THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE
The general situation--"Die grosse Zeit"--The turn of the tide--The
Battle of the Ourcq--The British advance--Cavalry fighting--The 1st
Lincolns and the guns--6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes--9th
Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly--The problem of the Aisne--Why
the Marne is one of the great battles of all time.
[Sidenote: The general situation.]
There are several problems connected with the strategical opening of
the great war which will furnish food for debate among military
critics for many years to come. One of these, already alluded to, is
the French offensive taken in Alsace and Lorraine. It ended in check
in both cases, and yet its ultimate effects in confusing the German
plans and deflecting German armies which might have been better used
elsewhere may be held to justify the French in their strategy.
Another remarkable and questionable move now obtrudes itself, this
time upon the part of the Germans. Very shortly after the outbreak
of war, the Russians had pushed their covering armies over the
frontier of East Prussia, and had defeated a German force at
Gumbinnen, with a loss of prisoners and guns. A few days later the
left wing of the widespread, and as yet only partially mobilised,
Russian army struck {139} heavily at the Austrians in the south near
Lemberg, where after a week of fighting they gained a great victory,
with prisoners, which amounted to over 70,000 men and a large booty
of guns and supplies. Before this blow had befallen their cause, and
influenced only by the fact that the Russian right wing was
encroaching upon the sacred soil of the Fatherland, a considerable
force was detached from the invading armies in France and dispatched
to the Eastern front. These men were largely drawn from the Third
(Saxon) Army of Von Haussen. Such a withdrawal at such a time could
only mean that the German general staff considered that the situation
in France was assured, and that they had still sufficient means to
carry on a victorious invasion. Events were to show that they were
utterly mistaken in their calculation. It is true that, aided by
these reinforcements, Von Hindenburg succeeded on August 31 in
inflicting a severe defeat upon the Russians at the battle of
Tannenberg, but subsequent events proved that such a victory could
have no decisive result, while the weakening of the armies in France
may have had a permanent effect upon the whole course of the war. At
the very moment that the Germans were withdrawing troops from their
Western front the British and French were doing all they could to
thicken their own line of resistance, especially by the transference
of armies from Alsace and the south. Thus the net result was that,
whereas the Germans had up to August 25 a very marked superiority in
numbers, by the beginning of September the forces were more equal.
From that moment the chance of their taking Paris became steadily
more and more remote.
The first month of the war represented a very {140} remarkable
military achievement upon the part of Germany. In her high state of
preparation as compared with the Allies, it was to be expected that
the beginning of hostilities would be all in her favour, but the
reality exceeded what could have been foreseen. Her great armies
were ready to the last button. Up to the eve of war the soldiers did
not themselves know what their field uniform was like. At the last
moment two millions of men filed into the depots and emerged in half
an hour clad in grey, with new boots, equipment, and every possible
need for the campaign. On her artillery surprises she set special
store, and they were upon a vast scale. The machine-gun had been
developed to an extent unknown by other armies, and of these deadly
little weapons it is certain that very many thousands were available.
From the tiny quick-firer, carried easily by two men upon a
stretcher, to the vast cannon with a diameter of sixteen and a half
inches at the mouth, taking three railway trucks for its majestic
portage, every possible variety of man-killing engine was ready in
vast profusion. So, too, was the flying service, from the little
Taube to the huge six-hundred-foot Zeppelin. From these latter
devices great results were expected which were not destined to
materialise, for, apart from reconnaissances, they proved themselves
to be machines rather for the murder of non-combatants than for
honest warfare.
[Sidenote: "Die grosse Zeit."]
Making every allowance for the huge advantage which the nation that
knows war is coming must always enjoy over those which merely fear
that it may come, it would be foolish to deny the vast military
achievement of Germany in the month of August. It reflects great
credit upon the bravery {141} and energy of her troops, as well as
upon the foresight of her organisers and the capacity of her leaders.
