THE BATTLE OF MONS
The landing of the British in France--The British leaders--The
advance to Mons--The defence of the bridges of Nimy--The holding of
the canal--The fateful telegram--The rearguard actions of Frameries,
Wasmes, and Dour--The charge of the Lancers--The fate of the
Cheshires--The 7th Brigade at Solesmes--The Guards in action--The
Germans' rude awakening--The Connaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre.
[Sidenote: The landing of the British in France]
The bulk of the British Expeditionary Force passed over to France
under cover of darkness on the nights of August 12 and 13, 1914. The
movement, which included four infantry divisions and a cavalry
division, necessitated the transportation of approximately 90,000
men, 15,000 horses, and 400 guns. It is doubtful if so large a host
has ever been moved by water in so short a time in all the annals of
military history. There was drama in the secrecy and celerity of the
affair. Two canvas walls converging into a funnel screened the
approaches to Southampton Dock. All beyond was darkness and mystery.
Down this fatal funnel passed the flower of the youth of Britain, and
their folk saw them no more. They had embarked upon the great
adventure of the German War. The crowds in the streets saw the last
serried files vanish into the darkness of the docks, heard the
measured tramp upon the stone quays dying farther {51} away in the
silence of the night, until at last all was still and the great
steamers were pushing out into the darkness.
No finer force for technical efficiency, and no body of men more
hot-hearted in their keen desire to serve their country, have ever
left the shores of Britain. It is a conservative estimate to say
that within four months a half of their number were either dead or in
the hospitals. They were destined for great glory, and for that
great loss which is the measure of their glory.
Belated pedestrians upon the beach of the southern towns have
recorded their impression of that amazing spectacle. In the clear
summer night the wall of transports seemed to stretch from horizon to
horizon. Guardian warships flanked the mighty column, while swift
shadows shooting across the surface of the sea showed where the
torpedo-boats and scouts were nosing and ferreting for any possible
enemy. But far away, hundreds of miles to the north, lay the real
protection of the flotilla, where the smooth waters of the Heligoland
Bight were broken by the sudden rise and dip of the blockading
periscopes.
It is well to state, once for all, the composition of this force, so
that in the succeeding pages, when a brigade or division is under
discussion, the diligent reader may ascertain its composition. This,
then, is the First Army which set forth to France. Others will be
chronicled as they appeared upon the scene of action. It may be
remarked that the formation of units was greatly altered with the
progress of the campaign, so that it has been possible without
indiscretion to raise the veil of secrecy which was once so essential.
{52}
THE FIRST ARMY CORPS--GENERAL HAIG
DIVISION I.
General LOMAX.
1_st Infantry Brigade--General Maxse_.
1st Coldstream Guards.
1st Scots Guards.
1st Black Watch.
2nd Munster Fusiliers.
2_nd Infantry Brigade--General Bulfin_.
2nd Sussex.
1st N. Lancs.
1st Northampton.
2nd K.R. Rifles.
3_rd Infantry Brigade--General Landon_.
1st West Surrey (Queen's).
1st S. Wales Borderers.
1st Gloucester.
2nd Welsh.
_Artillery--Colonel Findlay_.
25th Brig. R.F.A. 113, 114, 115.
26th Brig. R.F.A. 116, 117, 118.
39th Brig. R.F.A. 46, 51, 54.
43rd (How.) Brig. R.F.A. 30, 40, 57.
_Engineers--Colonel Schreiber_.
23 F. Co.
26 F. Co.
1 Signal Co.
DIVISION II.
General Munro.
4_th Infantry Brigade--General Scott-Kerr_.
2nd Grenadier Guards.
2nd Coldstream Guards.
3rd Coldstream Guards.
1st Irish.
5_th Infantry Brigade--General Haking_.
2nd Worcester.
2nd Ox. and Bucks L.I.
2nd Highland L.I.
2nd Connaught Rangers.
6_th Infantry Brigade--General Davies_.
1st Liverpool (King's).
2nd S. Stafford.
1st Berks.
1st K.R. Rifles.
_Artillery--General Perceval_.
34th Brig. R.F.A. 22, 50, 70.
36th Brig. R.F.A. 15, 48, 71.
41st Brig. R.F.A. 9, 16, 17.
How. Brig. R.F.A. 47, 56, 60.
35th Batt. R.G.A.
R.E. 5, 11, Field Cos.
THE SECOND ARMY CORPS--GENERAL SMITH-DORRIEN
DIVISION III.
General HAMILTON.
7_th Infantry Brigade--General McCracken_.
3rd Worcester.
2nd S. Lancs.
1st Wilts.
2nd Irish Rifles.
8_th Infantry Brigade--General B. Doran_.
2nd Royal Scots.
2nd Royal Irish.
4th Middlesex.
1st Gordon Highlanders.
9_th Infantry Brigade--General Shaw_.
1st North. Fusiliers.
4th Royal Fusiliers.
1st Lincoln.
1st Scots Fusiliers.
_Artillery--General Wing_.
23rd Brigade 107, 108, 109.
30th Brigade (How.) 128, 129, 130.
40th Brigade 6, 23, 49.
42nd Brigade 29, 41, 45.
48th Batt. R.G.A.
_R.E.--Colonel Wilson_.
56, 57 F. Corps.
3 Signal Co.
DIVISION V.
General FERGUSON.
13_th Infantry Brigade--General Cuthbert_.
2nd K.O. Scot. Bord.
2nd West Riding.
1st West Kent.
2nd Yorks. Light Infantry.
14_th Infantry Brigade--General Holt_.
2nd Suffolk.
1st East Surrey.
1st D. of Cornwall's L.T.
2nd Manchester.
15_th Infantry Brigade--General Gleichen_.
1st Norfolk.
1st Bedford.
1st Cheshire.
1st Dorset.
_Artillery--General Headlam_.
15th Brig. R.F.A. 11, 52, 80
27th Brig. R.F.A. 119, 120, 121
28th Brig. R.F.A. 122, 123, 124
8 How. Brig. 37, 61, 65.
Heavy G.A. 108 Battery,
_R.E.--Colonel Tulloch_.
17th and 59th Field Cos.
5 Signal Co.
The Cavalry consisted of four Brigades forming the first cavalry
division, and one extra Brigade. They were made up thus:
1st Cavalry Brigade (Briggs).--2nd and 5th Dragoon Guards; 11th
Hussars.
2nd Cavalry Brigade (De Lisle).--4th Dragoon Guards; 9th Lancers;
18th Hussars
3rd Cavalry Brigade (Gough).--4th Hussars; 5th Lancers; 16th Lancers.
4th Cavalry Brigade (Bingham).--3rd Hussars; 6th Dragoon Guards;
Comp. Guards Re.
5th Cavalry Brigade (Chetwode).--Scots Greys; 12th Lancers; 20th
Hussars.
D, E, I, J, and L batteries of Horse Artillery were attached to these
Brigades.
{53}
Such was the Army which first set forth to measure itself against the
soldiers of Germany. Prussian bravery, capacity, and organising
power had a high reputation among us, and yet we awaited the result
with every confidence, if the odds of numbers were not overwhelming.
It was generally known that during the period since the last war the
training of the troops had greatly progressed, and many of the men,
with nearly all the senior officers, had had experience in the
arduous campaign of South Africa. They could also claim those
advantages which volunteer troops may hope to have over conscripts.
At the same time there was no tendency to underrate the earnest
patriotism of our opponents, and we were well aware that even the
numerous Socialists who filled their ranks were persuaded, incredible
as it may seem, that the Fatherland was really attacked, and were
whole-hearted in its defence.
The crossing was safely effected. It has always been the traditional
privilege of the British public to grumble at their public servants
and to speak of "muddling through" to victory. No doubt the
criticism has often been deserved. But on this occasion the
supervising General in command, the British War Office, and the Naval
Transport Department all rose to a supreme degree of excellence in
their arrangements. So too did the Railway Companies concerned. The
details were meticulously correct. Without the loss of man, horse,
or gun, the soldiers who had seen the sun set in Hampshire saw it
rise in Picardy or in Normandy. Boulogne and Havre were the chief
ports of disembarkation, but many, including the cavalry, went up the
Seine and came ashore at Rouen. The soldiers everywhere received a
rapturous {54} welcome from the populace, which they returned by a
cheerful sobriety of behaviour. The admirable precepts as to wine
and women set forth in Lord Kitchener's parting orders to the Army
seem to have been most scrupulously observed. It is no slight upon
the gallantry of France--the very home of gallantry--if it be said
that she profited greatly at this strained, over-anxious time by the
arrival of these boisterous over-sea Allies. The tradition of
British solemnity has been for ever killed by these jovial invaders.
