THE BATTLE OF LE CATEAU
The order of battle at Le Cateau--The stand of the 2nd
Suffolks--Major Yate's V.C.--The fight for the quarries--The splendid
work of the British guns--Difficult retirement of the Fourth
Division--The fate of the 1st Gordons--Results of the
battle--Exhaustion of the Army--The destruction of the 2nd
Munsters--A cavalry fight--The news in Great Britain--The views of
General Joffre--Battery L--The action of Villars-Cotteret--Reunion of
the Army.
Reference has already been made to the retirement of Smith-Dorrien's
Second Corps, covered by Allenby's cavalry, throughout the 25th. The
heads of the columns arrived at the Le Cateau position at about 3
P.M., but the rearguards were fighting into the night, and came in
eventually in an exhausted condition. The Fourth Division, which was
still quite fresh, did good and indeed vital service by allowing the
tired units to pass through its ranks and acting as a pivot upon
which the cavalry could fall back.
Sir John French had reconsidered the idea of making a stand at Le
Cateau, feeling, no doubt, that if his whole Army could not be
consolidated there the affair would be too desperate. He had moved
with his staff during the evening of the 25th to St. Quentin, leaving
word that the retirement should be continued early next morning.
Smith-Dorrien spent the afternoon and evening going round the
position, but it was {97} not until 2 A.M. upon the morning of the
26th that he was able to ascertain the whereabouts of all his
scattered and weary units. About that time General Allenby reported
that his cavalry had been widely separated, two and a half brigades
being at Chatillon, six miles east of Le Cateau, the other one and a
half brigades being near Ligny, four miles west of the same town.
General Smith-Dorrien was in the position that his troops were
scattered, weary, and in danger of losing their morale through
continued retreat in the presence of an ever-pressing enemy. Even
with the best soldiers such an experience too long continued may turn
an army into a rabble. He therefore made urgent representations by
telephone to the Commander-in-Chief, pointing out that the only hope
of checking the dangerous German pursuit was to stagger them by a
severe counter. "The only thing for the men to do when they can't
stand is to lie down and fight," said he. Sir John assented to the
view, with the proviso that the retirement should be continued as
soon as possible. Smith-Dorrien, taking under his orders the
cavalry, the Fourth Division, and the 19th Brigade, as well as his
own corps, issued instructions for the battle which he knew must
begin within a few hours.
Owing to the gap of eight miles between the nearest points of the two
corps, both flanks of the position were in the air. Smith-Dorrien
therefore requested the cavalry brigades from Chatillon to move in
and guard the east flank, while the rest of the cavalry watched the
west. He was less anxious about the latter, as he knew that Sordet's
French cavalry was in that direction.
[Sidenote: The order of battle at Le Coteau.]
The exhausted infantry, who had now been {98} marching for about a
week, and fighting for three days and the greater part of three
nights, flung themselves down where best they could, some to the
north-east of Le Cateau, some in the town, and some along the line of
very inadequate trenches hastily prepared by civilian labour. In the
early dawn they took up their position, the Fifth Division being to
the right near the town. Of this division, the 14th Brigade (Rolt's)
was on the extreme right, the 13th (Cuthbert's) to the left of it,
and the 15th (Gleichen's) to the left again. To the west of the
Fifth Division lay the Third, their trenches covering the villages of
Troisville (9th Brigade), Audencourt (8th Brigade), and Caudry (7th
Brigade). Behind Caudry one and a half brigades of cavalry were in
reserve to strengthen the left wing. From Caudry the line was thrown
back to meet a flanking movement and extended to Haucourt. This
portion was held by Snow's Fourth Division. Sordet's cavalry had
passed across the rear of the British position the day before, and
lay now to the left flank and rear of the Army. There were rumours
of approaching French forces from the south, which put heart into the
weary men, but, as a matter of fact, they had only their own brave
spirits upon which to depend. Their numbers, putting every unit at
its full complement, were about 70,000 men. Their opponents were
four army corps at the least, with two divisions of cavalry--say,
170,000 men with an overpowering artillery. Subsequent reports
showed that the guns of all five army corps had been concentrated for
the battle.
It has been said that Rolt's 14th Brigade was at the extreme right of
the line. This statement needs some expansion. The 14th Brigade
consisted of the {99} 1st East Surrey, 2nd Suffolk, 2nd Manchester,
and 1st Cornwalls. Of these four regiments, half of the East Surrey
had been detached on escort duty and the other half, under Colonel
Longley, with the whole of the Cornwalls, bivouacked in the northern
suburbs of Le Cateau on the night of the 25th. In the early morning
of the 26th the enemy's advanced guard got into the town, and this
detachment of British troops were cut off from their comrades and
fired upon as they assembled in the streets of the town. They made
their way out, however, in orderly fashion and took up a position to
the south-east of the town, where they fought an action on their own
account for some hours, quite apart from the rest of the Army, which
they could hear but not see. Eventually the division of cavalry fell
back from Chatillon to join the Army and picked up these troops _en
route_, so that the united body was able to make its way safely back
to their comrades. These troops were out of the main battle, but did
good work in covering the retreat. The whole signal section of the
14th Brigade was with them, which greatly hampered the brigade during
the battle. Two companies of the 1st East Surreys under Major Tew
had become separated from their comrades after Mons, but they
rejoined the British line at Troisville, and on the morning of August
26 were able to fall in on the rear of the 14th Brigade, where, as
will be seen later, they did good service.
The 19th Brigade had also bivouacked in Le Cateau and was nearly cut
off, as the two regiments of the 14th Brigade had been, by the sudden
intrusion of the enemy. It had been able to make its way out of the
town, however, without being separated from the rest of the Army, and
it took up its position on {100} the right rear of the infantry line,
whence it sent help where needed and played the part of a reserve
until towards the close of the action its presence became very vital
to the Fifth Division. At the outset the 2nd Argyll and Sutherlands
were in the front line of this brigade and the 1st Middlesex
supporting them, while the other two battalions, the 2nd Welsh
Fusiliers and 1st Scots Rifles, with a battery of artillery had been
taken as a reserve by the force commander. No trenches had been
prepared at this point, and the losses of the two front battalions
from shell-fire were, from the beginning, very heavy. The other two
battalions spent a day of marching rather than fighting, being sent
right across to reinforce the Fourth Division and then being brought
back to the right flank once more.
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{101}
[Illustration: Sketch of the Battle of Le Cateau, Aug. 26th]
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[Sidenote: The stand of the 2nd Suffolks.]