Though we are her enemies, our admiration would have been
whole-hearted were it not for the brutalities which marked her
advance both in Poland, in Belgium, and in France. Consider that
wonderful panorama of victory which was known all over the Fatherland
as "Die grosse Zeit." On August 10 fell the great fortress of Liége,
on the 22nd the great fortress of Namur, early in September that of
Maubeuge, while the smaller strongholds went down as if they were
open cities. On August 10 was a considerable victory at Mülhausen,
on the 20th the Belgians were defeated at Tirlemont, on the same day
Brussels was occupied. On the 22nd the French central army of ten
corps was defeated in a great battle near Charleroi, losing,
according to the Germans, some 20,000 prisoners and 200 guns. On the
left flank the Crown Prince's army won the battle of Longwy, taking
10,000 prisoners and many more guns. On August 23 the Duke of
Würtemberg won a battle in the Ardennes. Upon the same date the
British were driven from their position at Mons. Upon the 26th they
were defeated at Le Cateau. Most of Belgium and the North of France
were overrun. Scattered parties of Uhlans made their way to the
shores of the Atlantic spreading terror along the Channel coast. The
British bases were in such danger that they had to be moved.
Finally, upon the last day of the month, a great battle took place at
Tannenberg in East Prussia, in which the Russian invading army was
almost completely destroyed. I do not know where in history such a
succession of victories is to be found, and our {142} horror of the
atrocities of Louvain, Aerschot, Dinard, and so many other places
must not blind us to the superb military achievement.
It was not, it is true, an unbroken series of successes even in the
West. The French in the early days won a victory at Dornach in
Alsace, and another smaller one at Dinant in the Ardennes. They held
the enemy in the neighbourhood of Nancy, fought a fairly equal battle
at St. Quentin in taking the pressure off the British at the end of
August, and had a success at Guise. These, however, were small
matters as compared with the sweeping tide of German victory. But
gradually the impetus of the rush was being stayed. Neither the
French nor the British lines were broken. They grew stronger from
compression, whilst the invaders grew weaker from diffusion. Even as
they hoped to reach the climax of their success, and the huge
winning-post of the Eiffel Tower loomed up before their racing
armies, the dramatic moment arrived, and the dauntless, high-hearted
Allies had the reward of their constant, much-enduring valour.
[Sidenote: The turn of the tide.]
September 6 was a day of great elation in the armies of the Allies,
for it marked the end of the retreat and the beginning of their
victorious return. It is clear that they could in no case have gone
farther south without exposing Paris to the danger of an attack. The
French Government had already been transferred to Bordeaux and the
city put into a state which promised a long and stubborn defence, but
after the surprising rapidity of the capture of Namur there was a
general distrust of fortresses, and it was evident that if only one
or two of the outer ring of forts should be overwhelmed by the German
fire, {143} the enemy would be in a position to do terrible damage to
the city, even if they failed to occupy it. The constant dropping of
bombs from German aeroplanes, one of which had already injured the
Cathedral of Notre Dame, gave a sinister forecast of the respect
which the enemy was likely to show to the monuments of antiquity.
Fortunately, the problem of investing Paris while the main French
armies remained unbeaten in the field proved to be an insuperable
one. The first German task, in accordance with the prophet
Clausewitz, was to break the French resistance. Everything would
follow after that, and nothing could precede it. Von Kluck, with his
army, comprising originally something over 200,000 men, had lost
considerably in their conflicts with the British, and were much
exhausted by rapid marching, but they were still in good heart, as
the roads over which they passed seemed to offer ample evidence that
their enemy was in full flight before them. Knowing that they had
hit the British hard, they hoped that, for a time at least, they
might disregard them, and, accordingly, they ventured to close in, by
a flank march, on to the other German armies to the east of them, in
order to combine against the main line of French resistance and to
make up the gaps of those corps which had been ordered to East
Prussia. But the bulldog, though weary and somewhat wounded, was
still watching with bloodshot eyes. He now sprang suddenly upon the
exposed flank of his enemy and got a grip which held firm for many a
day to come.
