Although overlarge for its garrison, the Sherpur cantonment had many of
the features of a strong defensive position. On the southern and western
faces the massive and continuous enciente made it impregnable against
any force unprovided with siege artillery. But on the eastern face the
wall had been built to the elevation only of seven feet, and at either
end of the Behmaroo heights, which constituted the northern line of
defence, there were open gaps which had to be made good. The space
between the north-western bastion and the heights was closed by an
entrenchment supported by a 'laager' of Afghan gun-carriages and
limbers, the ground in front strengthened by abattis and wire
entanglements, beyond which a village flanking the northern and western
faces was occupied as a detached post. The open space on the
north-eastern angle was similarly fortified; the village of Behmaroo was
loopholed, and outlying buildings to the front were placed in a state of
defence. The unfinished eastern wall was heightened by logs built up in
tiers, and its front was covered with abattis, a tower and garden
outside being occupied by a detachment. A series of block houses had
been built along the crest of the Behmaroo heights supporting a
continuous entrenchment, gun emplacements made in the line of defence,
and the gorge dividing the heights strongly fortified against an attack
from the northern plain. The enciente was divided into sections to each
of which was assigned a commanding officer with a specified detail of
troops; and a strong reserve of European infantry was under the command
of Brigadier-General Baker, ready at short notice to reinforce any
threatened point. It was presumably owing to the absorption of the
troops in fighting, collecting supplies, and providing winter shelter,
that when the concentration within Sherpur became suddenly necessary the
defences of the position were still seriously defective; and throughout
the period of investment the force was unremittingly engaged in the task
of strengthening them. Nor had the military precaution been taken of
razing the villages and enclosures within the fire zone of the enciente,
and they remained to afford cover to the enemy during the period of
investment.
Before the enemy cut the telegraph wire in the early morning of the 15th
Sir Frederick Roberts had informed the authorities in India of his
situation and of his need for reinforcements; and he had also ordered up
General Charles Gough's brigade without loss of time. Gough was already
at Jugdulluk when he received the order calling him to Cabul, but he had
to wait for reinforcements and supplies, and the tribesmen were
threatening his position and the line of communication in rear of it. He
did not move forward until the 21st. On the following day he reached
Luttabund, whence he took on with him the garrison of that post, but
although his march was unmolested it was not until the 24th that he
reached Sherpur, a day too late to participate in repelling the assault
on the cantonment.
While General Roberts' force was busily engaged in making good the
defences of Sherpur, the Afghans refrained from attempting to back their
success on the Asmai heights by an assault on the defensive position
which seemed to invite an attack. During the first two days of their
possession of the city they were enjoying the fruits of their occupation
in their own turbulent manner. Roberts' spies reported them busily
engaged in sacking the Hindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters, in looting and
wrecking the houses of chiefs and townsfolk who had shown friendliness
to the British, and in quarrelling among themselves over the spoils.
Requisitioning was in full force. The old Moulla Mushk-i-Alum was the
temporary successor of General Hills in the office of Governor of Cabul;
and spite of his ninety years he threw extraordinary energy into the
work of arousing fanaticism and rallying to Cabul the fighting men of
the surrounding country. The _jehad_ of which he had been the chief
instigator had certainly attained unexampled dimensions, and although it
was not in the nature of things that every Afghan who carried arms
should be inspired with religious fanaticism to such a pitch as to be
utterly reckless of his life, swarms of fierce ghazees made formidable
the levies which Mahomed Jan commanded.
On the 17th and 18th the Afghans made ostentatious demonstrations
against Sherpur, but those were never formidable, although they made
themselves troublesome with some perseverance during the daytime,
consistently refraining from night attacks, which was remarkable since
ordinarily they are much addicted to the _chapao_. There never was any
investment of Sherpur, or indeed any approximation to investment.
