March to Vittoria--Battle of Vittoria.
MARCH TO VITTORIA. (May, 1813.)
In England, the retreat from Burgos produced anger and fear; for the
public had been taught to believe the French weak and dispirited, and
the reverses were unexpected. Lord Wellesley justly attributed them to
the imbecile, selfish policy of Mr. Perceval and his colleagues, which
he characterized as having “_nothing regular but confusion_.” Lord
Wellington alone supported the contest, for the Portuguese and Spanish
Governments had become absolutely hostile to him, and were striving to
make the people of those countries hostile also. However, in 1813, the
aspect of the war, not in the Peninsula only but all over the civilized
world, was changed by the failure of Napoleon’s gigantic expedition
to Russia, and the English General, morally strengthened by this
great event, and seeing time ripe for a decisive blow, successfully
exerted all his mental vigour to overbear the folly and vices of the
governments he had to deal with. He renovated discipline, repressed
the intrigues of the Portuguese Regency, and, going to Cadiz, obtained
of the Spanish Cortes paramount military authority, with its assent to
a general combination all over the Peninsula. The three nations gave
him two hundred thousand men; the Anglo-Portuguese army furnishing
seventy thousand, with ninety pieces of artillery, and sixteen thousand
Anglo-Sicilians were at Alicant. His flanks rested on the Biscay and
Mediterranean seas, on each of which floated British fleets; now
effective auxiliaries, because the French lines of retreat being close
to and parallel with the coast on both sides of Spain, every port
abandoned by them, furnished a storehouse to the allies, and the navy
became a moveable base of operations.
To oppose him were great armies on the French side, yet all in
confusion. Napoleon had drawn off thousands of the old soldiers and
experienced officers, to give stability to the new levies with which
he was striving to restore his failing fortunes; to compensate for
the weakness thus occasioned, he directed the king to concentrate
on the northern line of invasion and act, not as the monarch of a
subdued country but as the general of an army in the field, having to
contend with an equal power. This view demanded promptness and vigour
to clear the communications of insurgents, judgment to adopt suitable
positions, and one imperious command over all the generals. Thus
governed the French soldiers were numerous enough to hope for victory
against greater numbers than Wellington could employ against them;
for though reduced by drafts, and the secondary war of the Spaniards
after the retreat of Burgos, to two hundred and thirty thousand men,
of which seventy-eight thousand were on the southern line of invasion
and thirty thousand in hospital, a hundred and twenty thousand men with
a hundred guns, including a reserve at Bayonne, were on the northern
line of invasion. This was a great power, of one nation, one spirit,
one discipline, and the emperor with comprehensive genius had explained
how it was to be made available. Joseph could not comprehend the
spirit of the great master’s instructions, and was unwilling to obey.
Quarrelling with his subordinates, he would be still a king, lost time,
made false movements, and at the opening of the campaign, instead of
being concentrated on the right point and under one head, his troops
were scattered over all the north of Spain, under generals who agreed
in nothing but opposition to his military command.
Such was the state of affairs when Wellington, forming two masses,
gave one of forty thousand fighting men to General Graham, with orders
to penetrate through the Portuguese province of Tras os Montes to
the Esla river, in Spain, thus turning that line of the Duero which
Marmont had the year before made an iron barrier. With the other mass,
thirty thousand, he designed to force the Tormes, pass the Duero, unite
with Graham, augment his army to ninety thousand, by calling down the
Gallicians under Castaños, and then ranging the whole on a new front
march all abreast upon the scattered French and drive them refluent to
the Pyrenees. A grand design and grandly executed. For strong of heart
and strong of hand his veterans marched to the encounter, the glories
of twelve victories playing about their bayonets, and he their leader,
so proudly confident, that in crossing the stream which marks the
frontier of Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand cried
out _Adieu Portugal!_
How were the French employed and disposed at this critical moment, when
the serpent they had pursued only a few months before, slowly trailing
his exhausted length into Portugal, had thus cast his slough, and with
glistening crest and rattling scales was again rolling forward in
voluminous strength?
The king was at Valladolid with his guards, holding a mock court
instead of a general’s orderly room.
Drouet with the army of the centre was in march from Segovia towards
the Duero above Valladolid.
General Leval who commanded ten thousand men at Madrid, was preparing
to move with a large convoy of pictures and other property towards
Segovia.
General Gazan with the army of the south, was moving his troops in a
state of uncertainty between the Upper Tormes and the Duero, having an
advanced division of infantry and cavalry at Salamanca under General
Villatte.
General Reille with the army of Portugal was on the Duero and the Esla.
The position of the French was therefore defined by the three rivers.
The Esla covered their right wing, the Duero their centre, the Tormes
their left, and the point of concentration was Valladolid. But Leval’s
troops at Madrid were isolated, and that was not all the extent of
the dissemination. Clausel, now commanding the army of the north, was
engaged in Navarre warring down the insurgents, Foy as his lieutenant
was in Biscay with a large detachment, and half of Reille’s army was on
the march to join Clausel. Add many false reports, false conjectures,
and continued disputes as to the real plan of the English general, and
the confusion of the king’s command will be comprehended.
On the 22nd of May, Graham being well advanced, Lord Wellington put his
right wing in motion towards the Tormes, and the 26th at 10 o’clock in
the morning the heads of his columns appeared with excellent concert
close to that river on all the roads.
