The occupation of Afghanistan by the British troops had been prolonged
far beyond the period originally intended by the authorities. But the
strain of that occupation was great, and although it had to be
maintained until there should be found a ruler strong enough to hold his
own after the evacuation, the decision was definitely arrived at to
withdraw from the country before the setting in of another winter. Mr
Lepel Griffin, a distinguished member of the political department of the
Indian Civil Service, reached Cabul on 20th March, his mission being to
further the selection and acceptance of a capable ruler to be left in
possession. The task was no easy one. There was little promise in any of
the Barakzai pretenders who were in Afghanistan, and in the address
which Mr Griffin addressed in Durbar to a number of sirdars and chiefs
in the middle of April, he preserved a tone at once haughty and
enigmatical. One thing he definitely announced, the Viceroy's decision
that Yakoub Khan was not to return to Afghanistan. The State was to be
dismembered. As to the future of Herat the speaker made no allusion; but
the province of Candahar was to be separated from Cabul and placed under
an independent Barakzai prince. No decision could for the present be
given in regard to the choice of an Ameer to rule over Cabul. The
Government desired to nominate an Ameer strong enough to govern his
people and steadfast in his friendship to the British; if those
qualifications could be secured the Government was willing and anxious
to recognise the wish of the Afghan people, and nominate an Ameer of
their choice.
But in effect the choice, so far as the English were concerned, had been
already virtually made. On the 14th of March Lord Lytton had telegraphed
to the Secretary of State advocating the 'early public recognition of
Abdurrahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and the despatch of a
deputation of sirdars, with British concurrence, to offer him the
throne, as sole means of saving the country from anarchy'; and the
Minister had promptly replied authorising the nomination of Abdurrahman,
should he be found 'acceptable to the country and would be contented
with Northern Afghanistan.' Abdurrahman had known strange vicissitudes.
He was the eldest grandson of the old Dost; his father was Afzul Khan,
the elder brother of Shere Ali. After the death of the Dost he had been
an exile in Bokhara, but he returned to Balkh, of which province his
father had been Governor until removed by Shere Ali, made good his
footing there, and having done so advanced on Cabul, taking advantage of
Shere Ali's absence at Candahar. The capital opened its gates to him in
March 1866; he fought a successful battle with Shere Ali at Sheikabad,
occupied Ghuznee, and proclaimed his father Ameer. Those were triumphs,
but soon the wheel came round full circle. Afzul had but a short life as
Ameer, and Abdurrahman had to retire to Afghan Turkestan. Yakoub, then
full of vigour and enterprise, defeated him at Bamian and restored his
father Shere Ali to the throne in the winter of 1868. Abdurrahman then
once more found himself an exile. In 1870, after much wandering, he
reached Tashkend, where General Kaufmann gave him permission to reside,
and obtained for him from the Czar a pension of 25,000 roubles per
annum. Petrosvky, a Russian writer who professed to be intimate with him
during his period of exile, wrote of him that, 'To get square some day
with the English and Shere Ali was Abdurrahman's most cherished thought,
his dominant, never-failing passion.' His hatred of Shere Ali, his
family, and supporters, was intelligible and natural enough, but why he
should have entertained a bitter grudge against the English is not very
apparent; and there has been no overt manifestation of its existence
since he became Ameer. To Mr Eugene Schuyler, who had an interview with
him at Tashkend, he expressed his conviction that with £50,000 wherewith
to raise and equip an army he could attain his legitimate position as
Ameer of Afghanistan. Resolutely bent on an effort to accomplish this
purpose, he was living penuriously and saving the greater part of his
pension, and he hinted that he might have Russian assistance in the
prosecution of his endeavour. The selection of a man of such antecedents
and associations as the ruler of a 'buffer' state in friendly relations
with British India was perhaps the greatest leap in the dark on record.
