Battle of Castalla--English Siege of Taragona--Siege of San
Sebastian--Storming of San Bartolomeo--First Storm of San
Sebastian.
While the main armies strove in the north of Spain, the Mediterranean
coast was the scene of a secondary contest maintained by an English
expedition sent from Sicily in 1812. Destined at first for Catalonia,
it finally landed at Alicant, where it remained inactive until April,
1813, but then Sir John Murray, whose want of vigour on the Douro
was overbalanced by aristocratic influence at home, assumed command.
Acting in conjunction with the Spanish general Elio, he commenced a
series of petty enterprises, and broached several projects which he had
not nerve to execute, and only roused Suchet to serious action. That
marshal, previously inert, concentrated in the night of the 11th all
his disposable force, and next morning falling upon Mijares, Elio’s
lieutenant, defeated him with a loss of fifteen hundred prisoners. Then
he marched against Murray, who retreated through the pass of Biar to
a position of battle, leaving Colonel F. Adam with two thousand five
hundred men and six guns in the defile. The ground was very strong, but
the French light troops crowned the rocks on each side and after two
hours’ fighting the allies abandoned the pass, with a loss of two guns
and some prisoners besides killed and wounded, yet made their retreat,
three miles, to the main position, in good order, and were not pursued.
This double success in one day indicated the approach of a decisive
battle, in anticipation of which Murray had studied and chosen his
ground with judgment. His left, composed of Whittingham’s Spanish
division, was intrenched on a rugged sierra, and the troops coming from
Biar prolonged the line on a front of two miles, until the ridge ended
abruptly over the town of Castalla. That place with its old castle,
crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, was prepared for defence, having
all the approaches commanded by batteries, and being strongly occupied
with Mackenzie’s British division. The cavalry was disposed on a plain,
partly in front, partly behind the town. Clinton’s English and Roche’s
Spanish divisions were in reserve in rear of the right, on a lower
height nearly perpendicular to the main front; and their line as well
as the town was covered by the dry bed of a torrent called a _baranco_,
having precipitous sides and in many places a hundred feet in depth:
that front was therefore refused and scarcely attackable.
On the 12th Suchet’s cavalry, issuing cautiously from the defile of
Biar, extended to its left on the plain; the infantry, following, took
possession of a low ridge facing the Sierra, and then the cavalry,
passing the baranco, turned the town as if to menace the divisions
in reserve. This movement alarmed Murray, and notwithstanding the
impregnable strength of his ground he shrunk from the encounter; even
while Suchet was advancing he thrice gave orders to the quartermaster
general Donkin to put the army in retreat; the last time so
peremptorily, that obedience must have followed if at that moment the
French light troops in advance had not commenced firing.
BATTLE OF CASTALLA. (April, 1813.)
Suchet’s dispositions were slowly made, as if he feared to commence.
A mountain spur, jutting from the Sierra between Whittingham and the
troops from Biar, hid two-thirds of the allies from his view, and he
first sent an exploring column of infantry towards Castalla, to turn
the intercepting spur and discover all the conditions of the position;
when that was effected his cavalry closed towards the baranco. Then he
formed two powerful columns of attack and sent them against Whittingham
and Adam on each side of the spur, retaining a reserve on his own
ridge, and keeping his exploring column towards Castalla to meet any
sally from that point.
The ascent against Whittingham was so ruggedly steep, and the upper
part so intrenched, that the battle resolved itself there at once
into a stationary skirmish of light troops; but on the other side of
the spur the French mounted the height, slowly indeed and with many
skirmishers, yet so resolutely, that it was evident good fighting only
would send them down again. Their light troops, spreading over the face
of the Sierra and in some places attaining the summit, were met and
held in play by the Anglo-Sicilian troops with changing fortune; but
where the main column came on the 27th Regiment there was a terrible
crash of battle, and preceded by a singular encounter. For an abrupt
declination of ground enabled the French to halt and re-form for the
decisive assault, out of fire, yet close to that regiment which was by
order lying down in expectation of the charge. Suddenly a grenadier
officer, rising alone to the upper ground, challenged Waldron the
captain of the 27th Grenadiers to single combat; he, an agile Irishman
of boiling courage, instantly leaped forward to the duel, and the
hostile lines though ready to charge awaited the result. Rapidly
the champions’ swords clashed and glittered in the sun, but Waldron
cleft his adversary’s head in twain, and the 27th springing up with
a deafening shout charged and sent the French, maugre their numbers
and courage, down the mountain side, covering it with their dead and
wounded. It was a glorious exploit, erroneously attributed in the
despatch to Colonel Adam, though entirely conducted by the colonel of
the regiment, Reeves.
Suchet seeing his principal column thus broken, and having the worst of
the fight in other parts, made two secondary attacks with his reserve
to cover a rally, yet failed in both and his army was thus separated in
three parts without connection; for the column beaten by Reeves was in
great confusion at the foot of the Sierra, the exploring column was on
the left, and the cavalry beyond the baranco, the only passage across
it being commanded by the allies. A vigorous sally from Castalla, and
a general advance, would then have compelled the French-infantry to
fall back upon Biar in confusion before the cavalry could come to their
assistance, and the victory would have been completed; but Murray,
who had remained during the whole action behind Castalla, first gave
Suchet time to rally and retire in order towards the pass of Biar,
and then gradually passing out Clinton’s and Roche’s divisions by the
right of the town, with a tedious pedantic movement, changed his own
front, keeping his left at the foot of the heights, and extending his
right, covered by the cavalry, towards another sierra called Onil:
General Mackenzie however, moving out by the left of Castalla with four
battalions and eight guns, followed the enemy without orders.