Without going into complicated details of French strategy, which
would be outside the scope of this work, it may be generally stated
that the whole {144} French line, which had stretched on August 22
from Namur along the line of the Sambre to Charleroi and had retired
with considerable loss before the German advance, was now extended in
seven separate armies from Verdun to the west of Paris.
General Joffre had assembled Maunoury's Sixth Army, which consisted
of the Seventh Regular Corps, one reserve corps, and three
territorial divisions, with Sordet's cavalry, in the neighbourhood of
Amiens, and at the end of the month they lay with their right upon
Roye. Thus, when Von Kluck swerved to his left, this army was on the
flank of the whole great German line which extended to Verdun. Next
to this Sixth Army and more to the south-east were the British, now
no longer unsupported, but with solid French comrades upon either
side of them. Next to the British, counting from the left or
westward end of the defensive line, was the Fifth French Army under
General d'Esperey, of four corps, with Conneau's cavalry forming the
link between. These three great bodies, the French Sixth, the
British, and the French Fifth, were in touch during the subsequent
operations, and moved forward in close co-operation upon September 6.
Their operations were directed against the First (Von Kluck's) and
Second (Von Bülow's) Armies. On the right of the Fifth French Army
came another extra, produced suddenly by the prolific Joffre and
thrust into the centre of the line. This was General Foch's Seventh,
three corps strong, which joined to the eastward General Langlé de
Cary's Fourth Army. Opposed to them were the remains of Von
Haussen's Third Saxon Army and the Prince of Würtemberg's Fourth
Army. Eastward of this, on the farther side of the great plain of
{145} Chalons, a place of evil omen for the Huns, were the Third
(Sarrail), Second (Castelnau), and First (Dubail) French Armies,
which faced the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German, commanded
respectively by the Crown Prince of Prussia, the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, and General von Heeringen. Such were the mighty lines which
were destined to swing and sway for an eventful week in the strain of
a close-locked fight.
[Sidenote: The Battle of the Ourcq.]
The eastern portion of this great battle is outside the scope of this
account, but it may briefly be stated that after murderous fighting
neither the French nor the German lines made any marked advance in
the extreme east, but that the Crown Prince's army was driven back by
Dubail, Sarrail, and Castelnau from all its advanced positions, and
held off from Nancy and Verdun, which were his objectives. It was at
the western end of the Allied line that the strategical position was
most advantageous and the result most marked. In all other parts of
that huge line the parallel battle prevailed. Only in the west were
the Germans outflanked, and the shock of the impact of the Sixth
French Army passed down from Meaux to Verdun as the blow of the
engine's buffer sends the successive crashes along a line of trucks.
This French army was, as already stated, upon the extreme outside
right of Von Kluck's army, divided from it only by the River Ourcq.
This was the deciding factor in the subsequent operations.
By mid-day upon September 6, according to the dispatch of Sir John
French, the Germans had realised their dangerous position. The
British Army, consisting of five divisions and five cavalry brigades,
with its depleted ranks filled up with reinforcements and some of its
lost guns replaced, was advancing {146} from the south through the
forest of Crécy, men who had limped south with bleeding feet at two
miles an hour changing their gait to three or four now that they were
bound northward. The general movement of the Army cannot, however,
be said to have been rapid. Von Kluck had placed nothing more
substantial than a cavalry screen of two divisions in front of them,
while he had detached a strong force of infantry and artillery to
fight a rearguard action against the Sixth French Army and prevent it
from crossing the Ourcq.
The desperate struggle of September 6, 7, 8, and 9 between Von Kluck
and Maunoury may be looked upon as the first turning-point of the
war. Von Kluck had originally faced Maunoury with his Fourth Reserve
Corps on the defensive. Recognising how critical it was that
Maunoury should be crushed, he passed back two more army corps--the
Seventh and Second--across the Ourcq, and fell upon the French with
such violence that for two days it was impossible to say which side
would win. Maunoury and his men fought magnificently, and the
Germans showed equal valour. At one time the situation seemed
desperate, but 20,000 men, odds and ends of every kind--Republican
Guards, gendarmes, and others--were rushed out from Paris in a
five-mile line of automobiles, and the action was restored. Only on
the morning of the 10th did the Germans withdraw in despair, held in
their front by the brave Maunoury, and in danger of being cut off by
the British to the east of them.
