BOOK XI.

Pyrenees--Combat of Roncesvalles--Combat of Linzoain--Combat of

Maya--Combat of Zabaldica--First Battle of Sauroren--Combat of

Buenza--Second Battle of Sauroren--Combat of Doña Maria--Combats

of Echallar and Ivantelly.

The battle of Vittoria was fought the 21st of June, and on the 1st of

July Marshal Soult, under a decree issued at Dresden, succeeded Joseph

as lieutenant to the emperor.

The 12th, travelling with surprising expedition, that marshal assumed

command of the French troops, now reorganized in one body, called _the

army of Spain_, and he had secret orders to put Joseph forcibly aside

if necessary, but that monarch voluntarily retired.[32]

Reinforced from the interior, Soult’s army was composed of nine

divisions of infantry, a reserve and two regular divisions of cavalry,

besides light horsemen attached to the infantry. Including garrisons,

and thirteen German, Italian, and Spanish battalions not belonging

to the organization, he had one hundred and fourteen thousand men:

and as the armies of Catalonia and Aragon numbered at the same period

above sixty-six thousand, the whole force still employed against Spain

exceeded one hundred and eighty thousand men, with twenty thousand

horses.

Soult was one of the few men whose energy rendered them worthy

lieutenants of the emperor, and with singular zeal and ability he

now served. Nominally he had ninety-seven thousand men under arms,

with eighty-six pieces of artillery; but the foreign battalions, most

of which were to return to their own countries for the disciplining

of new levies, only counted as part of the garrisons of Pampeluna,

San Sebastian, Santoña and Bayonne: they amounted to seventeen

thousand, and the permanent _army of Spain_ furnished therefore, only

seventy-seven thousand five hundred men under arms, seven thousand

being cavalry. Its condition was not satisfactory. The military

administration was disorganized, the soldiers were discouraged by

disaster, discipline had been deteriorated, and the people were flying

from the frontier.

To secure his base and restore order ere he retook the offensive was

Soult’s desire; but Napoleon’s orders were imperative against delay,

and he was compelled to immediate action, though Wellington’s advance

from Portugal had been so rapid that the great resources of the French

frontier were not immediately available, and everything was reeling and

rocking in terror from the blow given to the army at Vittoria.

Bayonne, a fortress of no great strength, had been entirely neglected.

But the arming and provisioning that and other places; the restoration

of an intrenched camp, originally traced by Vauban to cover Bayonne;

the enforcement of discipline; the removal of the immense train of

Joseph’s wasteful court; the establishment of a general system for

supplies, and judicious efforts to stimulate the civil authorities and

excite the national spirit, soon indicated the presence of a great

commander. The soldiers’ confidence then revived, and some leading

merchants of Bayonne zealously seconded the general: the people were

however more inclined to avoid burdens than to answer calls on their

patriotism.

Soult examined the line of military positions on the 14th, and ordered

Reille, who then occupied the passes of Vera and Echallar, to prepare

pontoons for throwing two bridges over the Bidassoa at Biriatou;

Wellington, as before said, drove him from those passes next day,

yet he prepared his bridges, and by the 16th, Soult was ready for a

gigantic offensive movement.

His army was divided into three corps of battle and a reserve. Clausel

with the left was at St. Jean Pied de Port, and in communication, by

the French frontier, with a division under General Paris at Jaca,

belonging to Suchet but under Soult’s orders.

Drouet, Count D’Erlon, with the centre, occupied the heights near

Espelette and Ainhoa.

Reille with the right wing was on the mountains overlooking Vera from

the side of France.

The reserve, under Villatte, guarded the right bank of the Bidassoa

from the mouth to Irun, at which place the stone bridge was destroyed.

The heavy cavalry under Trielhard, and the light horsemen under Pierre

Soult, the marshal’s brother, were on the banks of the Nive and the

Adour.

To oppose this force Wellington had in Navarre and Guipuscoa above a

hundred thousand men. Of these the Anglo-Portuguese furnished fifty

thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry; the Spanish regulars

under Giron, Abispal, and Carlos España, about twenty-five thousand

infantry; the rest were irregular; and hence the troops in line were,

of the allies, eighty-two thousand, of the French seventy-eight

thousand.

The theatre of operations was quadrilateral, with sides from forty

to sixty miles in length, having a fortress at each angle, namely,

Bayonne, San Jean Pied de Port, San Sebastian and Pampeluna, all in

possession of the French. The interior, broken and tormented by peaked

mountains, narrow craggy passes, deep watercourses, dreadful precipices

and forests, appeared a wilderness which no military combinations could

embrace. The great spinal ridge of the Pyrenees furnished a clue to the

labyrinth. Running diagonally across the quadrilateral, it entirely

separated Bayonne, St. Jean Pied de Port and San Sebastian from

Pampeluna, and the troops blockading the latter were thus cut off from

those besieging San Sebastian, the only direct communication between

them being a great road running behind the mountains from Tolosa, by

Irurzun, to Pampeluna.

A secondary range of mountains on the French side of the Great Spine,

inclosing the valley of Bastan and lining that of the Bidassoa,

furnished positions for the centre and left of the covering armies,

with interior but difficult lateral communications.

The troops covering Pampeluna were on the Great Spine of the Pyrenees.

Behind them were valleys into which the passes across the spine led,

descending at the other side in parallel lines, and giving to each

division means for a concentric retreat on Pampeluna.

Wellington having his battering-train and stores about San Sebastian,

which was nearer and more accessible to the enemy than Pampeluna, made

his army lean towards that side. His left wing, including the army of

siege, was twenty-one thousand, with singularly strong positions of

defence; his centre, twenty-four thousand strong, could in two marches

unite with the left to cover the siege or fall upon the flanks of

an enemy advancing by the high road of Irun; but three days or more

were required by those troops to concentrate for the security of the

blockade of Pampeluna on the right.

Soult thought no decisive result would attend a direct movement upon

San Sebastian, and by his seaboard intercourse he knew that place was

not in extremity; but he had no communication with Pampeluna, and

feared its fall. Wherefore he resolved rapidly to concentrate on his

left by means of the great French roads leading to St. Jean Pied de

Port, covering his movement by the Nivelle and Nive rivers, and by the

positions of his centre: thus he hoped to gather on Wellington’s right

quicker than that general could gather to oppose him, and, compensating

by numbers the disadvantage of assailing mountain positions, force a

way to Pampeluna.

That fortress succoured, he designed to seize the road of Irurzun,

and either fall upon the separated divisions of the centre in detail

as they descended from the Great Spine, or operate on the rear of the

troops besieging San Sebastian, while a corps of observation, left on

the Lower Bidassoa, menaced it in front. The siege of San Sebastian and

the blockade of Pampeluna would be thus raised, the French army united

in an abundant country, and its communication with Suchet secured.

To mislead Wellington by vexing his right, simultaneously with the

construction of the bridges against his left, Soult directed General

Paris to march from Jaca, when time suited, by the higher valleys

towards Sanguessa, to drive the partizans from that side, and join

the left of the army when it should have reached Pampeluna. Clausel

was directed to repair the roads in his own front, push the heads of

columns towards the Roncesvalles pass, and with a strong detachment

menace Hill’s flank by the lateral passes of the Bastan.

On the 20th Reille’s troops on the heights of Sarre and Vera, being

cautiously relieved by Villatte, marched towards St. Jean Pied de Port,

which they were to reach early on the 22nd; and on that day the two

divisions of cavalry and parc of artillery were to concentrate at the

same place. D’Erlon, with the centre, was to hold his positions in

front of Hill while these great movements were taking place.

Villatte, having fifteen thousand sabres and bayonets, remained in

observation on the Bidassoa. If threatened by superior forces he was

to retire upon the intrenched camp at Bayonne, halting successively on

certain positions. If only a small corps crossed the river, he was to

drive it vigorously back; and if the allies retired in consequence of

Soult’s operations, he was to relieve San Sebastian and follow them

briskly by Tolosa.

Rapidity was of vital importance to the French marshal, but heavy

rains swelled the streams and ruined the roads in the deep country

between Bayonne and the mountains; the head-quarters which should have

arrived at St. Jean Pied de Port on the 20th, were a few miles short

of that place the 21st, and Reille’s troops were forced to go round by

Bayonne to gain the causeway. The cavalry was also retarded, and the

army, men and horses, worn down by severe marches. Two days were thus

lost, yet the 24th more than sixty thousand fighting men, including

cavalry, national guards, and _gens d’armes_, with sixty-six pieces of

artillery, were assembled to force the passes of Roncesvalles and Maya;

the former being in the Great Spine, the latter giving entrance to the

Bastan. The main road leading to Roncesvalles was repaired, and three

hundred sets of bullocks were provided to drag the guns; the national

guards of the frontier on the left, ordered to assemble in the night on

the heights of Yropil, were reinforced with regular troops to vex and

turn the right of the allies at the foundry of Orbaiceta.

At St. Jean Pied de Port Soult was almost in contact with the allies

at the passes of the Roncesvalles, which were also the points of the

defence nearest to Pampeluna. He had thirty thousand bayonets, the

frontier national guards to aid, and his artillery and cavalry were

massed behind his infantry; for here the great road from St. Jean

Pied de Port to Pampeluna, the only one fit for cannon, entered the

mountains: but to understand his movements a short description of the

country is necessary, taking the point of departure from his camp.