Suchet had by this time plunged into the pass with his infantry,
cavalry and tumbrils, in one mass, leaving the rear-guard of three
battalions and eight guns to cover the passage; these being pressed
by Mackenzie and sharply cannonaded, turned and offered battle,
answering gun for gun; but they were heavily crushed by the English
shot, the clatter of musketry commenced, and one well-directed vigorous
charge would have overturned and driven them in mass upon the other
troops, then wedged in the narrow defile. Mackenzie was willing, but
his advance had been directed by the quartermaster-general Donkin,
not by Murray, and he was now compelled by the latter, despite of
all remonstrances and the indignant cries of the troops, to retreat!
Suchet, thus relieved from ruin by his adversary, immediately occupied
a position across the defile, having his flanks on the ridges above;
and though Murray finally sent some light companies to attack his left
he retained his position until night.
This battle, in which the allies had about seventeen thousand men of
all arms, the French about fifteen thousand, was, Suchet says, brought
on against his wish by the impetuosity of his light troops, and that he
lost only eight hundred men. His statement is confirmed by Vacani the
Italian historian. Murray affirmed that it was a pitched battle, and
that the French lost above three thousand men. In favour of Suchet’s
version it may be remarked, that neither the place, nor the time, nor
the mode of attack was answerable to his talents and experience in
war, if he had really intended a pitched battle; and though the fight
was strong at the principal point, it was scarcely possible to have
so many as three thousand killed and wounded. Eight hundred seems too
few, because the loss of the victorious troops, with all advantages of
ground, was more than six hundred. This however is certain; if Suchet
lost three thousand men, which would have been at least a fourth of
his infantry, he must have been so disabled, that what with the narrow
defile of Biar in the rear, and the distance of his cavalry in the
plain, to have escaped at all was extremely discreditable to Murray’s
generalship.
ENGLISH SIEGE OF TARRAGONA. (June, 1813.)
It has been shown that Lord Wellington put every armed body of the
Peninsula in movement against the French when he commenced the march to
Vittoria; and under his combinations the Duke del Parque should have
joined Elio from Andalusia, before the battle of Castalla, which would
have raised the allied forces there to fifty thousand men, including
the irregulars. Del Parque with the usual Spanish procrastination
delayed his arrival until the end of May; and then Murray had to
execute his part of the following plan, sketched by Wellington to
hamper Suchet and prevent him from moving to the king’s assistance.
The Spaniards, numerous but unwieldy, were to oppose that marshal in
front on the Xucar, while Murray with the Anglo-Sicilians was to embark
and sail for the siege of Tarragona in his rear: if he detached men to
raise the siege the Spaniards were to advance, and Murray was to return
and aid them to keep the country thus gained: if Suchet came back to
recover his ground this operation was to be repeated.
On the 31st of May Murray, in pursuance of this arrangement, sailed
with fifteen thousand men under arms, his British and Germans being
about eight thousand, his cavalry seven hundred. His battering-train
was complete and powerful, the materials for gabions and fascines
were previously collected at Iviça, and the naval part, under Admiral
Hallowel, was strong in ships of the line, frigates, bomb-vessels,
gun-boats and transports. There was however no cordiality between
General Clinton, the second in command, and Murray; nor between the
latter and his quartermaster-general Donkin; nor between Donkin and
the admiral: subordinate officers also, adopting false notions, some
from vanity, some from hearsay, added to the uneasy state of the
leaders, and there was much tale-bearing. Neither admiral nor general
was very sanguine as to success, and in no quarter was there a clear
comprehension of Lord Wellington’s ably devised plan.
When the fleet passed Valencia with a fair wind Suchet knew the
expedition aimed at Catalonia, and prepared to aid that principality,
but he could not march before the 7th of June. Murray’s armament
however, having very favourable weather, anchored on the evening of
the 2nd in the Bay of Tarragona, whence five ships of war were sent
with two battalions of infantry and some guns, under Colonel Prevost
to attack San Felippe de Balaguer, a fort garrisoned by a hundred men
and only sixty feet square. But it was on a steep isolated rock in
the gorge of a pass, blocking the only carriage-way from Tortoza to
Tarragona, and though the mountains on either hand commanded it, they
were nearly inaccessible themselves, and great labour was required to
form the batteries.
Prevost, landing the 3rd, was joined by a Spanish brigade, and in
concert with the navy placed two six-pounders on the heights south
of the pass, from whence at seven hundred yards’ distance they threw
shrapnel-shells. Next day two twelve-pounders and a howitzer, brought
to the same point by the sailors, opened also, and at night the seamen
with extraordinary exertions dragged up five twenty-four pounders and
their stores. The troops then constructed their batteries with great
labour, for the earth was carried up from below, and everything else,
even water, brought from the ships, the landing-place being more than a
mile and a half off; wherefore, time being valuable, favourable terms
were offered to the garrison. They were refused and the fire continued,
yet with slight success, one battery was relinquished, and a violent
storm retarded the construction of the others.
Colonel Prevost had early warned Murray that his means were
insufficient, and a second Spanish brigade was now sent to him; but,
so severe was the labour, that the breaching batteries were still
incomplete on the 6th, and out of three guns mounted one was disabled.
Suchet, who was making forced marches to Tortoza, ordered the governor
of that place to succour San Felippe, and he would certainly have
raised the siege, if Captain Peyton of the Thames frigate had not
brought up two eight-inch mortars, with which, on the 7th, he exploded
a small magazine, whereupon the garrison surrendered. The besiegers
then occupied the place, and meanwhile Murray had commenced the siege
of Tarragona.
Bertoletti, an Italian, commanded the fortress and was supposed to be
disaffected, yet be proved himself a loyal and energetic officer. His
garrison, sixteen hundred strong, five hundred being privateer seamen
and Franco-Spaniards, served him well, and when Murray occupied the
Olivo and Loretto heights the first day, and the town was bombarded
in the night by the navy, the fire was returned so sharply that the
flotilla suffered most. Two batteries were then opened the 6th, but
were found too distant, and a third was commenced six hundred yards
from Fort Royal. The 8th a practicable breach was made in that outwork,
yet the assault was deferred, and some pieces removed to play from
the Olivo; whereupon the besieged, finding the fire slacken, repaired
the breach at Fort Royal and increased the defences. The subsequent
proceedings cannot be understood without reference to the relative
positions of the French and allied armies.