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{147}
[Illustration: British Advance during the Battle of the Marne]
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[Sidenote: The British advance.]
The advance of the British upon September 6 was made in unison with
that of the Fifth French Army (D'Esperey's) upon the right, and was
much facilitated {148} by the fact that Von Kluck had to detach the
strong force already mentioned to deal with Maunoury upon the left.
The British advanced with the Fourth Division upon the left, the
Second Corps in the centre and the First Corps upon the right. The
high banks of the Grand Morin were occupied without serious fighting,
and the whole line pushed forward for a considerable distance,
halting on the Coulommiers-Maisoncelles front. The brunt of the
fighting during the day was borne by the French on either wing, the
Third and Fourth German Corps being thrown back by D'Esperey's men,
among whom the Senegal regiments particularly distinguished
themselves. The fighting in this section of the field continued far
into the night.
On September 7 the British and the Fifth French were still moving
northwards, while the Sixth French were continuing their bitter
struggle upon the Ourcq. The British infantry losses were not heavy,
though a hidden battery cost the South Lancashires of the 7th Brigade
forty-one casualties. Most of the fighting depended upon the
constant touch between the British cavalry and the German. It was
again the French armies upon each flank who did the hard work during
this eventful day, the first of the German retreat. The Sixth Army
were all day at close grips with Von Kluck, while the Fifth drove the
enemy back to the line of the Petit Morin River, carrying
Vieux-Maisons at the point of the bayonet. Foch's army, still
farther to the east, was holding its own in a desperate defensive
battle.
[Sidenote: Cavalry fighting.]
Of the cavalry skirmishes upon this day one deserves some special
record. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (De Lisle) was acting at the time as
flank {149} guard with the 9th Lancers in front. Coming into contact
with some German dragoons near the village of Moncel, there followed
a face-to-face charge between two squadrons, each riding through the
other. The American, Coleman, who saw the encounter, reckons the
odds in numbers to have been two to one against the Lancers. The
British Colonel Campbell was wounded, and the adjutant, Captain
Reynolds, transfixed through the shoulder by a lance. While drawing
the weapon out Captain Allfrey was killed. The other casualties were
slight, and those of the German dragoons were considerably greater.
This example of shock tactics was almost instantly followed by an
exhibition of those mounted rifleman tactics which have been
cultivated of late years. A squadron of the 18th Hussars, having
dismounted, was immediately charged by a German squadron in close
order. About 70 Germans charged, and 32 were picked up in front of
the dismounted Hussars, while the few who passed through the firing
line were destroyed by the horse-holders. It may fairly be argued
that had the two squadrons met with shock tactics, no such crushing
effect could possibly have been attained. It is interesting that in
one morning two incidents should have occurred which bore so directly
upon the perennial dispute between the partisans of the _arme
blanche_ and those of the rifle.
On the 8th the orders were to advance towards Chateau-Thierry and to
endeavour to reach the Marne. The Germans were retreating fast, but
rather on account of their generally faulty strategical position than
from tactical compulsion, and they covered themselves with continual
rearguard actions, especially along the line of the Petit Morin. It
is one of {150} the noticeable results, however, of the use of
aircraft that the bluff of a rearguard has disappeared and that it is
no longer possible to make such a retreat as Massena from Torres
Vedras, where the pursuer never knew if he were striking at a
substance or a shadow. Gough's Second Cavalry Division, which
consisted of the 3rd and 5th Brigades, swept along, and the infantry
followed hard at the heels of the horses, Doran's 8th Brigade
suffering the loss of about 100 men when held up at the crossing of
the Petit Morin River near Orly, which they traversed eventually
under an effective covering fire from J Battery, R.H.A.
