in the midst of a great battle. On 9th May
it remained in reserve to the Indian Corps, and was held in readiness to
move at short notice until 11th May. By this date it had become clear
that the progress of the Indian Corps had not been such as to render the
employment of its reserve at all probable.
On 14th May the 51st Division, less two brigades R.F.A. temporarily
attached to the Lahore and 49th Division, moved to the area Caestre,
Borre, Merris, Meteren, and came into G.H.Q. reserve.[2]
On 18th May the Division moved into the area La Gorgue-Vieille Chapelle.
On the night 19-20th May the 152nd Infantry Battalion began the relief
of the 2nd Division (General Horne), south of Neuve Chapelle, and on
20-21st the 153rd Infantry Brigade relieved a Canadian brigade in the
Richebourg sector.
The Highland Division during its first tour of duty in the line was thus
employed in the particularly trying operation of consolidating a
newly-won position. Few operations call for more resource and more
tactical skill on the part of junior officers and N.C.O.'s, or for more
detailed planning and arrangement on the part of commanders and staffs.
Order has immediately to be evolved from chaos. Covered approaches are
non-existent, and must be constructed before movement during daylight
becomes possible; sniping with rifles and, in some cases, field-guns is
constant; the protection afforded by barbed-wire entanglements is
wanting; arrangements for sanitation and cooking have not been planned.
In fact, the amount of work required to make the position defensible and
habitable appears overwhelming.
To make confusion worse confounded, officers, runners, reliefs, ration
parties, &c., as long as movement is restricted to the hours of
darkness, find the greatest difficulty in acquiring a working knowledge
of the geography of the defences.
Moreover the Germans, in those days of short advances, were quick at
recovering from the confusion in their artillery arrangements created
by a successful attack. They were therefore always liable to bombard a
newly-captured position heavily before the men had time to construct
sufficient field-works to protect themselves from shell splinters.
In the case of the front taken over by the Division on this occasion,
the normal difficulties were accentuated by the fact that digging-in was
only possible to a depth of from two to three feet. Everywhere in the
Flanders mud, below that level water is encountered. It is therefore
necessary to erect above ground double rows of traversed breastworks,
between which the men must live and have their being.
The difficulty of consolidation in this mud country requires to have
been experienced to be fully appreciated.
The work of maintaining breastworks, when completed, in a state of
repair is considerable, as they cannot withstand a bombardment by
artillery or trench-mortars. In consequence sections of the trenches are
frequently levelled to the ground, and have to be reconstructed. The
labour of maintaining them when once erected is, however, a small
problem when compared with the difficulty of erecting them _de novo_
during active operations.
In the first place, owing to the flatness and absence of cover from
view, which is characteristic of Flanders, the work of construction is
in the initial stages almost entirely confined to night work. As
breastworks will only stand if their sides are graded at the proper
slope, darkness makes this work infinitely more difficult. Moreover,
breastworks during their construction and before they have reached their
full thickness can be demolished by light field-guns, and be seriously
damaged even by machine-gun fire. Of these two facts the enemy used to
take full advantage. He also knew well that much of the work had to be
done by men standing in the open on his side of the breastworks, and so
made considerable use of machine-guns to inflict casualties on working
parties thus engaged.
There are other serious drawbacks to garrisoning breastwork trenches.
Deep dug-outs cannot be mined in the clay in the normal way, again on
account of water. Concrete shelters, which take a considerable time to
erect, are therefore the only alternative form of shell-proof cover.
Even these have a marked tendency to fill with water.
There was a good example of a concrete dug-out in the right sector at
Armentières in September 1916. Some simple-minded soldier, finding that
it was gradually filling with water, made a hole through the concrete
floor to let the water out. In consequence the dug-out filled with water
up to the level of the ground surface in a few hours, driving its
occupants out. A battalion medical officer subsequently visiting the
trenches came across this dug-out, and thinking it was a storage tank
for water, tested the water and caused a notice-board to be placed on
it, saying, "For ablution purposes only; not fit for drinking."