Before him was the Val Carlos, formed by two descending shoots from

the Great Spine of the Pyrenees. That on his left hand separated this

valley from the valley of Orbaiceta; that on his right hand separated

it from several conjoint valleys, known as the Alduides and Baygorry,

the latter name being given to the lower, the former to the upper parts.

The great road to Pampeluna led up the left hand tongue by the

remarkable rocks of Château Pignon, near which narrow branches went

off to the village of San Carlos on the right, and to the foundry of

Orbaiceta on the left. The main line, after ascending to the summit of

the Great Spine, turned to the right and run along the crest until it

reached the pass of Ibañeta, where, turning to the left, it led down by

the famous Roncesvalles into the valley of Urros.

A lateral continuation however run along the magistral crest, beyond

the Ibañeta, to another pass called the Mendichuri, which also led down

into the Val de Urros; and from Mendichuri there was a way into the

Alduides valley through a side pass called the Atalosti.

On Soult’s right hand the Val Carlos was bounded by the ridge and rock

of Ayrola, from the summit of which there was a way directly to the

Mendichuri and the lateral pass of Atalosti; and the ground between

those defiles, called the Lindouz, was an accessible mountain knot,

tying all the valleys together and consequently commanding them.

Continuing along the Great Spine, after passing the Atalosti, there

would be on the right hand, descending towards the French frontier, the

Val de Ayra, the Alduides and the Bastan. On the left hand, descending

to Pampeluna, would be the Val de Zubiri and the valley of Lanz,

separated from each other by a lofty wooded range. All these valleys

on each side were, in their order, connected by roads leading over

comparatively low portions of the Great Spine, called by the French

_cols_, or necks, by the Spaniards _puertos_, or doors.

General Byng and Morillo, the first having sixteen hundred British

troops, the second four thousand Spaniards, were in position before

Soult. Byng, reinforced with two Spanish battalions, held the rocks of

Altobiscar, just above Château Pignon. On his right a Spanish battalion

was posted at the foundry of Orbaiceta; on his left Morillo’s remaining

Spaniards were near the village of Val Carlos on a minor height called

the Iroulepe.

Behind the Great Spine, in the valley of Urros, General Cole held

the fourth division in support of Byng; but he was twelve miles off,

separated by the Ibañeta pass, and could not come up under four hours.

General Campbell, having a Portuguese division two thousand strong,

watched the Alduides; but he was eight miles off, and separated by the

lateral pass of Atalosti. General Picton, with the third division,

was at Olague in the valley of Lanz, on the Spanish side of the

Spine; and both he and Campbell could at pleasure gain the valley

of Zubiri--Picton by a cross communication, Campbell by the pass of

Urtiaga, which was directly in his rear; he could also join Cole in the

valley of Urros by the pass of Sahorgain.

In this state of affairs Soult placed twelve thousand infantry within

two miles of the Château Pignon, against Byng, and directed the

national guards at Yropil, reinforced with regulars, to move into the

valley of Orbaiceta and turn the Spaniards at the foundry. A second

column, four thousand strong, was placed in the Val Carlos to assail

Morillo at Iroulepe. A third column of sixteen thousand, under Reille,

assembled, in the night, at the foot of the Ayrola rock, with orders

to ascend at daylight and move along the crest of the ridge to seize

the culminant Lindouz. From that point detachments were to be pushed

through the passes of Ibañeta, Mendichuri, and Sahorgain, into the

Roncesvalles, while others extended to the right as far as the pass of

Urtiaga, thus cutting off Byng and Morillo from Cole and Hamilton.

COMBAT OF RONCESVALLES. (July, 1813.)

On the 23rd Soult issued an order of the day remarkable for its force

and frankness. Conscious of ability he avowed a feeling of his own

worth; but he was too proud to depreciate brave adversaries on the eve

of battle.

“_Let us not_,” he said to his soldiers, “_defraud the enemy of the

praise which is due to him. The dispositions of the general have been

prompt, skilful, and consecutive, the valour and steadiness of his

troops have been praiseworthy._”

On the 25th at daylight he led up against the rocks of Altobiscar.

Byng, warned the evening before that danger was near, and jealous for

the village of Val Carlos, had sent the 57th Regiment down there, yet

kept his main body in hand and gave notice to Cole.

Soult, throwing out a multitude of skirmishers, pushed forward his

supporting columns and guns as fast as the steepness of the road and

difficult nature of the ground would permit; but the British fought

strongly, the French fell fast among the rocks, and their musketry

pealed in vain for hours along that cloudy field of battle, five

thousand feet above the level of the plains. Their numbers however

continually increased in front, and the national guards from Yropil,

skirmishing with the Spaniards at the foundry of Orbaiceta, threatened

to turn the right. Val Carlos was at the same time menaced by the

central column, and Reille ascending the rock of Ayrola turned

Morillo’s left.

At mid-day Cole arrived in person at Altobiscar, but his troops were

distant, and the French, renewing their attack, neglected the Val

Carlos to gather more thickly against Byng. He resisted their efforts,

yet Reille made progress along the summit of the Ayrola ridge, Morillo

fell back towards Ibañeta, and the French were nearer that pass than

Byng, when Ross’s brigade, of Cole’s division, coming up the Mendichuri

pass, appeared on the Lindouz at the instant when the head of Reille’s

column was closing on the Atalosti to cut the communication with

Campbell. This last-named officer had been early molested, according

to Soult’s plan, by the frontier guards of the Val de Baygorry, yet he

soon detected the feint and moved by his right towards Atalosti when he

heard the firing on that side. The Val d’Ayra separated him from the

ridge of Ayrola, along which Reille was advancing, yet, noting that

general’s strength and seeing Ross’s brigade labouring up the steep

ridge of Mendichuri, he judged its commander to be ignorant of what was

going on above, and, sending Cole notice of the enemy’s proximity and

strength, offered to pass the Atalosti and join battle, if he could be

furnished afterwards with provisions and transport for his sick.

Before this message reached Cole, a wing of the 20th Regiment and a

company of Brunswickers, forming the head of Ross’s column, had gained

the Lindouz, where suddenly they encountered Reille’s advanced guard.

The moment was critical, and Ross, an eager hardy soldier, called

aloud to charge, whereupon Captain Tovey of the 20th run forward with

a company, and full against the 6th French Light Infantry dashed

with the bayonet. Brave men fell by that weapon on both sides, yet

numbers prevailed and Tovey’s soldiers were eventually pushed back.

Ross however gained his object, the remainder of his brigade had

time to come up and the pass of Atalosti was secured, with a loss of

one hundred and forty men of the 20th Regiment and forty-one of the

Brunswickers.

Previous to this vigorous action, Cole, seeing the French in the Val

Carlos and the Orbaiceta valley, on both flanks of Byng, whose front

was not the less pressed, had reinforced the Spaniards at the foundry,

but now recalled his men to defend the Lindouz; and learning from

Campbell how strong Reille was, caused Byng, with a view to a final

retreat, to relinquish Altobiscar and approach Ibañeta. This movement

uncovered the road leading down to the foundry of Orbaiceta, yet it

concentrated all the troops; and Campbell, although he could not enter

the line, Cole being unable to meet his demands, made such skilful

dispositions as to impress Reille with a notion that his numbers were

considerable.

During these operations the skirmishing never ceased, though a thick

fog, coming up the valley, stopped a general attack which Soult was

preparing; thus, when night fell Cole still held the Great Spine,

having lost three hundred and eighty men killed and wounded. His right

was however turned by Orbaiceta, he had only eleven thousand bayonets

to oppose thirty thousand, and his line of retreat, five miles down

hill and flanked by the Lindouz, was unfavourable; wherefore in the

dark, silently threading the passes, he gained the valley of Urros,

and his rear-guard followed in the morning. Campbell went off by

Urtiaga into the Zubiri valley, and the Spanish battalion retreated

from the foundry by a goat path. The great chain was thus abandoned,

yet the result of the day’s operation was unsatisfactory to Soult. He

had lost four hundred men, he had not gained ten miles, and was still

twenty-two miles from Pampeluna, with strong positions in the way,

where increasing numbers of intrepid enemies were to be expected.

His combinations had been thwarted by fortune, and by errors of

execution which the most experienced generals know to be inevitable.

Fortune sent the fog at the moment he was thrusting forward his

heaviest masses; Reille failed in execution; for he was to have gained

the Lindouz with all speed, but previous to ascending the rock of

Ayrola lost time by reorganizing two newly arrived conscript battalions

and serving out provisions; the two hours thus employed would have

sufficed to seize the Lindouz before Ross got through the pass of

Mendichuri. The fog would still have stopped the spread of his column

to the extent designed by Soult, yet fifteen or sixteen thousand men

would have been placed on the flank and rear of Byng and Morillo.

