When in the early spring of 1880 Sir Donald Stewart quitted Candahar
with the Bengal division of his force, he left there the Bombay
division, to the command of which General Primrose acceded, General
Phayre assuming charge of the communications. The province during the
early summer was fairly quiet, but it was known that Ayoub Khan was
making hostile preparations at Herat, although the reports as to his
intentions and movements were long uncertain and conflicting. Shere Ali
Khan, who had been Governor of Candahar during Stewart's residence
there, had been nominated hereditary ruler of the province with the
title of 'Wali,' when it was determined to separate Candahar from
North-Eastern Afghanistan. On June 21st the Wali, who had some days
earlier crossed the Helmund and occupied Girishk with his troops,
reported that Ayoub was actually on the march toward the Candahar
frontier, and asked for the support of a British brigade to enable him
to cope with the hostile advance. There was reason to believe that the
Wali's troops were disaffected, and that he was in no condition to meet
Ayoub's army with any likelihood of success. After Stewart's departure
the strength of the British forces at Candahar was dangerously low--only
4700 of all ranks; but it was important to thwart Ayoub's offensive
movement, and a brigade consisting of a troop of horse-artillery, six
companies of the 66th, two Bombay native infantry regiments, and 500
native troopers, in all about 2300 strong, under the command of
Brigadier-General Burrows, reached the left bank of the Helmund on July
11th. On the 13th the Wali's infantry, 2000 strong, mutinied _en masse_
and marched away up the right bank of the river, taking with them a
battery of smooth bore guns, a present to Shere Ali Khan from the
British Government. His cavalry did not behave quite so badly, but, not
to go into detail, his army no longer existed, and Burrows' brigade was
the only force in the field to resist the advance of Ayoub Khan, whose
regular troops were reported to number 4000 cavalry, and from 4000 to
5000 infantry exclusive of the 2000 deserters from the Wali, with thirty
guns and an irregular force of uncertain strength.
[Illustration: ACTION AT MAIWAND. 27th. July 1880.]
Burrows promptly recaptured from the Wali's infantry the battery they
were carrying off, and punished them severely. The mutineers had removed
or destroyed the supplies which the Wali had accumulated for the use of
the brigade, and General Burrows therefore could no longer remain in the
vicinity of Girishk. The Helmund owing to the dry season was passable
everywhere, so that nothing was to be gained by watching the fords. It
was determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nakhud, a point distant thirty
miles from Girishk and forty-five from Candahar, where several roads
from the Helmund converged and where supplies were plentiful. At and
near Khushk-i-Nakhud the brigade remained from the 16th until the
morning of the 27th July. While waiting and watching there a despatch
from army headquarters at Simla was communicated to General Burrows from
Candahar, authorising him to attack Ayoub if he thought himself strong
enough to beat him, and informing him that it was considered of the
greatest political importance that the force from Herat should be
dispersed and prevented from moving on toward Ghuznee. Spies brought in
news that Ayoub had reached Girishk, and was distributing his force
along the right bank between that place and Hydrabad. Cavalry patrols
failed to find the enemy until the 21st, when a detachment was
encountered in the village of Sangbur on the northern road about midway
between the Helmund and Khushk-i-Nakhud. Next day that village was found
more strongly occupied, and on the 23d a reconnaissance in force came
upon a body of Ayoub's horsemen in the plain below the Garmao hills,
about midway between Sangbur and Maiwand.
Those discoveries were tolerably clear indications of Ayoub's intention
to turn Burrows' position by moving along the northern road to Maiwand
and thence pressing on through the Maiwand pass, until at Singiri
Ayoub's army should have interposed itself between the brigade and
Candahar. There was certainly nothing impossible in such an endeavour,
since Maiwand is nearer Candahar than is Khushk-i-Nakhud. Why, in the
face of the information at his disposal and of the precautions enjoined
on him to hinder Ayoub from slipping by him toward Ghuznee through
Maiwand and up the Khakrez valley, General Burrows should have remained
so long at Khushk-i-Nakhud, is not intelligible. He was stirred at
length on the afternoon of the 26th, by the report that 2000 of Yakoub's
cavalry and a large body of his ghazees were in possession of Garmao and
Maiwand, and were to be promptly followed by Ayoub himself with the main
body of his army, his reported intention being to push on through the
Maiwand pass and reach the Urgundab valley in rear of the British
brigade. Later in the day Colonel St John, the political officer,
reported to General Burrows the intelligence which had reached him that
the whole of Ayoub's army was at Sangbur; but credence was not given to
the information.