Breastwork parapets, even when they are not subjected to bombardment,
require constant attention. They have in particular a disconcerting
habit of settling down and losing height, particularly after rain. In
consequence it sometimes happens that by the gradual subsidence of the
parapet men may unwittingly expose themselves to enemy snipers in places
where a day or two previously they were completely hidden from view.
Apart from the amount of labour the upkeep of breastworks requires,
there are other reasons which make them unpleasant to live in on an
active front. During a bombardment, for instance, when a shell hits the
trench, men are constantly being buried in a heap of sandbags and earth.
They have then to be dug out immediately to save them from suffocation.
In these circumstances the rescue parties often have to work while the
bombardment continues, and with enemy snipers and machine-gunners ready
to engage them whenever they expose themselves in the breach.
German machine-gunners were also expert at firing a series of bursts
into a particular portion of breastwork until it became
non-bullet-proof. They would then continue firing bursts at irregular
intervals at the same spot, with the result that the bullets penetrated
the parapet and came through into the trench. Casualties were often
caused in this manner.
The Highland Division, thus having arrived in France with its training
only partially completed, was called upon to undertake a difficult and
unpleasant task--namely, the holding and consolidation of a
newly-captured position in Flanders. Moreover, the circumstances were
such that the Division could not carry out a period of attachment in
the line to an experienced Division for instruction.
Thus no opportunity was vouchsafed to officers and men of being "put
wise" before the full responsibility of holding a captured position was
thrust upon them. The significance of this statement is that troops on
the first occasion that they enter the battle zone are liable to be
"gobrowed" by their new circumstances. They require, as it were, a
chaperon to assist them to assess things at their true value, and teach
them what not to fear but to respect, and what they may disregard.
Discussing this question, a Brigadier-General once related how when he
first arrived in France as a company commander he saw a "woolly bear"
burst over a wood in which his company was lying in mass. He turned and
galloped back to the wood _ventre à terre_ in a frenzied state of mind,
certain that he would find numbers of his men dead and dying. He was
amazed to find that, on the contrary, not a single man had been touched.
A veteran would, of course, have regarded the woolly bear in its true
light--as a vulgar and ostentatious beast that usually burst too high
and seldom took any effect on the ground.
In the other direction one remembers the novice who, during his period
of initiation, cut up a duck-board (a most impious act in itself) in a
forward sap and kindled a smoking bonfire on which to boil a mess-tin of
water, and his indignant astonishment at the shower of rifle grenades
which he unwittingly but naturally provoked.
Indeed, the debutante Division entering its first theatre of battle may
well be excused a certain amount of shyness concerning its behaviour,
however well prompted it may have been before it left home.
General Davies, commanding the 8th Division, however, gave the 51st
every possible assistance, even lending them his own instructors to help
to complete their training. His assistance proved most valuable.
On 26th May Divisional Headquarters was shelled out of Lacouture. This
bombardment was attributed to an article which had appeared in the
press, and which disclosed the location of units about Lacouture,
including Divisional Headquarters and a Canadian 60-pounder battery. The
Germans appear to have taken full advantage of this information, as
both the Divisional Headquarters and the 60-pounder battery were heavily
shelled. Several of the Divisional Headquarters signal section were
killed or wounded, and General Bannatine-Allason had a narrow escape,
the wind screen of his car being shattered. After this episode it was
noticed that the censorship of articles appearing in the press became
more rigorous.
On taking over the line, the clearing of the battlefield had to be
undertaken in addition to the work of consolidation. The bodies of men
who had been killed in the recent operations lay thick throughout the
whole area. Even the wounded had not all been brought in. The men were
thus quickly introduced to war in its worst aspects, in a manner which
clearly revealed to them the power of modern destructive weapons.
Officers and men still speak of the depressing effect which the
spectacle of so many dead had on them. This feeling was augmented by the
unpleasant duty of searching for the bodies in the polluted atmosphere
and burying them, which had to be undertaken during their first few days
in the line.