Tarragona was situated on one of a cluster of rocks terminating a
range descending to the sea, but, with the exception of that range,
surrounded by an open country called the _Campo de Tarragona_, itself
environed by very rugged mountains, through which several roads descend
into the plain.
Westward there were only two carriage-ways from Tortoza. One direct,
by the Col de Balaguer to Tarragona; the other circuitous, leading by
Mora, Falcet, Momblanch and Reus. The capture of San Felippe blocked
the first, the second was in bad order, and at best only available for
small mountain-guns.
Northward there was a carriage-way leading from Lerida, which united
with that from Falcet at Momblanch.
Eastward was the royal causeway from Barcelona, running through Villa
Franca and Torredembarra, and after passing Villa Franca sending two
branches to the right, one through the Col de Cristina, the other
through Col de Leibra.
Between these various roads the mountains were too rugged to permit
cross communications; troops coming from different sides could only
unite in the Campo de Tarragona; where Murray, who had fifteen
thousand fighting men, and Copons, who had six thousand regulars and
the irregular division of Manso, could present twenty-five thousand
combatants.
Copons indeed told Murray, that his troops could only fight in
position, and he would not join in any operation to endanger his
retreat into the mountains; but his force, the best in Spain, was now
at Reus and the Col de Balaguer, ready to harass and oppose any French
corps which should attempt to descend into the Campo. Murray could
also calculate upon seven or eight hundred seamen and marines to aid
him in the siege, or in a battle near the shore, and he expected three
thousand fresh troops from Sicily. Sir Edward Pellew, commanding the
great Mediterranean fleet, promised to distract the French by a descent
eastward of Barcelona, and a general rising of the Somatenes might have
been effected: those mountaineers were indeed all at his disposal, to
procure intelligence, to give timely notice of the French marches and
impede them by breaking up the roads.
The French power was greater yet more scattered. On the west Suchet,
coming with nine thousand men from Valencia, was to be reinforced
by Pannetier’s brigade and some troops from Tortoza, up to eleven
or twelve thousand men with artillery; but the fall of San Felippe
de Balaguer barred his only carriage-way, and the road by Mora and
Momblanch, which remained open, was long and bad. On the eastern side
Maurice Mathieu could bring seven thousand men with artillery from
Barcelona; Decaen could move from the Ampurdam with an equal number,
and thus twenty-five thousand men in all might finally bear upon the
allied army.
Suchet had more than a hundred and sixty miles to march, and Maurice
Mathieu was to collect his forces from various places, and march
seventy miles after Murray had disembarked; nor could he stir at
all until Tarragona was actually besieged, lest the allies should
reëmbark and attack Barcelona. Decaen had in like manner to look to
the security of the Ampurdam, and was one hundred and thirty miles
distant. Wherefore the English general could calculate upon ten days’
clear operations after investment, before even the heads of the enemy’s
columns could issue from the hills bordering the Campo; and it was
possible that Suchet might endeavour to cripple the Spaniards in his
front at Valencia before he marched to the succour of Tarragona.
Eastward, and westward also, the royal causeway was in places exposed
to the fire of the naval squadron; and though the first siege of
Tarragona had shown that an army could not be there stopped by this
fire, it was an impediment not to be left out of the calculation. Thus,
a central position, possession of the enemy’s point of junction, the
initial movement, the good-will of the people, and the aid of powerful
flank diversions belonged to Murray: superior numbers and better
soldiers to the French, since the allies, brave and formidable to fight
in a position, were not well constituted for general operations.
Tarragona, if the resources for an internal defence be disregarded, was
a weak place. A simple revetment three feet and a half thick, without
ditch or counterscarp, covered it on the west; the two outworks of Fort
Royal and San Carlos, slight obstacles at best, were not armed or even
repaired until after the investment; and the garrison, too weak for the
extent of rampart, was oppressed with labour. Here then, time being
precious to both sides, ordinary rule should have been set aside for
daring operations, and Murray’s troops were brave. They had been acting
together for nearly a year, and after the fight at Castalla became so
eager, that an Italian regiment, which at Alicant was ready to go over
bodily to the enemy, now volunteered to lead the assault on Fort Royal.
This confidence was not shared by their general: up to the 8th his
proceedings were ill-judged, and his after operations disgraceful to
the British army.
False reports had made Suchet reach Tortoza on the 5th, and put two
thousand Frenchmen in motion from Lerida, whereupon Murray avowed
alarm and regret at having left Alicant; yet he constructed heavy
counter-batteries near the Olivo, sent a detachment to Valls on the
Lerida road, and placed Manso on that of Barcelona.
On the 9th the emissaries said the French were coming from the east and
from the west, and would, when united, exceed twenty thousand. Murray
sought an interview with the admiral, and declared his intention to
raise the siege, and though his views changed during the conference, he
was discontented, and the two commanders were evidently at variance,
for Hallowel would not join in a summons to the governor, and again
bombarded the place.
On the 10th spies in Barcelona gave notice that ten thousand French
with fourteen guns would march from that city next day, whereupon
Copons joined Manso; but Murray landed several mortars, armed the
batteries at the Olivo, and on the 11th opened their fire in concert
with the ships of war. Professing also a desire to fight the column
coming from Barcelona, he sent the cavalry under Lord Frederick
Bentinck to Altafalla, and pretending to seek a position of battle
to the eastward left orders to storm the outworks that night; he
returned however before the hour appointed, extremely disturbed by
intelligence that Maurice Mathieu was at Villa Franca with eight
thousand combatants, and Suchet closing on the Col de Balaguer. His
infirmity of mind was now apparent. At eight o’clock he repeated the
order to assault, and the storming party was awaiting the signal,
when a countermand arrived; the siege was then to be raised and the
guns removed immediately from the Olivo; the commandant of artillery
remonstrated, and the general promised to hold the batteries until next
night, but meanwhile called in the detachment at Valls and the cavalry,
without any notice to Copons, though he depended on their support.