On the 26th Soult putting his left wing on Cole’s track, ordered Reille

to follow the crest of the mountains and seize the passes from the

Bastan in Hill’s rear, while D’Erlon pressed him in front. Hill would

thus, Soult hoped, be crushed or thrown off from Pampeluna, and D’Erlon

could thus reach the valley of Zubiri with his left, while his right,

descending the valley of Lanz, would hinder Picton from joining Cole. A

retreat by those generals, on separate lines, would then be inevitable,

and the French army could issue in a compact order of battle from the

mouths of the two valleys against Pampeluna.

COMBAT OF LINZOAIN. (July, 1813.)

All the columns were in movement at daybreak, but every hour brought

its obstacle. The fog still hung heavy on the mountain-tops. Reille’s

guides were bewildered, refused to lead the troops along the crests,

and at ten o’clock, having no other resource, he marched down the

Mendichuri pass and fell into the rear of Soult’s column, the head of

which, though retarded also by the fog and rough ground, had overtaken

Cole’s rear-guard. The leading infantry struck hotly upon some British

light companies under Colonel Wilson, while a squadron, passing their

flank, fell on the rear; but Wilson, facing about, drove them off,

and thus fighting Cole reached the heights of Linzoain. There Picton

met him, with intelligence that Campbell had reached Eugui in the

Val de Zubiri, and that the third division, having crossed the woody

ridge, was also in that valley. The junction of all was thus secured,

the loss of the day was less than two hundred, and neither wounded

men nor baggage had been left behind; but at four o’clock the French

seized some heights which endangered Cole’s position, and he again

fell back a mile, offering battle at a puerto, in the ridge separating

the valley of Zubiri from that of Urros, which last, though descending

on a parallel line, did not open on Pampeluna. During this skirmish,

Campbell, coming from Eugui, showed his Portuguese on the ridge above

the French right flank; he was however distant, Picton’s troops were

still further off, and there was light for an action if Soult had

pressed one; but, disturbed with intelligence received from D’Erlon,

and doubtful what Campbell’s troops might be, he put off the attack

until next morning, and after dark the junction of all the allies was

effected.

This delay was an error. Cole was alone for five hours, and every

action, by augmenting the wounded men and creating confusion, would

have augmented the difficulties of a retreat for troops fatigued with

incessant fighting and marching during two days and a night. Moreover

Reille’s failure from the fog, had reduced the primary combinations

to D’Erlon’s co-operation, and reports now brought the mortifying

conviction that he also had gone wrong: by rough fighting only could

Soult therefore attain his object, and, it is said, his manner

discovered a secret anticipation of failure; yet his temper was too

steadfast to yield, for he gave orders to advance next day, renewing

his instructions to D’Erlon, whose operations must now be noticed.

That general, who had eighteen thousand fighting men, placed two

divisions on the morning of the 25th near the passes of Maya, having

previously caused the national guards of Val Baygorry to make

demonstrations towards the lateral passes of Arriette, Yspeguy and

Lorietta, on Hill’s right. General William Stewart, commanding a

division, and still the same daring but imprudent man he had shown

himself at Albuera, was deceived by these feints, and looked to that

quarter which was guarded by Sylviera’s Portuguese more than to his

own front. His division, consisting of two British brigades, was

consequently neither posted as it should be, nor otherwise prepared for

an attack. His ground was strong, but however rugged a position may be,

if it is too extensive and the troops are not disposed with judgment,

the inequalities constituting its strength become advantageous to an

assailant.

There were three passes over the Col de Maya to defend, Aretesque on

the right, Lessessa in the centre, Maya on the left; and from these

entrances two roads led into the Bastan in parallel directions; one

down the valley through the town of Maya, the other along the Atchiola

mountain. General Pringle’s brigade guarded the Aretesque, Colonel

Cameron’s brigade the Maya and Lessessa passes. The Col itself was

broad on the summit, three miles long, and on each flank lofty rocks

and ridges rose one above another; those on the right blended with the

Goramendi mountains, those on the left with the Atchiola mountain,

near the summit of which the 82nd Regiment, belonging to the seventh

division, was posted.

Cameron, encamped on the left, had a clear view of troops coming from

Urdax, one of D’Erlon’s camps; but at Aretesque a great round hill, one

mile in front, masked the movements of an enemy coming from Espelette,

the other French camp. This hill was not occupied at night, nor in the

daytime, save by some Portuguese cavalry videttes, and the nearest

guard was an infantry picquet of eighty men posted on the French slope

of the Col. Behind this picquet there was no immediate support, but

four light companies were encamped one mile down the reverse slope,

which was more rugged and difficult of access than that towards the

enemy. The rest of Pringle’s brigade was disposed at distances of two

and three miles in the rear, and the signal for occupying the position

was to be the fire of four Portuguese guns from the rocks above the

Maya pass. Thus of six British regiments, furnishing more than three

thousand fighting men, half only were in line, and chiefly massed on

the left of a position, wide, open, and of an easy ascent from the

Aretesque side. Stewart also, quite deceived as to the real state of

affairs, was at Elisondo, several miles off, when at midday D’Erlon

commenced the battle.

COMBAT OF MAYA. (July, 1813.)

From the Aretesque pass at dawn a glimpse had been obtained of cavalry

and infantry in movement along the hills in front, and soon afterwards

some peasants announced the approach of the French. At nine o’clock a

staff officer, patrolling round the great hill in front, discovered

sufficient to make him order up the light companies from the reverse

slope, to support the picquet; and they formed on the ridge with their

left at the rock of Aretesque, just as D’Armagnac’s division, coming

from Espelette, mounted the great hill in front; Abbé’s division

followed, while Maransin, with a third division, advanced from Ainhoa

and Urdax against the Maya pass, seeking also to turn it by a narrow

way leading up the Atchiola mountain.

D’Armagnac forced the picquet back with great loss upon the light

companies, who sustained his assault with infinite difficulty; the

alarm guns were then heard from the Maya pass, and Pringle hastened to

the front; but his battalions, moving hurriedly from different camps,

came up irregularly. The 34th arrived first at a running pace, yet by

companies not in mass, and breathless from the length and ruggedness

of the ascent; the 39th and 28th followed, but not immediately nor

together, and meanwhile D’Armagnac, closely supported by Abbé, with

domineering numbers and valour combined, maugre the desperate fighting

of the light companies and the 34th, established his columns on the

broad ridge of the position. Colonel Cameron sent the 50th from the

left to the assistance of the overmatched troops, and that fierce and

formidable old regiment, charging the head of an advancing column drove

it clear out of the pass of Lessessa in the centre. But the French

were many, and checked at one point assembled with increased force

at another; nor could Pringle restore the battle with the 39th and

28th Regiments, which, cut off from the others, were, though fighting

strongly, forced back to a second and lower ridge crossing the main

road into the Bastan. They were followed by D’Armagnac, while Abbé

pushed the 50th and 34th towards the Atchiola road to the left, upon

Cameron’s brigade. That officer, still holding the pass of Maya with

the left wings of the 71st and 92nd Regiments, now brought their right

wings and the Portuguese guns into action: yet so dreadful was the

slaughter, especially of the 92nd, that the enemy was, it is said,

actually stopped for a time by the heaped mass of dead and dying; and

then the left wing of that noble regiment, coming down from the higher

ground, was forced to smite wounded friends and exulting foes alike, as

mingled together they stood or crawled before its fire.[33]

Such was the state of affairs when Stewart reached the field by the

mountain road of Atchiola. The passes of Lessessa and Aretesque were

lost; that of Maya was still held by the left wing of the 71st, but

Stewart, seeing Maransin’s men gathered thickly on one side, and Abbé’s

men on the other, abandoned it for a new position on the first rocky

ridge covering the road over the Atchiola. He called down the 82nd from

the highest part of that mountain, sent messengers to demand further

aid from the seventh division, and meanwhile, though wounded, made

a strenuous resistance, for he was a very gallant man. During this

retrograde movement, Maransin suddenly thrust the head of his division

across the front of the British line and connected his left with Abbé,

throwing as he passed a destructive fire into the wasted remnant of the

92nd, which even then gave way but sullenly, and still fought, though

two-thirds had fallen: however, one after the other, all the regiments

were forced back, the Portuguese guns were taken and the position lost.

Abbé now followed D’Armagnac on the road to the town of Maya, leaving

Maransin to deal with Stewart’s new position; and notwithstanding

its extreme strength the French gained ground until six o’clock; for

the British, shrunk in numbers, wanted ammunition, and a part of the

82nd defended the rocks on which they were posted with stones. In

this desperate condition Stewart was upon the point of abandoning

the mountain entirely, when Barnes’ brigade of the seventh division,

arriving from Echallar, charged and drove the French back to the Maya

ridge. Stewart was then master of the Atchiola, and D’Erlon thinking

greater reinforcements had come up, recalled his other divisions from

the Maya road and re-united his whole corps on the _Col_. He had lost

fifteen hundred men and a general, but he took four guns, and fourteen

hundred British soldiers and one general were killed or wounded.

Such was the commencement of Soult’s operations to restore the fortunes

of France. Three considerable actions fought on the same day had

each ended in his favour. At San Sebastian the allies’ assault was

repulsed; at Roncesvalles they abandoned the passes; at Maya they were

defeated--but the decisive blow was still to be struck.