It is probable that the beautiful tune, and even the paltry words of
"Tipperary," will pass into history as the marching song, and often
the death-dirge, of that gallant host. The dusty, poplar-lined roads
resounded with their choruses, and the quiet Picardy villages
re-echoed their thunderous and superfluous assurances as to the state
of their hearts. All France broke into a smile at the sight of them,
and it was at a moment when a smile meant much to France.
[Sidenote: The British leaders.]
Whilst the various brigades were with some deliberation preparing for
an advance up-country, there arrived at the Gare du Nord in Paris a
single traveller who may be said to have been the most welcome
British visitor who ever set foot in the city. He was a short, thick
man, tanned by an outdoor life, a solid, impassive personality with a
strong, good-humoured face, the forehead of a thinker above it, and
the jaw of an obstinate fighter below. Overhung brows shaded a pair
of keen grey eyes, while the strong, set mouth was partly concealed
by a grizzled moustache. Such was John French, leader of cavalry in
Africa and now Field-Marshal commanding the Expeditionary Forces of
Britain. His defence of Colesberg at {55} a critical period when he
bluffed the superior Boer forces, his dashing relief of Kimberley,
and especially the gallant way in which he had thrown his exhausted
cavalry across the path of Cronje's army in order to hold it while
Roberts pinned it down at Paardeberg, were all exploits which were
fresh in the public mind, and gave the soldiers confidence in their
leader.
French might well appreciate the qualities of his immediate
subordinates. Both of his army corps and his cavalry division were
in good hands. Haig, like his leader, was a cavalry man by
education, though now entrusted with the command of the First Army
Corps, and destined for an ever-increasing European reputation.
Fifty-four years of age, he still preserved all his natural energies,
whilst he had behind him long years of varied military experience,
including both the Soudanese and the South African campaigns, in both
of which he had gained high distinction. He had the advantage of
thoroughly understanding the mind of his commander, as he had worked
under him as Chief of the Staff in his remarkable operations round
Colesberg in those gloomy days which opened the Boer War.
The Second Army Corps sustained a severe loss before ever it reached
the field of action, for its commander, General Grierson, died
suddenly of heart failure in the train between Havre and Rouen upon
August 18. Grierson had been for many years Military Attaché in
Berlin, and one can well imagine how often he had longed to measure
British soldiers against the self-sufficient critics around him. At
the very last moment the ambition of his lifetime was denied him.
His place, however, was worthily filled by General Smith-Dorrien,
another South African {56} veteran whose brigade in that difficult
campaign had been recognised as one of the very best. Smith-Dorrien
was a typical Imperial soldier in the world-wide character of his
service, for he had followed the flag, and occasionally preceded it,
in Zululand, Egypt, the Soudan, Chitral, and the Tirah before the
campaign against the Boers. A sportsman as well as a soldier, he had
very particularly won the affections of the Aldershot division by his
system of trusting to their honour rather than to compulsion in
matters of discipline. It was seldom indeed that his confidence was
abused.
Haig and Smith-Dorrien were the two generals upon whom the immediate
operations were to devolve, for the Third Army Corps was late,
through no fault of its own, in coming into line. There remained the
Cavalry Division commanded by General Allenby, who was a column
leader in that great class for mounted tactics held in South Africa a
dozen years before. It is remarkable that of the four leaders in the
initial operations of the German War--French, Smith-Dorrien, Haig,
and Allenby--three belonged to the cavalry, an arm which has usually
been regarded as active and ornamental rather than intellectual.
Pulteney, the commander of the Third Army Corps, was a product of the
Guards, a veteran of much service and a well-known heavy-game shot.
Thus, neither of the more learned corps were represented among the
higher commanders upon the actual field of battle, but brooding over
the whole operations was the steadfast, untiring brain of Joffre,
whilst across the water the silent Kitchener, remorseless as Destiny,
moved the forces of the Empire to the front. The last word in each
case lay with the sappers.
{57}
The general plan of campaign was naturally in the hands of General
Joffre, since he was in command of far the greater portion of the
Allied Force. It has been admitted in France that the original
dispositions might be open to criticism, since a number of the French
troops had engaged themselves in Alsace and Lorraine, to the
weakening of the line of battle in the north, where the fate of Paris
was to be decided. It is small profit to a nation to injure its
rival ever so grievously in the toe when it is itself in imminent
danger of being stabbed to the heart. A further change in plan had
been caused by the intense sympathy felt both by the French and the
British for the gallant Belgians, who had done so much and gained so
many valuable days for the Allies. It was felt that it would be
unchivalrous not to advance and do what was possible to relieve the
intolerable pressure which was crushing them. It was resolved,
therefore, to abandon the plan which had been formed, by which the
Germans should be led as far as possible from their base, and to
attack them at once. For this purpose the French Army changed its
whole dispositions, which had been formed on the idea of an attack
from the east, and advanced over the Belgian frontier, getting into
touch with the enemy at Namur and Charleroi, so as to secure the
passages of the Sambre. It was in fulfilling its part as the left of
the Allied line that on August 18 and 19 the British troops began to
move northwards into Belgium. The First Army Corps advanced through
Le Nouvion, St. Remy, and Maubeuge to Rouveroy, which is a village
upon the Mons-Chimay road. There it linked on to the right of the
Second Corps, which had moved up to the line of {58} the Condé-Mons
Canal. On the morning of Sunday, August 23, all these troops were in
position. The 5th Brigade of Cavalry (Chetwode's) lay out upon the
right front at Binche, but the remainder of the cavalry was brought
to a point about five miles behind the centre of the line, so as to
be able to reinforce either flank. The first blood of the land
campaign had been drawn upon August 22 outside Soignies, when a
reconnoitring squadron of the 4th Dragoon Guards under Captain Hornby
charged and overthrew a body of the 4th German Cuirassiers, bringing
back some prisoners. The 20th Hussars had enjoyed a similar
experience. It was a small but happy omen.
[Sidenote: The advance to Mons.]
The forces which now awaited the German attack numbered about 86,000
men, who may be roughly divided into 76,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry,
and 312 guns. The general alignment was as follows: The First Army
Corps held the space between Mons and Binche, which was soon
contracted to Bray as the eastward limit. Close to Mons, where the
attack was expected to break, since the town is a point of
considerable strategic importance, there was a thickening of the line
of defence. From that point the Third Division and the Fifth, in the
order named, carried on the British formation down the length of the
Mons-Condé Canal. The front of the Army covered nearly twenty miles,
an excessive strain upon so small a force in the presence of a
compact enemy.
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{59}
[Illustration: POSITION OF 2nd ARMY CORPS AT MONS. AUG. 23rd]
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If one looks at the general dispositions, it becomes clear that Sir
John French was preparing for an attack upon his right flank. From
all his information the enemy was to the north and to the east of
him, so that if they set about turning his position it must be from
the Charleroi direction. Hence, his right {60} wing was laid back at
an angle to the rest of his line, and the only cavalry which he kept
in advance was thrown out to Binche in front of this flank. The rest
of the cavalry was on the day of battle drawn in behind the centre of
the Army, but as danger began to develop upon the left flank it was
sent across in that direction, so that on the morning of the 24th it
was at Thulin, at the westward end of the line.