The whole country-side was further littered with arms, equipment,
clothing, tools, and ammunition. Considerable exertions were therefore
required to save even a portion of the serviceable stores which had been
left on the ground during the preceding operations.
On 30th May the Division was transferred to the IVth Corps, being
relieved by the Indian Corps. The following day the 153rd Infantry
Brigade relieved the Canadians between Festubert and Le Quinque Rue.
This sector was subsequently divided, the 152nd Infantry Brigade taking
over the line on the left.
On 7th June orders were issued from the IVth Corps to attack the enemy's
positions about Rue d'Ouvert and Chapelle St Roch and farther south on
the morning of the 11th, with the object of gaining ground towards
Violaines. Later this attack was postponed until the 15th. On the 12th
the operation order for this attack was issued. The objective of the
IVth Corps was "the German positions from Chapelle St Roch along the Rue
d'Ouvert to L12.
"The Canadian Division was to attack on the right and form a defensive
flank; the 7th Division was allotted the Chapelle St Roch and the
southern end of the Rue d'Ouvert as its objective; and the 51st Division
the extreme end.
"The actual objective given to the 51st Division were the houses at L11,
L12, L13, and K7. At the last-named they were to join hands with the 7th
Division.
"The 154th Infantry Brigade were detailed for the attack, their right
being directed on the south-west corner of the German salient--that is,
a point about 150 yards east by south of L8. The left of this attack was
to be directed through L9."
One section of the 1/1 Highland Field Company, R.E., and "C" Company of
the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, were ordered to assemble in the D line
towards the left flank, in readiness to construct and occupy a
fire-trench between M6 and L12 after that point had been gained.
One section 2/2 Highland Field Company, R.E., with two platoons of the
154th Infantry Brigade, were ordered to assemble in B line near the
right flank. Their purpose was "to protect the right flank of the attack
and to construct a _point d'appui_ on a suitable site between L8 and
L10."
It was arranged that sufficient infantry bombing parties should be
detailed from the bombers of the Division to carry out various tasks,
according to the progress made by the assaulting infantry.
In these days the bomb commonly used was the Bethune bomb. These were
made of cast-iron, and were exploded by means of time-fuses fixed into
detonators, with patent lighters attached to the fuse. They were but
clumsy and dangerous weapons when compared with the modern Mills bomb.
Bombing and its tactics was then an art which could only be acquired by
a course of specialist training, which, with the facilities that then
existed, lasted a considerable time.
The result was that the output of bombers was small, and it was
therefore considered necessary, if full value was to be obtained from
them, to amalgamate all the bombers of each brigade into brigade
grenadier companies.
On this occasion all three brigade grenadier companies detailed bombing
squads to take part in the operations.
The artillery available for this attack was, both as regards the number
of guns and the amount of ammunition, insignificant in the light of more
recent experience. The Divisional artillery, it is true, had been
reinforced by a group of French 75's. The 15-pounders, with which the
Divisional artillery was armed, had, however, such faulty ammunition and
so little of it that effective co-operation with the infantry was,
according to modern standards, out of the question. The artillery
programme included wire-cutting, a two days' continuous bombardment, and
a final intensive bombardment. The first bombardment was to continue up
to the moment of the infantry assault. At 6 P.M., the hour of the
assault, the guns firing on the enemy's front line were to lift on to
the line L9-L10. At 6.15 P.M. there was a further lift on to the Rue
d'Orient.
The general plan can be summed up as being an attempt to straighten out
a re-entrant in our line by pinching off a salient in the enemy's.
The artillery began wire-cutting on 13th June, the deliberate
bombardment beginning on the 14th. On the 15th it continued, becoming
intensive between 5.30 P.M. and 6 P.M. Mountain-guns and trench-mortars
also joined in the bombardment.
At 6 P.M., 15th June, the attack was launched by the 4th Loyal North
Lancashires and the 6th Scottish Rifles[3] of the 154th Brigade.