Lord Wellington heard of the fight at Maya on his way back from San

Sebastian, after the assault, but with the false addition that D’Erlon

was beaten. As early as the 22nd he had known that Soult was preparing

a great offensive movement; yet the impassive attitude of the French

centre, the disposition of their reserve, twice as strong as he at

first supposed, together with the bridges prepared by Reille, were

calculated to mislead, and did mislead him. Soult’s combinations to

bring his centre finally into line on the crest of the great chain

being impenetrable, the English general could not believe he would

throw himself with only thirty thousand men into the valley of the

Ebro, unless sure of aid from Suchet. But that general’s movements

indicated a determination to remain in Catalonia, and Wellington,

in contrast to Soult, knew that Pampeluna was not in extremity, and

thought, the assault not having been made, that San Sebastian was.

Hence the operations against his right, their full extent not known,

appeared a feint, and he judged the real effort would be to raise

the siege of San Sebastian. But in the night of the 25th, correct

intelligence of the Maya and Roncesvalles affairs arrived. Graham was

then ordered to turn the siege into a blockade, to embark the guns and

stores, and hold his spare troops ready to join Giron, on a position of

battle marked out near the Bidassoa. Cotton was directed to move the

cavalry up to Pampeluna, and Abispal was instructed to hold some of his

Spanish troops ready to act in advance of that fortress. Meanwhile

Wellington, having arranged his lines of correspondence, proceeded to

San Esteban, which he reached early in the morning.

While the embarkation of the guns and stores was going on it was

essential to hold the posts at Vera and Echallar, because D’Erlon’s

object was not pronounced; and an enemy in possession of those places

could approach San Sebastian by the roads leading over the Peña de

Haya, or by the defiles of Zubietta leading round that mountain. But

when Wellington reached Irueta, saw the reduced state of Stewart’s

division, and knew Picton had marched from Olague, he directed all

the troops within his power upon Pampeluna, and to prevent mistakes

indicated the valley of Lanz as the general line of movement. Of

Picton’s exact position, or of his intentions, nothing positive was

known; but supposing him to have joined Cole at Linzoain, as indeed

he had, Wellington judged their combined forces sufficient to check

the enemy until assistance could reach them from the centre, or from

Pampeluna, and he so advised Picton on the evening of the 26th.[34]

Following these orders the seventh division marched in the night of the

26th, the sixth division the next morning, and Hill in the following

night. Meanwhile the light division, quitting Vera, reached the summit

of the Santa Cruz mountain, and there halted to cover the defiles

of Zubietta until Longa’s Spaniards should block the roads leading

over the Peña de Haya; that effected, it was to thread the passes

and descend upon the great road of Irurzun, thus securing Graham’s

communication with the army round Pampeluna.

These movements spread fear and confusion far and wide. All the narrow

valleys and roads were crowded with baggage, commissariat stores,

artillery and fugitive families; reports of the most alarming nature

were as usual rife; each division, ignorant of what had really happened

to the other, dreaded that some of the numerous misfortunes related

might be true; none knew what to expect, or where they were to meet the

enemy, and one universal hubbub filled the wild regions through which

the French army was working its fiery path towards Pampeluna.

D’Erlon’s inactivity gave great uneasiness to Soult: he repeated his

original orders to push forward by his left whatever might be the force

opposed, and thus stimulated D’Erlon advanced to Elisondo the 27th; yet

again halted there, and it was not until the morning of the 28th, when

Hill’s retreat had opened the way, that he followed through the pass of

Vellate. His further progress belongs to other combinations, arising

from Soult’s direct operations which shall now be continued.

Picton having assumed command of all the troops, seventeen thousand,

in the valley of Zubiri on the evening of the 26th, retreated before

dawn the 27th, without hope or intention of covering Pampeluna; Soult

followed in two columns down both banks of the Guy river, his cavalry

and artillery closing the rear: both moved in compact order, the narrow

valley was overgorged with troops, and a bicker of musketry alone

marked the separation of the hostile forces. Meanwhile the garrison

of Pampeluna attacked the Count of Abispal, who in great alarm spiked

some of his guns, destroyed his magazines, and would have suffered

a disaster, if Carlos España had not fortunately arrived from the

Ebro with his division and checked the sally. Imminent was the crisis

however, for Cole, first emerging from the Zubiri valley, had passed

Villalba, three miles from Pampeluna, in retreat; Picton, following

close, was at Huarte, and Abispal’s Spaniards were in confusion: in

fine Soult was all but successful, when Picton, feeling the importance

of the crisis, suddenly turned on some steep ridges which stretched

across the mouths of the Zubiri and Lanz valleys and screened Pampeluna.

Posting the third division on the right, he prolonged his left with

Morillo’s Spaniards, called upon Abispal to support him, and directed

Cole to occupy some heights a little in advance. That general had

however noted a salient hill one mile farther on, commanding the great

road, where two Spanish regiments of the blockading troops were still

posted, and towards them he directed his course. Soult had also marked

this hill, and a French detachment was in full career to seize it, when

the Spaniards, seeing the British so close, vindicated their ground

by a sudden charge. This was for Soult the stroke of fate. His double

columns, just then emerging exultant from the narrow valley, stopped at

the sight of ten thousand men crowning the summit of the mountain in

opposition, while two miles further back stood Picton with a greater

number, for Abispal had now taken post on Morillo’s left. To advance by

the great road was then impossible, and to stand still was dangerous;

for the French army, contracted to a span in front, was cleft in its

whole length by the river Guy, and compressed on each side by mountains

which there narrowed the valley to a quarter of a mile. In this

difficulty Soult, with the promptness of a great commander, instantly

shot the head of Clausel’s columns to his right, across the ridge which

separated the Zubiri from the Lanz valley, and threw one of Reille’s

divisions of infantry and a body of cavalry across the mountains on his

left, beyond the Guy river, thus giving himself a strong position of

battle and menacing Picton’s right flank. Reille’s remaining divisions

he established at the village of Zabaldica in the Val de Zubiri, close

under Cole’s right, while Clausel seized the village of Sauroren as

close under that general’s left.

While Soult was thus establishing a line of battle, Wellington, who

had quitted Hill’s quarters in the Bastan early on the 27th, crossed

the great mountain spine into the valley of Lanz, without being able

to learn anything of Picton’s movements or position until he reached

Ostiz, a few miles from Sauroren. There he found Long’s brigade of

light cavalry, placed to furnish posts of correspondence in the

mountains, and from him heard that Picton had abandoned the heights of

Linzoain: whereupon, leaving instructions to stop all the troops coming

down the valley of Lanz until the state of affairs near Pampeluna could

be ascertained, he made at racing speed for Sauroren. As he entered

that village he saw Clausel’s divisions moving along the crest of the

mountain, and thus knew the allied troops in the valley of Lanz were

intercepted; then pulling up his horse, he wrote on the parapet of the

bridge at Sauroren fresh instructions to turn everything from that

valley to the right by a cross-road, which led out of it to Marcalain

and thence round the hills, to enter the valley again at Oricain, in

rear of the position occupied by Cole. Lord Fitzroy Somerset, who had

kept up with him, galloped with these orders out of Sauroren by one

road, the French light cavalry simultaneously dashed in by another, and

Wellington rode alone up the mountain.

A Portuguese battalion on the left, first recognising him, raised

a joyful cry, and soon the shrill clamour was taken up by the next

regiments, swelling as it run along the line into that stern and

appalling shout which the British soldier is wont to give upon the edge

of battle, and which no enemy ever heard unmoved. In a conspicuous

place he stopped, desirous that both armies should know he was there. A

spy who was present pointed out Soult, then so near that his features

could be plainly distinguished. Fixing his eyes attentively upon that

formidable man, Wellington thus spoke, “_Yonder is a great commander,

but he is a cautious one and will delay his attack to ascertain the

cause of these shouts; that will give time for the sixth division to

arrive and I shall beat him._” The event justified the prediction.

Cole’s position was the summit of a mountain mass, which filled all

the space between the Guy and Lanz valleys, as far back as Huarte and

Villalba. It was highest in the centre and well defined towards the

enemy, yet the trace was irregular, the right being thrown back towards

the village of Arletta so as to flank the great road, which was also

swept by guns placed on a lower range behind.

Overlooking Zabaldica and the Guy river, was the bulging hill

vindicated by the Spaniards, a distinct but lower point on the right

of the position. The left, also abating in height, was yet extremely

rugged and steep, overlooking the Lanz river, and Ross’s brigade was

posted on that side, having in front a Portuguese battalion, whose

flank rested on a small chapel. Campbell was on the right of Ross.

Anson was on the highest ground, partly behind, partly on the right of

Campbell. Byng’s brigade was on a second mass of hills in reserve, and

the Spanish hill was further reinforced by a battalion of Portuguese.

This front of battle was less than two miles, and well filled, its

flanks being washed by the Lanz and the Guy; and those torrents,

pursuing their course, broke by narrow passages through the steep

ridges screening Pampeluna which had been first occupied by Picton,

and where the second line was now posted; that is to say, at the

distance of two miles from, and nearly parallel to the first position,

but on a more extended front. Carlos España maintained the blockade

behind these ridges, and the British cavalry under Cotton stood on some

open ground in the rear of Picton’s right wing.