The First Army Corps upon this day forced the Petit Morin at two
places, both near La Trétoire, north of Rebaix. The First Division
secured the passage at Sablonnières, where the Black Watch seized the
heights, causing the German rearguard some losses and taking 60
prisoners. The Second Division met with considerable resistance, but
the 2nd Worcesters got over at Le Gravier and the 2nd Grenadier
Guards at La Forge. The enemy was then driven from the river bank
into the woods, where they were practically surrounded and had
eventually to surrender. Eight machine-guns and 350 prisoners, many
of them from the Guards' Jaeger Battalion, were captured. Six of
these machine-guns fell to the Irish Guards.
The Second Army Corps passed the Petit Morin near St. Cyr and St.
Ouen, the 13th Brigade attacking the former and the 14th the latter,
both being villages on the farther side of the river. Such fighting
as there was in this quarter came largely to the 1st East Surrey and
1st Cornwalls, of the 14th Brigade, {151} but the resistance was not
great, and was broken by the artillery fire. To the soldiers engaged
the whole action was more like a route march with occasional
deployments than a battle.
On the 9th the Army was up to the Marne and was faced with the
problem of crossing it. The operations extending over many miles
were unimportant in detail, though of some consequence in the mass.
The real hard fighting was falling upon the Sixth French Army north
of Ligny, which was still in desperate conflict with the German
right, and upon Foch's army, which was fighting magnificently at
Fère-Champenoise. The advance of the British, and their own
exertions, caused the Germans to retire and cleared the passage over
the Ourcq for our Allies. The chief losses during the day upon the
British side fell upon the Guards' Brigade, the 1st Lincolns, and the
1st Cornwalls, most of which were inflicted by invisible quick-firing
batteries shrouded by the woods which flank the river. The latter
regiment lost Colonel Turner, Major Cornish-Bowden, and a number of
other killed or wounded in a brilliant piece of woodland fighting,
where they drove in a strong German rearguard. The 1st East Surrey,
who were very forward in the movement, were also hard hit, having 6
officers and about 120 men out of action.
[Sidenote: The 1st Lincolns and the guns.]
The British infantry was able on this day to show that woods may
serve for other purposes besides hiding batteries. The 1st Lincolns,
being held up a rapid and accurate fire from invisible guns,
dispatched two companies, C and D, to make in single file a detour
under the shelter of the trees. Coming behind the battery, which
appears to have had no immediate support, they poured in a rapid fire
at {152} two hundred and fifty yards, which laid every man of the
German gunners upon the ground. The whole battery was captured. The
casualties of the Lincolns in this dashing exploit, which included
Captains Hoskyns and Ellison, with Lieutenant Thruston, were
unavoidably caused by British shrapnel, our gunners knowing nothing
of the movement.
On this date (September 9) both the First and the Second Army Corps
were across the Marne, and advanced some miles to the north of it,
killing, wounding, or capturing many hundreds of the enemy. The
Sixth French Army was, as stated, fighting hard upon the Ourcq, but
the Fifth had won a brilliant success near Montmirail and driven the
enemy completely over the river.
Pulteney's Third Corps, still a division short, had been held up by
the destruction of the bridges at La Ferté, but on September 10 they
were across and the whole Army sweeping northwards. The cavalry
overrode all resistance and rounded up a number of prisoners, over
2000 in all. It was a strange reversal of fortune, for here within a
fortnight were the same two armies playing the converse parts, the
British eagerly pushing on with a flushed consciousness of victory,
while the Germans, tired and dispirited, scattered in groups among
the woods or were gathered up from the roadsides. It was a day of
mist and rain, with muddy, sodden roads, but all weather is fine
weather to the army that is gaining ground. An impression of
complete German demoralisation became more widespread as transport,
shells, and even guns were found littering the high-roads, and yet
there was really even less cause for it than when the same delusion
was held by the Germans. The {153} enemy were actually making a
hurried but orderly retreat, and these signs of disaster were only
the evidence of a broken rearguard resistance. German armies do not
readily dissolve. There is no more cohesive force in the world. But
they were undoubtedly hard pressed.