Villatte, a good officer, barricaded the bridge, sent his baggage to
the rear, and called in a detachment from Alba, yet wishing to discover
the real force of his enemy waited on the heights above the ford of
Santa Marta too long; for the ground enabled Wellington to conceal his
movements, and Fane’s horsemen with six guns passed the ford of Santa
Marta in Villatte’s rear unseen, while Victor Alten’s cavalry removed
the barricades on the bridge and pushed through the town to attack in
front. The French general indeed gained the heights of Cabrerizos,
marching towards Babila Fuente, before Fane got over the river, but at
the defile of Aldea Lengua was overtaken by both columns of cavalry,
and being first battered by the guns was charged. But horsemen are no
match for such infantry, whose courage and discipline nothing could
quell. They fell before the round shot in sections, and one hundred
died in the ranks without a wound from intolerable heat; yet they beat
off the cavalry, and in the face of thirty thousand enemies made their
way to Babila Fuente, where, being joined by the detachment from Alba,
the whole disappeared from the sight of their admiring and applauding
opponents. Two hundred had fallen dead in the ranks, a like number,
unable to keep up, were captured, and a leading gun being overturned in
the defile retarded six others, all of which were taken.
On the 28th, having approached the point on the Duero where he proposed
to throw the bridge for communication with Graham’s corps, Wellington
left Hill in command, and went off suddenly to the Esla, being uneasy
for his combination there. Passing the Duero at Miranda, by means of a
basket moving on a rope stretched from rock to rock, the river foaming
hundreds of feet below, he on the 30th reached Carvajales.
Graham had met with many difficulties in the rugged Tras os Montes, and
though the Gallicians did not fail here, the combination was retarded
by the difficulty of crossing the Esla. It was to have been effected
the 29th, at which time the right wing, continuing its march from
the Tormes, could have been near Zamora and the passage of the Duero
insured; the French would then have been surprised, separated, and
overtaken in detail; now, though still ignorant that a whole army was
on the Esla, they were alarmed, and had planted the opposite bank with
picquets of cavalry and infantry; moreover, the stream was full and
rapid, the banks steep, the fords hard to find, difficult and deep,
and the appearance of the allies on the Tormes was known through all
the cantonments. Nevertheless Wellington, early on the 31st, caused
some squadrons of hussars with infantry holding by their stirrups, to
pass a ford, and Graham approached the right bank with all his forces;
a French picquet was thus surprised by the hussars, the pontoons were
immediately laid, and the columns commenced crossing, but several men,
even of the cavalry, were drowned.
On the 1st of June the rear was still on the Esla, yet the van entered
Zamora, the French retiring on Toro. Next day their rear-guard of
cavalry being overtaken by the hussars gave battle, was broken, and
driven back on the infantry with a loss of two hundred men.
Wellington halted the 3rd to bring the Gallicians down on his left,
and to close up his own rear, for he thought the French, who were
concentrating, might give battle; but he had entirely mastered the
line of the Duero, and those who understand war may say, whether it
was an effort worthy of the man and his army. Some of his columns had
marched a hundred and fifty, some above two hundred and fifty miles in
the wild Tras os Montes, through regions thought to be impracticable
even for small corps; forty thousand men, infantry, cavalry, artillery,
and even pontoons, all had passed, and been suddenly placed as if by a
supernatural power upon the Esla before the enemy knew that they were
in movement.
The field was now clear for the shock of arms, but the forces were
unequally matched. Wellington had ninety thousand men, and more than
one hundred pieces of artillery in hand. Twelve thousand were cavalry,
the British and Portuguese were seventy thousand; and this mass of
regulars was aided by all the Partidas. Sanchez’ horsemen, a thousand
strong, were on the right beyond the Duero; Porlier, Barcena, Salazar
and Manzo on the left between the Upper Esla and the Carion; Saornil
menaced Avila, the Empecinado hovered about Leval; and the Spanish
reserve of Andalusia, having crossed the Tagus on the 30th, drew all
the numerous small bands swarming around as it advanced. On the other
hand, though the French could collect nine or ten thousand horsemen and
one hundred guns, their infantry was less than half the number of the
allies, being only thirty-five thousand strong, exclusive of Leval. The
way to victory was therefore open, and on the 4th Wellington marched
forward with a conquering vehemence, pouring a torrent of war, whose
depth and violence the king was even now ignorant of.
It was thought Joseph would fight on the Carion. But though he had
then fifty-five thousand fighting men, exclusive of a Spanish division
escorting the convoys and baggage, he did not judge that river a good
position and retired behind the upper Pisuerga. Meanwhile he sent
Jourdan to examine Burgos castle, and expedited fresh letters, having
before written from Valladolid, to Foy, Sarrut and Clausel, calling
them towards the plains of Burgos, and others to Suchet, directing
him to march upon Zaragoza: but Suchet was then engaged in Catalonia,
Clausel was in Aragon, Foy on the coast of Guipuscoa, and Sarrut
pursuing Longa in the Montaña.
Joseph was still unacquainted with his enemy. Higher than seventy or
eighty thousand he did not estimate his force, and proposed to fight
on the elevated plains of Burgos. But more than a hundred thousand
men were before and around him; for all the Partidas of the Asturias
and Montaña were drawing together on his right, Julian Sanchez and
the Partidas of Castile were closing on his left, and Abispal having
passed the Gredos mountains with the Andalusian reserve and Frere’s
cavalry was in full march for Valladolid. Joseph was however hopeful
to win if he could rally Clausel’s and Foy’s divisions in time, and
his despatches to the former were frequent and urgent. Come with the
infantry of the army of Portugal! Come with the army of the north, and
we shall drive the allies over the Duero! Such was his cry, but he was
not a general to contend with Wellington, and recover the initiatory
movement at such a crisis.
While still on the Pisuerga he received Jourdan’s report. The castle
of Burgos was untenable, there were no magazines of provisions, the
new works were unfinished and commanded the old, which were unable
to hold out a day. Of Clausel’s and Foy’s divisions nothing had been
heard. This intelligence was decisive, and he resolved to retire behind
the Ebro. All the French outposts in the Bureba and Montaña were
immediately withdrawn, and the great depôt of Burgos was evacuated
upon Vittoria, which was thus encumbered with the artillery depôts of
Madrid, Valladolid and Burgos, and with the baggage and stores of many
armies and many fugitive families; and at that moment also arrived,
from France, a convoy of treasure which had long waited for escort at
Bayonne.