All the artillery stores and the heavy guns of the batteries on the
low ground, were removed to the beach for embarkation on the morning
of the 12th, and at twelve o’clock Lord Frederick Bentinck arrived
with the cavalry: it is said he was ordered to shoot his horses, but
refused to obey and moved towards the Col de Balaguer. The detachment
from Valls arrived next, the infantry marched to Cape Salou to embark,
the horsemen followed Lord Frederick, and were themselves followed by
fourteen pieces of artillery; yet each body moved independently, and
all was confused, incoherent, afflicting, and dishonourable.
When the seamen were embarking the guns, orders were sent to abandon
that business and collect boats for the reception of troops, the enemy
being supposed close at hand; and notwithstanding Murray’s previous
promise to hold the Olivo he now directed the artillery officer to
spike the guns and burn the carriages. Then loud murmurs arose, army
and navy were alike indignant, and so excited, that it is said personal
insult was offered to the general. Three staff-officers repaired in
a body to his quarters to offer plans and opinions, and the admiral,
who did not object to raising the siege but to the manner of doing
it, would not suffer the seamen to discontinue the embarkation of
artillery; he however urged an attack upon the column coming from
Barcelona, and opposed the order to spike the guns at the Olivo,
offering to be responsible for carrying all clear off during the night.
Murray again wavered. Denying he had ordered the battering-pieces to
be spiked, he sent counter-orders, and directed a part of Clinton’s
troops to advance towards the Gaya river; yet a few hours afterwards he
peremptorily renewed the order to destroy the guns. Even this unhappy
action was not performed without confusion. General Clinton, forgetful
of his own arrangements, with an obsolete courtesy took off his hat to
salute an enemy’s battery which had fired upon him, forgetting that
this action from that particular spot was the conventional signal for
the artillery to spike the guns: they were thus spiked prematurely. All
the troops were embarked in the night of the 12th, and many stores and
horses on the 13th, without interruption from the enemy; but nineteen
battering-pieces, whose carriages had been burnt, were, in view of the
fleet and army, carried in triumph, with all the platforms, fascines,
gabions, and small ammunition, into the fortress! Murray, seemingly
unaffected by this misfortune, shipped himself on the evening of the
12th and took his usual repose in bed!
During these proceedings, the French, unable to surmount the obstacles
opposed to their junction, unable even to communicate by their
emissaries, were despairing of the safety of Tarragona. Suchet did
not reach Tortoza before the 10th, but a detachment from the garrison
had on the 8th attempted to succour San Felippe, and nearly captured
the naval Captain Adam, Colonel Prevost, and other officers, who were
examining the country. On the other side Maurice Mathieu reached
Villa Franca the 10th, announcing that Decaen was close behind with
a powerful force; he drove Copons from Arbos the 11th, and sent his
scouting parties into Vendrills, as if he was resolved singly to
attack Murray. Sir Edward Pellew had however landed his marines at
Rosas, which arrested Decaen’s march; and Maurice Mathieu, alarmed
at the cessation of fire about Tarragona, knowing nothing of Suchet’s
movements and too weak to fight the allies alone, fell back in the
night of the 12th to the Llobregat.
Suchet’s operations to the westward were even less decisive. His
advanced guard under Panettier reached Perillo the 10th. Next day,
hearing nothing from his spies, he caused Panettier to pass by his left
over the mountains to some heights terminating abruptly on the Campo;
on the 12th therefore that officer was but twenty-five miles from
Tarragona, and a patrol, descending into the plains, met Lord Frederick
Bentinck’s troopers, and reported that Murray’s whole army was at hand:
Panettier would not then enter the Campo, but at night kindled large
fires to encourage the garrison. These signals were unobserved, the
country people had disappeared, no intelligence could be procured,
and Suchet could not follow him with a large force in those wild
hills, where there was no water. Thus on both sides of Tarragona the
succouring armies were quite baffled at the moment chosen by Murray for
flight.
Suchet now received alarming intelligence from Valencia, yet still
anxious for Tarragona, pushed towards Felippe de Balaguer on the 14th,
thinking to find Prevost’s division alone; but the head of his column
was suddenly cannonaded by the Thames frigate, and he found the British
fleet anchored off San Felippe and disembarking troops. Murray’s
operations were indeed as irregular as those of a partizan, yet without
partizan vigour. He had heard in the night of the 12th of Panettier’s
march, and to protect the cavalry and guns under Lord Frederick, sent
Mackenzie’s division by sea to Balaguer on the 13th, following with the
whole army on the 14th. Mackenzie drove back the French posts at both
sides of the pass, the embarkation of the cavalry and artillery then
commenced, and Suchet, still uncertain if Tarragona had fallen, marched
to bring off Panettier.
At this moment Murray heard that Maurice Mathieu’s column, which he
always erroneously supposed to be under Decaen, had retired to the
Llobregat, that Copons was again at Reus, and Tarragona had not been
reinforced. Elated by this information, he revolved various projects
in his mind, at one time thinking to fall upon Suchet, at another to
cut off Panettier; now resolving to march upon Cambrills, and even to
menace Tarragona again by land; then he was for sending a detachment
by sea to surprise the latter, yet finally disembarked the army on the
15th, and being ignorant of Suchet’s last movement decided to strike
at Panettier. With that object, he detached Mackenzie by a rugged
valley against Valdillos, which he reached on the 16th; but Suchet had
then carried off Panettier’s brigade, and next day the detachment was
recalled by Murray, who now only thought of re-embarking.
This determination was caused by a fresh alarm from the eastward.