Soult’s position was also a mountain filling the space between the two

rivers. It was even more rugged than that of the allies, and was only

separated from it by a deep narrow ravine. Clausel’s three divisions

leaned to the right on the village of Sauroren, which was down in the

valley of Lanz, close under the chapel height; Reille’s two divisions

occupied the village of Zabaldica, quite down in the valley of Zubiri

under the right of the allies. The remaining division of this wing and

the light cavalry were, as before said, thrown forward on the mountains

at the other side of the Guy river, menacing Picton and seeking to

communicate with Pampeluna.

COMBAT OF ZABALDICA. (July, 1813.)

The French guns at Zabaldica first opened fire, but the elevation

required to send the shot upward rendered it so ineffectual, that the

greatest part of the artillery remained in the narrow valley of Zubiri.

Soult had however made another effort to gain the Spaniards’ hill and

establish himself near the centre of the allies’ line of battle, but

had been valiantly repulsed just before the arrival of Wellington, who

now reinforced the post with the 40th British Regiment. There was then

a general skirmish along the front, under cover of which Soult examined

the whole position, and the firing continued on the mountain side

until a terrible storm, the usual precursor of English battles in the

Peninsula, brought on premature darkness and terminated the dispute.

This was the state of affairs at daybreak on the 28th, but a signal

alteration had place before the great battle of that day commenced,

and the movements of the wandering divisions by which this change was

effected must now be traced.

Although the Lanz covered the left of the allies and the right of

the French, the heights occupied by both were prolonged beyond that

river; the continuation of the allies’ range sweeping forward so as

to look into the rear of Sauroren, while the continuation of the

French range fell back in a direction nearly parallel to this forward

inclination of the allies’ ridge. On each side they were steep and

high, yet lower and less rugged than the heights on which the armies

stood opposed; for on the latter, rocks piled on rocks stood out like

castles, so difficult to approach and so dangerous to assail that the

hardened veterans of the Peninsula only would have dared the trial:

both sides were therefore strong in defence. But Soult was forced to

attack or retreat, and therefore Wellington looked anxiously for his

sixth division, then coming from Marcalain by a road which run behind

his ridge beyond the Lanz and fell into that valley at Oricain, one

mile in rear of Cole’s left. It had been turned into that road from

the higher part of the Lanz valley by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, and was

followed by General Hill when he arrived at the point of divarication;

the way was thus open for D’Erlon to join Soult, and the rapidity

with which that marshal had seized Sauroren would thus have proved a

master-stroke, if his lieutenant had pursued Hill vigorously: for the

change of direction gave the sixth division a march of eighteen instead

of four hours to join the army; and Hill, forced to take a position at

Marcalain, covering the great road of Irurzun on Wellington’s left, was

there joined by the seventh division and the whole were thrown out of

the line of battle. During these important movements, which were not

completed until the evening of the 28th, and which finally placed all

the allies in military communication, D’Erlon remained inactive in the

Bastan!

The proximity of the sixth division on the morning of the 28th, with

the certainty of Hill’s co-operation, made Wellington think Soult would

not venture an attack; and the latter, disquieted about D’Erlon, of

whom he only knew that he had not followed his instructions, certainly

viewed the British position with uneasy anticipations, and again with

anxious eyes took cognizance of its rugged strength, seeming dubious

and distrustful of fortune. He could not operate with advantage by his

left beyond the Guy river, because the mountains there were rough, and

his enemy, having shorter lines of movement, could meet him with all

arms combined; moreover his artillery, unable to emerge from the Val

de Zubiri, except by the great road, would thus have been exposed to a

counter attack. In this dubious state he crossed the Lanz and ascended

the prolongation of the allies’ ridge, which, as he had possession

of the bridge of Sauroren, was for the moment his own ground; from

thence he could see into the left and rear of Cole’s position, but

the country towards Marcalain was so broken that he could not discern

the march of the sixth division. The deserters however told him that

four divisions, namely, the second, sixth, and seventh British, and

Sylviera’s Portuguese, which was under Hill, were expected from that

side; he was thus influenced to attack, because the valley, widening

as it descended, offered the means of assailing the allies in front

and flank, and intercepting the divisions from Marcalain by the same

combination.

One of Clausel’s divisions already occupied Sauroren, and the other two

were now posted on each side of that village; that on the right hand

was ordered to send flankers to the ridge from whence Soult had made

his observations, and upon signal to move down the valley, wheel to the

left, and assail the rear of the allies while the other two divisions

assailed their front: five thousand men would thus be enveloped by

sixteen thousand, and Soult hoped to crush them notwithstanding the

strength of ground. Meanwhile Reille’s two divisions on the side of

Zabaldica, were each to send a brigade against the Spanish hill, and

connect the right of their attack with Clausel’s left. The remaining

brigades were to follow in support, the division beyond the Guy was to

keep Picton in check, and all were to throw themselves frankly into

action.

FIRST BATTLE OF SAUROREN. (July, 1813.)

At midday on the 28th of July, the anniversary of the Talavera fight,

the French gathered in masses at the foot of the position, and their

skirmishers quickly spread over the face of the mountain, working

upward like a conflagration; but the columns of attack were not all

ready when Clausel’s right-hand division, without awaiting the general

signal of battle, threw out flankers on the ridge beyond the Lanz and

pushed down the valley in one mass. With a rapid pace it turned Cole’s

left and was preparing to wheel up on his rear, when suddenly Madden’s

Portuguese brigade of the sixth division appeared on the crest of the

ridge beyond the river, driving the flankers back and descending, as

from the clouds, with a rattling fire upon the right and rear of the

column; and not less suddenly the main body of that division, emerging

from behind the same ridge near the village of Oricain, presented

a line of battle across the front. It was the counter-stroke of

Salamanca! The French were, while striving to encompass Cole’s left,

themselves encompassed; for two brigades of Cole’s division instantly

turned and smote them on the left, the Portuguese smote them on the

right, and thus scathed on both flanks with fire, they were violently

shocked and pushed back with a mighty force by the sixth division, yet

not in flight, but fighting fiercely and strewing the ground with their

enemies’ bodies as well as with their own.

Clausel’s second division, on the other side of Sauroren, seeing this

dire conflict, with a hurried movement assailed the chapel height to

draw off Cole’s fire from the troops in the valley, and gallantly did

the French soldiers throng up the craggy steep; yet the general unity

of the attack was ruined; neither the third division nor Reille’s

brigades had yet received the signal, and their attacks were made

irregularly, in succession, running from right to left as the necessity

of aiding others became apparent. It was however a terrible battle

and well fought. One column darting out of the village of Sauroren,

silently, sternly, without firing a shot, worked up to the chapel under

a tempest of bullets, which swept away whole ranks without abating the

speed and power of the mass; the Portuguese there shrunk abashed, and

that part of the position was won; soon however they rallied on Ross’s

British brigade, and the whole, running forward, charged the French

with a loud shout and dashed them down the hill. Heavily stricken the

latter were, yet undismayed, they re-formed, and again ascended, to be

again broken and overturned. But the other columns of attack now bore

upwards through the smoke and flame with which the skirmishers covered

the face of the mountain, and another Portuguese regiment, fighting

on the right of Ross, yielded to their fury; thus a heavy body crowned

the heights, and wheeling against Ross’s exposed flank forced him back

also, and his ground was instantly occupied by the enemies with whom he

had been engaged in front. Now the fight raged close and desperate on

the crest of the position, charge succeeding charge, each side yielding

and advancing by turns. This astounding effort of French valour was

however of no avail. Wellington brought Byng’s brigade forward at a

running pace, and calling the 27th and 48th British Regiments, from the

higher ground in the centre, against the crowded masses, rolled them

backward in disorder, and threw them, one after the other, violently

down the mountain-side; yet with no child’s play; the two British

regiments had to fall upon the enemy three separate times with the

bayonet, and lost more than half their own numbers.

During this battle on the mountain-top, the sixth division gained

ground in the Lanz valley, and when it arrived on a front with the

left of the victorious troops near the chapel, Wellington, seeing the

momentary disorder of the enemy, ordered Madden’s Portuguese brigade

beyond the Lanz, which had never ceased its fire against the right

flank of the French column, to assail the village of Sauroren in rear;

but the state of the action in other parts and the exhaustion of the

troops soon induced him to countermand this movement.

On the French left, Reille’s brigades, connecting their right with

Clausel’s third division, had environed the Spanish hill and ascended

it unchecked, at the moment when the fourth division was so hardly

pressed from Sauroren; a Spanish regiment then gave way on the left of

the 40th, but a Portuguese battalion, rushing forward, again covered

the flank of that invincible regiment, which waited in stern silence

until the French set their feet upon the broad summit. Scarcely did

their glittering arms appear over the brow of the mountain when the

charging British cry was heard, the fierce shock given, the French mass

was broken to pieces and a tempest of bullets followed it down the

mountain. Four times this assault was renewed, and the French officers

were seen even to pull up their tired men by the belts, so fierce

and resolute they were to win, but it was the labour of Sisyphus; the

vehement shout and shock of the British soldier always prevailed, and

at last, with thinned ranks, tired limbs, and fainting hearts, hopeless

from repeated failures, the French were so abashed that three British

companies sufficed to bear down a whole brigade.[35]

While the battle was thus being fought on the mountain, Soult’s cavalry

beyond the Guy river passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines

forced the 10th Hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton’s right,

but the 18th Hussars renewed the combat, killed two officers, and drove

them over the rivulet again.