The somewhat tardy resolution was taken to march to Maiwand on the
morning of the 27th. There was the expectation that the brigade would
arrive at that place before the enemy should have occupied it in force,
and this point made good there might be the opportunity to drive out of
Garmao the body of Yakoub's cavalry reported in possession there. There
was a further reason why Maiwand should be promptly occupied; the
brigade had been obtaining its supplies from that village, and there was
still a quantity of grain in its vicinity to lose which would be
unfortunate. The brigade, now 2600 strong, struck camp on the morning of
the 27th. The march to Maiwand was twelve miles long, and an earlier
start than 6.30 would have been judicious. The soldiers marched fast,
but halts from time to time were necessary to allow the baggage to come
up; the hostile state of the country did not admit of anything being
left behind and the column was encumbered by a great quantity of stores
and baggage. At Karezah, eight miles from Khushk-i-Nakhud and four miles
south-west of Maiwand, information was brought in that the whole of
Yakoub's army was close by on the left front of the brigade, and
marching toward Maiwand. The spies had previously proved themselves so
untrustworthy that small heed was taken of this report; but a little
later a cavalry reconnaissance found large bodies of cavalry moving in
the direction indicated and inclining away toward Garmao as the brigade
advanced. A thick haze made it impossible to discern what force, if any,
was being covered by the cavalry. About ten A.M. the advance guard
occupied the village of Mundabad, about three miles south-west of
Maiwand. West of Mundabad, close to the village, was a broad and deep
ravine running north and south. Beyond this ravine was a wide expanse of
level and partially cultivated plain across which, almost entirely
concealed by the haze, Ayoub's army was marching eastward toward Maiwand
village, which covers the western entrance to the pass of the same name.
If General Burrows' eye could have penetrated that haze, probably he
would have considered it prudent to take up a defensive position, for
which Mundabad presented many advantages. But he was firm in the
conviction that the enemy's guns were not up, notwithstanding the
reports of spies to the contrary; he believed that a favourable
opportunity presented itself for taking the initiative, and he resolved
to attack with all possible speed.
Lieutenant Maclaine of the Horse-Artillery, a gallant young officer who
was soon to meet a melancholy fate, precipitated events in a somewhat
reckless fashion. With the two guns he commanded he crossed the ravine,
galloped across the plain, and opened fire on a body of Afghan cavalry
which had just come within view. General Nuttall, commanding the cavalry
and horse-artillery, failing to recall Maclaine, sent forward in support
of him the four remaining guns of the battery. Those approached to
within 800 yards of the two advanced pieces, and Maclaine was directed
to fall back upon the battery pending the arrival of the brigade, which
General Burrows was now sending forward. It crossed the ravine near
Mundabad, advanced on the plain about a mile in a north-westerly
direction, and then formed up. There were several changes in the
dispositions; when the engagement became warm about noon the formation
was as follows:--The 66th foot was on the right, its right flank thrown
back to check an attempt made to turn it by a rush of ghazees springing
out of the ravine in the British front; on the left of the 66th were
four companies of Jacob's Rifles (30th Native Infantry) and a company of
sappers, the centre was occupied by the horse-artillery and smooth bore
guns, of which latter, however, two had been moved to the right flank;
on the left of the guns were the 1st Grenadiers somewhat refused, and on
the extreme left two companies of Jacob's Rifles. The cavalry was in the
rear, engaged in efforts to prevent the Afghans from taking the British
infantry in reverse. The position was radically faulty, and indeed
invited disaster. Both flanks were _en l'air_ in face of an enemy of
greatly superior strength; almost from the first every rifle was in the
fighting line, and the sole reserve consisted of the two cavalry
regiments. The baggage had followed the brigade across the ravine and
was halted about 1000 yards in rear of the right, inadequately guarded
by cavalry detachments.