The attack was at first successful; the west end of the German salient
was carried, and the attack pushed on to the main German line near the
Rue d'Ouvert, and for a time the third German trench line was occupied
and held. Three companies of the 4th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment
were accordingly sent forward to reinforce the Scottish Rifles.
Meanwhile "C" Company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had advanced to
the attack at 6.45 P.M.
[Illustration: MAP 1.--ATTACK NEAR FESTUBERT, 15TH JUNE 1915.]
The action of this company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders is amply
described by the following extracts from a letter written by a platoon
sergeant who took part in the attack:--
"On the night of the 14th we went into the front line, the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders having eased away to the left of the Divisional sector
towards the Orchard, to make room for our company.
"Communications from reserve trenches to front line were very bad;
movement had mostly to be carried out in the open under direct German
observation. Daylight movement had therefore to be restricted as much
as possible.
"On the 15th we had a most uncomfortable day. The Boche rose early,
having apparently known our plans. In fact, some of them were heard to
call across No Man's Land, 'Come along, Jocks; we are waiting for you.'
And undoubtedly they were. From early morning we were subjected to
continual shell-fire, causing many casualties to us. As the afternoon
drew on the Boche became still more lively, but we still had great
hopes. These, however, became fainter as each occasional look over the
top showed the German wire unbroken.
"At 5 o'clock we began to make our final preparations. The adjutant
and C.O. arrived and took up a point of vantage in the trench where a
view of the 6th Scottish Rifles could be got during their advance. It
was only by this means that the C.O. could judge as to the failure or
success of the Scottish Rifles.
"Thus we awaited our further orders. From this time onwards an
occasional bark from a field-gun could be heard, and a small shrapnel
burst could be seen over the German lines.
"At last the hour had come for the 6th Scottish Rifles. Over they
went. Then the Germans showed to advantage the quantity and quality of
their munitions. Machine-guns swept over the parapets and tore them to
pieces; the 154th Infantry Brigade were seen to be advancing gloriously
in front of the most colossal artillery and machine-gun fire--their
ranks thinned considerably before they were many yards from their own
trenches. But on they went and entered the German front line, where
they were lost to view.
"Our time had now come. Nothing for it but to go over. The order was
passed along, 'Get ready.' At 6.45 P.M. the order came 'Advance!' The
place was a perfect hell. Just one solid sheet of bullets. Over we
went. Many were hit on the top of the parapet; before a distance of
thirty yards was traversed all the officers of our company were hit,
as well as the brigade bombing officer (Lieutenants Mowatt and Dunnet
killed, Captains Robertson, Ritson, and Lieutenant Fraser-Campbell
wounded). On we went; but men were falling in all directions, and by
the time we were within reach of the German wire, not more than fifteen
of the company were still on the move. The outlook was hopeless, the
wire was an insurmountable obstacle, and the few who remained had to
take cover in the nearest shell-hole until darkness allowed us to make
our own lines again--a sad dejected remnant of a company."
So much for the subsidiary attack of the 5th Seaforths.
The attack of the 7th Division on the right of the 154th Infantry
Brigade had failed to develop substantially, and no progress was made.
Farther back the 1st Canadian Brigade captured the German front line
trenches.
Night thus fell with the 154th Infantry Brigade having penetrated the
German positions on a narrow front, but with both its flanks "in the
air." The situation, however, remained too obscure to enable the salient
thus made in the German lines to be utilised for developing flank
attacks against the German front and support line trenches.
The nature of the country, as has been pointed out above, made it
impossible for the men to dig themselves in, and they were thus
dependent for protection on the slender breastworks that they had been
enabled to improvise during the night amongst the débris of the German
trenches. In this exposed position they were counter attacked in the
early hours of the morning. Engaged with bombs and machine-gun fire,
both from their front and flanks, they were unable to hold their
position, and were finally forced back to their original front line
trenches. They had suffered considerable casualties, the 1/4 Loyal North
Lancashires alone having lost 19 killed, 255 wounded, and 145 missing,
amongst them 5 officers being killed and 8 wounded.