The line of the canal was a most tempting position to defend from
Condé to Mons, for it ran as straight as a Roman road across the path
of an invader. But it was very different at Mons itself. Here it
formed a most awkward loop. A glance at the diagram will show this
formation. It was impossible to leave it undefended, and yet troops
who held it were evidently subjected to a flanking artillery fire
from each side. The canal here was also crossed by at least three
substantial road bridges and one railway bridge. This section of the
defence was under the immediate direction of General Smith-Dorrien,
who at once took steps to prepare a second line of defence, thrown
back to the right rear of the town, so that if the canal were forced
the British array would remain unbroken. The immediate care of this
weak point in the position was committed to General Beauchamp Doran's
8th Brigade, consisting of the 2nd Royal Scots, 2nd Royal Irish, 4th
Middlesex, and 1st Gordon Highlanders. On their left, occupying the
village of Nimy and the western side of the peninsula, as well as the
immediate front of Mons itself, was the 9th Brigade (Shaw's),
containing the 4th Royal Fusiliers, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers,
and the 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers, together with the 1st Lincolns.
To the left of this brigade, occupying the eastern end of {61} the
Mons-Condé line of canal, was Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, containing the
2nd Scottish Borderers, 2nd West Ridings, 1st West Kents, and 2nd
Yorkshire Light Infantry. It was on these three brigades, and
especially on the 8th and 9th, that the impact of the German army was
destined to fall. Beyond them, scattered somewhat thinly along the
line of the Mons-Condé Canal from the railway bridge west of St.
Ghislain, were the two remaining brigades of the Fifth Division, the
14th (Rolt's) and the 15th (Gleichen's), the latter being in
divisional reserve. Still farther to the west the head of the newly
arrived 19th Brigade just touched the canal, and was itself in touch
with French cavalry at Condé. Sundry units of artillery and field
hospitals had not yet come up, but otherwise the two corps were
complete.
Having reached their ground, the troops, with no realisation of
immediate danger, proceeded to make shallow trenches. Their bands
had not been brought to the front, but the universal singing from one
end of the line to the other showed that the men were in excellent
spirits. Cheering news had come in from the cavalry, detachments of
which, as already stated, had ridden out as far as Soignies, meeting
advance patrols of the enemy and coming back with prisoners and
trophies. The guns were drawn up in concealed positions within half
a mile of the line of battle. All was now ready, and officers could
be seen on every elevation peering northwards through their glasses
for the first sign of the enemy. It was a broken country, with large
patches of woodland and green spaces between. There were numerous
slag-heaps from old mines, with here and there a factory and here and
there a private dwelling, but the sappers {62} had endeavoured in the
short time to clear a field of fire for the infantry. In order to
get this field of fire in so closely built a neighbourhood, several
of the regiments, such as the West Kents of the 13th and the
Cornwalls of the 14th Brigades, had to take their positions across
the canal with bridges in their rear. Thrilling with anticipation,
the men waited for their own first entrance upon the stupendous
drama. They were already weary and footsore, for they had all done
at least two days of forced marching, and the burden of the pack, the
rifle, and the hundred and fifty rounds per man was no light one.
They lay snugly in their trenches under the warm August sun and
waited. It was a Sunday, and more than one have recorded in their
letters how in that hour of tension their thoughts turned to the old
home church and the mellow call of the village bells.
A hovering aeroplane had just slid down with the news that the roads
from the north were alive with the advancing Germans, but the
estimate of the aviator placed them at two corps and a division of
cavalry. This coincided roughly with the accounts brought in by the
scouts and, what was more important, with the forecast of General
Joffre. Secure in the belief that he was flanked upon one side by
the 5th French Army, and on the other by a screen of French cavalry,
whilst his front was approached by a force not appreciably larger
than his own, General French had no cause for uneasiness. Had his
airmen taken a wider sweep to the north and west,[1] or had the
French commander among his many pressing {63} preoccupations been
able to give an earlier warning to his British colleague, the
trenches would, no doubt, have been abandoned before a grey coat had
appeared, and the whole Army brought swiftly to a position of
strategical safety. Even now, as they waited expectantly for the
enemy, a vast steel trap was closing up for their destruction.
[1] An American correspondent, Mr. Harding Davis, actually saw a
shattered British aeroplane upon the ground in this region. Its
destruction may have been of great strategic importance. This
aviator was probably the first British soldier to fall in the
Continental War.
Let us take a glance at what was going on over that northern horizon.
The American Powell had seen something of the mighty right swing
which was to end the combat. Invited to a conference with a German
general who was pursuing the national policy of soothing the United
States until her own turn should come round, Mr. Powell left Brussels
and chanced to meet Von Kluck's legions upon their western and
southerly trek. He describes with great force the effect upon his
mind of those endless grey columns, all flowing in the same
direction, double files of infantry on either side of the road, and
endless guns, motor-cars, cavalry, and transport between. The men,
as he describes them, were all in the prime of life, and equipped
with everything which years of forethought could devise. He was
dazed and awed by the tremendous procession, its majesty and its
self-evident efficiency. It is no wonder, for he was looking at the
chosen legions of the most wonderful army that the world had ever
seen--an army which represented the last possible word on the
material and mechanical side of war. High in the van a Taube
aeroplane, like an embodiment of that black eagle which is the
fitting emblem of a warlike and rapacious race, pointed the path for
the German hordes.
A day or two before, two American correspondents, {64} Mr. Irvin Cobb
and Mr. Harding Davis, had seen the same great army as it streamed
westwards through Louvain and Brussels. They graphically describe
how for three consecutive days and the greater part of three nights
they poured past, giving the impression of unconquerable energy and
efficiency, young, enthusiastic, wonderfully equipped. "Either we
shall go forward or we die. We do not expect to fall back ever. If
the generals would let them, the men would run to Paris instead of
walking there." So spoke one of the leaders of that huge invading
host, the main part of which was now heading straight for the British
line. A second part, unseen and unsuspected, were working round by
Tournai to the west, hurrying hard to strike in upon the British
flank and rear. The German is a great marcher as well as a great
fighter, and the average rate of progress was little less than thirty
miles a day.
It was after ten o'clock when scouting cavalry were observed falling
back. Then the distant sound of a gun was heard, and a few seconds
later a shell burst some hundreds of yards behind the British lines.
The British guns one by one roared into action. A cloud of smoke
rose along the line of the woods in front from the bursting shrapnel,
but nothing could be seen of the German gunners. The defending guns
were also well concealed. Here and there, from observation points
upon buildings and slag-heaps, the controllers of the batteries were
able to indicate targets and register hits unseen by the gunners
themselves. The fire grew warmer and warmer as fresh batteries
dashed up and unlimbered on either side. The noise was horrible, but
no enemy had been seen by the infantry, and little damage done.
{65}
But now an ill-omened bird flew over the British lines. Far aloft
across the deep blue sky skimmed the dark Taube, curved, turned, and
sailed northwards again. It had marked the shells bursting beyond
the trenches. In an instant, by some devilish cantrip of signal or
wireless, it had set the range right. A rain of shells roared and
crashed along the lines of the shallow trenches. The injuries were
not yet numerous, but they were inexpressibly ghastly. Men who had
hardly seen worse than a cut finger in their lives gazed with horror
at the gross mutilations around them. "One dared not look sideways,"
said one of them. Stretcher-bearers bent and heaved while wet, limp
forms were hoisted upwards by their comrades. Officers gave short,
sharp words of encouragement or advice. The minutes seemed very
long, and still the shells came raining down. The men shoved the
five-fold clips down into their magazines and waited with weary
patience. A senior officer peering over the end of a trench leaned
tensely forward and rested his glasses upon the grassy edge.
"They're coming!" he whispered to his neighbour. It ran from lip to
lip along the line of crouching men. Heads were poked up here and
there above the line of broken earth. Soon, in spite of the crashing
shells overhead, there was a fringe of peering faces. And there at
last in front of them was the German enemy. After all the centuries,
Briton and Teuton faced each other at last for the test of battle.
A stylist among letter-writers has described that oncoming swarm as
grey clouds drifting over green fields. They had deployed under
cover whilst the batteries were preparing their path, and now over an
extended front to the north-west of Mons they {66} were breaking out
from the woods and coming rapidly onwards. The men fidgeted with
their triggers, but no order came to fire. The officers were gazing
with professional interest and surprise at the German formations.