For half-an-hour no reply was made to the British shell fire, and an
offensive movement at this time might have resulted in success. But
presently battery after battery was brought into action by the Afghans,
until half-an-hour after noon the fire of thirty guns was concentrated
on the brigade. Under cover of this artillery fire the ghazees from the
ravine charged forward to within 500 yards of the 66th, but the rifle
fire of the British regiment drove them back with heavy loss, and they
recoiled as far as the ravine, whence they maintained a desultory fire.
The enemy's artillery fire was well sustained and effective; the
infantry found some protection from it in lying down, but the artillery
and cavalry remained exposed and suffered severely. An artillery duel
was maintained for two hours, greatly to the disadvantage of the
brigade, which had but twelve guns in action against thirty well-served
Afghan pieces. The prostrate infantry had escaped serious punishment,
but by two P.M. the cavalry had lost fourteen per cent, of the men in
the front line, and 149 horses; the Afghan horsemen had turned both
flanks and the brigade was all but surrounded, while a separate attack
was being made on the baggage. Heat and want of water were telling
heavily on the sepoys, who were further demoralised by the Afghan
artillery fire.
A little later the smooth bore guns had to be withdrawn for want of
ammunition. This was the signal for a general advance of the Afghans.
Their guns were pushed forward with great boldness; their cavalry
streamed round the British left; in the right rear were masses of
mounted and dismounted irregulars who had seized the villages on the
British line of retreat. Swarms of ghazees soon showed themselves
threatening the centre and left; those in front of the 66th were still
held in check by the steady volleys fired by that regiment. At sight of
the ghazees, and cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of their
officers, the two companies of Jacob's Rifles on the left suddenly fell
into confusion, and broke into the ranks of the Grenadiers. That
regiment had behaved well but it caught the infection of demoralisation,
the whole left collapsed, and the sepoys in utter panic, surrounded by
and intermingled with the ghazees, rolled in a great wave upon the
right. The artillerymen and sappers made a gallant stand, fighting the
ghazees hand-to-hand with handspikes and rammers, while the guns poured
canister into the advancing masses. Slade reluctantly limbered up and
took his four guns out of action; Maclaine remained in action until the
ghazees were at the muzzles of his two guns, which fell into the enemy's
hands. The torrent of mingled sepoys and ghazees broke in upon the 66th,
and overwhelmed that regiment. The slaughter of the sepoys was
appalling--so utterly cowed were they that they scarcely attempted to
defend themselves, and allowed themselves without resistance to be
dragged out of the ranks and killed. A cavalry charge was ordered in the
direction of the captured guns, but it failed and the troopers retired
in disorder. The infantry, assailed by hordes of fierce and triumphant
ghazees, staggered away to the right, the 66th alone maintaining any
show of formation, until the ravine was crossed, when the broken
remnants of the sepoy regiments took to flight toward the east and the
General's efforts to rally them were wholly unavailing. The 66th with
some of the sappers and grenadiers, made a gallant stand round its
colours in an enclosure near the village of Khig. There Colonel
Galbraith and several of his officers were killed, and the little body
of brave men becoming outflanked, continued its retreat, making stand
after stand until most were slain. The Afghans pursued for about four
miles, but were checked by a detachment of rallied cavalry, and
desisted. The fugitives, forming with wounded and baggage a straggling
column upwards of six miles long, crossed the waterless desert sixteen
miles wide, to Hanz-i-Madat, which was reached about midnight and where
water was found. From Asu Khan, where cultivation began, to Kokoran near
Candahar, the retreat was harassed by armed villagers and the troops had
to fight more or less all the way. Officers and men were killed,
Lieutenant Maclaine was taken prisoner, and five of the smooth bore guns
had to be abandoned because of the exhaustion of the teams. About midday
of the 28th the broken remnants of the brigade reached Candahar. When
the casualties were ascertained it became evident how disastrous to the
British arms had been the combat of Maiwand. Out of a total of 2476
engaged no fewer than 964 were killed. The wounded numbered 167; 331
followers and 201 horses were killed and seven followers and sixty-eight
horses wounded. Since Chillianwallah the British arms in Asia had not
suffered loss so severe.