Abdurrahman came straight from the position of a Russian pensionary; in
moving on Afghanistan he obeyed Russian instructions; his Tashkend
patrons had furnished him with a modest equipment of arms and money, the
value of which he undertook to repay if successful. It is of course
possible that those functionaries of a notoriously simple and ingenuous
government started and equipped him in pure friendly good nature,
although they had previously consistently deterred him. But there was
not a circumstance in connection with Abdurrahman that was not
suspicious. Three distinct hypotheses seem to present themselves in
relation to this selection as our nominee; that Lord Lytton had
extraordinary, almost indeed preternatural foresight and sagacity; that
he was extremely fortunate in his leap in the dark; that he desired to
bring to the naked _reductio ad absurdum_ the 'buffer state' policy.
When Abdurrahman began his movement is uncertain. So early as the middle
of January it was reported at Sherpur that he had left Tashkend, and was
probably already on the Afghan side of the Oxus. In a letter of February
17th Mr Hensman speaks of him as being in Badakshan, where his wife's
kinsmen were in power, and describes him as having a following of 2000
or 3000 Turcoman horsemen and possessed according to native report of
twelve lakhs of rupees. On the 17th of March Lord Lytton telegraphed to
the Secretary of State that he was in possession of 'authentic
intelligence that the Sirdar was in Afghan Turkestan, having lately
arrived there from Badakshan.'
[Illustration: The Ameer Abdurrahman.]
It was regarded of urgent importance to ascertain definitely the
disposition of Abdurrahman, and whether he was disposed to throw in his
lot with the British Government, and accept the position of its nominee
in Northern Afghanistan. The agent selected by Mr Griffin to open
preliminary negotiations was a certain Mohamed Surwar, Ghilzai, who had
been all his life in the confidential service of the Sirdar's family.
Surwar was the bearer of a formal and colourless letter by way simply of
authentication; but he also carried full and explicit verbal
instructions. He was directed to inform the Sirdar that since he had
entered Afghan Turkestan and occupied places there by force of arms, it
was essential for him to declare with what object he had come, and
whether actuated by friendly or hostile feelings toward the British
Government, which for its part had no ill-feeling toward him because of
his long residence within the Russian Empire and his notoriously close
relations with that power. That the British Government was able to
benefit him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and that
wisdom and self interest alike suggested that he should at once open a
friendly correspondence with the British officers in Cabul. That his
opportunity was now come, and that the British Government was disposed
to treat him with every consideration and to consider most favourably
any representations he might make. It had no intention of annexing the
country, and only desired to see a strong and friendly chief established
at Cabul; and that consequently the present communication was made
solely in Abdurrahman's own interest, and not in that of the British
Government. He was desired to send a reply by Surwar, and later to
repair to Cabul, where he should be honourably received.
Surwar returned to Cabul on 21st April, bringing a reply from
Abdurrahman to Mr Griffin's letter. The tone of the reply was friendly
enough, but somewhat indefinite. In conversation with Surwar as reported
by the latter, Abdurrahman was perfectly frank as to his relations with
the Russians, and his sentiments in regard to them. It had been reported
that he had made his escape clandestinely from Tashkend. Had he cared to
stand well with us at the expense of truth, it would have been his cue
to disclaim all authority or assistance from the Russian Government, to
confirm the current story of his escape, and to profess his anxiety to
cultivate friendly relations with the British in a spirit of opposition
to the power in whose territory he had lived so long virtually as a
prisoner. But neither in writing nor in conversation did he make any
concealment of his friendliness toward the Russians, a feeling which he
clearly regarded as nowise incompatible with friendly relations with the
British Government. 'If,' said he to Surwar, 'the English will in
sincerity befriend me, I have no wish to hide anything from them'; and
he went on to tell how the Russians had forbidden him for years to make
any effort to interfere in Afghan affairs. This prohibition stood until
information reached Tashkend of the deportation of Yakoub Khan to India.
Then it was that General Kaufmann's representative said to him: 'You
have always been anxious to return to your country; the English have
removed Yakoub Khan; the opportunity is favourable; if you wish you are
at liberty to go.' The Russians, continued Abdurrahman, pressed him most
strongly to set out on the enterprise which lay before him. They lent
him 33,000 rupees, and arms, ammunition, and supplies; he was bound to
the Russians by no path or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude.
'I should never like,' said he, 'to be obliged to fight them. I have
eaten their salt, and was for twelve years dependent on their
hospitality.'