[Sidenote: 6th Brigade's action at Hautvesnes.]
About eight o'clock upon the morning of the 10th the 6th Brigade
(Davies') observed a column of the enemy's infantry on a parallel
road near the village of Hautvesnes. Artillery fire was at once
opened upon them, and a vigorous infantry attack, the 1st Rifles
advancing direct with the 1st Berkshires on their right, whilst the
1st King's Liverpool worked round each flank in Boer fashion. The
2nd Staffords were in support. The Germans had taken refuge in a
sunken road, but they were mercilessly lashed by shrapnel, and 400 of
them ran forward with their hands up. The sunken road was filled
with their dead and wounded. Some hundreds streamed away across
country, but these were mostly gathered up by the Third Division on
the left.
In this brisk little action the 50th R.F.A., and later the whole of
the 34th Brigade R.F.A., put in some fine work, the shrapnel-fire
being most deadly and accurate. The British had pushed their guns
freely forward with their cavalry and did much execution with them,
though they had the misfortune on this same date, the 10th, to lose,
by the answering shell-fire of the enemy, General Findlay, artillery
commander of the First Division. In this second action, in which the
German rearguard, infantry as well as artillery, was engaged, the 2nd
Sussex Regiment, which was leading the First Division, sustained
considerable losses near Courchamps or {154} Priez, as did the 1st
Northamptons and the 1st North Lancashires. Some 300 of Bulfin's 2nd
Brigade were hit altogether, among whom was Colonel Knight, of the
North Lancashires. The enemy came under heavy fire, both from the
infantry and from the guns, so that their losses were considerable,
and several hundred of them were captured. The country was very
hilly, and the roads so bad that in the exhausted state of men and
horses the pursuit could not be sufficiently pressed. Thirty large
motor cars were seen at Priez in front of the 2nd Brigade, carrying
the enemy's rearguard.
[Sidenote: 9th Brigade's capture of Germans at Vinly.]
On this same date the 9th Brigade captured 600 German infantry, the
survivors of a battalion, at the village of Vinly. This seems to
have been an incident of the same character as the loss of the
Cheshires or of the Munsters in the British retreat, where a body of
troops fighting a covering action was left too long, or failed to
receive the orders for its withdrawal. The defence was by no means a
desperate one, and few of the attacking infantry were killed or
wounded. On this date the Fifth and Sixth French Armies were hardly
engaged at all, and the whole Allied Force, including General Foch's
Seventh French Army on the right of the Fifth, were all sweeping
along together in a single rolling steel-crested wave, composed of at
least twelve army corps, whilst nine German corps (five of Von Kluck
and four of Bülow) retired swiftly before them, hurrying towards the
chance of re-forming and refitting which the Aisne position would
afford them.
On September 11 the British were still advancing upon a somewhat
narrowed front. There was no opposition and again the day bore a
considerable {155} crop of prisoners and other trophies. The weather
had become so foggy that the aircraft were useless, and it is only
when these wonderful scouters are precluded from rising that a
general realises how indispensable they have become to him. As a wit
expressed it, they have turned war from a game of cards into a game
of chess. It was still very wet, and the Army was exposed to
considerable privation, most of the officers and men having neither
change of clothing, overcoats, nor waterproof sheets, while the
blowing up of bridges on the lines of communication had made it
impossible to supply the wants. The undefeatable commissariat,
however, was still working well, which means that the Army was doing
the same. On the 12th the pursuit was continued as far as the River
Aisne. Allenby's cavalry occupied Braine in the early morning, the
Queen's Bays being particularly active, but there was so much
resistance that the Third Division was needed to make the ground
good. Gough's Cavalry Division also ran into the enemy near
Chassemy, killing or capturing several hundred of the German
infantry. In these operations Captain Stewart, whose experience as
an alleged spy has been mentioned, met with a soldier's death. On
this day the Sixth French Army was fighting a considerable action
upon the British left in the vicinity of Soissons, the Germans making
a stand in order to give time for their impedimenta to get over the
river. In this they succeeded, so that when the Allied Forces
reached the Aisne, which is an unfordable stream some sixty yards
from bank to bank, the retiring army had got across it, had destroyed
most of the bridges, and showed every sign of being prepared to
dispute the crossing.