Meanwhile the tide of war flowed onwards with terrible power. The
allies having crossed the Carion the 7th, Joseph retired to Burgos
with his left wing, composed of the armies of the south and centre,
while Reille’s army, forming the right wing, moved by Castro Xerez.
Wellington followed hard: conducting his operations continually on
the same principle, he pushed his left wing and the Gallicians along
bye-roads, and passed the upper Pisuerga on the 8th, 9th, and 10th.
Having thus turned the line of the Pisuerga entirely, and outflanked
Reille, he made a short journey the 11th, and on the 12th halted his
left wing to arrange the supplies; yet he still pushed forward the
right wing, resolved to make the French yield the castle of Burgos or
fight for possession.
Reille, who had regained the great road to Burgos the 9th, was now
strongly posted behind the Hormaza stream, barring the way to Burgos;
the other armies were in reserve behind Estepar. In this situation they
had been for three days, cheered by intelligence of Napoleon’s victory
at Bautzen, and the consequent armistice; but on the 12th, Wellington’s
columns came up, and the light division, preceded by the hussars and
dragoons, turned Reille’s right, while the rest of the troops attacked
the whole range of heights to Estepar. Reille, finding horsemen acting
behind his right flank while his front was strongly menaced, made for
the bridge of Baniel under the fire of Gardiner’s horse-artillery,
losing some prisoners and a gun; an effort was made to cut him off
from the bridge, but he bore the artillery fire without shrinking,
and, evading a serious attack, passed the Arlanzan with a loss of only
thirty men killed. The three French armies being then covered by the
Urbel and Arlanzan rivers could not be easily attacked, all the stores
of Burgos were removed, and in the night the king, having mined the
castle, retreated along the high road to Pancorbo, into which he threw
a garrison. Everything was done confusedly. The mines under the castle
exploded outwardly at the moment a column of infantry was defiling
beneath, several streets were laid in ruins, thousands of shells and
other combustibles were driven upwards with a horrible crash, the hills
rocked above the devoted column, and a shower of iron, timber, and
stony fragments falling on it, in an instant destroyed more than three
hundred men! Fewer deaths might have sufficed to determine the crisis
of a great battle! Such and so fearful is the consequence of error, so
terrible the responsibility of a general!
Wisely did Napoleon speak when he told Joseph, if he would command
he must give himself up entirely to the business, labouring day and
night, thinking of nothing else. Here was a noble army driven like
sheep before prowling wolves, yet in every action the inferior generals
had been prompt and skilful, the soldiers brave, ready and daring,
and in a country very favourable for defence; but the mind of a great
commander was wanting, and the Esla, the Tormes, the Duero, the Carion,
the Pisuerga, the Arlanzan, seemed to be dried up, the rocks, the
mountains, the deep ravines to be levelled. Clausel’s strong positions,
Dubreton’s thundering castle, all disappeared like a dream, and sixty
thousand veteran soldiers, willing to fight, were hurried with all the
confusion of defeat across the Ebro: nor was that barrier found of more
avail to mitigate the rushing violence of their formidable adversary.
Joseph, having placed the defile and fort of Pancorbo between him
and his enemy, thought he could safely await his reinforcements, and
extended his wings for the sake of subsistence. Hence on the 16th
Drouet marched to Aro on the left, while Gazan held the centre, having
a strong advanced guard beyond Pancorbo; for as the king’s hope was
to retake the offensive, he retained the power of issuing beyond the
defiles, and his scouting parties were pushed forward on all sides. The
rest of the army was cantoned by divisions in rear, and Reille, from
behind the Ebro, was to watch the road to Bilbao, being there joined
by Sarrut.
While these movements were in progress, all the incumbrances of
the armies were assembled in the basin of Vittoria, and many small
garrisons of the army of the north came in; for Clausel, having
received the king’s first letter on the 15th of June, had gathered his
scattered columns to rejoin by the way of Logroño, yet his garrisons
were many, and he could only concentrate fourteen thousand men. The
king was nevertheless confident in the strength of his front, and had
no doubt of retaking the offensive when all his forces came in.
His dream was short-lived. On the 13th, while the explosion at Burgos
was still ringing in the hills, Wellington was marching by his left
towards the country about the sources of the Ebro. This great movement,
masked by the cavalry and the Spanish irregulars who infested the
rear of the French, suddenly placed the army between the sources of
the Ebro and the great mountains of Reynosa; this cut the French
entirely off from the sea-coast, and all the ports, except Santona and
Bilbao, were immediately evacuated. Santona was then invested by the
Spaniards, and the English ships entered Sant Andero, where a depôt
and hospital station was established; the connection of the army with
Portugal was thus severed: she was cast off as a heavy tender is cast
from its towing-rope, and all the British military establishments were
transferred by sea to the coast of Biscay.
The English general had now to choose between a march down the left
bank of the Ebro to seek a battle; or to place the army on the great
communication with France, while the fleet, keeping pace, furnished
fresh depôts at Bilbao and other ports. The first was an uncertain
operation, because of the many narrow and dangerous defiles which were
to be passed; the second was secure even if the first should fail; but
both were compatible to a certain point; for to gain the great road
leading from Burgos to Bilbao, was a good step for either, and, failing
of that, there was a road leading by Valmaceda to Bilbao in reserve.
Wherefore with an eagle’s sweep Wellington brought his left wing round,
and poured his numerous columns through all the deep narrow valleys
and rugged defiles towards the great road of Bilbao. At Medina de
Pomar, a central point, he left the sixth division to guard his stores
and supplies, but the march of the other divisions was unmitigated;
neither the winter gullies, nor the ravines, nor the precipitous
passes amongst the rocks, retarded the march even of the artillery;
where horses could not draw men hauled, when the wheels would not roll
the guns were let down or lifted up with ropes; and strongly did the
rough veteran infantry work their way through those wild and beautiful
regions: six days they toiled unceasingly; on the seventh, swelled by
Longa’s Spaniards, and all the smaller bands which came trickling from
the mountains, they burst like raging streams from every defile and
went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.