Such were the leading events of this sanguinary struggle, which

Lord Wellington, fresh from the fight, with homely emphasis called

“_bludgeon work_.” Two generals and eighteen hundred men had been

killed or wounded on the French side, following their official reports;

a number far below the estimate made at the time by the allies,

whose loss amounted to two thousand six hundred. These discrepancies

between hostile calculations ever occur, and there is little wisdom in

disputing where proof is unattainable; yet the numbers actually engaged

were twenty-five thousand French and twelve thousand allies; hence,

if the strength of the latter’s position did not save them from the

greater loss, their steadfast courage is more to be admired.

The 29th the armies rested in position without firing a shot, and the

wandering divisions on both sides were now entering the line.

Hill had sent all his baggage, artillery, and wounded men to Berioplano

behind Picton’s ridge, but still occupied his position, covering the

Marcalain and Irurzun roads; thus posted, he likewise menaced the

valley of Lanz in rear of Soult’s right, his communication with Oricain

being maintained by the seventh division; the light division was also

approaching Hill’s left, and therefore on Wellington’s side the crisis

was over. He had vindicated his position with only sixteen thousand

combatants, and now, including the Spanish troops blockading Pampeluna,

he had fifty thousand in close military combination. Thirty thousand

flushed with recent successes were in hand, and Hill’s troops were

well placed for re-taking the offensive.

Soult’s situation was proportionably difficult. Seeing he could not

force the position, he had sent his artillery, part of his cavalry, and

his wounded men, back to France immediately after the battle, ordering

the two former to join Villatte on the Lower Bidassoa and await further

instructions. Having shaken off this burthen he awaited D’Erlon’s

arrival by the valley of Lanz, and that general did reach Ostiz, a few

miles above Sauroren, at mid-day on the 29th, bringing intelligence,

obtained indirectly during his march, that Graham had retired from the

Bidassoa and Villatte had crossed that river. This gave Soult a hope

that his first movements had disengaged San Sebastian, and he instantly

conceived a new plan of operations, dangerous indeed, yet conformable

to the critical state of his affairs.

No success was to be expected from another attack, yet he could not,

being reinforced with eighteen thousand men, retire by the road he

came without some dishonour; nor could he remain where he was, because

his supplies of provisions and ammunition, derived from distant

magazines by slow and small convoys, were unequal to the consumption.

Two-thirds of the British troops, great part of the Portuguese and

all the Spaniards, were, as he supposed, assembled in his front under

Wellington, or on his right flank under Hill; and it was probable other

reinforcements were on the march; wherefore he resolved to prolong his

right with D’Erlon’s corps, and cautiously drawing off the rest of his

army place the whole between the allies and the Bastan, in military

connection with his reserve and closer to his frontier magazines. Thus

posted he could combine all his forces in one operation to relieve San

Sebastian, and profit from new combinations.

In the evening of the 29th the second division of cavalry, which was in

the valley of Zubiri, passed over to that of Lanz and joined D’Erlon,

who was ordered to march early on the 30th by the cross road, leading

on Marcalain, which Hill had followed to get out of that valley. During

the night the first division of cavalry and La Martinière’s division

of infantry, both on the extreme left of the French army, retired

over the mountains to Eugui, in the upper part of the Zubiri valley,

having orders to cross the separating ridge there and join D’Erlon in

the valley of Lanz. The remainder of Reille’s wing moved by the crest

of the position to Sauroren, being gradually to relieve Clausel’s

troops, which were then to move up the Lanz valley, follow D’Erlon,

and be followed in like manner by Reille: meanwhile Clausel detached

two regiments to the ridges beyond the Lanz river, to cover his own

march and open a military connection with D’Erlon, whose new line of

operations was just beyond those heights.

In the night Soult again heard, from deserters, that three divisions

were to make an offensive movement next day by the Marcalain road

on his right, and at daylight he was convinced the men spoke truly;

because from the ridges held by Clausel beyond Sauroren he descried

columns descending from Picton’s position and from above Oricain, while

others were in movement apparently to turn Clausel’s right flank.

These columns were Morillo’s Spaniards, Campbell’s Portuguese, and the

seventh division, marching to adopt a new disposition, which shall be

presently explained.

Early in the morning Soult’s combination was apparent: Foy’s division,

the last of Reille’s wing, was seen in march along the crest of

the mountain to Sauroren, where Maucune’s division had previously

relieved Conroux’s, and the latter, belonging to Clausel, was moving

up the valley of Lanz. Wellington was not a general to suffer a flank

march across his front within cannon-shot. He immediately opened

his batteries from the chapel height, and sent skirmishers against

Sauroren; and soon this fire, spreading to the right, became brisk

between Cole and Foy; but it subsided at Sauroren, and Soult, relying

on the strength of the ground, directing Reille to maintain that

village until nightfall, went off himself to join D’Erlon. His design

was to fall upon the troops he had seen moving to turn his right and

crush them with superior numbers: a daring project, well and finely

conceived, but he had to deal with a man more rapid of perception and

of a rougher stroke than himself. Overtaking D’Erlon, who had three

divisions of infantry and two of heavy cavalry, he found him facing,

not the troops seen in march the evening before, but Hill who was in

position with ten thousand men.

COMBAT OF BUENZA. (July, 1813.)

Hill, occupying a very extensive mountain ridge, had his right strongly

posted on rugged ground, but his left was insecure. D’Erlon, who

had not less than twenty thousand sabres and bayonets in line, was

followed by La Martinière’s division of infantry. Soult’s combination

was therefore still extremely powerful, the light troops were already

engaged when he arrived, and thus the same soldiers on both sides who

had so strenuously combated at Maya were again opposed to each other.

D’Armagnac made a false attack on Hill’s right, Abbé endeavoured to

turn his left and gain the summit of the ridge in the direction of

Buenza; Maransin followed Abbé, and the French cavalry, entering the

line, connected the two attacks. D’Armagnac pushed his feint too far,

became seriously engaged and was beaten; but after some hard fighting

Abbé turned the left flank, gained the summit of the mountain, and

rendered the position untenable.

Hill, who had lost four hundred men, retired to the heights of Eguaros,

drawing towards Marcalain with his right and throwing back his left;

being there joined by Campbell and Morillo he again offered battle.

Soult, whose principal loss was in D’Armagnac’s division, had however

gained his main object; he had turned Hill’s left, secured a fresh line

of retreat, a shorter communication with Villatte by the pass of Doña

Maria, and withal, the command of the great Irurzun road to Toloza,

which was distant only one league. His first thought was to seize it

and march upon Toloza or Ernani to raise the siege of San Sebastian;

there was nothing to oppose this, except the light division, whose

movements shall be noticed hereafter, but neither Hill nor Soult knew

of its presence. If the French marshal’s other combinations had been

happily executed he would have broken into Guipuscoa on the 31st with

fifty thousand men, thrust aside the light division in his march, and

taken Graham in reverse while Villatte’s reserve attacked him in front.

Wellington would have followed, yet scarcely in time, for he did not

suspect his views, and was ignorant of his strength, thinking D’Erlon’s

force to be only three divisions, whereas it was four divisions of

infantry and two of cavalry. This error however did not prevent him

from seizing the decisive point of operation and like a great captain

giving a counter-stroke which Soult, trusting to the strength of

Reille’s position, little expected. For when La Martinière’s division

and the cavalry had abandoned the mountains above Elcano, and that

Zabaldica was evacuated, Picton, reinforced with two squadrons of

cavalry and a battery of artillery, was directed to enter the Zubiri

valley and turn the French left. Meanwhile the seventh division swept

over the hills beyond the Lanz river upon Clausel’s right, with safety,

because Campbell and Morillo insured communication with Hill, who

was ordered to push the head of his column towards Olague and menace

Soult’s rear in the valley of Lanz. He was in march to do this when

D’Erlon, as shown, met and forced him back. During these movements Cole

never ceased to skirmish with Foy on the mountain between Zabaldica

and Sauroren, while the sixth division reinforced with Byng’s brigade

assaulted the latter village.

SECOND BATTLE OF SAUROREN. (July, 1813.)

Picton quickly gained the Val de Zubiri, and threw his skirmishers

against Foy’s left flank on the mountain, while on the other flank

General Inglis, one of those veterans who purchase every step of

promotion with their blood, advancing with only five hundred men of the

seventh division, broke at one shock the two French regiments on the

ridges covering Clausel’s right, and drove them down into the valley of

Lanz. He lost indeed one-third of his own men, but instantly spread the

remainder in skirmishing order along the descent and opened a biting

fire upon the flank of Conroux’s division, which being in march up

the valley from Sauroren, was now thrown into disorder by having two

regiments thus suddenly tumbled upon it from the top of the mountain.