During the night the remnants of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and the
sappers who accompanied them crawled back from the shell-holes or long
grass in which they had been lying to our own trenches. In a similar way
the Canadians, also unable to hold their exposed position on the German
trenches, had returned to their own lines.
The failure of the attack was thus complete. Great credit is, however,
due to the 154th Infantry Brigade for their advance in the face of heavy
artillery and close-range rifle and machine-gun fire. There is little
doubt but that, had the operations on their flanks been successful, they
would have had every prospect of holding their gains. "C" Company of the
5th Seaforths did all that could have been expected of them in
circumstances in which success, as it turned out, was out of the
question.
General Ross, commanding 152nd Infantry Brigade, says of them in his
report of the operations: "I am glad to say that both officers and men
behaved very well indeed, and all went into the attack with the full
intention of getting through. The company had been somewhat shaken
during bombardment, as they had had several casualties from shell-fire,
mainly from our own shells, and the German shells had fallen amongst
them more steadily than usual. The casualties are not known yet
exactly, but are heavy, being over a hundred in one company."
Results were undoubtedly discouraging in the first attack carried out by
troops of the Highland Division, but it is doubtful if, in the
circumstances, any troops could have done better.
They had within a few days of arriving in France played a principal part
in the deepest tragedy that attacking infantry can assist in--the
tragedy of uncut wire.
After a gallant advance across No Man's Land, through which nothing but
their determination to close with the enemy could have carried them, the
survivors had been suddenly halted by an intact entanglement covered at
close range by rifles and machine-guns.
In cases such as this the whole impetus of the attack collapses, skill
and initiation are no longer of avail, the brain can no longer help the
body. Some men plunge into the entanglement, tearing at it with their
wire-cutters, and lacerating their flesh on the barbs until they fall.
Others double up and down the belt looking for a gap through which they
may make their way. Odd heroes may find such a gap, and, if they live to
reach the German trenches, leap into them, subsequently to be posted as
missing. Their story is never told.
Others, with a disregard for death born of despair, may stand for a
moment or two and return the enemy's fire until they are shot down.
Only those survive to answer the roll who either fall wounded and have
strength subsequently to regain their own lines under cover of darkness,
or who with quick perception see that the obstacle is impenetrable, and
instantly seek cover in which they may be hid until nightfall.
Uncut wire might be written as the epitaph on the grave of many a
British infantryman, and equally well in later days, when air
reconnaissance was perfected, on the grave of many a commander's
reputation.
During the following night the 6th Scottish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North
Lancashires, and the 4th King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment were
withdrawn, and were replaced by the 8th Liverpools and the 7th Black
Watch. The latter had been sent up from the 153rd Infantry Brigade to
take over the reserve trenches.
On the morning of the 16th orders were received from the IVth Corps to
renew the attack at 4.45 P.M. after an artillery bombardment. The 5th
and 7th Gordons from the 153rd Brigade were therefore temporarily
attached to the 154th Brigade to replace the battalions which had been
withdrawn.
The attack met with no more success than its predecessor. The 8th
Liverpools, supported by the 7th Black Watch, carried out the advance.
It was, however, impeded from the start by a heavy bombardment opened on
our trenches by the enemy. The 8th Liverpools managed to get forward in
small parties, and passed the west end of the German salient. The troops
on their right flanks were, however, unable to make progress, and about
8 P.M. the Liverpools were forced back to our trenches.
It had been intended that, if the 154th Brigade was successful, the
152nd Brigade should continue the attack. These orders were therefore
cancelled, and during the night the 5th and 7th Gordon Highlanders
replaced the 7th Black Watch and 8th Liverpools.