Surwar reported Abdurrahman as in fine health and possessed of great
energy. He had with him a force of about 3000 men, consisting of four
infantry and two cavalry regiments, with twelve guns and some
irregulars. He professed his readiness, in preference to conducting
negotiations through agents, to go himself to Charikar in the Kohistan
with an escort, and there discuss matters with the English officers in
person. Surwar testified that the Sirdar had with him in Turkestan no
Russian or Russian agent, and this was confirmed through other sources.
He had sent forward to ascertain which was the easiest pass across the
Hindoo Koosh, but meanwhile he was to remain at Kondooz until he should
hear again from Mr Griffin.
While the wary Sirdar waited on events beyond the Hindoo Koosh he was
sending letters to the leading chiefs of the Kohistan and the Cabul
province, desiring them to be ready to support his cause. That he had an
influential party was made clear at a durbar held by Mr Griffin on April
21st, when a considerable gathering of important chiefs united in the
request that Abdurrahman's claim to the Ameership should be favourably
regarded by the British authorities. In pursuance of the negotiations a
mission consisting of three Afghan gentlemen, two of whom belonged to Mr
Griffin's political staff, left Cabul on May 2nd carrying to Abdurrahman
a letter from Mr Griffin intimating that it had been decided to withdraw
the British army from Afghanistan in the course of a few months, and
that the British authorities desired to leave the rulership in capable
and friendly hands; that they were therefore willing to transfer the
Government to him, recognise him as the head of the State, and afford
him facilities and even support in reorganising the Government and
establishing himself in the sovereignty. The mission found the attitude
of Abdurrahman scarcely so satisfactory as had been reported by Surwar,
and its members were virtual prisoners, their tents surrounded by
sentries. Abdurrahman's explanation of this rigour of isolation was that
he could not otherwise ensure the safety of the envoys; but another
construction conveyed to them was that they were kept prisoners that
they might not, by mixing with the people, learn of the presence on the
right bank of the Oxus of a Russian officer with whom Abdurrahman was
said to be in constant communication and on whose advice he acted. Their
belief was that Abdurrahman was entirely under Russian influence; that
Mr Griffin's letter after it had been read in Durbar in the camp was
immediately despatched across the Oxus by means of mounted relays; and
that Russian instructions as to a reply had not been received when they
left Turkestan to return to Cabul. They expressed their belief that the
Sirdar would not accept from British hands Cabul shorn of Candahar. They
had urged him to repeat in the letter they were to carry back to Cabul
the expression of his willingness to meet the British representative at
Charikar which had been contained in his letter sent by Surwar; but he
demurred to committing himself even to this slight extent. The letter
which he sent by way of reply to the weighty communication Mr Griffin
had addressed to him on the part of the Government of India that
official characterised as 'frivolous and empty, and only saved by its
special courtesy of tone from being an impertinence.'
An Afghan who had sat at Kaufmann's feet, Abdurrahman was not wholly a
guileless man; and the truth probably was that he mistrusted the Greeks
of Simla and the gifts they tendered him with so lavish protestation
that they were entirely for his own interest. There was very little
finesse about the importunity of the British that he should constitute
himself their bridge of extrication, so that they might get out of
Afghanistan without the dangers and discredit of leaving chaos behind
them. But Abdurrahman had come to know himself strong enough to reduce
to order that legacy of chaos if it should be left; and in view of his
future relations with his fellow Afghans he was not solicitous to be
beholden to the foreigners to any embarrassing extent. He knew, too, the
wisdom of 'masterly inactivity' in delicate conditions. And, again, he
had no confidence in our pledges. On the 4th of August, the day after
the meeting between him and Mr Griffin at Zimma, the latter wrote: 'They
(Abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our intention was to rid
ourselves of a formidable opponent, and dreaded that if he had come
straight into Cabul he would have been arrested, and deported to India.'