It was the Fifth Division, on the right of the line, who first
experienced the full effect of the heavy shelling which about seven
o'clock became general along the whole position, but was always most
severe upon the right. There was a dangerous salient in the trenches
at the cross-roads one mile west of Le Cateau which was a source of
very great weakness. Every effort was made to strengthen the
trenches, the 15th Brigade and 59th Company R.E. working especially
hard in the Troisville section. The Germans were moving round upon
this right wing, and the murderous hail of missiles came from the
flank as well as from the front, being supplemented by rifle and
machine-gun fire. The 2nd Suffolks and 2nd Manchesters, the
remaining half of Rolfs 14th Brigade, being on the extreme right of
the line, suffered the most. The guns immediately supporting them,
of the 28th Artillery Brigade, were quite overmatched and were {102}
overwhelmed by the devastating rain of shells, many of them being put
out of action. A heavy battery, the 108th, some little distance
behind the line, kept up a steady and effective fire which long held
back the German advance. The pressure, however, was extreme, and
growing steadily from hour to hour until it became well-nigh
intolerable. Especially it fell upon the 2nd Suffolks, who held
their shallow trenches with splendid tenacity. Their colonel, Brett,
was killed, Major Doughty was wounded in three places, Captains
Orford and Cutbill, with eight lieutenants, were on the ground.
Finally, when the position of the brigade became untenable and it was
ordered to retreat, the gallant Suffolks held on to their line with
the desire of saving the disabled guns, and were eventually all
killed, wounded, or taken, save for about 250 men, while their
neighbours, the 2nd Manchesters, lost 14 officers and 350 of their
men. In this way the extreme right of the British line was
practically destroyed.
The 19th Brigade, in the rear of the 14th, were able to observe the
fate of their comrades, and about mid-day the 2nd Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, who had already lost a good many men from
shell-fire, advanced in the chivalrous hope of relieving the
pressure. The battalion went forward as if on parade, though the
casualties were numerous. They eventually gained the shelter of some
trenches near the remains of the 14th Brigade, but their gallant
effort, instead of averting the threatened destruction, ended by
partially involving them in the same fate. They could do nothing
against the concentrated and well-directed artillery fire of the
enemy. When eventually they fell back, part of two companies were
cut {103} off in their trench and taken. The rest of the regiment,
together with the 1st Middlesex and two companies of the Royal Scots
Fusiliers from the 9th Brigade, formed a covering line on a ridge in
the rear and held back the German advance for a long time. This line
did not retire until 5 P.M., when it was nearly enveloped. General
Drummond, commanding the 19th Brigade, had met with an injury in the
course of the action, and it was commanded during the latter part by
Colonel Ward, of the Middlesex.
[Sidenote: Major Yate's V.C.]
The retirement or destruction of the 14th Brigade exposed the flank
of the 13th (Cuthbert's) to a murderous enfilade fire, which fell
chiefly upon the 2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry. This brigade had
defended itself successfully for six hours against various frontal
attacks, but now the flank-fire raked it from end to end and
practically destroyed the Yorkshiremen, who were the most exposed to
it. On them and on the 2nd Scottish Borderers fell the great bulk of
the losses, for the West Rents and the survivors of the West Ridings
were in reserve. Of the two companies of the Yorkshire Light
Infantry who held the foremost trenches, that on the right had only
fifteen men left, with whom Major Yate attempted a final charge,
finding his Victoria Cross in the effort, while the next company,
under Major Trevor, had only forty-one survivors, the whole losses of
the battalion being 600 men, with 20 officers. Both the Yorkshire
and the Scottish Border battalions lost their colonels in the action.
Their losses were shared by the two companies of the 1st East Surreys
under Major Tew, who had been placed between the 14th and 13th
Brigades, and {104} who fought very steadily in shallow trenches,
holding on to the last possible moment.
Whilst the battle was going badly on the right, the Third Division in
the centre and the Fourth Division on the left had held their own
against a succession of attacks. The 8th and 9th Brigades drove off
the German infantry with their crushing rifle-fire, and endured as
best they might the shelling, which was formidable and yet very much
less severe than that to which the Fifth Division had been exposed.
In the case of the 7th Brigade (McCracken's) the village of Caudry,
which it defended, formed a salient, since the Fourth Division on the
left was thrown back. The attack upon this brigade from daylight
onwards was very severe, but the assailants could neither drive in
the line nor capture the village of Caudry. They attacked on both
flanks at short rifle range, inflicting and also enduring heavy
losses. In this part of the field the British guns held their own
easily against the German, the proportion of numbers being more equal
than on the right of the line.
Whilst the right flank was crumbling before the terrific
concentration of German guns, and while the centre was stoutly
holding its own, farther to the west, in the Haucourt-Ligny
direction, the Second German Army Corps was beating hard against
Snow's Fourth Division, which was thrown back to protect the left
flank of the Army, and to cover the Cambrai-Esnes road.
Hunter-Weston's 11th Brigade was on the right, south of Fontaine,
with Wilson's 12th upon its left, and Haldane's 10th in reserve at
Haucourt. As the German attack came from the left, or western flank,
the 12th Brigade received the {105} first impact. The artillery of
the division had not yet come up, and the 1st Royal Lancasters,
stretched in a turnip patch, endured for some time a severe fire
which cost them many casualties, including their Colonel Dykes, and
to which little reply could be made. There were no cavalry scouts in
front of the infantry, so that working parties and advanced posts
were cut up by sudden machine-gun fire. Some of the covering parties
both of the Lancasters and of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers were never
seen again. At about seven the British guns came up, the 14th
Brigade R.F.A. on the left, the 29th in the centre, and the 32nd on
the right, with the howitzers of the 37th behind the right centre on
the high ground near Selvigny. From this time onward they supported
the infantry in the most self-sacrificing way. The German infantry
advance began shortly afterwards, and was carried out by wave after
wave of men. A company of the 2nd Essex Regiment, under Captain
Vandeleur, upon the British left, having good cover and a clear field
of fire, inflicted very heavy losses on the Germans, though they were
finally overwhelmed, their leader having been killed. The 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers in the front line were also heavily attacked,
and held their own for several hours. About ten o'clock the pressure
was so great that the defence was driven in, and two battalions lost
their machine-guns, but a new line was formed in the Haucourt-Esnes
road, the retirement being skilfully covered by Colonel Anley, of the
Essex, and Colonel Griffin, of the Lancashire Fusiliers. There the
2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Royal Lancasters, the 2nd
Lancashire Fusiliers, and the 2nd Essex held firmly on until the
afternoon under very heavy and {106} incessant fire, while the 11th
Brigade upon their right were equally involved in the fight. Two
battalions of the 10th Brigade (Haldane's), the 1st Irish Fusiliers
and 2nd Seaforths, had dug themselves in on the high ground just
north of Selvigny and repulsed every attack, but two others, the 2nd
Dublins and 1st Warwicks, had got involved with the 12th Brigade and
could not be retrieved. The Signal Corps had not yet arrived, and
the result was that General Snow had the greatest difficulty in
ensuring his connections with his brigadiers, the orders being
carried by his staff officers. At two o'clock, as there was a lull
in the German advance, Wilson of the 12th Brigade made a spirited
counter-attack, recovering many of the wounded, but being finally
driven back to the old position by intense artillery and machine-gun
fire.
It is worth recording that during this advance the Essex men found
among the German dead many Jaeger with the same Gibraltar badge upon
their caps which they bore themselves. It was a Hanoverian battalion
who had been comrades with the old 56th in the defence of the
fortress one hundred and fifty years before.