Maurice Mathieu, hearing the siege was raised, and the allies had
re-landed at the Col de Balaguer, retraced his steps and boldly entered
Cambrills the 17th, on which day, Mackenzie having returned, Murray’s
whole army was concentrated in the pass. Suchet was then behind
Perillo, and as Copons was at Reus, by Murray’s desire, to attack
Maurice Mathieu, the latter was in danger, if the English general
had been capable of a vigorous stroke. On the other hand Suchet,
too anxious for Valencia, had disregarded Mackenzie’s movement on
Valdillos, and taught by the disembarkation of the army at San Felippe
that the fate of Tarragona, for good or evil, was decided, had on the
16th retired to Perillo and Amposta, attentive only to the movement of
the fleet.
Meanwhile Maurice Mathieu endeavoured to surprise Copons, who was led
into this danger by Murray; for having desired him to harass the French
general’s rear with a view to a general attack, he changed his plan
without giving the Spaniard notice. However he escaped, and Murray was
free to embark or remain at Col de Balaguer. He called a council of
war, and it was concluded to re-embark; but at that moment the great
Mediterranean fleet appeared in the offing, and Admiral Hallowel,
observing the signal announcing Lord William Bentinck’s arrival,
answered with more promptitude than decorum, “_we are all delighted_.”
Thus ended an operation perhaps the most disgraceful that ever befel
the British arms.
Murray’s misconduct deeply affected Lord Wellington’s operations. The
English battering train being taken, Suchet had nothing to fear for
Catalonia, which was full of fortresses, and he could therefore move
by Zaragoza to disturb the siege of Pampeluna, which was consequently
relinquished for a blockade, and the siege of San Sebastian undertaken.
This involved the adoption of an immense line of covering positions
along the Pyrenees from Roncesvalles to the Bidassoa, and along the
left hank of that river to the sea; and the siege, itself a difficult
one, was rendered more so by the culpable negligence of the English
naval administration.
Passages, the only port near the scene of operations suited for the
supply of the army, being between the covering and besieging forces,
the stores and guns once landed were in danger from every movement of
the enemy; and no permanent magazines could therefore be established
nearer than Bilbao, at which port and at St. Ander and Coruña the
great depôts of the army were fixed; the stores being transported to
them from the establishments in Portugal. But the French held Santoña,
whence their privateers interrupted the communication along the coast
of Spain; American privateers did the same between Lisbon and Coruña;
and the intercourse between Sebastian and the ports of France was
scarcely molested by the English vessels of war: because Wellington’s
urgent remonstrances could not procure a sufficient naval force on the
coast of Biscay!
SIEGE OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (June, 1813.)
Built on a low sandy isthmus, having the harbour on one side, the river
Urumea on the other, Sebastian was strong; and behind it rose the Monte
Orgullo, a rugged cone four hundred feet high, washed by the ocean and
crowned with the small castle of La Mota. This hill was cut off from
the town by a line of defensive works, and covered with batteries; but
was itself commanded at a distance of thirteen hundred yards by the
Monte Olia, on the other side of the Urumea.
The land front of the town, three hundred and fifty yards wide,
stretching quite across the isthmus, consisted of a high curtain or
rampart, very solid, with half bastions at either end and a lofty
casemated flat bastion or cavalier in the centre. A regular horn-work
was pushed out from this front, and six hundred yards beyond the
horn-work the isthmus was closed by the ridge of San Bartolomeo, at the
foot of which stood the suburb of San Martin.
On the opposite side of the Urumea were certain sandy hills called the
_Chofres_, through which the road from Passages passed to a wooden
bridge over the river, and thence, by a suburb called Santa Catalina,
along the top of a sea-wall which formed a _fausse-braye_ for the
horn-work.
The flanks of the town were protected by simple ramparts, washed on one
side by the water of the harbour, on the other by the Urumea, which
at high tide covered four of the twenty-seven feet comprised in its
elevation. This was the weak side of the fortress, though protected
by the river; for it had only a single wall, which was ill-flanked by
two old towers and a half-bastion called San Elmo, close under the
Monte Orgullo. There was no ditch, no counterscarp, no glacis; the
wall could be seen to its base from the Chofre hills, at distances
varying from five hundred to a thousand yards; and when the tide was
out the Urumea left a dry strand under the rampart as far as St. Elmo.
However the guns from the batteries at Monte Orgullo, especially that
called the Mirador, could rake this strand. The other flank of the
town was secured by the harbour, in the mouth of which was a rocky
island, called Santa Clara, where the French had established a post of
twenty-five men.
Previous to the battle of Vittoria Sebastian was nearly dismantled;
there were no bomb-proofs, no palisades, no outworks; the wells were
foul, the place only supplied with water by an aqueduct. Joseph’s
defeat restored its importance as a fortress. General Emanuel Bey
entered it the 22nd of June, bringing with him the convoy which had
quitted Vittoria the day before the battle. The town was thus filled
with emigrant Spanish families, and the ministers and other persons
attached to the court; the population, ordinarily eight thousand,
was increased to sixteen thousand, and disorder and confusion were
predominant. Rey, pushed by necessity, forced all persons not residents
to march at once to France; the people of quality went by sea, the
others by land, and fortunately without being attacked, for the
Partidas would have given them no quarter.
On the 27th Foy threw a reinforcement into the place, and next day
Mendizabal’s Spaniards appeared; whereupon Rey burned the wooden bridge
with both the suburbs, and commenced fortifying the heights of San
Bartolomeo.
The 29th the Spaniards having slightly attacked San Bartolomeo were
repulsed.
The 1st of July the governor of Gueteria abandoned that place, and
his troops, three hundred, entered San Sebastian; at the same time a
vessel from St. Jean de Luz arrived with fifty-six cannoniers and some
workmen. The garrison was thus increased to three thousand men, and all
persons not able to provide subsistence for themselves were ordered
away: meanwhile Mendizabal cut off the aqueduct.
On the 3rd an English frigate and sloop with some small craft arrived
to blockade the harbour, but French vessels from St. Jean de Luz
continued to enter by night.