{156}
[Sidenote: The problem of the Aisne.]
Missy Bridge, facing the Fifth Division, appeared at first to be
intact, but a daring reconnaissance by Lieutenant Pennecuick, of the
Engineers, showed that it was really badly damaged. Condé Bridge was
intact, but was so covered by a high horse-shoe formation of hills
upon the farther side that it could not be used, and remained
throughout under control of the enemy. Bourg Bridge, however, in
front of the First Army Corps, had for some unexplained reason been
left undamaged, and this was seized in the early morning of September
13 by De Lisle's cavalry, followed rapidly by Bulfin's 2nd Brigade.
It was on the face of it a somewhat desperate enterprise which lay
immediately in front of the British general. If the enemy were still
retreating he could not afford to slacken his pursuit, while, on the
other hand, if the enemy were merely making a feint of resistance,
then, at all hazards, the stream must be forced and the rearguard
driven in. The German infantry could be seen streaming up the roads
on the farther bank of the river, but there were no signs of what
their next disposition might be. Air reconnaissance was still
precluded, and it was impossible to say for certain which alternative
might prove to be correct, but Sir John French's cavalry training
must incline him always to the braver course. The officer who rode
through the Boers to Kimberley and threw himself with his weary men
across the path of the formidable Kronje was not likely to stand
hesitating upon the banks of the Aisne. His personal opinion was
that the enemy meant to stand and fight, but none the less the order
was given to cross.
September 13 was spent in arranging this dashing {157} and dangerous
movement. The British got across eventually in several places and by
various devices. Bulfin's men, followed by the rest of the First
Division of Haig's Army Corps, passed the canal bridge of Bourg with
no loss or difficulty. The 11th Brigade of Pulteney's Third Corps
got across by a partially demolished bridge and ferry at Venizel.
They were followed by the 12th Brigade, who established themselves
near Bucy. The 13th Brigade was held up at Missy, but the 14th got
across and lined up with the men of the Third Corps in the
neighbourhood of Ste. Marguerite, meeting with a considerable
resistance from the Germans. Later, Count Gleichen's 15th Brigade
also got across. On the right Hamilton got over with two brigades of
the Third Division, the 8th Brigade crossing on a single plank at
Vailly and the 9th using the railway bridge, while the whole of
Haig's First Corps had before evening got a footing upon the farther
bank. So eager was the advance and so inadequate the means that
Haking's 5th Brigade, led by the Connaught Rangers, was obliged to
get over the broad and dangerous river, walking in single file along
the sloping girder of a ruined bridge, under a heavy, though distant,
shell-fire. The night of September 13 saw the main body of the Army
across the river, already conscious of a strong rearguard action, but
not yet aware that the whole German Army had halted and was turning
at bay. On the right De Lisle's cavalrymen had pushed up the slope
from Bourg Bridge and reached as far as Vendresse, where they were
pulled up by the German lines.