[Sidenote: The fight for the quarries.]
The 11th Brigade (Hunter-Weston), on the right of the 12th, had
meanwhile played a very vital part in the fight. This brigade was
defending a position called Les Carrières, or the quarry pits, which
was east of Fontaine and to the north of the village of Ligny. It
was a desperate business, for the British were four times driven out
of it and four times came back to their bitter work amid a sleet of
shells and bullets. Parties of the 1st Somersets and of the 1st East
Lancashires held the quarries with the 1st {107} Hants and 1st Rifle
Brigade in immediate support, all being eventually drawn into the
fight. Major Bickman, of the latter regiment, distinguished himself
greatly in the defence, but was seriously wounded and left behind in
the final retirement. Besides incessant gun-fire, the defenders were
under infantry fire of a very murderous description from both flanks.
In spite of this, the place was held for six hours until the
retirement of the line in the afternoon caused it to be untenable, as
the enemy was able to get behind it. The brigade then fell back upon
Ligny under heavy shrapnel-fire, moving steadily and in good order.
The Germans at once attacked the village from the east and
north-east. Could they have taken it, they would have been upon the
flank of the British line of retirement. They were twice driven
back, however, by the fire of the infantry, losing very heavily upon
both occasions. About four o'clock, the Army being in full retreat,
the brigade received orders to abandon Ligny and march upon
Malincourt. The effect of a heavy shrapnel-fire was minimised by
this movement being carried out in small columns of fours. A loss of
30 officers and 1115 men in a single day's fighting showed how severe
had been the work of Hunter-Weston's brigade. The 12th Brigade had
also lost about a thousand men. Many of the guns had run short of
shells. A spectator has described how he saw the British gunners
under a heavy fire, sitting in gloomy groups round the guns which
they had neither the shells to work, nor the heart to abandon.
Such was the general fortune of the British left. At the extreme
edge of it, in the gap between the left of the Fourth Division and
the town of Cambrai, {108} Sordet's French cavalry had been fighting
to prevent the British wing from being turned. There was some
misconception upon this point at the time, but in justice to our Ally
it should be known that General Smith-Dorrien himself galloped to
this flank in the course of the afternoon and was a witness of the
efforts of the French troopers, who had actually marched 40 miles in
order to be present at the battle. The narrative has now taken the
movements of the left wing up to the point of its retirement, in
order to preserve the continuity of events in that portion of the
field, but the actual abandonment of their position by Snow's Fourth
Division was due to circumstances over which they had no control, and
which had occurred at a considerable distance. Both the centre and
the left of the Army could have held its own, though it must be
admitted that the attack to which they were exposed was a very
violent one gallantly pushed home.
All might have gone well had the Germans not been able to mass such
an overpowering artillery attack upon the right of the line. It was
shortly after mid-day that this part of the position began to weaken,
and observers from the centre saw stragglers retiring over the low
hill in the Le Cateau direction. At that hour the artillery upon the
right of the British line was mostly silenced, and large masses of
the German infantry were observed moving round the right flank. The
salient of the Suffolks was in the possession of the enemy, and from
it they could enfilade the line. It was no longer possible to bring
up ammunition or horses to the few remaining guns. The greater part
of the troops held on none the less most doggedly to their positions.
A steady downpour {109} of rain was a help rather than a discomfort,
as it enabled the men to moisten their parched lips. But the
situation of the Fifth Division was growing desperate. It was plain
that to remain where they were could only mean destruction. And yet
to ask the exhausted men to retire under such a rain of shells would
be a dangerous operation. Even the best troops may reach their
snapping point. Most of them had by the afternoon been under
constant shrapnel-fire for eight hours on end. Some were visibly
weakening. Anxious officers looked eagerly over their shoulders for
any sign of reinforcement, but an impassable gap separated them from
their comrades of the First Army Corps, who were listening with
sinking hearts to the rumble of the distant cannonade. There was
nothing for it but to chance the retirement. About three o'clock
commanders called to officers and officers to men for a last great
effort. It was the moment when a leader reaps in war the love and
confidence which he has sown in peace. Smith-Dorrien had sent his
meagre reserve, which consisted of one battery and two battalions, to
take up a rearguard position astride the Le Cateau-St. Quentin road.
Every available detail, that could pull a trigger, down to
Hildebrand's signallers of the Headquarters Staff, who had already
done wonderful work in their own particular line, were thrust into
the covering line. One by one the dishevelled brigades were drawn
off towards the south. One section of the heavy guns of the 108th
Heavy Battery was ordered back to act with two battalions of the 19th
Brigade in covering the Reumont-Maritz road, while the 1st Norfolks
were put in echelon behind the right flank for the same purpose.
{110}
[Sidenote: The splendid work of the British guns.]
The Fifth Division, with the 15th Brigade as rearguard, considerably
disorganised by its long hammering, retreated along the straight
Roman road via Maritz and Estrees. The Third Division fell back
through Berthy and Clary to Beaurevoir, the 9th Brigade forming a
rearguard. The cavalry, greatly helped by Sordet's French cavalry
upon the west, flung itself in front of the pursuit, while the guns
sacrificed themselves to save the retiring infantry. Every British
battery was an inferno of bursting shells, and yet every one fought
on while breech-block would shut or gunner could stand. Many
batteries were in the state of the 61st R.F.A., which fired away all
its own shells and then borrowed from the limbers of other
neighbouring batteries, the guns of which had been put out of action.
Had the artillery gone the Army would have gone. Had the Army gone
the Germans had a clear run into Paris. It has been said that on the
covering batteries of Wing, Milne, and Headlam may, on that wet
August afternoon, have hung the future history of Europe.
Wing's command included the 23rd, 30th, 40th, and 42nd Brigades, with
the 48th Heavy Battery; Headlam's were the 15th, 27th, 28th, and 8th,
with the 108th Heavy; Milne's, the 14th, 29th, 32nd, and 37th, with
the 31st Heavy. These numbers deserve to be recorded, for every gun
of them did great service, though many were left in ruins on the
field. Some, like those of the 37th R.F.A., were plucked from under
the very noses of the Germans, who were within a hundred yards of
them when they were withdrawn, a deed of valour for which Captain
Reynolds of that battery received the Cross. One by one those
batteries which could move were drawn off, the cavalry covering {111}
the manoeuvre by their rifle-fire, and sometimes man-handling the gun
from the field. Serving one day as charging cavaliers, another as
mounted infantry in covering a retreat, again as sappers in making or
holding a trench, or when occasion called for it as gun-teams to pull
on the trace of a derelict gun, the cavalry have been the general
utility men of the Army. The days of pure cavalry may have passed,
but there will never be a time when a brave and handy fighting man
who is mobile will not be invaluable to his comrades.
[Sidenote: Difficult retirement of the Fourth Division.]