Were these the tactics of the army which had claimed to be the most
scientific in Europe? British observers had seen it in peace-time
and had conjectured that it was a screen for some elaborate tactics
held up for the day of battle. Yet here they were, advancing in what
in old Soudan days used to be described as the twenty-acre formation,
against the best riflemen in Europe. It was not even a shoulder to
shoulder column, but a mere crowd, shredding out in the front and
dense to the rear. There was nothing of the swiftly weaving lines,
the rushes of alternate companies, the twinkle and flicker of a
modern attack. It was mediaeval, and yet it was impressive also in
its immediate display of numbers and the ponderous insistence of its
onward flow. It was not many weeks before the stern lesson of war
taught very different formations to those of the grand Kaiser
manoeuvres.
The men, still fingering their triggers, gazed expectantly at their
officers, who measured intently the distance of the approaching
swarms. The Germans had already begun to fire in a desultory
fashion. Shrapnel was bursting thickly along the head of their
columns but they were coming steadily onwards. Suddenly a rolling
wave of independent firing broke out from the British position. At
some portions of the line the enemy were at eight hundred, at others
at one thousand yards. The men, happy in having something definite
to do, snuggled down earnestly to their work and fired swiftly but
deliberately into {67} the approaching mass. Rifles, machine-guns,
and field-pieces were all roaring together, while the incessant crash
of the shells overhead added to the infernal uproar. Men lost all
sense of time as they thrust clip after clip into their rifles. The
German swarms staggered on bravely under that leaden sleet. Then
they halted, vacillated, and finally thinned, shredded out, and
drifted backwards like a grey fog torn by a gale. The woods absorbed
them once again, whilst the rain of shells upon the British trenches
became thicker and more deadly.
There was a lull in the infantry attack, and the British, peering
from their shelters, surveyed with a grim satisfaction the patches
and smudges of grey which showed the effect of their fire. But the
rest was not a long one. With fine courage the German battalions
re-formed under the shelter of the trees, while fresh troops from the
rear pushed forward to stiffen the shaken lines. "Hold your fire!"
was the order that ran down the ranks. With the confidence bred of
experience, the men waited and still waited, till the very features
of the Germans could be distinguished. Then once more the deadly
fire rippled down the line, the masses shredded and dissolved, and
the fugitives hurried to the woods. Then came the pause under shell
fire, and then once again the emergence of the infantry, the attack,
the check, and the recoil. Such were the general characteristics of
the action at Mons over a large portion of the British line--that
portion which extended along the actual course of the canal.
It is not to be supposed, however, that there was a monotony of
attack and defence over the whole of the British position. A large
part of the force, {68} including the whole of the First Army Corps,
was threatened rather than seriously engaged, while the opposite end
of the line was also out of the main track of the storm. It beat
most dangerously, as had been foreseen, upon the troops to the
immediate west and north of Mons, and especially upon those which
defended the impossible peninsula formed by the loop of the canal.
[Sidenote: The defence of the bridges of Nimy.]
There is a road which runs from Mons due north through the village of
Nimy to Jurbise. The defences to the west of this road were in the
hands of the 9th Brigade. The 4th Royal Fusiliers, with the Scots
Fusiliers, were the particular battalions which held the trenches
skirting this part of the peninsula, while half the Northumberland
Fusiliers were on the straight canal to the westward. To the east of
Nimy are three road bridges--those of Nimy itself, Lock No. 5, and
Aubourg Station. All these three bridges were defended by the 4th
Middlesex, who had made shallow trenches which commanded them. The
Gordons were on their immediate right. The field of fire was much
interfered with by the mines and buildings which faced them, so that
at this point the Germans could get up unobserved to the very front.
It has also been already explained that the German artillery could
enfilade the peninsula from each side, making the defence most
difficult. A rush of German troops came between eleven and twelve
o'clock across the Aubourg Station Bridge. It was so screened up to
the moment of the advance that neither the rifles nor the
machine-guns of the Middlesex could stop it. It is an undoubted fact
that this rush was preceded by a great crowd of women and children,
through which the leading files of the {69} Germans could hardly be
seen. At the same time, or very shortly afterwards, the other two
bridges were forced in a similar manner, but the Germans in all three
cases as they reached the farther side were unable to make any rapid
headway against the British fire, though they made the position
untenable for the troops in trenches between the bridges. The whole
of the 8th Brigade, supported by the 2nd Irish Rifles from
McCracken's 7th Brigade, which had been held in reserve at Ciply,
were now fully engaged, covering the retirement of the Middlesex and
Gordons. At some points the firing between the two lines of infantry
was across the breadth of a road. Two batteries of the 40th
Artillery Brigade, which were facing the German attack at this point,
were badly mauled, one of them, the 23rd R.F.A., losing its gun
teams. Major Ingham succeeded in reconstituting his equipment and
getting his guns away.
It is well to accentuate the fact that though this was the point of
the most severe pressure there was never any disorderly retirement,
and strong reserves were available had they been needed. The 8th
Brigade, at the time of the general strategical withdrawal of the
Army, made its arrangements in a methodical fashion, and General
Doran kept his hold until after nightfall upon Bois la Haut, which
was an elevation to the east of Mons from which the German artillery
might have harassed the British retreat, since it commanded all the
country to the south. The losses of the brigade had, however, been
considerable, amounting to not less than three hundred and fifty in
the case of the 4th Middlesex, many being killed or wounded in the
defence, and some cut off in the trenches between the various
bridge-heads. Majors {70} Davey and Abell of the Middlesex were
respectively wounded and killed, with thirteen other officers.
It has already been said that the line of the 4th Royal Fusiliers
extended along the western perimeter up to Nimy Road Bridge, where
Colonel MacMahon's section ended and that of Colonel Hull, of the
Middlesex Regiment, began. To the west of this point was the Nimy
Railway Bridge, defended also by Captain Ashburner's company of the
4th Royal Fusiliers. This was assaulted early, and was held for
nearly five hours against an attack of several German battalions.
The British artillery was unable to help much in the defence, as the
town of Mons behind offered no positions for guns, but the 107th
Battery in the immediate rear did good work. The defence was
continued until the Germans who had already crossed to the east were
advancing on the flank. Lieutenant Maurice Dease, five times wounded
before he was killed, worked his machine-gun to the end, and every
man of his detachment was hit. Lieutenant Dease and Private Godley
both received the Victoria Cross. The occupants of one trench,
including Lieutenant Smith, who was wounded, were cut off by the
rush. Captain Carey commanded the covering company and the
retirement was conducted in good order, though Captain Bowden Smith,
Lieutenant Mead, and a number of men fell in the movement.
Altogether, the Royal Fusiliers lost five officers and about two
hundred men in the defence of the bridge, Lieutenant Tower having
seven survivors in his platoon of sixty. Captain Byng's company at
the Glin Bridge farther east had severe losses and was driven in in
the same way. As the infantry retired a small party of engineers
under Captain Theodore {71} Wright endeavoured to destroy this and
other bridges. Lieutenant Day was twice wounded in his attempt upon
the main Nimy Bridge. Corporal Jarvis received the V.C. for his
exertions in preparing the Jemappes bridge for destruction to the
west of Nimy. Captain Wright, with Sergeant Smith, made an heroic
endeavour under terrific fire to detonate the charge, but was wounded
and fell into the canal. Lieutenant Holt, a brave young officer of
reserve engineers, also lost his life in these operations.
[Sidenote: The holding of the canal.]
Having held on as long as was possible, the front line of the 9th
Brigade fell back upon the prepared position on high ground between
Mons and Frameries, where the 107th R.F.A. was entrenched. The 4th
Royal Fusiliers passed through Mons and reached the new line in good
order and without further loss. The 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers,
however, falling back to the same point on a different route through
Flenu, came under heavy machine-gun fire from a high soil heap,
losing Captain Rose and a hundred men.
The falling back of the 8th and 9th Brigades from the Nimy Peninsula
had an immediate effect upon Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, which was on
their left holding the line up to the railway bridge just east of St.
Ghislain. Of this brigade two battalions, the 1st West Kent on the
right and the 2nd Scottish Borderers on the left, were in the
trenches while the 2nd West Riding and the 2nd Yorkshire Light
Infantry were in support, having their centre at Boussu. The day
began by some losses to the West Kent Regiment, who were probably,
apart from cavalry patrols, the first troops to suffer in the great
war. A company of the regiment under Captain Lister was sent across
the canal early as a support to some advancing {72} cavalry, and was
driven in about eleven o'clock with a loss of two officers and about
a hundred men.