The spirit of the Candahar force suffered materially from the Maiwand
disaster, and it was held that there was no alternative but to accept
the humiliation of a siege within the fortified city. The cantonments
were abandoned, the whole force was withdrawn into Candahar, and was
detailed for duty on the city walls. The effective garrison on the night
of the 28th numbered 4360, including the survivors of the Maiwand
brigade. So alert were the Afghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on
the morning of the 29th, found the cantonments plundered and partly
burned and the vicinity of Candahar swarming with armed men. The whole
Afghan population amounting to about 12,000 persons, were compelled to
leave the city, and then the work of placing it in a state of defence
was energetically undertaken. Buildings and enclosures affording cover
too close to the enciente were razed, communication along the walls was
opened up, and gun platforms were constructed in the more commanding
positions. The walls were both high and thick, but they were
considerably dilapidated and there were gaps and breaks in the bastions
and parapet. The weak places as well as the gates were fronted with
abattis, the defects were made good with sandbags, and wire
entanglements and other obstructions were laid down outside the walls.
While this work was in progress the covering parties were in daily
collision with the enemy, and occasional sharp skirmishes occurred.
On the 8th August Ayoub opened fire on the citadel from Picquet hill, an
elevation north-westward of the city, and a few days later he brought
guns into action from the villages of Deh Khoja and Deh Khati on the
east and south. This fire, steadily maintained though it was day after
day, had little effect, and the return fire gave good results. It was
not easy to invest the city since on the west and north there was no
cover for the besiegers, but in Deh Khoja on the east there was ample
protection for batteries, and the ground on the south-west was very
favourable. Its advantages were improved so skilfully that it was at one
time believed there was a European engineer in Ayoub's camp. Deh Khoja
was inconveniently near the Cabul gate, and was always full of men. So
menacing was the attitude of the Afghans that a sortie was resolved on
against the village, which was conducted with resolution but resulted in
utter failure. The attempt was made on the morning of the 16th. The
cavalry went out to hinder reinforcements from entering the village from
the eastward. An infantry force 800 strong commanded by
Brigadier-General Brooke and divided into three parties, moved out later
covered by a heavy artillery fire from the city walls. The village was
reached, but was so full of enemies in occupation of the fortress-like
houses that it was found untenable, and the three detachments extricated
themselves separately. In the course of the retirement General Brooke
and Captain Cruickshank were killed. The casualties were very heavy; 106
were killed and 117 were wounded.
The tidings of the Maiwand disaster reached Cabul on the 29th July by
telegram from Simla. The intention of the military authorities had
already been intimated that the Cabul force should evacuate Afghanistan
in two separate bodies and by two distinct routes. Sir Donald Stewart
was to march one portion by the Khyber route; the other under Sir
Frederick Roberts was to retire by the Kuram valley, which Watson's
division had been garrisoning since Roberts had crossed the Shutargurdan
in September 1879. But the Maiwand news interfered with those
arrangements. Stewart and Roberts concurred in the necessity of
retrieving the Maiwand disaster by the despatch of a division from
Cabul. Roberts promptly offered to lead that division, and as promptly
the offer was accepted by Stewart. By arrangement with the latter
Roberts telegraphed to Simla urging that a force should be despatched
from Cabul without delay; and recognising that the authorities might
hesitate to send on this errand troops already under orders to return to
India, he took it on himself to guarantee that none of the soldiers
would demur, providing he was authorised to give the assurance that
after the work in the field was over they would not be detained in
garrison at Candahar. The Viceroy's sanction came on the 3d August. The
constitution and equipment of the force were entrusted to the two
generals; and in reply to questions His Excellency was informed that
Roberts would march on the 8th and expected to reach Candahar on 2d
September. Sir Donald Stewart gave his junior full freedom to select the
troops to accompany him, and placed at his disposal the entire resources
of the army in transport and equipment. It cannot truly be said that it
was the _elite_ of the Cabul field force which constituted the column
led by Roberts in his famous march to Candahar. Of the native infantry
regiments of his own original force which he had mustered eleven months
previously in the Kuram only two followed him to Candahar, the 5th
Goorkhas and 23d Pioneers, and the second mountain battery adhered to
him staunchly, Of his original white troops the 9th Lancers, as ever,
were ready for the march. His senior infantry regiment, the 67th, would
fain have gone, but the good old corps was weak from casualties and
sickness, and the gallant Knowles denied himself in the interests of his
men. The two Highland regiments, the 72d and 92d, had done an infinity
of fighting and marching, but both had received strong drafts, were in
fine condition, and were not to be hindered from following the chief
whom, though not of their northern blood, the stalwart sons of the mist
swore by as one man.