It was about four o'clock that the Fourth Division, on the left
flank, who had been maintaining the successful defensive already
described, were ordered to begin their retirement. The 12th Brigade
was able to withdraw with no great difficulty along the line
Walincourt-Villiers-Vendhuile, reaching the latter village about
nine-thirty. The doings of the 11th Brigade have been already
described. There was considerable disintegration but no loss of
spirit. One of the regiments of the 12th, the 2nd Royal Lancasters,
together with about three hundred Warwicks, from the 10th Brigade,
and some detachments of other regiments, were by some mischance,
isolated in the village of Haucourt with no definite orders, and held
on until ten o'clock at night, when the place was nearly surrounded.
They fought their way out, however, in a most surprising fashion, and
eventually made good their retreat. One party, under Major Poole of
the Warwicks, rejoined the Army next day. Captain Clutterbuck, with
a small party of Royal Lancasters, wandered into Haumont after it was
occupied by the Germans. Summoned to surrender the gallant officer
refused, and was shot {112} dead, but his men charged with the
bayonet and fought their way clear to a post which was held by Major
Parker of the same regiment, to the immediate south of the village.
This officer, finding that he was the last rearguard, withdrew in the
face of heavy German forces. Being joined by Major Christie of the
Warwicks with 200 men, they followed the Army, and, finally, by a
mixture of good luck and good leadership, picked their way through
the German advance guards, and on the third day rejoined the colours
at Noyon.
Haldane's 10th Brigade had got split up during the confused fighting
of the day, half of it, the 1st Warwicks and 2nd Dublins, getting
involved with the 12th Brigade in the fighting on the Haucourt Ridge.
The other two battalions, the 2nd Seaforths and 1st Royal Irish
Fusiliers, kept guard as a reserve over the left flank of the
division. Towards evening General Haldane, finding it hopeless to
recover control of his lost regiments, collected the rest of his
brigade, and endeavoured to follow the general line of retreat. He
lost touch with the remainder of the Army, and might well have been
cut off, but after a most exhausting experience he succeeded in
safely rejoining the division at Roisel upon the 27th. It may be
said generally that the reassembling of the Fourth Division after the
disintegration they had experienced was a remarkable example of
individualism and determination.
It is impossible to doubt that the Germans, in spite of their
preponderating numbers, were staggered by the resistance which they
had encountered. In no other way can one explain the fact that their
pursuit, which for three days had been incessant, {113} should now,
at the most critical instant, have eased off. The cavalry and guns
staved off the final blow, and the stricken infantry staggered from
the field. The strain upon the infantry of the Fifth Division may be
gathered from the fact that up to this point they had lost, roughly,
143 officers, while the Third Division had lost 92 and the Fourth 70.
For the time they were disorganised as bodies, even while they
preserved their moral as individuals.
When extended formations are drawn rapidly in under the conditions of
a heavy action, it is often impossible to convey the orders to men in
outlying positions. Staying in their trenches and unconscious of the
departure of their comrades, they are sometimes gathered up by the
advancing enemy, but more frequently fall into the ranks of some
other corps, and remain for days or weeks away from their own
battalion, turning up long after they have helped to swell some list
of casualties. Regiments get intermingled and pour along the roads
in a confusion which might suggest a rout, whilst each single soldier
is actually doing his best to recover his corps. It is
disorganisation--but not demoralisation.
[Sidenote: The fate of the 1st Gordons.]
It has been remarked above that in the widespread formations of
modern battles it is difficult to be sure of the transmission of
orders. An illustration of such a danger occurred upon this
occasion, which gave rise to an aftermath of battle nearly as
disastrous as the battle itself. This was the episode which
culminated in the loss of a body of troops, including a large portion
of the 1st Gordon Highlanders. This distinguished corps had been
engaged with the rest of Beauchamp Doran's 8th Brigade at Mons and
again upon the following day, after which they {114} retreated with
the rest of their division. On the evening of the 25th they
bivouacked in the village of Audencourt, just south of the Cambrai-Le
Cateau highway, and on the morning of the 26th they found themselves
defending a line of trenches in front of this village. From nine
o'clock the Gordons held their ground against a persistent German
attack. About 3.30 an order was given for the battalion to retire.
This message only reached one company, which acted upon it, but the
messenger was wounded _en route_, and failed to reach battalion
headquarters. Consequently the remainder of the battalion did not
retire with the Army, but continued to hold its trenches, greatly
helped by the flank (D) Company of Royal Scots, until long after
nightfall, when the enemy in great force had worked round both of its
flanks. It should be understood that the withdrawal of the Royal
Scots was under direct order emanating from brigade headquarters, but
an officer of the Gordons, not knowing that such an order had been
issued, and perceiving that their flank would be exposed if D Company
left their trench, said a few words to them which had such an effect
upon their fiery souls that they rushed back to stand by the
Highlanders, their Captain being shot dead as he waved his men back
into their trench. From that time onwards this company of Royal
Scots, finely led by two young lieutenants, Graves and Graham Watson,
shared all the dangers and the ultimate fate of the Gordons, as did a
handful of Royal Irish upon the other flank. When it was dusk it
became clear to Colonel Gordon, who was now in command of the mixed
detachment, that he and his men were separated from the Army and
surrounded {115} on every side by the advancing Germans. At that
time the men, after supreme exertion for several days, had been in
action for twelve hours on end. He therefore decided, as against
annihilation in the morning, that retreat was the only course open.
The wounded were left in the trenches. The transport, machine-guns,
and horses had already been destroyed by the incessant shelling. The
detachment made a move towards the south, the operation being a most
difficult one in pitch darkness with the enemy within a few hundred
yards. The success attained in this initial stage was largely due to
the way in which the Master of Saltoun conveyed the orders which drew
in the flanks to the centre. Having made good the Audencourt-Caudry
road at 1 A.M. on August 27, the troops managed to traverse some
miles of road, with blazing villages all about them, and had a fair
chance of reaching safety when unfortunately at Montigny they took a
wrong turn, which brought them into Bertry which was held by the
Germans. Some confusion was caused by the latter challenging in
French. A confused fight followed in the darkness, in the course of
which many individual acts of great bravery and devotion were
performed. The enemy were now all round the Highlanders, and though
the struggle continued for fifty minutes, and there was no official
surrender, the little body of men was embedded in Von Kluck's army,
and no escape could be found. The utmost discipline and gallantry
were shown by all ranks. It must be some consolation to the
survivors to know that it is freely admitted that their resistance in
the trenches for so long a period undoubtedly facilitated the safe
withdrawal of the Third, and to some extent of the Fourth Divisions.
{116} Major Leslie Butler, Brigade-Major of the 8th Brigade, who had
made a gallant effort to ride to the Gordons and warn them of their
danger, was entangled among the Germans, and only succeeded six days
later in regaining the British lines.
[Sidenote: Results of the battle.]
