While Sir Frederick Roberts had been fighting hard in North-Eastern
Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart had been experiencing comparative
tranquillity in his Candahar command. As soon as the news reached him of
the destruction of Cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated his
troops, and so early as the third week of September (1879) he was in a
position to carry out his orders to create a diversion in aid of
Roberts' advance on Cabul by making a demonstration in the direction of
Ghuznee and placing a garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. No subsequent
movements of importance were undertaken in Southern Afghanistan during
the winter, and the province enjoyed almost unbroken quietude. In Herat,
however, disturbance was rife. Ayoub Khan, the brother of Yakoub Khan,
had returned from exile and made good his footing in Herat, of which
formerly he had been conjoint governor with Yakoub. In December he began
a hostile advance on Candahar, but a conflict broke out between the
Cabul and Herat troops under his command, and he abandoned for the time
his projected expedition.
[Illustration: ACTION AT AHMED KHEL. 20 Miles from GHUZNEE. 19th. April
1880.]
In the end of March Sir Donald Stewart began the march toward Cabul
which orders from India had prescribed. He left behind him in Candahar
the Bombay division of his force under the command of Major-General
Primrose, whose line of communication with the Indus valley was to be
kept open by Phayre's brigade, and took with him on the northward march
the Bengal division, consisting of two infantry brigades and a cavalry
brigade. The first infantry brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General
Barter, the second by Brigadier-General Hughes, and the cavalry brigade,
which divisional headquarters accompanied, by Brigadier-General
Palliser. Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reached on 6th April; the Bengal portion
of its garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed on the
following day. Until Shahjui, the limit of the Candahar province, the
march was uneventful; but beyond that place extreme difficulties were
experienced in procuring supplies, for the villages were found deserted
and the inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or hidden their stores
of grain. The force was embarrassed by a horde of Hazaras, who swarmed
in wild irregularity on its flanks, plundering and burning with great
vindictiveness, eager to wreak vengeance on their Afghan foes. And it
had another although more distant companionship, in the shape of several
thousand hostile tribesmen and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas
had been assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day parallel with
the British right flank along the foothills at a distance of about eight
miles. Their attitude was threatening but it was not thought wise to
meddle with them, since their retreat over the hills could not well be
cut off, and since the policy of non-interference would tend to
encourage them to venture on a battle. The soundness of this reasoning
was soon to be made manifest.
On the night of April 18th the division was encamped at Mushaki, about
thirty miles south of Ghuznee. The spies that evening brought in the
information that the enemy had resolved on fighting on the following
morning, and that the position they intended to take up was the summit
of a low spur of the Gul Koh mountain ridge, bounding on the west the
valley followed by the road. This spur was said to project in a
north-easterly direction toward the Ghuznee river, gradually sinking
into the plain. During a great part of its length it flanked and
overhung the road, but near where it merged into the plain the road
passed over it by a low saddle at a point about six miles beyond
Mushaki. At dawn of the 19th the column moved off, Palliser leading the
advance, which Sir Donald Stewart accompanied, Hughes commanding the
centre, Barter bringing up the rear and protecting the baggage. An hour
later the enemy were visible in great strength about three miles in
advance, presenting the aspect of a vast body formed up on the spur and
on the saddle crossed by the road, and thus threatening Stewart at once
in front and on both flanks. The British general at once made his
dispositions. His guns were on the road in column of route. The three
infantry regiments of Hughes' brigade came up to the left of and in line
with the leading battery, the cavalry took ground on the plain on its
right, and a reserve was formed consisting of an infantry regiment, two
companies sappers and miners, and the General's escort of a troop and
two companies. Orders were sent back to Barter to send forward without
delay half the infantry of his brigade. In the formation described the
force resumed its advance until within striking distance. Then the two
batteries came into action on either side of the road; the horse-battery
on the right, the flat ground to its right being covered by the 2d
Punjaub Cavalry; the field-battery on the left. Sir Donald Stewart's
proper front thus consisted of the field and horse-batteries with their
supports, but since it was apparent that the greatest strength of the
enemy was on the higher ground flanking his left, it behoved him to show
a front in that direction also, and for this purpose he utilised Hughes'
three infantry regiments, of which the 59th was on the right, the 2d
Sikhs in the centre, and the 3d Goorkhas on the left. Part of the
reserve infantry was sent to make good the interval between the left of
the artillery and the right of the infantry.