During this movement many reports reached the French, some absurdly
exaggerated, as that Wellington had one hundred and ninety thousand
men, yet all indicating the true direction of his march; and as early
as the 15th, Jourdan, warning Joseph that the allies would turn his
right, pressed him to place Reille at Valmaceda and close the other
armies towards the same quarter. Joseph yielded so far, that Reille
was ordered to concentrate at Osma and gain Valmaceda by Orduña if it
was still possible; if not he was to descend rapidly upon Bilbao, and
rally Foy’s division and the garrisons of Biscay upon his army: but no
general decided dispositions were made.
Reille called in Maucune from Frias, and having fears for his safety
gave him a choice between a direct road across the hills, or the
circuitous route of Puente Lara. Maucune started late in the night of
the 17th by the direct road; and meanwhile Reille having reached Osma
on the morning of the 18th, found a strong English column issuing from
the defiles in his front, and in possession of the high road to Orduña.
This was Graham. He had three divisions and a considerable body of
cavalry, and the French general, who had eight thousand infantry and
fourteen guns, engaged him with a sharp skirmish and cannonade, wherein
fifty men fell on the side of the allies, above a hundred on that of
the enemy; but at half-past two o’clock, Maucune had not arrived, and
beyond the mountains, on the left of the French, the sound of a battle
arose and seemed to advance along the valley of Boveda in rear of
Osma. Reille, suspecting the truth, instantly retired fighting towards
Espejo, where the mouths of the two valleys opened on each other, and
then suddenly, from that of Boveda Maucune’s troops rushed forth,
begrimed with dust and powder, breathless and broken.
That general had, as before said, marched over the Araçena ridge
instead of going by the Puente Lara, and his leading brigade, after
clearing the defiles, halted near the village of San Millan in the
valley of Boveda, without planting picquets; he was there awaiting
his other brigade and the baggage, when suddenly the light division,
moving on a line parallel with Graham’s march, appeared on some rising
ground in front. The surprise was equal on both sides, but the British
riflemen instantly dashed down the hill with loud cries and a bickering
fire, the 52nd followed in support, and the French retreated fighting
as they best could. The rest of the English regiments remained in
reserve, thinking all their enemies before them, but then the second
French brigade, followed by the baggage, came hastily out from a narrow
cleft in some perpendicular rocks on their right hand, and a confused
action ensued. For the reserve scrambled over rough intervening ground
to attack this new foe, who made for a hill a little way in front,
and then the 52nd, whose rear was thus menaced, quitting their first
enemies, wheeled round and running full speed up the hill met them
on the summit; so pressed, the French cast off their packs, and half
flying, half fighting, escaped along the side of the mountains, while
their first brigade, still retreating on the road towards Espejo,
were pursued by the riflemen. Meanwhile the sumpter animals, sadly
affrighted, run about the rocks with a wonderful clamour; and though
the escort, huddled together, fought desperately, all the baggage
became the spoil of the victors, and four hundred of the French fell or
were taken: the rest with unyielding resolution and activity escaped,
though pursued through the mountains by some Spanish irregulars: Reille
then retreated behind Salinas de Añara.
Neither Reille nor the few prisoners he had made could account for
more than six Anglo-Portuguese divisions at these defiles; hence, as
no enemy had been felt on the great road from Burgos, the king judged
that Hill was marching with the others by Valmaceda into Guipuscoa,
to menace the great communication with France. It was however clear
that six divisions were on the right and rear of the French position,
and no time was to be lost; wherefore Gazan and D’Erlon marched in the
night to unite behind the Zadora river, up the left bank of which they
had to file into the basin of Vittoria. But their way was through the
pass of Puebla de Arganzan, two miles long, and so narrow as scarcely
to furnish room for the great road: wherefore to cover the movement,
Reille fell back during the night to Subijana Morillas on the Bayas
river. His orders were to dispute the ground vigorously, for by that
route Wellington could enter the basin before the others could thread
the pass of Puebla; or he might send a corps from Frias, to attack the
king on the Miranda side in rear while his front was engaged in the
defile. One of these things the English general should have endeavoured
to accomplish, but the troops had made long marches on the 18th, and it
was dark before the fourth division reached Espejo: D’Erlon and Gazan,
therefore, without difficulty passed the defile, and the head of their
column appeared on the other side just as the allies drove Reille back
from the Bayas.
Wellington had reached that river before mid-day the 19th, and, if
he could have forced it at once, the other two armies, then in the
defile, would have been cut off; Reille was however well posted, his
front covered by the stream, his right by the village of Subijana de
Morillas, which was occupied as a bridge-head; his left was secured
by rugged heights, and it was only by a combat in which eighty French
fell that he was forced beyond the Zadora; but the other armies had
then passed the defile, the crisis was over, and the allies pitched
their tents on the Bayas. The king now heard of Clausel at Logroño, and
called him to Vittoria; he also directed Foy, then in march for Bilbao,
to rally the garrisons of Biscay and Guipuscoa and join him on the
Zadora. These orders were received too late.
The basin into which the king had thus poured all his troops, his
parcs, convoys and incumbrances, was eight miles broad by ten long,
Vittoria being at the further end. The Zadora, narrow and with rugged
banks, after passing that town, flows through the Puebla defile towards
the Ebro, dividing the basin unequally,--the largest portion being on
the left bank. A traveller, coming from the Ebro by the royal Madrid
road, would enter the basin by the Puebla defile, breaking through a
rough mountain ridge. On emerging from the pass, at the distance of six
miles on the left he would see the village of Subijana de Morillas,
facing the opening into the basin which Reille had defended on the
Bayas. The spires of Vittoria would appear eight miles in front, and
radiating from that town, the road to Logroño would be on his right
hand; that to Bilbao by _Murgia_ on the left hand, crossing the Zadora
at a bridge near the village of Ariaga. Further on, the road to Estella
and Pampeluna would be seen on the right, the road to Durango on the
left, and between them the royal causeway leading over the great
Arlaban ridge by the defiles of Salinas. Of all these roads, though
some were practicable for guns, especially that to Pampeluna, the royal
causeway alone could suffice for such an incumbered army; and as the
allies were behind the ridge, bounding the basin on the right bank of
the Zadora, and parallel to the causeway, they could by prolonging
their left cut off that route.