From this time onwards the German attacks were easily held, though
the German guns were within twelve hundred yards. The situation was
changed when it was learned later in the day that the Germans were
across to the right and had got as far as Flenu on the flank of the
brigade. In view of this advance, General Smith-Dorrien, having no
immediate supports, dashed off on a motor to Sir Douglas Haig's
headquarters some four miles distant, and got his permission to use
Haking's 5th Brigade, which pushed up in time to re-establish the
line.
It has been shown that the order of the regiments closely engaged in
the front line was, counting from the east, the 1st Gordons, the 4th
Middlesex, the 4th Royal Fusiliers, the 1st Scots Fusiliers, half the
1st Northumberland Fusiliers, the 1st West Kents, and the 2nd
Scottish Borderers, the other regiments of these brigades being in
reserve. The last-named battalion, being opposite a bridge, was
heavily engaged all day, losing many men, but holding its position
intact against repeated advances. On the left hand or western side
of the Scottish Borderers, continuing the line along the canal, one
would come upon the front of the 14th Brigade (Rolfs), which was
formed by the 1st Surrey on the right and the 1st Duke of Cornwall's
on the left. The German attack upon this portion of the line began
about 1 P.M., and by 3 P.M. had become so warm that the reserve
companies were drawn into the firing line. Thanks to their good
work, both with rifles and with machine-guns, the regiments held
their own until about six o'clock in the evening, when the retirement
of the troops on {73} their right enabled the Germans to enfilade the
right section of the East Surreys at close range. They were ordered
to retire, but lost touch with the left section, which remained to
the north of the canal where their trench was situated. Captain
Benson of this section had been killed and Captain Campbell severely
wounded, but the party of one hundred and ten men under Lieutenant
Morritt held on most gallantly and made a very fine defence. Being
finally surrounded, they endeavoured to cut their way out with cold
steel, Lieutenant Ward being killed and Morritt four times wounded in
the attempt. Many of the men were killed and wounded, and the
survivors were taken. Altogether the loss of the regiment was five
officers and one hundred and thirty-four men.
On the left of the East Surreys, as already stated, lay the 1st Duke
of Cornwall's of the same brigade. About four o'clock in the
afternoon the presence of the German outflanking corps first made
itself felt. At that hour the Cornwalls were aware of an advance
upon their left as well as their front. The Cornwalls drew in across
the canal in consequence, and the Germans did not follow them over
that evening.
The chief point defended by the 14th Brigade upon this day had been
the bridge and main road which crosses the canal between Pommeroeul
and Thulin, some eight or nine miles west of Mons. In the evening,
when the final order for retreat was given, this bridge was blown up,
and the brigade fell back after nightfall as far as Dour, where it
slept.
[Sidenote: The fateful telegram.]
By the late afternoon the general position was grave, but not
critical. The enemy had lost very heavily, while the men in the
trenches were, in comparison, unscathed. Here and there, as we have
{74} seen, the Germans had obtained a lodgment in the British
position, especially at the salient which had always appeared to be
impossible to hold, but, on the other hand, the greater part of the
Army, including the whole First Corps, had not yet been seriously
engaged, and there were reserve troops in the immediate rear of the
fighting line who could be trusted to make good any gap in the ranks
before them. The German artillery fire was heavy and well-directed,
but the British batteries had held their own. Such was the position
when, about 5 P.M., a telegram from General Joffre was put into Sir
John French's hand, which must have brought a pang to his heart.
From it he learned that all his work had been in vain, and that far
from contending for victory, he would be fortunate if he saved
himself from utter defeat.
There were two pieces of information in this fatal message, and each
was disastrous. The first announced that instead of the two German
corps whom he had reason to think were in front of him, there were
four--the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Fourth Reserve Corps--forming,
with the second and fourth cavalry divisions, a force of nearly
200,000 men, while the Second Corps were bringing another 40,000
round his left flank from the direction of Tournai. The second item
was even more serious. Instead of being buttressed up with French
troops on either side of him, he learned that the Germans had burst
the line of the Sambre, and that the French armies on his right were
already in full retreat, while nothing substantial lay upon his left.
It was a most perilous position. The British force lay exposed and
unsupported amid converging foes who far outnumbered it in men and
guns. What was the profit of one {75} day of successful defence if
the morrow would dawn upon a British Sedan? There was only one
course of action, and Sir John decided upon it in the instant, bitter
as the decision must have been. The Army must be extricated from the
battle and fall back until it resumed touch with its Allies.
But it is no easy matter to disengage so large an army which is
actually in action and hard-pressed by a numerous and enterprising
enemy. The front was extensive and the lines of retreat were
limited. That the operation was carried out in an orderly fashion is
a testimony to the skill of the General, the talents of the
commanders, and the discipline of the units. If it had been done at
once and simultaneously it would certainly have been the signal for a
vigorous German advance and a possible disaster. The positions were
therefore held, though no efforts were made to retake those points
where the enemy had effected a lodgment. There was no possible use
in wasting troops in regaining positions which would in no case be
held. As dusk fell, a dusk which was lightened by the glare of
burning villages, some of the regiments began slowly to draw off to
the rear. In the early morning of the 24th the definite order to
retire was conveyed to the corps commanders, whilst immediate
measures were taken to withdraw the impedimenta and to clear the
roads.
Such, in its bare outlines, was the action of Mons upon August 23,
interesting for its own sake, but more so as being the first clash
between the British and German armies. One or two questions call for
discussion before the narrative passes on. The most obvious of these
is the question of the bridges. Why were they not blown up in the
dangerous peninsula? {76} Without having any special information
upon the point, one might put forward the speculation that the reason
why they were not at once blown up was that the whole of Joffre's
advance was an aggressive movement for the relief of Namur, and that
the bridges were not destroyed because they would be used in a
subsequent advance. It will always be a subject for speculation as
to what would have occurred had the battle been fought to a finish.
Considering the comparative merits of British and German infantry as
shown in many a subsequent encounter, and allowing for the advantage
that the defence has over the attack, it is probable that the odds
might not have been too great and that Sir John French might have
remained master of the field. That, however, is a matter of opinion.
What is not a matter of opinion is that the other German armies to
the east would have advanced on the heels of the retiring French,
that they would have cut the British off from their Allies, and that
they would have been hard put to it to reach the coast. Therefore,
win or lose, the Army had no possible course open but to retire. The
actual losses of the British were not more than three or four
thousand, the greater part from the 8th, 9th, and 13th Brigades.
There are no means as yet by which the German losses can be taken out
from the general returns, but when one considers the repeated
advances over the open and the constant breaking of the dense
attacking formations, it is impossible that they should have been
fewer than from seven to ten thousand men. Each army had for the
first time an opportunity of forming a critical estimate of the
other. German officers have admitted with soldierly frankness that
the efficiency of the British came to them as a revelation, which is
{77} not surprising after the assurances that had been made to them.
On the other hand, the British bore away a very clear conviction of
the excellence of the German artillery and of the plodding bravery of
the German infantry, together with a great reassurance as to their
own capacity to hold their own at any reasonable odds.
[Sidenote: The rearguard actions of Frameries, Wasmes, and Dour.]
After a night of flames and of uproar the day dawned, a day of great
anxiety to the British commanders and of considerable pressure upon a
portion of the troops. Sir John French had given instructions that
the First Corps, which had been only slightly engaged the day before,
should pretend to assume the offensive upon the extreme right wing in
the direction of Binche, whilst the Second Corps began its
retirement. The enemy was following up rapidly, however, along the
whole length of the British line, both flanks of which were exposed.
Shortly after dawn the evacuated positions had been occupied, and
Mons itself was in the hands of the advancing Germans. The Second
Corps began its retreat, helped by the feint which was carried out by
General Haig upon the right, and by the bulk of the batteries of both
corps, but the pursuit was vigorous and the shell-fire incessant. A
shell from the rear is more intimidating than twenty in the front.