So ended the perilous, costly, and almost disastrous action of Le
Cateau. The loss to the British Army, so far as it can be extracted
from complex figures and separated from the other losses of the
retreat, amounted to between seven and eight thousand killed,
wounded, and missing, while at the time of the action, or in the
immediate retreat, a considerable quantity of transport and
thirty-six field-pieces, mostly in splinters, were abandoned to the
enemy. It was an action which could hardly have been avoided, and
from which the troops were extricated on better terms than might have
been expected. It will always remain an interesting academic
question what would have occurred had it been possible for the First
Corps to line up with the rest of the Army. The enemy's
preponderance of artillery would probably have prevented a British
victory, and the strategic position would in any case have made it a
barren one, but at least the Germans would have been hard hit and the
subsequent retreat more leisurely. As it stood, it was an engagement
upon which the weaker side can look back without shame or dishonour.
One result of it was to give both the Army and the country increased
confidence in themselves and their leaders. Sir John French has
testified to the splendid qualities shown by the troops, while his
whole-hearted tribute to Smith-Dorrien, in which he said, "The saving
of the left wing of the Army could never have been accomplished
unless a commander of rare and unusual {117} coolness, intrepidity,
and determination had been present to personally conduct the
operation," will surely be endorsed by history.
It is difficult to exaggerate the strain which had been thrown upon
this commander. On him had fallen the immediate direction of the
action at Mons; on him also had been the incessant responsibility of
the retreat. He had, as has been shown in the narrative, been hard
at work all night upon the eve of the battle; he superintended that
trying engagement, he extricated his forces, and finally motored to
St. Quentin in the evening, went on to Noyon, reached it after
midnight, and was back with his Army in the morning, encouraging
every one by the magnetism of his presence. It was a very remarkable
feat of endurance.
[Sidenote: Exhaustion of the Army]
Exhausted as the troops were, there could be no halt or rest until
they had extricated themselves from the immediate danger. At the
last point of human endurance they still staggered on through the
evening and the night time, amid roaring thunder and flashing
lightning, down the St. Quentin road. Many fell from fatigue, and
having fallen, continued to sleep in ditches by the roadside,
oblivious of the racket around them. A number never woke until they
found themselves in the hands of the Uhlan patrols. Others slumbered
until their corps had disappeared, and then, regaining their senses,
joined with other straggling units so as to form bands, which
wandered over the country, and eventually reached the railway line
about Amiens with wondrous Bill Adams tales of personal adventures
which in time reached England, and gave the impression of complete
disaster. But the main body were, as a matter of fact, holding well
{118} together, though the units of infantry had become considerably
mixed and so reduced that at least four brigades, after less than a
week of war, had lost 50 per cent of their personnel. Many of the
men threw away the heavier contents of their packs, and others
abandoned the packs themselves, so that the pursuing Germans had
every evidence of a rout before their eyes. It was deplorable that
equipment should be discarded, but often it was the only possible
thing to do, for either the man had to be sacrificed or the pack.
Advantage was taken of a forked road to station an officer there who
called out, "Third Division right, Fifth Division left," which
greatly helped the reorganisation. The troops snatched a few hours
of rest at St. Quentin, and then in the breaking dawn pushed upon
their weary road once more, country carts being in many cases
commandeered to carry the lame and often bootless infantry. The
paved _chaussées_, with their uneven stones, knocked the feet to
pieces, and caused much distress to the tired men, which was
increased by the extreme heat of the weather.
In the case of some of the men the collapse was so complete that it
was almost impossible to get them on. Major Tom Bridges, of the 4th
Royal Irish Dragoons, being sent to round up and hurry forward 250
stragglers at St. Quentin, found them nearly comatose with fatigue.
With quick wit he bought a toy drum, and, accompanied by a man with a
penny whistle, he fell them in and marched them, laughing in all
their misery, down the high road towards Ham. When he stopped he
found that his strange following stopped also, so he was compelled to
march and play the whole way to Roupy. Thus by one man's compelling
{119} personality 250 men were saved for the Army. But such complete
collapse was rare. The men kept their _moral_. "Beneath the dirt
and grime and weariness I saw clear eyes and grim jaws even when the
men could hardly walk." So spoke Coleman, the gallant American
volunteer.
Up to now nothing had been seen of the French infantry, and the
exposed British force had been hustled and harried by Von Kluck's
great army without receiving any substantial support. This was
through no want of loyalty, but our gallant Allies were themselves
hard pressed. Sir John French had sent urgent representations,
especially to General Sordet, the leader of the cavalry operating
upon the western side, and he had, as already shown, done what he
could to screen Smith-Dorrien's flank. Now at last the retiring Army
was coming in touch with those supports which were so badly needed.
But before they were reached, on the morning of the 27th, the Germans
had again driven in the rearguard of the First Corps.
[Sidenote: The destruction of the 2nd Munsters.]
Some delay in starting had been caused that morning by the fact that
only one road was available for the whole of the transport, which had
to be sent on in advance. Hence the rearguard was exposed to
increased pressure. This rearguard consisted of the 1st Brigade.
The 2nd Munsters were the right battalion. Then came the 1st
Coldstream, the 1st Scots Guards, and the 1st Black Watch in reserve.
The front of the Munsters, as it faced round to hold back the too
pushful Germans, was from the north of Fesmy to Chapeau Rouge, but
Major Charrier, who was in command, finding no French at Bergues, as
he had been led to expect, sent B and D {120} Companies of Munsters
with one troop of the 15th Hussars to hold the cross-roads near that
place.
At about 12.30 a message reached Major Charrier to the effect that
when ordered to retire he should fall back on a certain line and act
as flank-guard to the brigade. He was not to withdraw his two
companies from Chapeau Rouge until ordered. The Germans were already
in force right on the top of the Irishmen, the country being a broken
one with high hedges which restricted the field of fire. A section
of guns of the 118th R.F.A. were served from the road about fifty
yards behind the line of the infantry. A desperate struggle ensued,
in the course of which the Munsters, suffering heavily, overlapped on
each flank, and utterly outnumbered, held on bravely in the hope of
help from the rest of the brigade. They did not know that a message
had already been dispatched to them to the effect that they should
come on, and that the other regiments had already done so. Still
waiting for the orders which never came, they fell back slowly
through Fesmy before the attack, until held up at a small village
called Etreux, where the Germans cut off their retreat. Meanwhile
the Brigadier, hearing that the Munsters were in trouble, gave orders
that the Coldstream should reinforce them. It was too late, however.
At Oisy Bridge the Guards picked up sixty men, survivors of C
Company. It was here at Oisy Bridge that the missing order was
delivered at 3 P.M., the cycle orderly having been held up on his
way. As there was no longer any sound of firing, the Coldstream and
remnant of Munsters retired, being joined some miles back by an
officer and some seventy men. Together with the transport guard this
brought the {121} total survivors of that fine regiment to 5 officers
and 206 men. All the rest had fought to the end and were killed,
wounded, or captured, after a most desperate resistance, in which
they were shot down at close quarters, making repeated efforts to
pierce the strong German force at Etreux. To their fine work and
that of the two lost guns and of a party of the 15th Hussars, under
Lieutenant Nicholson, who covered the retreat it may have been due
that the pursuit of the First Corps by the Germans from this moment
sensibly relaxed. Nine gallant Irish officers were buried that night
in a common grave. Major Charrier was twice wounded, but continued
to lead his men until a third bullet struck him dead, and deprived
the Army of a soldier whose career promised to be a brilliant one.