Joseph, feeling this danger, thought to march by Salinas to Durango,
there to meet Foy’s troops and the garrisons of Guipuscoa and Biscay;
but in the rough country, neither his artillery nor his cavalry, on
which he greatly depended, though the cavalry and artillery of the
allies were scarcely less powerful, could act or subsist, and he must
have sent them into France: moreover, if pressed by Wellington in
that mountainous region, so favourable for irregulars, he could not
long remain in Spain. It was then proposed to retire to Pampeluna and
bring Suchet’s army up to Zaragoza; but Joseph desired to keep open
the great communication with France; for though the Pampeluna road was
practicable to wheels, it required something more for the enormous mass
of guns and carriages of all kinds now heaped around Vittoria.
One large convoy had marched the 19th, and the fighting men in front
were thus diminished, while the plain was still covered with artillery
parcs and equipages, and the king, infirm of purpose, continued to
waste time in vain conjectures about his adversary’s movements. And on
the 21st, at three o’clock in the morning, Maucune’s division, more
than three thousand good soldiers, also marched with a second convoy.
The king then adopted a new line of battle.
Reille, reinforced by a Franco-Spanish brigade of infantry and Digeon’s
dragoons, took the extreme right to defend the passage of the Zadora,
where the Bilbao and Durango roads crossed it by the bridges of Gamara
Mayor and Ariaga. The centre, under Gazan and Drouet, was distant six
or eight miles from Gamara, lining the Zadora also; but on another
front, for the stream, turning suddenly to the left round the heights
of Margarita, descended thence to the Puebla defile nearly at right
angles with its previous course. There covered by the river, on an easy
open range of heights, Gazan’s right was extended from an isolated hill
in front of the village of Margarita to the royal road; his centre was
astride of the royal road in front of the village of Arinez; his left
occupied rugged ground behind Subijana de Alava, facing the Puebla
defile, and a brigade under Maransin was on the Puebla ridge beyond
the defile. Drouet was in second line; the mass of cavalry, many
guns, and the king’s guards formed a reserve behind the centre about
the village of Gomecha, and fifty pieces of artillery were pushed in
front, pointing to the bridges of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas, and
Nanclares.
While the king was making conjectures, Wellington had made a new
disposition of his forces; for thinking Joseph would not fight on
the Zadora, he sent Giron with the Gallicians on the 19th to seize
Orduña; Graham was to have followed him, but finally penetrated through
difficult mountain ways to Murguia, thus cutting the enemy off from
Bilbao and menacing his communications with France. The army had been
so scattered by the previous marches that Wellington halted on the 20th
to rally the columns, and took that opportunity to examine the French
position, where, contrary to his expectation, they seemed resolved to
fight, wherefore he gave Graham fresh orders and hastily recalled Giron
from Orduña. The long-expected battle was then at hand, and on neither
side were the numbers and courage of the troops of mean account. The
sixth division, six thousand five hundred strong, had been left at
Medina de Pomar, and hence only sixty thousand Anglo-Portuguese sabres
and bayonets, with ninety pieces of cannon, were actually in the field;
but the Spanish auxiliaries raised the numbers to eighty thousand
combatants. The regular muster-roll of the French was lost with the
battle, yet a careful approximate reckoning gives about sixty thousand
sabres and bayonets, and in number and size of guns they had the
advantage: but their position was visibly defective.
Their best line of retreat was on the prolongation of Reille’s right,
at Gamara Mayor; yet he was too distant to be supported by the main
body, and therefore the safety of the latter depended on his good
fighting. Many thousand carriages and other impediments were heaped
about Vittoria, blocking all the roads and disordering the artillery
parcs; and on the extreme left, Maransin’s brigade, occupying the
Puebla ridge, was isolated and too weak to hold its ground. The
centre was indeed on an easy range of hills, its front open, with a
slope to the river, and powerful batteries bore on all the bridges;
nevertheless, many of the guns being advanced in the loop of the
Zadora, were exposed to musket-shot from a wood on the right bank.
Seven bridges were within the scheme of operations, yet none were
broken or retrenched. The bridge of La Puebla, facing the French left,
was beyond the defile; that of Nanclares, facing Subijana de Alava, was
at the French end of the defile; three bridges around the deep loop of
the river opened upon the right of the French centre, that of Mendoza
being highest up the stream, Vellodas lowest down, Tres Puentes in the
centre: the bridges of Gamara Mayor and Ariaga were, as already said,
guarded by Reille.
Wellington projected three distinct battles. Graham, moving by the
Bilbao road, was to force a passage with twenty thousand men against
Reille, and Giron’s Gallicians were called up to his support; the
design being to shut up the French centre and left between the Zadora
and the Puebla mountain. Hill, having Morillo’s Spaniards, Sylviera’s
Portuguese and the second British division, with cavalry and guns, in
all twenty thousand men, was to force the passage of the Zadora river
beyond the Puebla defile, assailing Maransin there with his right,
while his left, threading the pass to enter the basin on that side,
turned and menaced the French left and secured the bridge of Nanclares.
In the centre battle, the third, fourth, seventh and light divisions of
infantry, the great mass of artillery, the heavy cavalry and Portuguese
horsemen, in all thirty thousand combatants, were led by Wellington in
person. Being encamped along the Bayas, these bodies had only to march
over the ridge which bounded the basin of Vittoria on that side, and
come down to their respective points on the Zadora, namely, the bridges
of Mendoza, Tres Puentes, Villodas and Nanclares; but the country was
so rugged exact concert could not be maintained, and each general of
division was left in some degree master of his own movements.