Sir Frederick Roberts had already represented that it would be impolitic
to require the native regiments to remain absent from India and their
homes for a longer period than two years. In the case of many of the
regiments that term was closely approached, and the men after prolonged
absence and arduous toil needed rest and were longing to rejoin their
families. 'It was not,' in the words of General Chapman, 'with eager
desire that the honour of marching to Candahar was sought for, and some
commanding officers of experience judged rightly the tempers of their
men when they represented for the General's consideration the claims of
the regiments they commanded to be relieved as soon as possible from
field service.... The enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick Roberts'
force with exceptional rapidity to Candahar was an after-growth evolved
by the enterprise itself, and came as a response to the unfailing spirit
which animated the leader himself.' The constitution of the force was
made known by the general orders published on 3d August. It consisted of
three batteries of artillery commanded by Colonel Alured Johnson; of a
cavalry brigade of four regiments commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh
Gough; and of an infantry division of three brigades commanded by
Major-General John Ross. The first brigade was commanded by
Brigadier-General Herbert Macpherson, the second by Brigadier-General T.
D. Baker, and the third by Brigadier-General Charles Macgregor. Colonel
Chapman, R.A., who had served in the same capacity with Sir Donald
Stewart, was now Roberts' chief of staff. The marching out strength of
the column was about 10,000 men, of whom 2835 were Europeans. Speed
being an object and since the column might have to traverse rough
ground, no wheeled artillery or transport accompanied it; the guns were
carried on mules, the baggage was severely cut down, the supplies
carried were reduced to a minimum, and the transport animals, numbering
8590, consisted of mules, ponies, and donkeys. It was known that the
country could supply flour, sheep, and forage.
The time specified for the departure of the force from Sherpur was kept
to the day. On the 8th the brigades moved out a short distance into
camp, and on the following morning the march begun in earnest. The
distance from Cabul to Candahar is about 320 miles, and the march
naturally divides itself into three parts; from Cabul to Ghuznee,
ninety-eight miles; from Ghuznee to Khelat-i-Ghilzai, one hundred and
thirty-four miles; and from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Candahar, eighty-eight
miles, Ghuznee was reached on the seventh day, the daily average being
fourteen miles--excellent work for troops unseasoned to long continuous
travel, tramping steadily in a temperature of from 84° to 92° in the
shade. When possible the force moved on a broad front, the brigades and
regiments leading by rotation, and halts were made at specified
intervals. The 'rouse' sounded at 2.45 A.M. and the march began at four;
the troops were generally in camp by two P.M. and the baggage was
usually reported all in by five; but the rear-guard had both hard work
and long hours. There was no sign of opposition anywhere, not a single
load of baggage was left behind, comparatively few men fell out
foot-sore, and the troops were steadily increasing in endurance and
capacity of rapid and continuous marching.
At Ghuznee there was no rest day, and the steadfast dogged march was
resumed on the morning of the 16th. The strain of this day's long tramp
of twenty miles to Yergati was severe, but the men rallied gamely, and
the General by dint of care and expedient was able to keep up the high
pressure. 'The method,' writes General Chapman, 'of such marching as was
now put in practice is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of
freedom in movement with carefully regulated halts, and the closest
control in every portion of the column; it employed the individual
intelligence of each man composing the masses in motion, and called on
all for exertion in overcoming the difficulties of the march, in bearing
its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishment of the object
in view.' On the 20th a distance of twenty-one miles was covered--the
longest day's march made; the effort was distressing owing to the heat
and the lack of shade, but it was enforced by the absence of water.
There was no relaxation in the rate of marching, and Khelat-i-Ghilzai
was reached on the eighth day from Ghuznee, showing a daily average of
nearly seventeen miles.