A Liberal Government was now in office in England, and was urgent for
the speedy evacuation of Afghanistan. Lord Lytton had resigned and had
been succeeded as Viceroy by the Marquis of Ripon. Lieutenant-General
Sir Donald Stewart was in chief command at Cabul. A great number of
letters from Abdurrahman to chiefs and influential persons throughout
Afghanistan were being intercepted, the tone of which was considered
objectionable. He was reported to be in close correspondence with
Mahomed Jan, who had never ceased to be our bitter enemy. The fact that
negotiations were in progress between the British Government and
Abdurrahman had become matter of general knowledge throughout the
country, and was occasioning disquietude and excitement. So clear were
held the evidences of what was termed Abdurrahman's bad faith, but was
probably a combination of genuine mistrust, astute passivity, and shrewd
playing for his own hand, that it became a serious question with the
Indian Government on the arrival of the new Viceroy, whether it was good
policy to have anything more to do with him. It was resolved that before
breaking off intercourse the suggestion of Sir Donald Stewart and Mr
Griffin should be adopted, that a peremptory although still friendly
letter, demanding a definite acceptance or refusal of the proffers made,
within four days after the receipt, should be sent to Abdurrahman, with
a detailed explanation of the arrangements into which we were prepared
to enter with regard to him and the future of Afghanistan. A letter was
forwarded from Cabul on 14th June, in which Mr Griffin informed the
Sirdar that since the British Government admitted no right of
interference by foreign powers in Afghanistan, it was plain that the
Cabul ruler could have no political relations with any foreign power
except the English; and if any foreign power should attempt to interfere
in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked
aggression on the Cabul ruler, then the British Government would be
prepared to aid him, if necessary, to repel it. As regarded limits of
the territory, the latter stated that the whole province of Candahar had
been placed under a separate ruler, except Sibi and Pisheen, which were
retained in British possession. Consequently the British Government was
unable to enter into any negotiations on those points, or in respect to
arrangements in regard to the north-western frontier which were settled
by the treaty of Gundamuk. Subject to those reservations, the British
Government was willing that Abdurrahman should establish over
Afghanistan--including Herat when he should have conquered it--as
complete and extensive authority as was swayed by any previous Ameer.
The British Government would exercise no interference in the internal
government of those territories nor would it demand the acceptance of an
English Resident anywhere within Afghanistan, although for convenience
of ordinary friendly intercourse it might be agreed upon that a
Mahomedan Agent of the British Government should be stationed at Cabul.
Abdurrahman's reply to this communication was vague and evasive, and was
regarded by Sir Donald Stewart and Mr Griffin as so unsatisfactory that
they represented to the Government of India, not for the first time,
their conviction of the danger of trusting Abdurrahman, the imprudence
of delaying immediate action, and the necessity of breaking off with him
and adopting other means of establishing a government in Cabul before
the impending evacuation. Lord Ripon, however, considered that 'as
matters stood an arrangement with Abdurrahman offered the most advisable
solution, while he doubted whether it would not be found very difficult
to enter into any alternative arrangement.' His Excellency's decision
was justified by the event. Meanwhile, indeed, Abdurrahman had started
on June 28th for the Kohistan. He crossed the Hindoo Koosh and arrived
on July 20th at Charikar, where he was welcomed by a deputation of
leading chiefs, while the old Mushk-i-Alum, who for some time, thanks to
Mr Griffin's influence, had been working in the interests of peace,
intimated on behalf of a number of chiefs assembled in Maidan that they
were ready to accept as Ameer the nominee of the British Government.
So propitious seemed the situation that it was considered the time had
come for formally acknowledging Abdurrahman as the new Ameer, and also
for fixing approximately the date of the evacuation of Cabul by the
British troops. The ceremony of recognition was enacted in a great
durbar tent within the Sherpur cantonment on the afternoon of July 22d.