In view of the failure of the first attack, it is doubtful if the
second, which at best could only be hastily improvised, had any prospect
of success. However, at 5 P.M., 17th June, further orders were received
by the Divisional commander to renew the attack on the German salient at
3 A.M. on the night 17-18th after a short intense artillery preparation.
At 2.30 A.M., to the relief of all concerned, this attack was postponed
and subsequently cancelled.
The failure of these attacks can be attributed to the inadequacy of the
artillery preparation. Subsequent battles proved that the number of guns
and the allotment of ammunition per gun required is far in excess of
those allotted to the Division for the battle of Festubert, if infantry
are to have a reasonable chance of success in attacking organised
resistance, protected by strong wire entanglements.
In addition to the inadequacy in the number of guns, the 15-pounders
again proved themselves highly unsatisfactory. As evidence of the
unreliability of their ammunition, it is worth recording that Captain
Duncan of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had an eye knocked
out by a shrapnel bullet half a mile behind the British front line.
On the day after the launching of the first attack, the following
message had been received from Lieut.-General Sir James Rawlinson:
"The Corps commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the
troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and
to-day, particularly to the assaulting battalions--_viz._, the 6th
Scottish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 8th
King's Liverpool Regiment."
On the nights 18-19th and 19-20th June the 7th Division took over the
right sector, leaving only the 153rd Brigade in the line.
On the 24th orders were received for the 51st Division to rejoin the
Indian Corps, and to take over the line from the Lahore Division south
of Laventie. On the 27th June, this relief having been completed, the
G.O.C. took over command of the new sector.
All ranks experienced a sense of relief on leaving the Festubert area.
Not only on account of the serious casualties suffered by many units
during the attacks and the retaliation provoked by them, but also for
other reasons, it was rightly regarded as an unpleasant sector.
Communications had been almost non-existent, so that movement by day was
very restricted. The trenches, where they existed, were very open, and
sniping was rife. The ill-famed "Orchard," which it was hoped might be
consolidated and incorporated into the defences, had an evil reputation.
Breastworks were no sooner erected there by night than they were knocked
down by day. The Germans were, in fact, so opposed to the consolidation
of the Orchard that they introduced trench-mortars to check it.
The large calibre trench-mortars, or "Yon Minnie Wafers," as the Jocks
styled them, do not so much damage breastworks as remove them. They
frequently leave in a place where breastworks once stood nothing but a
deep crater, with two feet of water in it. In this case the result was
that, in spite of a vast amount of work carried out on the
consolidation, the sector was still far from completed when the Division
was relieved.
In those days there was little with which to reply to trench-mortars.
Appeals to the artillery for retaliatory shoots would seldom be
answered, owing to the restrictions placed on the use of ammunition on
account of its scarcity. Mountain-guns, manned by the R.G.A., were,
however, employed, and also a form of trench howitzer; but these were
inferior weapons when compared with the formidable mortars of the
Germans.
The Laventie front was in character similar to the Festubert front. When
the Division took over the line, the defences consisted of little more
than a single line of breastworks. Behind this, some 200 to 400 yards in
rear, lay a series of detached supporting posts at intervals of from 300
to 500 yards. A reserve line composed of similar posts lay 1000 to 1500
yards in rear of the supporting posts.
The enemy was occupying the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge, from which
he overlooked all the country in which the British defences were
situated.
Each sector has, as a rule, its particular "unhealthy spot." In the
Laventie sector Red Lamp Corner occupied this rôle.
The front line ended in a butt-end, some 100 yards from the German line
at Red Lamp Corner (Point B on the diagram); 300 yards west of Red Lamp
Corner the front line started from another butt-end (Point C). These two
butt-ends were connected by a fire-stepped communication trench (C--E).
See diagram.
[Illustration: Trench Layout]
The corner took its name from a red lamp which was lit at dusk and
placed at B to prevent the troops garrisoning CD from shooting into
those garrisoning AB in the dark. The trench from E to C was
continuously subjected to close-range rifle and machine-gun fire in
direct enfilade, and both it and the corner itself were places to be
avoided.