It has been mentioned above that the 11th and 12th Brigades of the
Fourth Division had passed the {158} river at Venizel. These troops
were across in the early afternoon, and they at once advanced, and
proved that in that portion of the field the enemy were undoubtedly
standing fast. The 11th Brigade, which was more to the north, had
only a constant shell-fall to endure, but the 12th, pushing forward
through Bucy-le-long, found itself in front of a line of woods from
which there swept a heavy machine-gun- and rifle-fire. The advance
was headed by the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, supported by the 2nd
Inniskilling Fusiliers. It was across open ground and under heavy
fire, but it was admirably carried out. In places where the
machine-guns had got the exact range the stricken Fusiliers lay dead
or wounded with accurate intervals, like a firing-line on a
field-day. The losses were heavy, especially in the Lancashire
Fusiliers. Colonel Griffin was wounded, and 5 of his officers with
250 men were among the casualties. It should be recorded that fresh
supplies of ammunition were brought up at personal risk by Colonel
Seely, late Minister of War, in his motor-car. The contest continued
until dusk, when the troops waited for the battle of next day under
such cover as they could find.
The crossing of the stream may be said, upon the one side, to mark
the end of the battle and pursuit of the Marne, while, on the other,
it commenced that interminable Battle of the Aisne which was destined
to fulfil Bloch's prophecies and to set the type of all great modern
engagements. The prolonged struggles of the Manchurian War had
prepared men's minds for such a development, but only here did it
first assume its full proportions and warn us that the battle of the
future was to be the siege of the past. {159} Men remembered with a
smile Bernhardi's confident assertion that a German battle would be
decided in one day, and that his countrymen would never be
constrained to fight in defensive trenches.
The moral effect of the Battle of the Marne was greater than its
material gains. The latter, so far as the British were concerned,
did not exceed 5000 prisoners, 20 guns, and a quantity of transport.
The total losses, however, were very heavy. The Germans had
perfected a method of burning their dead with the aid of petrol.
These numerous holocausts over the country-side were found afterwards
by the peasants to have left mounds of charred animal matter which
were scattered by their industrious hands on the fields which they
might help to fertilise. The heat of cremation had dissolved the
bones, but the teeth in most cases remained intact, so that over an
area of France it was no uncommon thing to see them gleaming in the
clods on either side of the new-cut furrow. Had the ring of
high-born German criminals who planned the war seen in some
apocalyptic vision the detailed results of their own villainy, it is
hard to doubt that even their hearts and consciences would have
shrunk from the deed.
Apart from the losses, the mere fact that a great German army had
been hustled across thirty miles of country, had been driven from
river to river, and had finally to take refuge in trenches in order
to hold their ground, was a great encouragement to the Allies. From
that time they felt assured that with anything like equal numbers
they had an ascendancy over their opponents. Save in the matter of
heavy guns and machine-guns, there was not a single arm {160} in
which they did not feel that they were the equals or the superiors.
Nor could they forget that this foe, whom they were driving in the
open and holding in the trenches, was one who had rushed into the war
with men and material all carefully prepared for this day of battle,
while their own strength lay in the future. If the present was
bright, it would surely be incomparably brighter when the reserves of
France and the vast resources of the British Empire were finally
brought into line. There had never from the beginning been a doubt
of final victory, but from this time on it became less an opinion and
more a demonstrable and mathematical certainty.
[Sidenote: Why the Marne is one of the great battles of all time.]
The battle must also be regarded as a fixed point in military
history, since it was the first time since the days of the great
Napoleon that a Prussian army had been turned and driven. In three
successive wars--against the Danes, the Austrians, and the
French--they had lived always in the warm sunshine of success. Now,
at last, came the first chill of disaster. Partly from their
excellent military qualities, but even more on account of their
elaborate and methodical preparations, joined with a want of scruple
which allowed them to force a war at the moment when they could take
their adversary at a disadvantage, they had established a legend of
invincibility. This they left behind them with their cannon and
their prisoners between the Marne and the Aisne. It had been feared
that free men, trained in liberal and humane methods, could never
equal in military efficiency those who had passed through the savage
discipline which is the heritage of the methods that first made
Prussia great at the expense {161} of her neighbours. This shadow
was henceforth for ever lifted from men's minds, and it was shown
that the kindly comradeship which exists in the Western armies
between officers and men was not incompatible with the finest
fighting qualities of which any soldiers are capable.
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