Among others who fell was Lieutenant Chute, whose masterly handling
of a machine-gun stemmed again and again the tide of the German
attack. One of the most vivid recollections of the survivors was of
this officer lying on his face in six inches of water--for the action
was partly fought in tropical rain--and declaring that he was having
"the time of his life." The moral both of this disaster and that of
the Gordons must be the importance of sending a message in duplicate,
or even in triplicate, where the withdrawal of a regiment is
concerned. This, no doubt, is a counsel of perfection under
practical conditions, but the ideal still remains.
[Sidenote: A cavalry fight.]
During the retreat of the First Corps its rear and right flank had
been covered by the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Chetwode). On August 28 the
corps was continuing its march towards La Fère and the cavalry found
itself near Cerizy. At this point the pursuing German horsemen came
into touch with it. At about {122} five in the afternoon three
squadrons of the enemy advanced upon one squadron of the Scots Greys,
which had the support of J Battery. Being fired at, the Germans
dismounted and attempted to advance upon foot, but the fire was so
heavy that they could make no progress and their led horses
stampeded. They retired, still on foot, followed up by a squadron of
the 12th Lancers on their flank. The remainder of the 12th Lancers,
supported by the Greys, rode into the dismounted dragoons with sword
and lance, killing or wounding nearly all of them. A section of guns
had fired over the heads of the British cavalry during the advance
into a supporting body of German cavalry, who retired, leaving many
dead behind them. The whole hostile force retreated northwards,
while the British cavalry continued to conform to the movements of
the First Corps. In this spirited little action the German regiment
engaged was, by the irony of fate, the 1st Guard Dragoons, Queen
Victoria's Own. The British lost 43 killed and wounded. Among the
dead were Major Swetenham and Captain Michell of the 12th Lancers.
Colonel Wormald of the same regiment was wounded. The excited
troopers rode back triumphantly between the guns of J Battery, the
cavalrymen exchanging cheers with the horse-gunners as they passed,
and brandishing their blood-stained weapons.
On the evening before this brisk skirmish, the flank-guards of the
British saw a considerable body of troops in dark clothing upon their
left, and shortly afterwards perceived the shell-bursts of a rapid
and effective fire over the pursuing German batteries. It was the
first contact with the advancing French. These men consisted of the
Sixty-first and Sixty-second {123} French Reserve Divisions, and were
the van of a considerable army under General D'Amade. From that
moment the British forces were at last enabled, after a week of
constant marching, covering sometimes a good thirty miles a day, and
four days of continual fighting against extreme odds, to feel that
they had reached a zone of comparative quiet.
[Sidenote: The news in Great Britain.]
The German cavalry still followed the Army upon its southerly march,
but there was no longer any fear of a disaster, for the main body of
the Army was unbroken, and the soldiers were rather exasperated than
depressed by their experience. On the Friday and Saturday, however,
August 28 and 29, considerable crowds of stragglers and fugitives,
weary and often weaponless, appeared upon the lines of communication,
causing the utmost consternation by their stories and their
appearance. Few who endured the mental anxiety caused in Great
Britain by the messages of Sunday, August 30, are likely to forget
it. The reports gave an enormous stimulus to recruiting, and it is
worthy of record and remembrance that, in the dark week which
followed before the true situation was clearly discerned, every
successive day brought as many recruits to the standards as are
usually gained in a year. Such was the rush of men that the
authorities, with their many preoccupations, found it very difficult
to deal with them. A considerable amount of hardship and discomfort
was the result, which was endured with good humour until it could be
remedied. It is to be noted in this connection that it was want of
arms which held back the new armies. He who compares the empty
arsenals of Britain with the huge extensions of Krupp's, undertaken
during the years before the war, will {124} find the final proof as
to which Power deliberately planned it.
To return to the fortunes of the men retreating from Le Cateau, the
colonels and brigadiers had managed to make order out of what was
approaching to chaos on the day that the troops left St. Quentin.
The feet of many were so cut and bleeding that they could no longer
limp along, so some were packed into a few trains available and
others were hoisted on to limbers, guns, wagons, or anything with
wheels, some carts being lightened of ammunition or stores to make
room for helpless men. In many cases the whole kits of the officers
were deliberately sacrificed. Many men were delirious from
exhaustion and incapable of understanding an order. By the evening
of the 27th the main body of the troops were already fifteen miles
south of the Somme river and canal, on the line Nesle-Ham-Flavy. All
day there was distant shelling from the pursuers, who sent their
artillery freely forward with their cavalry.
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{125}
[Illustration: Line of Retreat from Mons]
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On the 28th the Army continued its retreat to the line of the Oise
near Noyon. Already the troops were re-forming, and had largely
recovered their spirits, being much reassured by the declarations of
the officers that the retreat was strategic to get them in line with
the French, and that they would soon turn their faces northwards once
more. As an instance of reorganisation it was observed that the
survivors of a brigade of artillery which had left its horses and
guns at Le Cateau still marched together as a single disciplined unit
among the infantry. All day the enemy's horse artillery, cavalry,
and motor-infantry hung on the skirts of the British, but were unable
to make much impression. The work of the Staff was excellent, for
{126} it is on record that many of them had not averaged two hours'
sleep in the twenty-four for over a week, and still they remained the
clear and efficient brain of the Army.
On the next day, the 29th, the remainder of the Army got across the
Oise, but the enemy's advance was so close that the British cavalry
was continually engaged. Gough's 3rd Cavalry Brigade made several
charges in the neighbourhood of Plessis, losing a number of men but
stalling off the pursuit and dispersing the famous Uhlans of the
Guard. On this day General Pulteney and his staff arrived to take
command of the Third Army Corps, which still consisted only of the
Fourth Division (Snow) with the semi-independent 19th Infantry
Brigade, now commanded by Colonel Ward, of the 1st Middlesex. It was
nearly three weeks later before the Third Corps was made complete.
[Sidenote: The views of General Joffre.]
There had been, as already mentioned, a French advance of four corps
in the St. Quentin direction, which fought a brave covering action,
and so helped to relieve the pressure upon the British. It cannot be
denied that there was a feeling among the latter that they had been
unduly exposed, being placed in so advanced a position and having
their flank stripped suddenly bare in the presence of the main German
army. General Joffre must have recognised that this feeling existed
and that it was not unreasonable, for he came to a meeting on this
day at the old Napoleonic Palace at Compiégne, at which Sir John
French, with Generals Haig, Smith-Dorrien, and Allenby, was present.
It was an assemblage of weary, overwrought men, and yet of men who
had strength enough of mind and sufficient sense of justice to
realise that whatever {127} weight had been thrown upon them, there
was even more upon the great French engineer whose spirit hovered
over the whole line from Verdun to Amiens. Each man left the room
more confident of the immediate future. Shortly afterwards Joffre
issued his kindly recognition of the work done by his Allies,
admitting in the most handsome fashion that the flank of the long
French line of armies had been saved by the hard fighting and
self-sacrifice of the British Army.