Hamilton's Third Division, including the 8th and 9th Brigades, who
had done such hard work the day before, sustained the most severe
losses, especially at Frameries, four miles south of Mons. The 2nd
Royal Scots of the 8th Brigade about midnight had been attacked by a
heavy German column which got so near that the swish of their feet
through the long grass put the regiment on the alert. The attack was
{78} blown back by a volley at close quarters. The 9th Brigade
(Shaw's), which covered the retreat, was closely pressed from dawn by
the pursuing Germans, and was subjected to a very heavy shell-fire.
A barricade, erected in the village and manned by Captain Sandilands,
of the Northumberlands, with his company, held up the German advance,
and they were never permitted to reach the line nor to hustle the
retirement. Butler's 23rd Artillery Brigade helped with its fire.
The chief losses in this skilful covering action fell upon the 1st
Lincolns and upon the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, each of which
lost about 150 men, including Captain Rose, Lieutenants Bulbe,
Welchman, and others. There was a stational ambulance in the village
of Frameries, and a foreign nurse in its employ has left a vivid
picture of the wounded British rushing in grimy and breathless to
have their slighter wounds dressed and then running out, rifle in
hand, to find their place in the firing line.
The remaining brigade of the Third Division, McCracken's 7th Brigade,
had detached one regiment, the 2nd Irish Rifles, upon the day before
to reinforce the 8th Brigade, and this regiment had, as already
mentioned, some severe fighting, holding back the German advance
after the retirement from the Nimy Peninsula of the Middlesex and the
Gordons. It did not find its way back to its brigade until the
evening of the 24th. The brigade itself, during the first day of the
retreat, held a position near Ciply, to the south of Mons, where it
was heavily attacked in the early morning, and in some danger as its
flank was exposed. At ten o'clock it was ordered to retire _via_
Genly towards Bavai, and it carried out this difficult movement in
the face of a pushful enemy in {79} perfect order, covered by the
divisional artillery. The principal losses fell upon the 2nd South
Lancashire Regiment, which came under heavy fire from German
machine-guns posted upon slag-heaps. This regiment was very hard
hit, losing several hundred men. The brigade faced round near Bavai
and held off the pursuit.
Cuthbert's 13th Brigade, keeping in line with their comrades on the
right, halted at Wasmes, some four miles from the canal, where they
prepared some hasty entrenchments. Here, at the dawn of day, they
were furiously attacked by the German vanguard at the same time that
the 9th Brigade was hustled in Frameries, but for two hours the
assailants were beaten back with heavy losses. The brunt of the
fighting fell upon the 2nd West Riding Regiment, who lost heavily,
were at one time nearly surrounded, and finally, with dour Yorkshire
pertinacity, shook themselves clear. Their losses included their
commander, Colonel Gibbs, their adjutant, 300 men, and all their
officers save five. The 1st West Kents also lost about 100 men and
several officers, including Major Pack-Beresford. For the remainder
of the day and for the whole of the 25th the brigade, with the rest
of the Fifth Division, fell back with little fighting _via_ Bavai to
the Le Cateau line.
On the evening of the 23rd the 14th Brigade, still farther to the
west, had fallen back to Dour, blowing up the bridge and road over
the canal. After dark the Germans followed them, and Gleichen's 15th
Brigade, which had not yet been engaged, found itself in the position
of rearguard and immediately exposed to the pressure of the German
flanking movement. This was now threatening to envelop the {80}
whole of Ferguson's Fifth Division. The situation was particularly
difficult, since this General had to make a flank movement in the
face of the enemy in order to close up with his comrades of the Third
Division. He was soon compelled to call for assistance, and Allenby,
with his cavalry division, was advanced to help him. It was
evidently the intention of the enemy to strike in upon the western
side of the division and pin it to its ground until it could be
surrounded.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
{81}
[Illustration: 1st MORNING OF RETREAT OF 2nd ARMY CORPS AUG 24th.]
-------------------------------------------------------------------
[Sidenote: The charge of the Lancers.]
The first menacing advance in the morning of the 24th was directed
against the flank of the British infantry who were streaming down the
Elouges-Dour high road. The situation was critical, and a portion of
De Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigade was ordered to charge near Andregnies,
the hostile infantry being at that time about a thousand yards
distant, with several batteries in support. The attack of the
cavalry was vigorously supported by L Battery of Horse Artillery.
The charge was carried out by three squadrons of the 9th Lancers,
Colonel Campbell at their head. The 4th Dragoon Guards under Colonel
Mullens was in support. The cavalry rode forward amidst a heavy but
not particularly deadly fire until they were within a few hundred
yards of the enemy, when, being faced by a wire fence, they swung to
the right and rallied under the cover of some slag-heaps and of a
railway embankment. Their menace and rifle fire, or the fine work of
Major Sclater-Booth's battery, had the effect of holding up the
German advance for some time, and though the cavalry were much
scattered and disorganised they were able to reunite without any
excessive loss, the total casualties being a little over two hundred.
Some {82} hours later the enemy's pressure again became heavy upon
Ferguson's flank, and the 1st Cheshires and 1st Norfolks, of
Gleichen's 15th Brigade, which formed the infantry flank-guard,
incurred heavy losses. It was in this defensive action that the
119th R.F.A., under Major Alexander, fought itself to a standstill
with only three unwounded gunners by the guns. The battery had
silenced one German unit and was engaged with three others. Only
Major Alexander and Lieutenant Pollard with a few men were left. As
the horses had been destroyed the pieces had to be man-handled out of
action. Captain the Hon. F. Grenfell, of the 9th Lancers, bleeding
from two wounds, with several officers, Sergeants Davids and Turner,
and some fifty men of the regiment, saved these guns under a terrible
fire, the German infantry being within close range. During the whole
long, weary day the batteries and horsemen were working hard to cover
the retreat, while the surgeons exposed themselves with great
fearlessness, lingering behind the retiring lines in order to give
first aid to the men who had been hit by the incessant shell-fire.
It was in this noble task--the noblest surely within the whole range
of warfare--that Captain Malcolm Leckie, and other brave medical
officers, met with a glorious end, upholding to the full the
traditions of their famous corps.
[Sidenote: The fate of the Cheshires.]
It has been stated that the 1st Cheshires, in endeavouring to screen
the west flank of the Second Corps from the German pursuit, were very
badly punished. This regiment, together with the Norfolks, occupied
a low ridge to the north-east side of the village of Elouges, which
they endeavoured to hold against the onflowing tide of Germans.
About three in the afternoon it was seen {83} that there was danger
of this small flank-guard being entirely cut off. As a matter of
fact an order had actually been sent for a retreat, but had not
reached them. Colonel Boger of the Cheshires sent several
messengers, representing the growing danger, but no answer came back.
Finally, in desperation, Colonel Boger went himself and found that
the enemy held the position previously occupied by the rest of
Gleichen's Brigade, which had retired. The Cheshires had by this
time endured dreadful losses, and were practically surrounded. A
bayonet charge eased the pressure for a short time, but the enemy
again closed in and the bulk of the survivors, isolated amidst a
hostile army corps, were compelled to surrender. Some escaped in
small groups and made their way through to their retreating comrades.
When roll was next called, there remained 5 officers and 193 men out
of 27 officers and 1007 of all ranks who had gone into action. It
speaks volumes for the discipline of the regiment that this remnant,
under Captain Shore, continued to act as a useful unit. These
various episodes, including the severe losses of Gleichen's 15th
Brigade, the attack of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, and the artillery
action in which the 119th Battery was so severely handled, group
themselves into a separate little action occurring the day after Mons
and associated either with the villages of Elouges or of Dour. The
Second German Corps continued to act upon the western side of the
Second British Corps, whilst the rest of General von Kluck's army
followed it behind. With three corps close behind him, and one
snapping at his flank, General Smith-Dorrien made his way southwards,
his gunners and cavalry labouring hard to relieve the ever-increasing
{84} pressure, while his rear brigades were continually sprayed by
the German shrapnel.
It is to be noted that Sir John French includes the Ninth German
Corps in Von Kluck's army in his first dispatch, and puts it in Von
Bülow's second army in his second dispatch. The French authorities
are of opinion that Von Kluck's army consisted of the Second, Third,
Fourth, Seventh, and Fourth Reserve Corps, with two divisions of
cavalry. If this be correct, then part of Von Bulow's army was
pursuing Haig, while the whole of Von Kluck's was concentrated upon
Smith-Dorrien. This would make the British performance even more
remarkable than it has hitherto appeared, since it would mean that
during the pursuit, and at the subsequent battle, ten German
divisions were pressing upon three British ones.