The absence of Abdurrahman, and the notorious cause of that absence,
detracted from the intrinsic dignity of the occasion so far as concerned
the British participation in it; nor was the balance restored by the
presence of three members of his suite whom he had delegated to
represent him. A large number of sirdars, chiefs, and maliks were
present, some of whom had fought stoutly against us in December. Sir
Donald Stewart, who presided, explained to the assembled Afghans that
their presence and that of the officers of the British force had been
called for in order that the public recognition by the British
Government of the Sirdar Abdurrahman Khan as Ameer of Cabul should be
made known with as much honour as possible. Then Mr Griffin addressed in
Persian a short speech to the 'sirdars, chiefs, and gentlemen' who
constituted his audience. Having announced the recognition of
Abdurrahman by 'the Viceroy of India and the Government of Her Most
Gracious Majesty the Queen Empress,' he proceeded: 'It is to the
Government a source of satisfaction that the tribes and chiefs have
preferred as Ameer a distinguished member of the Barakzai family, who is
a renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. His sentiments towards the
British Government are most friendly; and so long as his rule shows that
he is animated by these sentiments, he cannot fail to receive the
support of the British Government.' Mr Griffin then intimated that the
British armies would shortly withdraw from Afghanistan; and in his
formal farewell there was a certain appropriate dignity, and a
well-earned tribute to the conduct of our soldiers during their service
within the Afghan borders. 'We trust and firmly believe,' said Mr
Griffin, 'that your remembrance of the English will not be unkindly. We
have fought you in the field whenever you have opposed us; but your
religion has in no way been interfered with; the honour of your women
has been respected, and every one has been secure in possession of his
property. Whatever has been necessary for the support of the army has
been liberally paid for. Since I came to Cabul I have been in daily
intercourse with you, but I have never heard an Afghan make a complaint
of the conduct of any soldier, English or native, belonging to Her
Majesty's army.' The durbar was closed by an earnest appeal by Sir
Donald Stewart to all the sirdars and chiefs that they should put aside
their private feuds and unite to support the new Ameer.
On August 3d Abdurrahman and Mr Griffin at length met, about sixteen
miles north of Cabul. His adherents were still full of excitement and
suspicion; but the Ameer himself was calm, cheerful, and dignified. The
conference between him and Mr Griffin lasted for three hours and was
renewed on the following day. 'He appeared,' wrote Mr Griffin, 'animated
by a sincere desire to be on cordial terms with the British Government,
and although his expectations were larger than the Government was
prepared to satisfy, yet he did not press them with any discourteous
insistence, and the result of the interview may be considered on the
whole to be highly satisfactory.' The tidings of the Maiwand disaster
had reached Sherpur by telegraph, and the Ameer was informed that a
necessity might occur for marching a force from Cabul to Candahar. His
reply was that the tribes might be hostile, but that if no long halts
were made by the way he would have no objections to such a march. In
this he showed his astuteness, since the defeat of Ayoub Khan by a
British army would obviously save him a contest. So willing to be of
service on this matter was he that when the march was decided on he sent
influential persons of his party in advance to arrange with the local
maliks to have supplies collected for the column. The arrangements made
with him were that he was to fall heir to the thirty guns of Shere Ali's
manufacture which the out-marching army was to leave in Sherpur, and was
to receive 19-1/2 lakhs of rupees (£190,500); ten lakhs of which were
given as an earnest of British friendship, and the balance was money
belonging to the Afghan State, which had gone into the commissariat
chest and was now restored. At the Ameer's earnest and repeated request
the forts which had been built around Cabul by the British army, were
not destroyed as had been intended, but were handed over intact to the
new Ameer.
It seemed that Sir Donald Stewart, who was to evacuate Sherpur on the
11th August, would leave Cabul without seeing Abdurrahman. But at the
last moment Mr Griffin succeeded in arranging an interview. It was held
early in the morning of the evacuation, in a tent just outside the
Sherpur cantonment, was quite public, and lasted only for quarter of an
hour. Abdurrahman was frank and cordial. He said that his heart was full
of gratitude to the British, and desired that his best thanks should be
communicated to the Viceroy. At the close of the interview he shook
hands with all 'who cared to wish him good-bye and good luck,' and sent
his principal officer to accompany the General on his first day's march,
which began immediately after the parting with Abdurrahman. Sir Donald
Stewart's march down the passes was accomplished without incident, quite
unmolested by the tribes. Small garrisons were temporarily left in the
Khyber posts, and the war-worn regiments were dispersed through the
stations of North-Western India.