On August 30, the whole Army having crossed the Oise, the bridges
over that river were destroyed, an operation which was performed
under a heavy shell-fire, and cost the lives of several sapper
officers and men. No words can exaggerate what the Army owed to
Wilson's sappers of the 56th and 57th Field Companies and 3rd Signal
Company, as also to Tulloch's, of the 17th and 59th Companies and 5th
Signal Company, whose work was incessant, fearless, and splendid.
The Army continued to fall back on the line of the Aisne, the general
direction being almost east and west through Crépy-en-Valois. The
aeroplanes, which had conducted a fine service during the whole of
the operations, reported that the enemy was still coming rapidly on,
and streaming southwards in the Compiégne direction. That they were
in touch was shown in dramatic fashion upon the early morning of
September 1. The epic in question deserves to be told somewhat
fully, as being one of those incidents which are mere details in the
history of a campaign, and yet may live as permanent inspirations in
the life of an army.
[Sidenote: Battery L.]
The 1st Cavalry Brigade, greatly exhausted after screening the
retreat so long, was encamped near Nery, {128} to the south of
Compiégne, the bivouac being a somewhat extended one. Two units were
close to each other and to the brigade headquarters of General
Briggs. These were the hard-worked 2nd Dragoon Guards (the Bays) and
L Battery of Horse Artillery. _Réveillé_ was at four o'clock, and
shortly after that hour both troopers and gunners were busy in
leading their horses to water. It was a misty morning, and, peering
through the haze, an officer perceived that from the top of a low
hill about seven hundred yards away three mounted men were looking
down upon them. They were the observation officers of three four-gun
German batteries. Before the British could realise the situation the
guns dashed up and came into action with shrapnel at point-blank
range. The whole twelve poured their fire into the disordered
bivouac before them. The slaughter and confusion were horrible.
Numbers of the horses and men were killed or wounded, and three of
the guns were dismounted. It was a most complete surprise, and
promised to be an absolute disaster. A body of German cavalry had
escorted the guns, and their rifles added to the volume of fire.
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{129}
[Illustration: "L" Battery Action, Sept. 1st, 1914]
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It is at such moments that the grand power of disciplined valour
comes to bring order out of chaos. Everything combined to make
defence difficult--the chilling hour of the morning, the suddenness
of the attack, its appalling severity, and the immediate loss of guns
and men. A sunken road ran behind the British position, and from the
edge of this the dismounted cavalrymen brought their rifles and their
machine-gun into action. They suffered heavily from the pelting
gusts of shrapnel. Young Captain de Crespigny, the gallant cadet of
a gallant family, {130} and many other good men were beaten down by
it. The sole hope lay in the guns. Three were utterly disabled.
There was a rush of officers and men to bring the other three into
action. Sclater-Booth, the major of the battery, and one lieutenant
were already down. Captain Bradbury took command and cheered on the
men. Two of the guns were at once put out of action, so all united
to work the one that remained. What followed was Homeric.
Lieutenant Giffard in rushing forward was hit in four places.
Bradbury's leg was shattered, but he lay beside the trail encouraging
the others and giving his directions. Lieutenant Mundy, standing
wide as observation officer, was mortally wounded. The limber could
not be got alongside and the shell had to be man-handled. In
bringing it up Lieutenant Campbell was shot. Immediately afterwards
another shell burst over the gun, killed the heroic Bradbury, and
wounded Sergeant Dorell, Driver Osborne, and Gunners Nelson and
Derbyshire, the only remaining men. But the fight went on. The
bleeding men served the gun so long as they could move, Osborne and
Derbyshire crawling over with the shells while Nelson loaded and
Dorell laid. Osborne and Derbyshire fainted from loss of blood and
lay between limber and gun. But the fight went on. Dorell and
Nelson, wounded and exhausted, crouched behind the shield of the
thirteen-pounder and kept up an incessant fire. Now it was that the
amazing fact became visible that all this devotion had not been in
vain. The cluster of Bays on the edge of the sunken road burst out
into a cheer, which was taken up by the staff, who, with General
Briggs himself, had come into the firing-line. Several of the German
pieces had gone out of action. {131} The dying gun had wrought good
work, as had the Maxim of the Bays in the hands of Lieutenant Lamb.
Some at least of its opponents had been silenced before the two brave
gunners could do no more, for their strength had gone with their
blood. Not only had the situation been saved, but victory had been
assured.
About eight in the morning news of the perilous situation had reached
the 19th Brigade. The 1st Middlesex, under Colonel Rowley, was
hurried forward, followed by the 1st Scottish Rifles. Marching
rapidly upon the firing, after the good old maxim, the Middlesex
found themselves in a position to command the German batteries.
After two minutes of rapid fire it was seen that the enemy had left
their guns. Eight guns were captured, two of them still loaded.
About a dozen German gunners lay dead or wounded round them.
Twenty-five of the escort were captured, as was an ambulance with
some further prisoners a mile in the rear. The cavalry, notably the
11th Hussars, endeavoured to follow up the success, but soon found
themselves in the presence of superior forces. New wheels and new
wheelers were found for the injured guns, and Battery L came intact
out of action--intact save for the brave acolytes who should serve
her no more. Bradbury, Nelson, and Dorell had the Victoria Cross,
and never was it better earned. The battery itself was recalled to
England to refit and the guns were changed for new ones. It is safe
to say that for many a long year these shrapnel-dinted
thirteen-pounders will serve as a monument of one of those deeds
which, by their self-sacrifice and nobility, do something to mitigate
the squalors and horrors of war.
The success was gained at the cost of many valuable {132} lives. Not
only had the personnel of the battery been destroyed, but the Bays
lost heavily, and there were some casualties among the rest of the
brigade who had come up in support. The 5th Dragoon Guards had 50 or
60 casualties, and lost its admirable commander, Colonel Ansell, who
was shot down in a flanking movement which he had initiated. Major
Cawley, of the staff, also fell. The total British loss was not far
short of 500 killed and wounded, but the Germans lost heavily also,
and were compelled to abandon their guns.[1]
[1] The German cavalry were the Fourth Cavalry Division, including
the 2nd Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans, 17th and 18th Dragoons. They
published in their losses for the "Combat of Néry" 643 casualties.
This is not the complete loss, as the artillery does not seem to have
been included.
[Sidenote: The action of Villars-Cotteret.]