It is not to be supposed that so huge a force was all moving abreast,
or available simultaneously at any one point. None the less a
General can use his advance corps very much more freely when he knows
that every gap can be speedily filled.
A tiny reinforcement had joined the Army on the morning after the
battle of Mons. This was the 19th Brigade under General Drummond,
which consisted of the 1st Middlesex, 1st Scots Rifles, 2nd Welsh
Fusiliers, and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. This detached
brigade acted, and continued to act during a large part of the war,
as an independent unit. It detrained at Valenciennes on August 23,
and two regiments, the Middlesex and the Cameronians, may be said to
have taken part in the battle of Mons, since they formed up at the
east of Condé, on the extreme left of the British position, {85} and
received, together with the Queen's Bays, who were scouting in front
of them, the first impact of the German flanking corps. They fell
back with the Army upon the 24th and 25th, keeping the line
Jenlain--Solesmes, finally reaching Le Cateau, where they eventually
took up their position on the right rear of the British Army.
As the Army fell back, the border fortress of Maubeuge with its heavy
guns offered a tempting haven of rest for the weary and overmatched
troops, but not in vain had France lost her army in Metz. Sir John
French would have no such protection, however violently the Germans
might push him towards it. "The British Army invested in Maubeuge"
was not destined to furnish the head-line of a Berlin special
edition. The fortress was left to the eastward, and the tired troops
snatched a few hours of rest near Bavai, still pursued by the guns
and the searchlights of their persistent foemen. At an early hour of
the 25th the columns were again on the march for the south, and for
safety.
It may be remarked that in all this movement what made the operation
most difficult and complicated was, that in the retirement the Army
was not moving direct to the rear, but diagonally away to the west,
thus making the west flank more difficult to cover as well as
complicating the movements of transport. It was this oblique
movement which caused the Third Division to change places with the
Fifth, so that from now onwards it was to the west of the Army.
The greater part of the Fourth Division of the Third Army Corps,
coming up from the lines of communication, brought upon this day a
welcome {86} reinforcement to the Army and did yeoman work in
covering the retirement. The total composition of this division was
as follows:--
THIRD ARMY CORPS
GENERAL PULTENEY.
DIVISION IV.--General SNOW.
10_th Infantry Brigade--General Haldane_.
1st Warwicks.
2nd Seaforths.
1st Irish Fusiliers.
2nd Dublin Fusiliers.
11_th Infantry Brigade--General Hunter-Weston_.
1st Somerset L. Infantry.
1st East Lancashires.
1st Hants.
1st Rifle Brigade.
12_th Infantry Brigade--General Wilson_.
1st Royal Lancaster Regiment.
2nd Lancs. Fusiliers.
2nd Innis. Fusiliers.
2nd Essex.
_Artillery--General Milne_.
XIV. Brig. R.F.A. 39, 68, 88.
XXIX. Brig. R.F.A. 125, 126, 127.
XXXII. Brig. R.F.A. 27, 134, 135.
XXXVII. Brig. (How.) 31, 35, 55.
Heavy R.G.A. 31 Battery.
R.E. 7, 9 Field Cos.
These troops, which had been quartered in the Ligny and Montigny
area, received urgent orders at one in the morning of the 25th that
they should advance northwards. They marched that night to Briastre,
where they covered the retreat of the Army, the Third Division
passing through their lines. The Fourth Division then retired south
again, having great difficulty in getting along, as the roads were
choked with transport and artillery, and fringed with exhausted men.
The 12th Brigade (Wilson's) was acting as rearguard, and began to
experience pressure from the pursuers, the Essex men being {87}
shelled out of the village of Bethencourt, which they held until it
was nearly surrounded by the German cavalry. The line followed by
the division was Briastre-Viesly-Bethencourt-Caudry-Ligny and
Haucourt, the latter village marking the general position which they
were to take up on the left of the Army at the line of Le Cateau.
Such reinforcements were mere handfuls when compared with the
pursuing hosts, but their advent heartened up the British troops and
relieved them of some of the pressure. It has been remarked by
officers of the Fourth Division that they and their men were
considerably taken aback by the worn appearance of the weary
regiments from Mons which passed through their ranks. Their
confidence was revived, however, by the undisturbed demeanour of the
General Headquarters Staff, who came through them in the late
afternoon of the 25th. "General French himself struck me as being
extremely composed, and the staff officers looked very cheerful."
These are the imponderabilia which count for much in a campaign.
Tuesday, August 25, was a day of scattered rearguard actions. The
weary Army had rested upon the evening of the 24th upon the general
line Maubeuge-Bavai-Wargnies. Orders were issued for the retirement
to continue next day to a position already partly prepared, in front
of the centre of which stood the town of Le Cateau. All rearguards
were to be clear of the above-mentioned line by 5.30 A.M. The
general conception was that the inner flanks of the two corps should
be directed upon Le Cateau.
The intention of the Commander-in-Chief was that the Army should
fight in that position next day, {88} the First Corps occupying the
right and the Second Corps the left of the position. The night of
the 25th found the Second Corps in the position named, whilst their
comrades were still at Landrecies, eight miles to the north-east,
with a cavalry brigade endeavouring to bridge the gap between. It is
very certain, in the case of so ardent a leader as Haig, that it was
no fault upon his part which kept him from Smith-Dorrien's side upon
the day of battle. It can only be said that the inevitable delays
upon the road experienced by the First Corps, including the rearguard
actions which it fought, prevented the ensuing battle from being one
in which the British Army as a whole might have stemmed the rush of
Von Kluck's invading host.
[Sidenote: The 7th Brigade at Solesmes.]
Whilst the whole Army had been falling back upon the position which
had been selected for a stand, it was hoped that substantial French
reinforcements were coming up from the south. The roads were much
blocked during the 25th, for two divisions of French territorials
were retiring along them, as well as the British Army. As a
consequence progress was slow, and the German pressure from the rear
became ever more severe. Allenby's cavalry and horse-guns covered
the retreat, continually turning round and holding off the pursuers.
Finally, near Solesmes, on the evening of the 25th, the cavalry were
at last driven in, and the Germans came up against McCracken's 7th
Brigade, who held them most skilfully until nightfall with the
assistance of the 42nd Brigade R.F.A. and the 30th Howitzer Brigade.
Most of the fighting fell upon the 1st Wiltshires and 2nd South
Lancashires, both of which had substantial losses. The Germans could
make no further progress, {89} and time was given for the roads to
clear and for the artillery to get away. The 7th Brigade then
followed, marching, so far as possible, across country and taking up
its position, which it did not reach until after midnight, in the
village of Caudry, on the line of the Le Cateau-Courtrai road. As it
faced north once more it found Snow's Fourth Division upon its left,
while on its immediate right were the 8th and the 9th Brigades, with
the Fifth Division on the farther side of them. One unit of the 7th
Brigade, the 2nd Irish Rifles, together with the 41st R.F.A., swerved
off in the darkness and confusion and went away with the cavalry.
The rest were in the battle line. Here we may leave them in position
while we return to trace the fortunes of the First Army Corps.
Sir Douglas Haig's corps, after the feint of August 24, in which the
Second Division appeared to be attacking with the First in support,
was cleverly disengaged from the enemy and fell back by alternate
divisions. It was not an easy operation, and it was conducted under
a very heavy shell-fire, which fell especially upon the covering guns
of Colonel Sandilands' 34th Artillery Brigade. These guns were
exposed to a concentration of fire from the enemy, which was so
intense that a thick haze of smoke and dust blotted out the view for
long periods at a time. It was only with difficulty and great
gallantry that they were got away. An officer of the 6th Brigade,
immediately behind them, writes: "Both going in and coming back the
limbers passed my trench at a tearing gallop, the drivers lying low
on the horses' necks and screaming at them to go faster, while on the
return the guns bounded about on the stubble {90} field like so many
tin cans behind a runaway dog." The guns having been drawn in, the
corps retired by roads parallel to the Second Corps, and were able to
reach the line Bavai-Maubeuge by about 7 P.M. upon that evening,
being on the immediate eastern flank of Smith-Dorrien's men. It is a
striking example of the historical continuity of the British Army
that as they marched that day many of the regiments, such as the
Guards and the 1st King's Liverpool, passed over the graves of their
predecessors who had died under the same colours at Malplaquet in
1709, two hundred and six years before.