The guns had no sooner come into action than the enemy in great masses
showed themselves on spur and saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an
attempt to envelop the position held by the British. 'Suddenly,' writes
Hensman, 'a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the
opposing army; the moullas could be seen haranguing the irregular host
with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then
as if by magic waves on waves of men--ghazees of the most desperate
type--poured down upon the plain, and rushed upon General Stewart's
force. The main body of the Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch
the ghazees in their reckless onslaught, and take advantage of any
success they might gain. The fanaticism of the 3000 or 4000 men who made
this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had 500 or
600 yards to cover before they could come to close quarters, and yet
they made nothing of the distance. Nearly all were well armed with
tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and matchlocks, while
a few--and those must have been resolute fanatics indeed--had simply
pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long
shafts. Their attack broke with greatest violence on our flanks. On our
left flank the 19th Bengal Lancers were still moving into position when
the ghazees rushed in among them. In an instant they were hidden in the
cloud of dust and smoke, and then they galloped toward the right rear,
and struck into the reserve in rear of the Lieutenant-General and his
staff. All was confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were
stampeded, and with the riderless horses of the lancers killed or
wounded in the _mêlée_, dashed into the headquarter staff. The ghazees
had continued their onward rush, and were engaged in hand-to-hand
fighting with our infantry. Some of them penetrated to within twenty
yards of the knoll on which the staff were watching the action, and so
critical was the moment that Sir Donald Stewart and every man of his
staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence.' The hurried
retirement of the lancers had left the left flank bare. It was turned by
the fierce rush of the fanatics, who were actually in rear of the
leftward infantry regiment and in the heart of the British position. The
Goorkhas had been thrown into momentary confusion, but their colonel
promptly formed them into rallying squares, whose fire mowed down the
ghazees and arrested the headlong vehemence of their turning movement.
But it was not the British left only which was temporarily compromised
by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. Their enveloping charge broke
down the defence of the weakly-manned interval between the left of the
artillery and the right of the infantry. The detachments holding that
interval were forced back, fighting hand-to-hand as the sheer weight of
the assault compelled them to give ground; the 59th, in its effort to
throw back its right to cover the interval and protect the guns, was
thrown into confusion and gave ground; and the guns, their case shot
exhausted and the Afghans within a few yards of their muzzles, had to be
retired. The onslaught on the right front of the horse-battery was
delivered with great determination, but was held at bay and finally
crushed by the repeated charges of the 2d Punjaub cavalry.
Every man of the reserves was hurried into the fighting line; the
soldiers were steadied by the energetic efforts of their officers and
settled down to a steady and continuous fire from their breechloaders;
the guns poured their shells into the hostile masses; and the fire of
the forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the attempt of the
Afghan horse to move round that flank. The hard-fought combat lasted for
an hour; at ten o'clock the 'cease fire' sounded, and the British
victory was signal. The enemy was dispersing in full flight, and the
cavalry was chasing the fugitives across the plain on the right. How
reckless had been the whirlwind charges of the ghazees was evidenced by
the extraordinary number of their dead whose corpses strewed the
battlefield. In no previous conflict between our troops and the Afghans
had the latter suffered nearly so heavily. More than 1000 dead were
counted on the field, and many bodies were carried away; on a moderate
computation their total loss must have been between 2000 and 3000, and
that in an estimated strength of from 12,000 to 15,000. The casualties
of the British force were seventeen killed and 124 wounded, of whom four
died of their wounds. The injuries consisted almost wholly of sword
slashes and knife stabs received in hand-to-hand encounters. The pursuit
was soon recalled, but the Hazaras took up the chase with ardour and in
the rancour of vengeance slew and spared not.
Sir Donald Stewart tarried on the field only long enough to bury his
dead and have his wounded attended to; and soon after noon his force
resumed its march. Ghuznee was reached on the 21st, where there was a
halt of three days. It had been reported that the indomitable
Mushk-i-Alum was raising the tribesmen of Zurmut and Shilgur to avenge
the defeat of Ahmed Khel, and a cavalry reconnaissance made on the 22d
had found a gathering of 2000 or 3000 men about the villages of Urzoo
and Shalez, six miles south-east of Ghuznee. On the morning of the 23d a
strong column commanded by Brigadier-General Palliser moved on the
villages, which were found occupied in considerable force. They were too
solidly built to be much injured by artillery fire, and the Afghans lay
close in the shelter they afforded. Palliser hesitated to commit his
infantry to an attack. Sir Donald Stewart having arrived, ordered the
infantry to carry the villages without delay, and the affair was soon
over, the tribesmen suffering severely from the rifle fire as they
evacuated the villages, and later in the pursuit made by the cavalry and
horse-artillery. On the following day the march toward Cabul was
resumed.
On the 16th April Major-General Ross had been despatched from Cabul by
Sir Frederick Roberts on the mission of joining hands with Stewart's
division. On the 20th Ross opened heliographic communication with Sir
Donald, and was informed of the latter's victory at Ahmed Khel. But the
junction of the two forces was not accomplished until the 27th; and in
the interval the force commanded by General Ross had received
considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal levies gathered by local
chiefs. The tribesmen interfered with the roadmaking operations of his
sappers in the vicinity of Sheikabad, and some fighting occurred in very
rugged country on the 23d. Trivial loss was experienced by his command,
but the demonstrations of the tribesmen evinced with what inveterate
determination, notwithstanding so many severe lessons, the Afghans
persisted in their refusal to admit themselves conquered. Driven away
with severe loss on the 25th, those indomitable hillmen and villagers
were back again on the following morning on the overhanging ridges; nor
were they dispersed by the 'resources of civilised warfare' until more
of them had paid with their lives the penalty of their obstinate
hostility. On the 28th, at Sheikabad, Sir Donald Stewart took leave of
the division which he had led from Candahar, and proceeded to Cabul with
General Ross' force to assume the chief command in North-Eastern
Afghanistan. His division turned aside into the Logur valley, where it
remained at until the final concentration about Cabul in anticipation of
the evacuation. By the reinforcement brought by Stewart the Cabul field
force was increased to a strength of about 18,000 men.