The 24th was a halt day at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, where Sir Frederick Roberts
received a letter from General Primrose in Candahar, describing the
sortie made on the village of Deh Khoja and giving details of his
situation. It was resolved to evacuate Khelat-i-Ghilzai and take on its
garrison with the column, which on the 25th resumed its march to
Candahar. On his arrival at Tir Andaz on the following day the General
found a letter from Candahar, informing him that at the news of the
approach of the Cabul force Ayoub Khan had withdrawn from his investment
of Candahar, and had shifted his camp to the village of Mazra in the
Urgundab valley, nearly due north of Candahar. On the morning of the
27th General Hugh Gough was sent forward with two cavalry regiments a
distance of thirty-four miles to Robat, the main column moving on to
Khel Akhund, half way to the former place. Gough was accompanied by
Captain Straton the principal signalling officer of the force, who was
successful in communicating with Candahar, and in the afternoon Colonel
St John, Major Leach, and Major Adam rode out to Robat, bringing the
information that Ayoub Khan was engaged in strengthening his position in
the Urgundab valley, and apparently had the intention to risk the issue
of a battle. On the 28th the whole force was concentrated at Robat; and
as it was desirable that the troops should reach Candahar fresh and
ready for prompt action, the General decided to make the 20th a rest day
and divide the nineteen miles from Robat to Candahar into two short
marches.
The long forced march from Cabul may be regarded as having ended at
Robat. The distance between those two places, 303 miles, had been
covered in twenty days. It is customary in a long march to allow two
rest days in each week, but Roberts had granted his force but a single
rest day in the twenty days of its strenuous march. Including this rest
day, the average daily march was a fraction over fifteen miles. As a
feat of marching by a regular force of 10,000 men encumbered with
baggage and followers, this achievement is unique, and it could have
been accomplished only by thorough organisation and steady vigorous
energy. Sir Frederick Roberts was so fortunate as to encounter no
opposition. For this immunity he was indebted mainly to the stern
lessons given to the tribesmen by Sir Donald Stewart at Ahmed Khel and
Urzoo while that resolute soldier was marching from Candahar to Cabul,
and in a measure also to the good offices of the new Ameer. But it must
be remembered that Roberts had no assurance of exemption from hostile
efforts to block his path, and that he marched ever ready to fight. It
will long be remembered how when Roberts had started on the long swift
march, the suspense as to its issue grew and swelled until the strain
became intense. The safety of the garrison of Candahar was in grave
hazard; the British prestige, impaired by the disaster of Maiwand, was
trembling in the balance. The days passed, and there came no news of
Roberts and of the 10,000 men with whom the wise, daring little chief
had cut loose from any base and struck for his goal through a region of
ill repute for fanaticism and bitter hostility. The pessimists among us
held him to be rushing on his ruin. But Roberts marched light; he lived
on what the country supplied; he gave the tribesmen no time to
concentrate against him; and two days in advance of the time he had set
himself he reached Candahar at the head of a force in full freshness of
vigour and burning with zeal for immediate battle.
While halted at Robat on the 29th Sir Frederick heard from General
Phayre that his division had been retarded in its march by lack of
transport, but that he hoped to have it assembled at Killa Abdoolla on
the 28th, and would be able to move toward Candahar on the 30th. But as
Killa Abdoolla is distant some eight marches from Candahar, it was
obvious that General Phayre could not arrive in time to share in the
impending battle. On the morning of the 31st the Cabul force reached
Candahar. Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been suffering from fever for
some days, was able to leave his dhooly and mount his horse in time to
meet General Primrose and his officers to the east of Deh Khoja. The
troops halted and breakfasted outside the Shikapore gate, while General
Roberts entered the city and paid a visit to the Wali Shere Ali Khan. On
his arrival he assumed command of the troops in Southern Afghanistan;
and he remained resting in the city while the Cabul force marched to its
selected camping ground near the destroyed cantonments on the north-west
of Candahar. A few shots were fired, but the ground was occupied without
opposition. Baker's brigade was on the right, camped in rear of Picquet
hill, in the centre was Macpherson's brigade sheltered in its front by
Karez hill, and on the left among orchards and enclosures was
Macgregor's brigade, in rear of which was the cavalry.