On the 4th Rey sallied to obtain news, and after some hours’
skirmishing returned with prisoners.
The 6th, French vessels with a detachment of troops and a considerable
convoy of provisions from St. Jean de Luz entered the harbour.
The 7th Mendizabal tried, unsuccessfully, to set fire to the convent of
San Bartolomeo.
The 9th Graham arrived with British and Portuguese troops, and on the
13th the Spaniards marched away.
At this time Reille was at Vera and Echallar, in a menacing position,
but Wellington drove him thence on the 15th and established the seventh
and light divisions there; thus covering the passes over the Peña de
Haya mountain, by which the siege might have been interrupted.
Before Graham arrived the French had constructed a redoubt on San
Bartolomeo, connecting it with the convent of that name, which they
also fortified. These outworks were supported by posts in the ruined
houses of the San Martin suburb, and by a circular redoubt, formed of
casks, on the main road, half-way between the convent and horn-work.
Hence, working along the isthmus, it was necessary to carry in
succession three lines covering the town, and a fourth behind it, at
the foot of Monte Orgullo, before the castle of La Mota could be
assailed: seventy-six pieces were mounted on the walls.
The besieging army consisted of the fifth division under General
Oswald, and the Portuguese brigades of J. Wilson and Bradford,
reinforced by detachments from the first division. Including the
artillery-men, some seamen commanded by Lieutenant O’Reilly of the
Surveillante, and one hundred regular sappers and miners, now for the
first time used in the sieges of the Peninsula, nearly ten thousand men
were employed, with forty pieces of artillery. The siege depôt was at
Passages, from whence to the Chofre sand-hills was only one mile and a
half of good road, and a pontoon bridge was laid over the Urumea river
above the Chofres; but from thence to the height of Bartolomeo was more
than five miles of very bad road.
Early in July, Major Smith, the engineer of Tarifa, proposed a plan
of siege, founded upon the facility furnished by the Chofre hills to
destroy the flanks, rake the principal front, and form a breach with
the same batteries; the works would, he observed, be secured, except at
low water, by the Urumea, and counter-batteries could be constructed
on the left of that river, to rake the line in which the breach was to
be formed. Against the castle and its out-works he relied principally
upon vertical fire, instancing the reduction of Fort Bourbon in the
West Indies as proof of its efficacy. This plan would probably have
reduced Sebastian in a reasonable time without any remarkable loss of
men, and Lord Wellington approved of it, though he erroneously doubted
the efficacy of the vertical fire. He renewed his approval after
examining the works in person, and all his orders were in that spirit;
but neither the plan nor his orders were followed, and the siege
which should have been an ordinary event of war obtained a mournful
celebrity. Wellington has been unjustly charged with a contempt for the
maxims of the great masters of the art in his desire to save time: he
did not urge the engineer here beyond the rules. _Take the place in the
quickest manner, but do not from over speed fail to take it_, was the
sense of his instructions. The haste was with Graham, one of England’s
best soldiers, but of a genius intuitive rather than reflective, which,
joined to great natural modesty and a certain easiness of temper,
caused him at times to abandon his own correct conceptions for less
judicious counsels of men who advised deviations from the original plan.
In the night of the 10th two batteries were raised against the convent
and redoubt of San Bartolomeo; and in that of the 13th, four batteries,
to contain twenty of the heaviest guns and four eight-inch howitzers,
were marked out on the Chofre sand-hills, at distances varying from
six hundred to thirteen hundred yards from the eastern rampart of the
town. No parallel of support was made, because the river was supposed
unfordable, but good trenches of communications and subsequently
regular approaches were formed. Two attacks were thus established--one
on the right bank of the Urumea by the Portuguese brigades; one on the
left bank by the fifth division: yet most of the troops were encamped
on the right bank to facilitate a junction with the covering army in
the event of a general battle.
On the 14th a French sloop entered the harbour with supplies, and the
batteries of the left attack opened against San Bartolomeo, throwing
hot shot into the convent. The besieged responded with musketry from
the redoubt, with heavy guns from the town, and with a field-piece
which they had mounted on the belfry of the convent itself.
The 15th Colonel Fletcher took command of the engineers, but Major
Smith retained the direction of the attack from the Chofre hills, and
Wellington’s orders continued to pass through his hands. This day, the
convent being set on fire, the musketry of the besieged silenced, and
the defences damaged, the Portuguese troops of the fifth division felt
the enemy, but were repulsed with loss: the French then sallied, and
the firing only ceased at nightfall.
A battery for seven additional guns was now commenced against
Bartolomeo on the right of the Urumea, and the original batteries
again set fire to the convent, yet the flames were extinguished by the
garrison.
In the night of the 16th Rey sounded the Urumea, designing to cross
and storm the batteries on the Chofres; but the fords discovered were
shifting, and the difficulty of execution deterred him.
The 17th, the convent being nearly in ruins, an assault was ordered.
Detachments from Wilson’s Portuguese, supported by the light company
of the 9th British Regiment and three companies of the Royals, composed
one column, which under General Hay was to storm the redoubt; another
column under General Bradford, composed of Portuguese, but supported
by three companies of the 9th British Regiment under Colonel Cameron,
assailed the convent.
STORMING OF SAN BARTOLOMEO. (July, 1813.)
At ten o’clock in the morning two six-pounders opened against the
redoubt, and the French, reinforced and occupying the suburb of
San Martin in support, announced with a sharp return of fire their
resolution to fight. The Portuguese advanced slowly at both attacks,
and the companies of the 9th, passing through them, first fell upon
the enemy. Cameron’s grenadiers going down the face of the hill were
exposed to a heavy cannonade from the horn-work, yet soon gained the
cover of a wall, fifty yards from the convent, and there awaited the
second signal. This rapid advance, which threatened to cut off the
garrison from the suburb, joined to the fire of the two six-pounders,
and some other field-pieces on the farther side of the Urumea, caused
the French to abandon the redoubt, whereupon Cameron jumped over the
wall and assaulted both the convent and the houses of the suburb. At
the latter a fierce struggle ensued, and Captain Woodman was killed
in the upper room of a house, after fighting his way from below; yet
the grenadiers carried the convent with such rapidity that the French
could not explode some small mines, and hastily joined the troops
in the suburb: there the combat continued, Cameron’s force was much
reduced and the affair was becoming doubtful, when the remainder of his
regiment arrived and the suburb was with much fighting entirely won.