The German advance guards were particularly active upon this day,
September 1, the anniversary of Sedan. Although the Soissons Bridge
had been destroyed they had possession of another at Vic, and over
this they poured in pursuit of the First Corps, overtaking about 8
A.M. near Villars-Cotteret the rearguard, consisting of the Irish
Guards and the 2nd Coldstream. The whole of the 4th Guards Brigade
was drawn into the fight, which resolved itself into a huge rifle
duel amid thick woods, Scott-Kerr, their Brigadier, riding up and
down the firing line. The Guards retired slowly upon the 6th
Infantry Brigade (Davies), which was aided by Lushington's 41st
Brigade of Artillery, just south of Pisseleux. The Germans had
brought up many guns, but could make no further progress, and the
British position was held until 6 P.M., when the rearguard closed up
with the rest of the Army. Lushington's guns had fought with no
infantry in front of them, and it was a matter of great difficulty in
the end to get them off, but it was {133} accomplished by some very
brilliant work under an infernal fire. After this sharp action, in
which Colonel Morris of the Irish Guards lost his life, the retreat
of the First Army Corps was not seriously interfered with. The
losses at that date in this corps amounted to 81 officers and 2180 of
all ranks.
So much attention is naturally drawn to the Second Army Corps, which
both at Mons and at Le Cateau had endured most of the actual
fighting, that there is some danger of the remarkable retreat
effected by the First Corps having less than its fair share of
appreciation. The actual fighting was the least of the difficulties.
The danger of one or both flanks being exposed, the great mobility of
the enemy, the indifferent and limited roads, the want of rest, the
difficulty of getting food cooked, the consequent absolute exhaustion
of the men, and the mental depression combined to make it an
operation of a most trying character, throwing an enormous strain
upon the judgment and energy of General Haig, who so successfully
brought his men intact and fit for service into a zone of safety.
[Sidenote: Reunion of the Army.]
On the night of September 1, the First and Second Army Corps were in
touch once more at Betz, and were on the move again by 2 A.M. upon
the 2nd. On this morning the German advance was curiously
interlocked with the British rear, and four German guns were picked
up by the cavalry near Ermenonville. They are supposed to have been
the remaining guns of the force which attacked Battery L at Nery.
The movements of the troops during the day were much impeded by the
French refugees, who thronged every road in their flight before the
German terror. In spite of these obstructions, the rearward services
{134} of the Army--supply columns, ammunition columns, and medical
transport--were well conducted, and the admiration of all independent
observers. The work of all these departments had been greatly
complicated by the fact that, as the Channel ports were now
practically undefended and German troops, making towards the coast,
had cut the main Calais-Boulogne line at Amiens, the base had been
moved farther south from Havre to St. Nazaire, which meant shifting
seventy thousand tons of stores and changing all arrangements. In
spite of this the supplies were admirable. It may safely be said
that if there is one officer more than another for whom the whole
British Army felt a glow of gratitude, it was for Sir William
Robertson, the Chief of the Commissariat, who saw that the fighting
man was never without his rations. Greatly also did they appreciate
the work of his subordinates, who, wet or fine, through rainfall or
shell-fall, passed the food forward to the weary men at the front.
A difficult movement lay in front of the Army which had to cross the
Marne, involving a flank march in the face of the enemy. A
retirement was still part of the general French scheme of defence,
and the British Army had to conform to it, though it was exultantly
whispered from officer to sergeant and from sergeant to private that
the turn of the tide was nearly due. On this day it was first
observed that the Germans, instead of pushing forward, were swinging
across to the east in the direction of Chateau-Thierry. This made
the task of the British a more easy one, and before evening they were
south of the Marne and had blown up the bridges. The movement of the
Germans brought them down to the river, {135} but at a point some ten
miles east of the British position. They were reported to be
crossing the river at La Ferté, and Sir John French continued to fall
back towards the Seine, moving after sundown, as the heat had been
for some days very exhausting. The troops halted in the
neighbourhood of Presles, and were cheered by the arrival of some
small drafts, numbering about 2000, a first instalment towards
refilling the great gaps in the ranks, which at this date could not
have been less than from 12,000 to 15,000 officers and men. Here for
a moment this narrative may be broken, since it has taken the Army to
the farthest point of its retreat and reached that moment of advance
for which every officer and man, from Sir John French to the
drummer-boys, was eagerly waiting. With their left flank resting
upon the extreme outer forts of Paris, the British troops had finally
ended a retreat which will surely live in military history as a
remarkable example of an army retaining its cohesion and courage in
the presence of an overpowering adversary, who could never either cut
them off or break in their rearguard. The British Army was a small
force when compared with the giants of the Continent, but when tried
by this supreme test it is not mere national complacency for us to
claim that it lived up to its own highest traditions. "It was not to
forts of steel and concrete that the Allies owed their strength,"
said a German historian, writing of this phase of the war, "but to
the magnificent qualities of the British Army." We desire no
compliments at the expense of our brothers-in-arms, nor would they be
just, but at least so generous a sentence as this may be taken as an
advance from that contemptuous view of the British Army with which
the campaign had begun.
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Before finally leaving the consideration of this historical retreat,
where a small army successfully shook itself clear from the long and
close pursuit of a remarkably gallant, mobile, and numerous enemy, it
may be helpful to give a chronology of the events, that the reader
may see their relation to each other.
HAIG'S FIRST CORPS. SMITH-DORRIEN'S SECOND CORPS.
_August_ 22.
Get into position to the Get into position to the
east of Mons, covering the west of Mons, covering the
line Mons-Bray. line Mons-Condé.
_August_ 23.
Artillery engagement, but Strongly attacked by Von
no severe attack. Ordered Kluck's army. Ordered to
to retreat in conformity with abandon position and fall
Second Corps. back.
_August_ 24.
Retreat with no serious Retreat followed up by the
molestation upon Bavai. Germans. Severe rearguard
Here the two Corps diverged actions at Dour, Wasmes,
and did not meet again till Frameries. Corps shook
they reached Betz upon itself clear and fell back on
September 1. Bavai.
_August_ 25.
Marching all day. Overtaken Marching all day. Reinforced
in evening at Landrecies by Fourth Division.
and Maroilles by the German Continual rearguard action
pursuit. Sharp fighting. becoming more serious towards
evening, when Cambrai-Le Cateau
line was reached.
_August_ 26.
Rearguard actions in morning. Battle of Le Cateau. German
Marching south all day, pursuit stalled off at
halting at the Venerolles heavy cost of men and guns.
line. Retreat on St. Quentin.
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_August_ 27.
Rearguard action in which Marching south. Reach
Munsters lost heavily. the line Nesle-Ham-Flavy.
Marching south all day.
_August_ 28.
Cavalry actions to stop Marching south, making
German pursuit. Marching for the line of the Oise near
south on La Fere. Noyon. Light rearguard
skirmishes.
_August_ 29, 30, and 31.
Marching on the line of the Crossed Oise. Cavalry
Aisne, almost east and west. continually engaged. General
direction through
Crépy-en-Valois.
_September_ 1.
Sharp action at Nery with Retreat upon Paris continued.
German vanguard. Later in Late this night the
the day considerable infantry two Corps unite once more at
action at Villars-Cotteret. Betz.
Unite at Betz.
_September_ 2.
Crossed the Marne and began Crossed the Marne and began
to fall back on the Seine. to fall back on the Seine.
Halted near Presles.
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