Foy’s division was marching along the crest of the position between

Zabaldica and Sauroren at the moment of this attack; but he was too

far off to give aid, and his own light troops were engaged with Cole’s

skirmishers; moreover Inglis had been so sudden that before the evil

was well perceived it was past remedy; for Wellington instantly pushed

the sixth division under Pakenham to the left of Sauroren, and sent

Byng headlong down from the chapel height against Maucune, who was in

that village. This vigorous assault was simultaneously enforced from

the other side of the Lanz by Madden’s Portuguese, and the battery near

the chapel sent its bullets crashing through the houses, or booming up

the valley towards Conroux’s column, which Inglis never ceased to vex.

The village and bridge of Sauroren and the straits beyond were soon

covered with a pall of smoke, the musketry pealed frequent and loud,

and the tumult and affray echoing from mountain to mountain filled all

the valley. Byng with hard fighting carried Sauroren, fourteen hundred

prisoners were made, and the two French divisions, being entirely

broken, fled, partly up the valley towards Clausel’s other divisions,

partly up the original position, to seek refuge with Foy, who remained

on the summit a helpless spectator of this rout. He rallied the

fugitives in great numbers, but had soon to look to himself, for his

own skirmishers were now driven up the mountain by Cole’s men, and his

left was infested by Picton’s detachments. Thus pressed, he fell back

along the hills separating the valley of Zubiri from that of Lanz, and

the woods enabled him to effect his retreat without much loss; yet he

dared not descend into either valley, and thinking himself entirely

cut off, sent advice to Soult and went over the Great Spine into the

Alduides by the pass of Urtiaga. Clausel meanwhile had been driven up

the valley of Lanz to Olague, where, being joined by La Martinière,

he took a position; and Wellington, whose pursuit had been damped by

hearing of Hill’s action, also halted.

The allies lost nineteen hundred men killed, wounded, or taken in this

and Hill’s battle, and nearly twelve hundred were Portuguese, for the

soldiers of that nation bore the brunt of both fights. On the French

side the loss was enormous. Conroux’s and Maucune’s divisions were

completely disorganized. Eight thousand men under Foy were entirely

separated from the main body, two thousand at the lowest computation

were killed or wounded, many were dispersed in the woods and ravines,

and three thousand prisoners were taken. Soult’s fighting men were

thus reduced to thirty-five thousand, of which fifteen thousand under

Clausel and Reille were dispirited by defeat, and the whole in a

critical situation, seeing that Hill’s force, increased to fifteen

thousand men by the junction of Morillo and Campbell, was in their

front at Eguaros, and thirty thousand were on their rear in the valley

of Lanz; for Picton, finding no enemies in the valley of Zubiri, had

joined Cole on the heights.

Wellington had sent some Spaniards to Marcalain when he first heard of

Hill’s action, yet he was not then aware of the true state of affairs

on that side, and his operations were founded on the notion that Soult

was in retreat towards the Bastan. Hence he designed to follow closely

and push his own left forward to support Graham on the Bidassoa; but

he still underrated D’Erlon’s force, and thought La Martinière’s

division had originally retreated up the Val de Zubiri to Roncesvalles,

instead of crossing the intervening ridge to the Lanz valley; and

as Foy’s column was numerous, and two divisions had been broken at

Sauroren, he judged the force immediately under Soult to be very weak,

and made dispositions accordingly. The sixth division and the 13th

Light Dragoons were ordered to join Picton, the whole to move upon the

Roncesvalles; Cole was called down into the valley of Lanz, and Hill

was directed to press Soult, turning his right, yet still directing his

own march upon Lanz: the seventh division was to let Hill cross its

front, and then march for the pass of Doña Maria.

These arrangements show that Wellington expected Soult to rejoin

Clausel, and make for the Bastan by the pass of Vellate. But the French

marshal was so far advanced he could not return to Lanz; he was between

two fires, and could only retreat into the valley of St. Estevan by the

pass of Doña Maria; wherefore, calling up Clausel, and giving D’Erlon,

whose divisions were in good order, the rear-guard, he commenced his

march at midnight towards the pass. Mischief was thickening around him.

Graham, on the British left, had twenty thousand men ready to move

either against Villatte or into the valley of St. Estevan; and there

remained on that side the light division, under Charles Alten, of whose

operations it is time to speak.

That general had descended the mountain of Santa Cruz on the evening of

the 28th, to gain the great road of Irurzun; but whether by orders from

Graham, or in default of orders, the difficulty of communication being

extreme in those wild regions, he commenced his movement very late, and

darkness falling on his rear brigade while in march, the troops got

dispersed in that frightful wilderness of woods and precipices. Many

soldiers made faggot torches, waving them as signals, and, so moving,

the lights served indeed to assist those who carried them, yet misled

and bewildered others who saw them at a distance; for the heights and

the ravines were alike studded with these small fires, and the soldiers

calling to each other filled the whole region with their clamour. Thus

they continued to rove and shout until morning showed the face of the

mountain covered with scattered men and animals, who had not gained

half a league of ground beyond their starting place, and it was many

hours ere they could be collected.

Alten, now for three days separated from the army, sent mounted

officers in various directions to obtain tidings, and at six o’clock in

the evening renewed his march, but at Areysa halted without suffering

fires to be lighted; for he knew nothing of the enemy and was fearful

of discovering his situation. At night he moved again, and finally

established his bivouacs near Lecumberri early on the 30th, having

heard the noise of Hill’s battle at Buenza in the course of the day.

The light division was thus brought into the immediate system of

operations, and had Soult continued his march, after driving back Hill,

it would have been in great danger. Now it was a new power thrown into

Wellington’s hands at a critical moment, for Villatte, contrary to

the intelligence received, had not advanced, and Soult was therefore

completely isolated: he had indeed no resources save what his ability

and courage could supply.

His single line of retreat by Doña Maria was secure only as far as

San Estevan, and from that town he could march up the Bidassoa to the

Bastan, to regain France by the Col de Maya; or down the same river

towards Vera by Sumbilla and Yanzi, from both of which roads branching

off to the right led over the mountains to Echallar: yet he might be

intercepted on either side. The Col de Maya way was good, that down

the Bidassoa was a long and terrible defile, so contracted about the

bridges of Yanzi and Sumbilla that a few men only could march abreast.

This then he had to dread. First, that Wellington by the pass of

Vellate would reach the Bastan before him, and block the Maya passes.

Second, that Graham would occupy the rocks of Yanzi and cut him off

from Echallar. Then, confined to a narrow mountain-way leading from San

Estevan to Zagaramurdi, and far too rugged for wounded men and baggage,

he would be followed by Hill, and perhaps headed at Urdax by Wellington.

In this state, the first object being to get through Doña Maria, he

commenced his retreat in the night of the 30th, while Wellington,

still ignorant of the real state of affairs, halted in the valley of

Lanz to let Hill pass his front and enter the Bastan. But early on the

31st, Soult’s real strength became known, and the seventh division

was directed to aid Hill, while Wellington marched himself through

the pass of Vellate, and sent Alten orders to cut in upon the French,

intercepting their march where he could. Longa, who was with Graham,

had instructions to seize the defiles at Yanzi, and aid the light

division to block that way, while Graham was to hold all his corps in

readiness for the same object.

COMBAT OF DOÑA MARIA. (July, 1813.)

General Hill overtook the French rear-guard early on the 31st, just as

the seventh division appeared on his right, and the enemy could only

gain the summit of the Doña Maria pass under the fire of his guns;

there however they turned, and throwing out skirmishers made strong

battle. General Stewart, leading the attack and now for the third time

engaged with D’Erlon’s troops, was again badly wounded and his first

brigade was repulsed; yet Pringle renewed the attack with the second

brigade, and broke the enemy’s right; the seventh division did the same

for the left, and some prisoners were taken: a thick fog prevented

further pursuit, and the loss of the French was unknown, but that of

the allies was four hundred.

The seventh division remained on the mountain. Hill, following his

orders, moved by a short rugged way between Doña Maria and Vellate

over the Great Spine to join Wellington, who had during this combat

entered the Bastan. Meanwhile General Byng, previously pushed forward,

had captured at Elisondo a large convoy of provisions and ammunition

left there by D’Erlon, had made several hundred prisoners after a sharp

skirmish, and seized the pass of Maya. Wellington then occupied the

hills through which the road from San Estevan led to the Bastan, and

full of hope he was to strike a terrible blow; for Soult, after passing

Doña Maria, had halted in San Estevan, although from his scouts he

knew the convoy had been taken by Byng. He was in a deep valley, and

four divisions were behind the crest of the mountains overlooking his

post; the seventh division was on the summit of the Doña Maria pass;

the light division and Graham’s Spaniards were marching to block the

valley at Vera and Echallar; Byng was at Maya, and Hill was moving by

Almandoz just behind Wellington; a few hours gained and the French must

surrender or disperse!

Strict orders were given to prevent the lighting of fires, the

straggling of soldiers, or any other indication of the presence of

troops, and the English commander placed himself on some rocks at a

culminant point, from whence he could observe every movement. Soult

seemed tranquil, and when four of his “_gens d’armes_” were seen to

ride up the valley in a careless manner some staff-officers proposed to

cut them off. Wellington, whose object was to hide his own presence,

forbade this; but the next moment three marauding English soldiers

entering the valley, were seen and carried off by the French patrol;

half an hour afterwards their drums beat to arms and the columns began

to move out of San Estevan towards Sumbilla. Thus the disobedience of

three plundering knaves, unworthy of the name of soldiers, deprived one

consummate commander of the most splendid success, and saved another

from the most terrible disaster.[36]

Soult walked from his prison, yet his chains still hung upon him.