At the right attack the company of the 9th, although retarded by a
ravine, by a thick hedge, by the slowness of the Portuguese, and by a
heavy fire, entered the abandoned redoubt with little loss; but the
troops were then rashly led against the cask redoubt, contrary to
orders, and were beaten back by the enemy. The loss was thus balanced.
That of the French was two hundred and forty, and the companies of the
9th under Cameron, alone, had seven officers and sixty men killed or
wounded. The operation, although successful, was an error; for the
seven-gun battery on the right of the Urumea was not opened, wherefore
the assault was precipitate or the battery was not necessary, but the
loss justified the conception of the battery. When the action ceased
the engineers made a lodgement in the redoubt, and commenced two
batteries to rake the horn-work and the eastern rampart of the place.
Two other batteries were also commenced on the right bank of the Urumea.
The 18th the besieged threw up traverses on the land front to meet the
raking fire of the besiegers; and the latter dragged four pieces up
the Monte Olia to plunge into the Mirador and other works on the Monte
Orgullo. In the night a lodgement was made on the ruins of San Martin,
the two batteries at the right attack were armed, and two additional
mortars dragged up the Monte Olia.
On the 19th all these batteries were armed, and in the night the French
were driven from the cask redoubt.
All the batteries opened fire the 20th, and were principally directed
to form the breach.
Smith’s plan was similar to that followed by Marshal Berwick a century
before. He proposed a lodgement on the horn-work before the breach
should be assailed; but he had not then read the description of that
siege, and unknowingly fixed the breaching-point precisely where the
wall had been most strongly rebuilt after Berwick’s attack. This was a
fault, yet a slight one, because the wall did not resist the batteries
very long; but it was a serious matter that Graham, at the suggestion
of the commander of the artillery, began his operations by breaching.
Smith objected to it, Fletcher acquiesced very reluctantly, on the
understanding that the ruin of the defences was only postponed, a
condition afterwards unhappily forgotten.
This first attack was not satisfactory, the weather proved bad, some
guns mounted on ship-carriages failed, one twenty-four-pounder was
rendered unserviceable by the enemy, another by accident, a captain of
engineers was killed, and the shot had little effect on the solid wall.
In the night however, the ship-guns were mounted on better carriages,
and a parallel across the isthmus was projected; but the greatest part
of the workmen, to avoid a tempest, sought shelter in the suburb of
San Martin, and when day broke only one-third of the work was performed.
On the 21st the besiegers sent a summons, the governor refused to
receive the letter, the firing was renewed, and though the main wall
resisted the parapets crumbled; the batteries on Monte Olia also
plunged into the horn-work at sixteen hundred yards’ distance, with
such effect that the besieged, having no bomb-proofs, were forced to
dig trenches to protect themselves. The French fire, directed solely
against the breaching batteries, was feeble, but at midnight a shell
thrown from the castle into the bay gave the signal for a sally, during
which French vessels with supplies entered the harbour. The besieged
now isolated the breach by cuts in the rampart and other defences, yet
the besiegers’ parallel across the isthmus was completed, and in its
progress laid bare the mouth of a drain four feet high and three feet
wide, containing the pipe of the aqueduct cut off by the Spaniards.
Through that dangerous opening Lieutenant Reid,[30] a young and zealous
engineer, crept even to the counterscarp of the horn-work, where he
found the passage closed and returned. Thirty barrels of powder were
placed in this drain, and eight feet was stopped with sand-bags,
forming a globe of compression to blow, as through a tube, so much
rubbish over the counterscarp as might fill the narrow ditch of the
horn-work.
On the 22nd the fire from the batteries, unexampled from its rapidity
and accuracy, opened what appeared a practicable breach in the eastern
flank wall, between two towers called Los Hornos and Las Mesquitas; but
the descent into the town behind this breach was more than twelve feet
perpendicular, and the garrison were seen from Monte Olia diligently
working at the interior defences to receive the assault: they added
also another gun to the battery of St. Elmo, just under the Mirador
battery, to flank the front attack. On the other hand the besiegers
had placed four sixty-eight pound carronades in battery to play on the
defences of the breach, yet the fire was slack because the guns were
now greatly enlarged at the vents.
On the 23rd, the sea blockade being null, the French vessels carried
off the badly-wounded men. This day also the besiegers, judging
the breach between the towers practicable, turned the guns, at the
suggestion of General Oswald, to break the wall on the right of the
main breach. Smith opposed this, urging, that no advantage would be
gained by making a second opening, to get at which the troops must
first pass the great breach; time would be thus lost, and there was a
manifest objection on account of the tide and depth of water at the new
point attacked. His counsel was overruled, and in the course of the
day, the wall being thin, the stroke heavy and quick, a second breach
thirty feet wide was rendered practicable.
The ten-inch mortars and sixty-eight-pound carronades were now turned
upon the great breach, and a stockade, the latter separating the
high curtain from the flank against which the attack was conducted.
Under this fire the houses near the breach were soon in flames, which
destroyed several defences and menaced the whole town with destruction,
wherefore the assault was ordered for next morning: when the troops
assembled the flames were still so fierce the attack was deferred, and
the batteries again opened.