BATTLE OF VITTORIA. (June, 1813.)
At daybreak on the 21st, the weather being rainy with a thick vapour,
the troops moved from the Bayas, crossed the ridge and slowly
approached the Zadora, while Hill on the other side of the ridge
commenced the passage of that river beyond the defile of Puebla. On
his side Morillo’s Spaniards led, and their first brigade assailed
the mountain to the right of the great road; but the ascent proved
so steep the soldiers appeared to climb rather than walk up, and the
second brigade, which was to connect the first with the British troops
below, ascended only half-way. Little opposition was made until the
first brigade was near the summit, when skirmishing commenced and
Morillo was wounded; his second brigade then joined him, and the
French, feeling the importance of the height, reinforced Maransin.
Hill soon succoured Morillo with the 71st regiment and a battalion of
light infantry, both under Colonel Cadogan, yet the fight was doubtful;
for though the British won the summit and gained ground along the
side of the mountain, Cadogan fell, and Gazan having sent Villatte’s
division to aid Maransin, the French fought so strongly that the
allies could scarcely hold their ground. Hill sent more troops, and
with the remainder of his corps passed the Zadora, threaded the Puebla
defile, and fiercely issuing forth on the other side won the village
of Subijana de Alava in front of Gazan’s line, and then connecting
his right with the troops on the mountain, maintained that forward
position, despite of the enemy’s efforts, until the centre battle was
begun on his left.
Meanwhile Wellington, keeping all his cavalry in mass as a reserve,
placed the fourth division opposite the bridge of Nanclares, the light
division at the bridge of Villodas, both being covered by rugged
ground and woods, and the light division so close to the water, that
the skirmishers could have killed the French gunners in the loop of
the river. The weather had now cleared up, and then Hill’s battle was
prolonged by the riflemen of the light division, with a biting fire
on the enemy’s skirmishers; but no serious effort was made, because
the third and seventh divisions, meeting with rough ground, had not
reached their point of attack, and it would have been imprudent to push
the fourth division and cavalry over the bridge of Nanclares, with the
Puebla defile in their rear, before the other divisions were ready.
While thus waiting, a Spanish peasant told Wellington the bridge of
Tres Puentes on the left of the light division was unguarded, and
offered to lead the troops over it. General Kempt’s brigade was on the
instant directed towards that quarter, and being concealed by some
rocks, passed the narrow bridge at a running pace, mounted a steep
rise of ground and halted close under the crest, being then actually
behind the king’s advanced posts, and within a few hundred yards of his
line of battle. Some French cavalry approached, and two round shots
were fired by the enemy, one of which killed the poor peasant to whose
courage and intelligence the allies were so much indebted, but no
movement of attack was made, and Kempt called the 15th Hussars over the
river: they came at a gallop, crossing the narrow bridge one by one,
horseman after horseman, and still the French remained torpid, showing
an army but no general.
It was now one o’clock, Hill’s assault on the village of Subijana was
entirely developed, and a curling smoke, faintly seen far up the Zadora
on the extreme left, and followed by the sound of distant guns, told
that Graham’s attack had also commenced. Then the king, finding both
flanks in danger, caused his reserve to file off towards Vittoria, and
gave Gazan orders to retire by successive masses; but at that moment
the third and seventh divisions were seen moving rapidly down to the
bridge of Mendoza, whereupon Gazan’s artillery opened, a body of his
cavalry drew near the bridge, and the French light troops, very strong
there, commenced a vigorous musketry. Some British guns replied to the
French cannon from the opposite bank, and the value of Kempt’s forward
position was instantly made manifest; for Andrew Barnard, springing
forward, led the riflemen of the light division in the most daring
manner between the French cavalry and the river, taking their light
troops and gunners in flank, and engaging them so closely that the
English artillerymen, thinking his dark-clothed troops enemies, played
on both alike.
This singular attack enabled a brigade of the third division to pass
the bridge of Mendoza without opposition, while the other brigade
forded the river higher up, followed by the seventh division and
Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division. The French now abandoned
the ground in front of Villodas; and the battle, which had slackened,
was revived with extreme violence; for Hill pressed the enemy in his
front, the fourth division passed the bridge of Nanclares, the smoke
and sound of Graham’s guns became more distinct, and the banks of the
Zadora presented a continuous line of fire. Thus the French, weakened
in the centre by the draft made of Villatte’s division, and shaken in
resolution by the king’s order to retreat, became perplexed and could
make no regular retrograde movement, because the allies were too close.
The seventh division and Colville’s brigade of the third division,
having forded the river, formed the left of the British, and were
immediately engaged with the French right; but then Wellington, seeing
the hill in front of Arinez nearly denuded of troops by the withdrawal
of Villatte’s division, led Picton and the rest of the third division
in close column at a running pace, diagonally, across the front of both
armies, towards that central point. This attack was headed by Barnard’s
riflemen, and followed by the remainder of Kempt’s brigade and the
hussars;[29] and at the same time, when the fourth division had passed
the bridge of Nanclares, the heavy cavalry, a splendid body, galloped
over also, squadron after squadron into the plain ground between Cole
and Hill.
Thus caught in the midst of their dispositions for retreat, the
French threw out a prodigious number of skirmishers, and fifty pieces
of artillery played with astonishing activity. To answer this fire
Wellington brought over most of his guns, and both sides were shrouded
by a dense cloud of smoke and dust, under cover of which the French
retired by degrees to the second range of heights in front of Gomecha,
on which their reserve had been posted, yet still holding the village
of Arinez on the main road. Picton’s troops, always headed by the
riflemen of the light division, then plunged into that village amidst
a heavy fire of muskets and artillery, and three guns were captured;
but the post was important, fresh French troops came down, and for some
time the smoke and dust and clamour, the flashing of the fire-arms,
and the shouts and cries of the combatants, mixed with the thundering
of the guns, were terrible: finally the British troops issued forth
victorious on the other side. During this conflict the seventh
division, reinforced by Vandeleur’s brigade of the light division, was
heavily raked by a battery at the village of Margarita, until the 52nd
regiment with an impetuous charge carried that village, and the 87th
won the village of Hermandad, and, so fighting, the whole line advanced.