The way was narrow, the multitude great, wounded men borne on their

comrades’ shoulders filed in long procession with the baggage,

Clausel’s troops, forming the rear-guard, were therefore still near

San Estevan the next morning; and scarcely had they marched a league

when Cole’s skirmishers and the Spaniards, thronging along the heights

on their flank, opened a fire on them, to which little reply could be

made: the soldiers and baggage soon got mixed in disorder, numbers fled

up the hills, and the energy of Soult, whose personal exertions were

conspicuous, could scarcely prevent a general dispersion. Prisoners and

baggage were now taken at every step, and the boldest were dismayed;

worse would have awaited them, if Wellington had been on other points

well seconded by his subordinate generals.

Instead of taking the first road leading from Sumbilla to Echallar,

the head of the French column passed onward towards that leading from

the bridge near Yanzi; the valley narrowed to a mere cleft in the

rocks as they advanced, the Bidassoa was on their left, and there was

a tributary torrent to cross, the bridge being defended by a battalion

of Spanish Caçadores from Vera. The head of the column was by this time

as much disordered as the rear, and had the Caçadores been reinforced,

only those French near Sumbilla, who could take the road from that

place to Echallar, would have escaped; but the Spanish general Longa

kept aloof, D’Erlon won the defile, and Reille’s divisions were

following, when a new enemy appeared.

The light division had been directed to head the French at San Estevan

or Sumbilla. The order was received on the evening of the 31st, and

General Alten, threading the defiles of Zubieta and descending the

deep valley of Lerins, reached Elgoriaga about mid-day on the 1st of

August, having then marched twenty-four miles. He was little more than

a league from Estevan, was about the same distance from Sumbilla,

and the movement of the French along the Bidassoa was immediately

discovered. Instead of moving direct on Sumbilla he turned to his

left, clambered up the great mountain of Santa Cruz and made for the

bridge of Yanzi. The weather was very sultry, the mountain steep and

hard to overcome, many men fell and died convulsed and frothing at the

mouth, others whose spirit and strength had never before been quelled,

leaned on their muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they yielded

for the first time. However, towards evening, after marching nineteen

consecutive hours, and over forty miles of mountain roads, the head of

the exhausted column reached the edge of a precipice near the bridge

of Yanzi. Below it, within pistol-shot, Reille’s divisions were seen

hurrying forward along the horrid defile in which they were pent up,

a fire of musketry commenced, and the scene which followed is thus

described by an eye-witness.[37]

“We overlooked the enemy at stone’s throw, and from the summit of a

tremendous precipice. The river separated us, but the French were

wedged in a narrow road with inaccessible rocks on one side and the

river on the other. Confusion impossible to describe followed, the

wounded were thrown down in the rush and trampled upon, the cavalry

drew their swords and endeavoured to charge up the pass of Echallar,

but the infantry beat them back, and several, horses and all, were

precipitated into the river; some fired vertically at us, the wounded

called out for quarter, while others pointed to them, supported as they

were on branches of trees, on which were suspended great coats clotted

with gore, and blood-stained sheets taken from different habitations to

aid the sufferers.”

On these miserable supplicants brave men could not fire, and so piteous

was the spectacle that it was with averted or doubtful aim they shot at

the others, although the latter rapidly plied their muskets in passing,

and some in their veteran hardihood even dashed across the bridge of

Yanzi to make a counter-attack. It was a soldier-like but vain effort,

the night found the British in possession of the bridge; and though the

great body of the enemy escaped by the mountain path to Echallar, the

baggage was cut off and with many prisoners fell into the hands of the

light troops which were still hanging on the rear in pursuit from San

Estevan.

That day the French losses were great, yet Wellington was justly

discontented with the result. Neither Longa nor Alten had fulfilled

their missions. The former should have stopped D’Erlon; the latter

should have passed the bridge of Yanzi and struck a great blow: it was

for that his soldiers had made such a prodigious exertion.

In the night Soult rallied his divisions about Echallar, and on the

morning of the 2nd occupied the Puerto of that name. His left was

on the rocks of Zagaramurdi, his right, on the Ivantelly mountain,

communicating with Villatte, who held certain ridges between the

Ivantelly and the head of the great Rhune mountain. Clausel’s three

divisions, reduced to six thousand men, were on a strong hill between

the Puerto and town of Echallar. This position was momentarily adopted

by Soult to make Wellington discover his final object, but that general

would not suffer the affront. He had the fourth, seventh, and light

divisions in hand, and resolved to fall upon Clausel, whose position

was dangerously advanced.

COMBATS OF ECHALLAR AND IVANTELLY. (Aug. 1813.)

From Yanzi the light division marched to the heights of Santa Barbara,

which were connected with the Ivantelly, thus turning Clausel’s

position and menacing Soult’s right, while the fourth division moved

to attack his front, and the seventh menaced his left; these attacks

were to be simultaneous, but General Barnes led his brigade of the

seventh division against Clausel’s strong post before the fourth and

light divisions were seen or felt. A vehement fight ensued, yet neither

the steepness of the mountain, nor the overshadowing multitude of

the enemy, clustering above in support of their skirmishers, could

arrest the assailants, and the astonishing spectacle was presented of

fifteen hundred men, driving by sheer valour and force of arms six

thousand good troops from ground so rugged, the numbers might have been

reversed and the defence made good without much merit. Incalculable

is the preponderance of moral power in war! These were the Frenchmen

who had assailed the terrible rocks above Sauroren with a force and

energy that all the valour of the hardiest British veterans scarcely

sufficed to repel; yet now, five days only having elapsed, although

posted so strongly, they did not sustain the shock of one-fourth of

their own numbers! And at this very time, eighty British soldiers,

the comrades and equals of those who achieved this wonderful exploit,

having wandered to plunder, surrendered to some French peasants, who as

Lord Wellington truly observed, “_they would under other circumstances

have eat up_!” What gross ignorance of human nature then do those

writers display, who assert, that the use of brute force is the highest

qualification of a general!

Clausel fell back fighting to a strong ridge beyond the pass of

Echallar, having his right covered by the Ivantelly mountain, which

was strongly occupied. Meanwhile the light division ascended the broad

heights of Santa Barbara, and halted until the operations of the fourth

and seventh divisions rendered it advisable to attack the Ivantelly,

which lifted its sugar-loaf head on their right rising as it were out

of the Santa Barbara heights, and shutting them off from the ridges

through which the troops beaten at Echallar were now retiring. Evening

was coming on, a thick mist capped the crowning rocks, where a strong

French regiment was ensconced, and the division, besides its terrible

march the previous day, had been for two days without sustenance.

Weak and fainting, the soldiers were leaning on their arms when the

advancing fire at Echallar imported an attack on the Ivantelly, and

Andrew Barnard led five companies of riflemen up the mountain. Four

companies of the 43rd followed in support, the misty cloud descended

lower, the riflemen were soon lost to the view, and the sharp clang of

their weapons, heard in distinct reply to the more sonorous rolling

musketry of the French, told what work was going on. For some time the

echoes rendered it doubtful how the action went, but the companies of

the 43rd could find no trace of an enemy save the killed and wounded:

Barnard had fought his way unaided, and without a check to the summit,

where his dark-clothed swarthy veterans raised their victorious shout

on the highest peak, just as the coming night showed the long ridges

of the mountains beyond, sparkling with the last musket-flashes from

Clausel’s troops retiring in disorder from Echallar.

This day cost the British four hundred men, and Wellington himself

narrowly escaped the enemy’s hands. He had taken towards Echallar half

a company of the 43rd as an escort, and placed a sergeant, named Blood,

with a party to watch in front while he examined his maps. A French

detachment endeavoured to cut the party off, and their troops, rushing

on at speed, would infallibly have fallen unawares upon Wellington, if

Blood, leaping down the precipitous rocks, had not given him warning:

as it was, they arrived in time to send a volley after him while

galloping away.

Now, after nine days of continual movement during which ten serious

actions had been fought, the operations ceased. Of the allies,

including the Spaniards, seven thousand three hundred officers and

soldiers had been killed, wounded, or taken, and many were dispersed

from fatigue or to plunder. On the French side the loss was terrible,

and the disorder rendered the official returns inaccurate. Wellington

called it twelve thousand, but hearing the French officers admitted

more, raised his estimate to fifteen thousand. The engineer _Belmas_,

in his Journals of Sieges compiled from official documents, sets down

above thirteen thousand. Soult in his official correspondence at the

time, gave fifteen hundred for Maya, four hundred for Roncesvalles, two

hundred on the 27th, eighteen hundred the 28th, after which he spoke

no more of losses by battle. There remain therefore to be added, the

combats of Linzoain, the battles of Sauroren and Buenza on the 30th,

the combats on the 31st, 1st and 2nd: finally, four thousand unwounded

prisoners. Let this suffice. It is not needful to sound the stream of

blood in all its horrid depths.