[Sidenote: The Guards in action.]
On August 25 General Haig continued his retreat. During the day he
fell back to the west of Maubeuge by Feignies to Vavesnes and
Landrecies. The considerable forest of Mormal intervened between the
two sections of the British Army. On the forenoon of this day the
vanguard of the German infantry, using motor transport, overtook
Davies' 6th Brigade, which was acting as rearguard to the corps.
They pushed in to within five hundred yards, but were driven back by
rifle-fire. Other German forces were coming rapidly up and
enveloping the wings of the British rearguard, but the brigade,
through swift and skilful handling, disengaged itself from what was
rapidly becoming a dangerous situation. The weather was exceedingly
hot during the day, and with their heavy packs the men were much
exhausted, many of them being barely able to stagger. In the
evening, footsore and weary, they reached the line of Landrecies,
Maroilles, and Pont-sur-Sambre. The 4th Brigade of Guards,
consisting of Grenadiers, Coldstream, and Irish, under General
Scott-Kerr, occupied the town of Landrecies. During {91} the day
they had seen little of the enemy, and they had no reason to believe
that the forest, which extended up to the outskirts of the town, was
full of German infantry pressing eagerly to cut them off. The
possession of vast numbers of motor lorries for infantry transport
introduces a new element into strategy, especially the strategy of a
pursuit, which was one of those disagreeable first experiences of
up-to-date warfare which the British Army had to undergo. It ensures
that the weary retreating rearguard shall ever have a perfectly fresh
pursuing vanguard at its heels.
The Guards at Landrecies were put into the empty cavalry barracks for
a much-needed rest, but they had hardly settled down before there was
an alarm that the Germans were coming into the town. It was just
after dusk that a column of infantry debouched from the shadow of the
trees and advanced briskly towards the town. A company of the 3rd
Coldstream under Captain Monck gave the alarm, and the whole regiment
stood to arms, while the rest of the brigade, who could not operate
in so confined a space, defended the other entrances of the town.
The van of the approaching Germans shouted out that they were French,
and seemed to have actually got near enough to attack the officer of
the picket and seize a machine-gun before the Guardsmen began to
fire. There is a single approach to the village, and no means of
turning it, so that the attack was forced to come directly down the
road.
[Sidenote: The Germans' rude awakening.]
Possibly the Germans had the impression that they were dealing with
demoralised fugitives, but if so they got a rude awakening. The
advance party, who were endeavouring to drag away the {92}
machine-gun, were all shot down, and their comrades who stormed up to
the houses were met with a steady and murderous fire which drove them
back into the shadows of the wood. A gun was brought up by them, and
fired at a range of five hundred yards with shrapnel, but the
Coldstream, reinforced by a second company, lay low or flattened
themselves into the doorways for protection, while the 9th British
Battery replied from a position behind the town. Presently,
believing that the way had been cleared for them, there was a fresh
surge of dark masses out of the wood, and they poured into the throat
of the street. The Guards had brought out two machine-guns, and
their fire, together with a succession of volleys from the rifles,
decimated the stormers. Some of them got near enough to throw hand
bombs among the British, but none effected a lodgment among the
buildings.
From time to time there were fresh advances during the night,
designed apparently rather to tire out the troops than to gain the
village. Once fire was set to the house at the end of the street,
but the flames were extinguished by a party led by Corporal Wyatt, of
the 3rd Coldstream. The Irish Guards after midnight relieved the
Coldstream of their vigil, and in the early morning the tired but
victorious brigade went forward unmolested upon their way. They had
lost 170 of their number, nearly all from the two Coldstream
companies. Lord Hawarden and the Hon. Windsor Clive of the
Coldstream and Lieut. Vereker of the Grenadiers were killed, four
other officers were wounded. The Germans in their close attacking
formation had suffered very much more heavily. Their enterprise {93}
was a daring one, for they had pushed far forward to get command of
the Landrecies Bridge, but their audacity became foolhardy when faced
by steady, unshaken infantry. History has shown many times before
that a retreating British Army still retains a sting in its tail.
At the same time as the Guards' Brigade was attacked at Landrecies
there was an advance from the forest against Maroilles, which is four
miles to the eastward. A troop of the 15th Hussars guarding a bridge
over the Sambre near that point was driven in by the enemy, and two
attempts on the part of the 1st Berkshires, of Davies' 6th Brigade,
to retake it were repulsed, owing to the fact that the only approach
was by a narrow causeway with marshland on either side, where it was
not possible for infantry to deploy. The 1st Rifles were ordered to
support the Berkshires, but darkness had fallen and nothing could be
done. The casualties in this skirmish amounted to 124 killed,
wounded, or missing. The Landrecies and Maroilles wounded were left
behind with some of the medical staff. At this period of the war the
British had not yet understood the qualities of the enemy, and
several times made the mistake of trusting surgeons and orderlies to
their mercy, with the result that they were inhumanly treated, both
by the authorities at the front and by the populace in Germany,
whither they were conveyed as starving prisoners of war. Five of
them, Captains Edmunds and Hamilton, Lieut. Danks (all of the Army
Medical Corps), with Dr. Austin and Dr. Elliott, who were exchanged
in January 1915, deposed that they were left absolutely without food
for long periods. It is only fair to state that at a later date,
with a few {94} scandalous exceptions, such as that of Wittenberg,
the German treatment of prisoners, though often harsh, was no longer
barbarous. For the first six months, however, it was brutal in the
extreme, and frequently accompanied by torture as well as neglect. A
Spanish prisoner, incarcerated by mistake, has given very clear
neutral evidence of the abominable punishments of the prison camps.
His account reads more like the doings of Iroquois than of a
Christian nation.
[Sidenote: The Connnaughts at Pont-sur-Sambre.]
A small mishap--small on the scale of such a war, though serious
enough in itself--befell a unit of the First Army Corps on the
morning after the Landrecies engagement. The portion of the German
army who pursued General Haig had up to now been able to effect
little, and that little at considerable cost to themselves. Early on
August 26, however, a brisk action was fought near Pont-sur-Sambre,
in which the 2nd Connaughts, of Haking's Fifth Brigade, lost six
officers, including Colonel Abercrombie, who was taken prisoner, and
280 men. The regiment was cut off by a rapidly advancing enemy in a
country which was so thickly enclosed that there was great difficulty
in keeping touch between the various companies or in conveying their
danger to the rest of the brigade. By steadiness and judgment the
battalion was extricated from a most difficult position, but it was
at the heavy cost already quoted. In this case again the use by the
enemy of great numbers of motor lorries in their pursuit accounts for
the suddenness and severity of the attacks which now and afterwards
fell upon the British rearguards.
Dawn broke upon August 26, a day upon which the exhausted troops were
destined to be tried to the {95} limit of human endurance. It was
the date of Von Kluck's exultant telegram in which he declared that
he held them surrounded, a telegram which set Berlin fluttering with
flags. On this day the First Army Corps was unmolested in its march,
reaching the Venerolles line that night. There was woody country
upon the west of it, and from beyond this curtain of trees they heard
the distant roar of a terrific cannonade, and knew that a great
battle was in progress to the westward. It was on Smith-Dorrien's
Second Corps and upon the single division of the Third Corps that the
full storm of the German attack had broken. In a word, a corps and a
half of British troops, with 225 guns, were assailed by certainly
four and probably five German corps, with 600 guns. It is no wonder
that the premature tidings of a great German triumph were forwarded
that morning to make one more item in that flood of good news which
from August 21 to the end of the month was pouring in upon the German
people. A glittering mirage lay before them. The French lines had
been hurled back from the frontier, the British were in full retreat,
and now were faced with absolute disaster. Behind these breaking
lines lay the precious capital, the brain and heart of France. But
God is not always with the big battalions, and the end was not yet.
{96}