When the village of Arinez was won, the French opposed to Hill, at
Subijana de Alava, were turned, and being hard pressed in front, and on
their left by the troops of the Puebla mountain, fell back two miles in
disorder, striving to regain the line of retreat to Vittoria. It was
thought some cavalry launched at the moment would have disorganized
the whole French battle, but none moved, and the confused multitude
shooting ahead recovered order.
The ground was exceedingly diversified with woods and plains, here
covered with corn, there broken by ditches, vineyards and hamlets;
hence the action, for six miles, resolved itself into a running fight
and cannonade, the dust and smoke and tumult of which, filling all
the basin, passed onwards towards Vittoria. Many guns were taken, and
at six o’clock the French reached the last defensible height, one
mile in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the
city stood, and beyond the houses thousands of carriages, animals and
non-combatants, men, women, and children, huddling together in all the
madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming over head, the
vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull
and horrid sound of distress arose: but there was no hope, no stay for
army or multitude. It was the wreck of a nation.
French courage was not yet quelled. Reille, on whom every thing now
depended, maintained his post at the Upper Zadora, and the armies of
the south and centre, drawing up on their last heights between the
villages of Ali and Armentia, made their muskets flash like lightning,
while more than eighty pieces of artillery, massed together, pealed
with such a horrid uproar, that the hills laboured and shook and
streamed with fire and smoke, amidst which the dark figures of the
French gunners were seen hounding with a frantic energy. This terrible
cannonade and musketry checked the allies. The third division, having
the brunt of the storm, could scarcely maintain its ground, and the
French generals began to draw off their infantry from the right
wing, when suddenly the fourth division rushing forward carried the
hill on the French left; then the heights were all abandoned, for at
that moment Joseph, finding the royal road so blocked by carriages
the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra for
retreat, and the troops at once went off in a confused mass. The
British followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town
to intercept the new line, which passed a marsh, and was likewise
choked with carriages and fugitive people, for on each side there were
deep drains. Disorder and mischief then prevailed entirely. The guns
were left on the edge of the marsh, the artillerymen fled with the
horses, and the infantry, breaking through the miserable multitude,
went clean off: the cavalry however still acted with order, and many
generous horsemen were seen to carry children and women from the
dreadful scene.
This retreat placed Reille in great danger. His advanced troops under
Sarrut had been originally posted at the village of Aranguis, beyond
the Zadora, holding some heights which covered the bridges of Ariaga
and Gamara Mayor. They were driven from thence by Graham’s vanguard
under General Oswald, who seized Gamara Menor on the Durango road, and
forced the Franco-Spaniards from Durano on the royal causeway: thus the
first blow on this side deprived the king of his best line of retreat
and confined him to the road of Pampeluna. Sarrut however recrossed
the river in good order, taking post with one brigade at the bridge
of Ariaga and the village of Abechuco covering it; the other was in
reserve to support him and General La Martinière, who defended the
bridge of Gamara Mayor and the village of that name, also on the right
of the river. Digeon’s dragoons were behind the village of Ariaga;
Reille’s own dragoons were behind the bridge of Gamara; one brigade of
light cavalry was on the extreme right to sustain the Franco-Spanish
troops, higher up the river; another, under General Curto, was on the
French left, extending down the Zadora.
Longa’s Spaniards were to have attacked Gamara at an early hour, when
it was feebly occupied, but they did not stir, and the village being
reinforced, Robinson’s brigade of the fifth division assaulted it
instead. He made the attack at a running pace at first, but the French
fire became so heavy, that his men stopped to reply, and the columns
got intermixed; however, encouraged by their officers, and especially
by the example of General Robinson, an inexperienced man but of a
daring spirit, they renewed the charge, broke through the village and
even crossed the bridge. One gun was captured and the passage seemed
to be won, when Reille suddenly turned twelve pieces upon the village,
and then La Martinière, rallying his men under cover of this cannonade
retook the bridge: it was with difficulty the allied troops could even
hold the village until they were reinforced.
Now a second British brigade came down, and the bridge was again
carried, but the new troops were soon driven back as the others had
been, and the bridge remained forbidden ground. Graham had meanwhile
attacked the village of Abechuco, covering the bridge of Ariaga; it
was carried at once by the German riflemen, who were supported by
Bradford’s Portuguese and the fire of twelve guns; yet here, as at
Gamara, the French maintained the bridge, so that at both places the
troops on each side remained stationary under a reciprocal fire of
artillery and small arms. Reille, with inferior numbers, thus continued
to interdict the passage until the tumult of Wellington’s battle,
coming up the Zadora, reached Vittoria itself, and a part of the
British horsemen rode out of that city upon Sarrut’s rear. Digeon’s
dragoons kept this cavalry in check for the moment, and Reille had
previously formed a reserve of infantry, which now proved his safety;
for Sarrut was killed at the bridge of Ariaga, and Menne, next in
command, could scarcely draw off his troops while Digeon’s dragoons
held the British cavalry at point; but with the aid of his reserve
Reille finally rallied all his troops at Betonio. He had now to make
head on several sides, because the allies were coming down from Ariaga,
from Durano, and from Vittoria; yet he fought his way to Metauco on the
Salvatierra road and there covered the general retreat with some degree
of order. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and neither
the bold demeanour of the French cavalry, which made several vigorous
charges, nor darkness, which now fell, could stop their victorious
career until the flying masses had passed Metauco.