During the night the vigilant governor mounted two field-pieces on the
cavalier, fifteen feet above the other defences and commanding the
high curtain; and he still had on the horn-work a light piece, and two
casemated guns on the flank of the cavalier. Two other field-pieces
were mounted on an intrenchment, crossing the ditch of the land front
and bearing on the approaches; a twenty-four pounder looked from the
tower of Las Mesquitas, flanking the main breach; two four-pounders
were in the tower of Hornos; two heavy guns on the flank of St. Elmo,
and two others, on the right of the Mirador, looked on the breaches
from within the fortified line of Monte Orgullo. Thus fourteen pieces
were still available for defence, and the retaining sea-wall, or
_fausse-braye_, between which and the river the storming parties must
necessarily advance, was covered with live shells to roll over on the
columns below. Behind the burning houses other edifices were loopholed
and filled with musketeers; but as the flames forced the French to
withdraw their guns until the moment of attack, and the British
artillery officers were confident that in daylight they could silence
the enemy’s fire and keep the parapet clear of men, Graham renewed his
order for the assault.
FIRST STORM OF SAN SEBASTIAN. (July, 1813.)
In the night of the 24th two thousand men of the fifth division filed
into the trenches on the isthmus. Of this force, a battalion of the
Royals, under Major Frazer, was destined for the great breach; the 38th
Regiment under Colonel Greville, was to assail the lesser and most
distant breach; the 9th Regiment under Colonel Cameron, was to support
the Royals. A detachment selected from the light companies of all those
battalions was placed in the centre of the Royals, under Lieutenant
Campbell[31] of the 9th Regiment, who was accompanied by the engineer
Machel with a ladder party, being designed to sweep the high curtain
after the breach should be won.
From the trenches to the points of attack was three hundred yards,
the way being between the horn-work and the river, strewed with rocks
slippery from sea-weed; the tide also had left large deep pools of
water; the parapet of the horn-work was entire, the parapets of
the other works and the two towers, closely flanking the breach,
were far from being ruined, and every place was thickly garnished
with musketeers. The difficulties were obvious, and a detachment of
Portuguese was placed in a trench on the isthmus, only sixty yards from
the ramparts, to quell, if possible, the fire of the horn-work.
It was still dark when the stormers moved out of the trenches, and
when the globe of compression in the drain was exploded against the
horn-work the astonished garrison abandoned the flanking parapet; the
troops then rushed onwards, the stormers for the main breach leading,
and suffering more from the fire of their own batteries on the right
of the Urumea than from the enemy. Frazer and the engineer Harry Jones
first reached the breach, the enemy had fallen back behind the ruins
of the burning houses, and those brave officers rushed up expecting
their troops would follow; but not many followed, for it was extremely
dark, the narrow way and the rocks had contracted the front and
disordered the column, and the soldiers came straggling and out of wind
to the foot of the breach. The foremost gathered near their gallant
leaders, yet the deep descent into the town and volumes of flames
and smoke still issuing from the houses awed the stoutest; more than
two-thirds, irritated by the destructive flank fire, had broken off at
the demi-bastion to commence a musketry battle with the enemy lining
the rampart on their left, and the shells from Monte Orgullo fell
rapidly. Then the French at the breach, recovering confidence, with a
smashing musketry from the ruins and loopholed houses smote the head of
the column, while those in the towers smote it on the flanks; and from
every quarter came showers of grape and hand-grenades tearing the ranks
in a dreadful manner.
Frazer was killed on the flaming ruins, the intrepid Jones stood there
awhile longer amidst a few heroic soldiers, hoping for aid, but none
came and he and those with him were struck down; the engineer Machel
had been killed early, his ladder-bearers fell or were dispersed,
and the rear of the column had got disordered before the head was
beaten. It was in vain Greville, Cameron, Captain Archimbeau, and
other regimental officers, strove to rally their men and refill the
breach; in vain Campbell, breaking through the tumultuous crowd with
the survivors of his chosen detachment, mounted the ruins; twice he
ascended, twice he was wounded, and all around him died. Then the
Royals endeavoured to retire, but got intermixed with the 38th and some
companies of the 9th, which were seeking to pass them and get to the
lesser breach; and thus swayed by different impulses, pent up between
the horn-work and the river, the mass, reeling to and fro, could
neither advance nor go back until the shells and musketry, constantly
plied in front and flank, thinned the concourse and the trenches were
regained in confusion. At daylight a truce was agreed to for an hour,
during which the French, who had removed Jones and other wounded men
from the breach, carried off the more distant sufferers, lest they
should be drowned by the rising of the tide.
Five officers of engineers, including Sir Richard Fletcher, and
forty-four officers of the line with five hundred and twenty men, were
killed, wounded, or made prisoners in this assault, the failure of
which was signal, yet the causes were obvious.
1°. Lord Wellington, on the 22nd, had given final directions for
the attack, finishing thus: “_Fair daylight must be taken for the
assault._” These instructions and their emphatic termination were
unheeded.
2°. Major Smith had ascertained that the ebb tide would serve exactly
at daybreak on the 24th, but the assault was made the 25th, and before
daylight, when the higher water contracted the ground, increased the
obstacles, and forced the column, with a narrow front and uneasy
progress, to trickle onwards instead of dashing with a broad surge
against the breach.
3°. The troops filed tediously out of long narrow trenches in the
night, and were immediately exposed to a fire of grape from their own
batteries on the Chofres; this fire should have ceased when the globe
of compression was sprung in the drain, but from the darkness and noise
that explosion was neither seen nor heard.
4°. There was a neglect of moral influence, followed by its natural
consequence, want of vigour in execution. No general went out of the
trenches. Oswald had opposed the plan of attack, and his opinion,
in which other officers of rank joined, was freely expressed out of
council, it was said even in the hearing of the troops, abating that
daring confidence which victory loves.
Wellington repaired immediately to St. Sebastian and would have renewed
the attack, but there was no ammunition, and next day extraneous events
compelled him to turn the siege into a blockade. The battering train
was then sent to Passages, and at daybreak the garrison sallied and
swept off two hundred Portuguese with thirty British soldiers. This
terminated the first siege of San Sebastian, in which the allies lost
thirteen hundred men.