In these days the red lamp was a necessary precaution, as a form of
activity which came later to be known as "wind fights" frequently
occurred. A post would see or imagine it saw an enemy patrol, which it
took to be a prelude to an attack. It in consequence opened rapid fire.
This fire was taken up by posts on its right and left. Subsequently the
alarm travelled for several miles, and rapid fire was opened all along
the line. The fight, often occasioned by Private X., just out from home,
mistaking a pollarded willow for a German, involved an enormous
expenditure of ammunition, in which the shooting was not always under
complete control.
It will be easily understood that, without the red lamp, CD might have
made things very unpleasant for AB in these circumstances.
This sector presented many difficulties. The defences that had been
constructed were so limited that the troops in the line were far too
congested. They were therefore liable to suffer undue casualties in the
event of bombardment. Moreover, the supporting posts being isolated
sections of trenches clearly visible, particularly in air photographs,
were in consequence liable to attract a considerable volume of artillery
fire. Further, communicating trenches, as usual, were quite inadequate
to meet the requirements of the garrison.
General Bannatine-Allason therefore at once decided that the whole
scheme of defence must be recast and largely augmented. Accordingly work
was begun on a continuous support line, and on increasing the number of
communication trenches. In fact, a considerable effort was demanded from
the ranks to render the sector reasonably defensible.
When the Division was relieved in July much progress had been made,
General Willcocks expressing himself to the Divisional commander as very
satisfied with the great improvements that had been effected in the
defences.
In this period the Division learnt many lessons in trench craft.
On taking over the line enemy sniping was continuous. The hostile
snipers were masters of the situation, and inflicted serious casualties.
However, every effort was made to check the enemy's activities in this
respect, with excellent results. Towards the end of the Division's tour
in this sector, the Highlanders were at least on equal terms, if not
superior to the enemy as snipers. In some cases telescopic rifles were
bought by private enterprise. The men who were entrusted with these
rifles were carefully selected from amongst the gamekeepers and stalkers
in the infantry, and on several days they were able to register good
bags.
On 1st July the Division saw the first British mine exploded. At 3 A.M.
two rounds were fired by the artillery as a signal; a moment later the
mine exploded. The artillery and machine-guns then opened on the enemy's
trenches for fifteen minutes. The German retaliation was slight. When
day broke it was reported that about fifty yards of the German parapet
was blown in. Later the Germans were seen with stretchers on and about
the crater. The blow, therefore, appeared to have been successful. After
daybreak, however, the enemy snipers killed several of our men who
exposed themselves in trying to see the results of the explosion.
As in the last sector, work in the defences was considerably hampered by
the enemy's artillery and trench-mortars, which were constantly
levelling the British trenches. As usual, appeals for artillery
retaliation could seldom be met, owing to the paucity of ammunition. It
became most discouraging to the men to see their breastworks being
damaged and destroyed in this manner, their labours of the previous
night often being undone in a few minutes, without it being possible to
fire a round in retaliation. In this sector life in the trenches was
made more uncertain than ever by the introduction of the rifle grenade
by the Germans.
In the early part of July, Colonel Ian Stewart, D.S.O., Scottish Rifles,
who had joined the Division as G.S.O. 1 in June, formulated a scheme of
training every man in the use of the bomb. Bombing, before this
innovation, had been regarded as the duty of specialists. The new scheme
was that every man should be trained to be able to light and throw a
bomb in the case of an emergency. At the same time the brigade grenadier
companies were put through a longer and more thorough course of
instruction than had been the case in the past. The introduction of this
scheme marked a big advance in the practice of bombing.
On 20th July orders were received that the Division was to join the Xth
Corps under the command of General Morland, in the area of the
newly-formed Third Army. The Xth Corps was then to consist of the 5th
Regular Division, the 51st Territorial Division, and the 18th Service
Division. Accordingly during the nights 22-23rd and 23-24th July the
Division was relieved in the line by the Lahore and 8th Divisions.
On the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th of July the Division proceeded by
train to the Neuilly area east of Amiens.