This was the battle of Vittoria. The French had, comparatively, few
men slain, but to use Gazan’s words, “_lost all their equipages, all
their guns, all their treasure, all their stores, all their papers;
no man could even prove how much pay was due to him: generals and
subordinate officers alike were reduced to the clothes on their backs,
and most of them were barefooted_.” Never was an army more hardly
used by its commander. The soldiers were not half beaten; yet never
was a victory more complete. The French carried off but two pieces of
artillery from the battle. Jourdan’s baton, a stand of colours, one
hundred and forty-three brass pieces, one hundred of which had been
used in the fight, all the parcs and dépôts from Madrid, Valladolid,
and Burgos, carriages, ammunition, treasure, every thing, fell into
the hands of the victors. The loss in men did not exceed six thousand;
the loss of the allies was five thousand one hundred and seventy-six,
killed, wounded, and missing. Of these one thousand and forty-nine were
Portuguese; five hundred and fifty-three Spanish. Hence the English
lost more than double what Portuguese and Spaniards did together;
yet both fought well, and especially the Portuguese: but British
troops are the soldiers of battle. The spoil was immense, yet so
plundered, principally by the followers and non-combatants, for with
some exceptions the fighting troops may be said to have marched upon
gold and silver without stooping to pick it up, that of five millions
and a half of dollars, indicated by the French accounts to be in the
money-chests, not one dollar came to the public. Wellington sent
fifteen officers with power to examine all loaded animals passing the
Ebro and the Duero, yet very little was recovered; and this robbery was
not confined to ignorant and vulgar people: officers were seen mixed
with the mob contending for the disgraceful gain.
On the 22nd, Giron and Longa pursued the convoy which had moved under
Maucune on the morning of the battle; the heavy cavalry and Portuguese
horsemen remained at Vittoria; Pakenham came with the sixth division
from Medina Pomar, and Wellington pursued Joseph, who had been flying
up the Borundia and Araquil valleys all night. Reille, who covered the
retreat, reached Huerta in the valley of Araquil, thirty miles from the
field of battle, on the evening of the 22nd. Joseph attained Yrursun,
from which roads branched off to Pampeluna on one side, and to Tolosa
and St. Esteban on the other, from thence on the 23rd, expediting
orders to different points on the French frontier to prepare provisions
and succours for his suffering army; meanwhile he sent Reille by St.
Esteban to the Lower Bidassoa with his infantry, six hundred select
cavalry, the artillery-men and horses: Gazan’s and D’Erlon’s troops
marched upon Pampeluna, intending to cross the frontier at St. Jean
Pied de Port.
At Pampeluna the army bivouacked on the glacis of the fortress, but in
such destitution and insubordination that the governor would not suffer
them to enter the town.
Wellington, who had sent Graham’s corps into Guipuscoa by the pass of
St. Adrian, overtook the French rear and captured one of the two guns
saved from Vittoria, and on the 28th the king fled into France by the
Roncesvalles. Foy and Clausel were thus isolated on each flank and in
great danger. The first had a strong country, but his troops were
disseminated, and the fugitives from the battle spread such alarm that
the forts of Arlaban, Montdragon, and Salinas, blocking the passes
into Guipuscoa, were abandoned to Longa and Giron. Foy, who had only
one battalion in hand, rallied the fugitive garrisons, advanced, and
from some prisoners acquired exact intelligence of the battle. Then he
ordered the two convoys from Vittoria to march day and night towards
France, and reinforcing himself with Maucune’s escort gave battle
to the Spanish general, who, having three times his force, worsted
him with a loss of six guns and two hundred men. He retreated to
Villafranca, where, late in the evening of the 24th, Graham came upon
him from the side pass of San Adrian: he had now rallied a considerable
force and gave battle on the Orio with Maucune’s troops and St. Pol’s
Italian division: the first were beaten, yet the Italians gained some
advantages, and the position was so strong that Graham had recourse to
flank operations; Foy then retired to Tolosa, and again offered battle;
whereupon Graham turned his flank with the Spaniards, broke his front
with the Anglo-Portuguese, drove his wings beyond Tolosa on each side,
and bursting the gate of the town forced a passage through his centre
by the main road. Nevertheless Foy retreated with a loss of only four
hundred men, and he had killed and wounded more than four hundred
Anglo-Portuguese in the two days’ operations. The Spanish loss was not
known, but must have been considerable, and Graham, who was himself
hurt, halted two days to hear of Wellington’s progress. During that
time the convoys reached France in safety, and Foy, his force increased
by the junction of detachments to more than sixteen thousand men,
threw a garrison into San Sebastian and joined Reille on the Bidassoa:
twenty-five thousand men were then on that river, and Graham halted to
invest Sebastian.
While these events passed in Guipuscoa, Clausel was more hardly pressed
on the other flank of the allies. He had approached Vittoria with
fourteen thousand men on the 22nd, but finding Pakenham there with
the 6th division, retired to Logroño and halted until the evening of
the 23rd, thus enabling Wellington, who thought he was at Tudela, to
discover his real situation and march against him. He fled to Tudela,
reached it the 27th, after a march of sixty miles in forty hours, and
thinking he had outstripped his pursuers proposed to enter France by
Taffalla and Olite, but an alcalde told him Wellington had forestalled
him at those places and he marched upon Zaragoza. He could have been
intercepted again, yet Wellington, fearing to drive him on Suchet, only
launched Mina in pursuit, and Clausel after destroying guns and baggage
finally escaped by Jacca into France. The king had meanwhile caused
Gazan to re-enter Spain by the Bastan, from whence Hill quickly drove
him. Joseph’s reign was over. After years of toils and combats, admired
rather than understood, Lord Wellington, emerging from the chaos of the
Peninsula struggle, crowned the Pyrenees--a recognized conqueror. From
that pinnacle the clangour of his trumpets was heard, and the splendour
of his genius blazed out, a flaming beacon for warring nations.