Cavalry reconnaissances constantly went out, and piquets and videttes
were habitually on external duty; infantry detachments sallied forth
whenever occasion demanded to dislodge the assailants from points
occupied by them in inconvenient proximity to the defences. The Afghan
offensive was not dangerous, but annoying and wearying. It was indeed
pushed with some resolution on the 18th, when several thousand men
poured out of the city, and skirmished forward under cover of the
gardens and enclosures on the plain between Cabul and Sherpur, in the
direction of the southern front and the south-western bastions. The
Afghans are admirable skirmishers, and from their close cover kept up
for hours a brisk fire on the soldiers lining the Sherpur defences, but
with singularly little effect. The return rifle fire was for the most
part restricted to volleys directed on those of the enemy who offered a
sure mark by exposing themselves; and shell fire was chiefly used to
drive the Afghan skirmishers from their cover in the gardens and
enclosures. Some of those, notwithstanding, were able to get within 400
yards of the enciente, but could make no further headway. On the morning
of the 19th it was found that in the night the enemy had occupied the
Meer Akhor fort, a few hundred yards beyond the eastern face, and close
to the Residency compound of the old cantonments of 1839-42. The fire
from this fort was annoying, and General Baker went out on the errand of
destroying it, with 800 bayonets, two mountain guns, and a party of
sappers. As the fort was being approached through the dense mist a
sudden volley from it struck down several men, and Lieutenant Montenaro
of the mountain battery was mortally wounded. The fort was heavily
shelled from the south-eastern bastion; its garrison evacuated it, and
it was blown up.
Mahomed Jan and his coadjutors could hardly flatter themselves that as
yet they had made any impression on the steadfast defence which the
British force was maintaining in the Sherpur cantonment. The Afghan
leader had tried force in vain; he knew the history of that strange
period in the winter of 1841 during which Afghan truculence and audacity
had withered the spirit of a British force not much less numerically
strong than the little army now calmly withstanding him. Things had not
gone very well with that little army of late, possibly its constancy
might have been impaired, and its chief might be willing, as had been
Elphinstone and the Eltchi, to listen to terms. Anyhow there could be no
harm in making a proffer based on the old lines. So the Afghan leader
proposed to General Roberts, apparently in all seriousness, that the
British army should forthwith evacuate Afghanistan, encountering no
molestation in its march; that the British General before departing
should engage that Yakoub Khan should return to Afghanistan as its
Ameer; and that there should be left behind two officers of distinction
as hostages for the faithful fulfilment of the contract. 'We have a lakh
of men; they are like wolves eager to rush on their prey! We cannot much
longer control them!'--such were said to have been the terms of a
message intended to disturb the equanimity of the British commander.
Meer Butcha and his Kohistanees, again, were not to all appearance
anxious for the restoration of Yakoub. They professed themselves content
to accept our staunch friend Wali Mahomed as Ameer, if only the British
army would be good enough to march home promptly and leave to Afghans
the administration of Afghan affairs. It was not likely that a man of
Roberts' nature would demean himself to take any notice of such
overtures. For the moment circumstances had enforced on him the wisdom
of accepting the defensive attitude, but he knew himself, nevertheless,
the virtual master of the situation. He had but one serious anxiety--the
apprehension lest the Afghans should not harden their hearts to deliver
an assault on his position.
That apprehension was not long to give him concern. On the 20th, as a
menace against the southern face of Sherpur, the enemy took strong
possession of the Mahomed Shereef fort, stormed so gallantly by Colonel
Griffiths on 6th November 1841; and they maintained themselves there
during the two following days in face of the fire of siege guns mounted
on the bastions of the enciente. On the 21st and 22d large numbers of
Afghans quitted the city, and passing eastward behind the Siah Sung
heights, took possession in great force of the forts and villages
outside the eastern face of Sherpur. On the 22d a spy brought in the
intelligence that Mahomed Jan and his brother-chiefs had resolved to
assault the cantonment early on the following morning, and the spy was
able to communicate the plan of attack. The 2000 men holding the King's
Garden and the Mahomed Shereef fort had been equipped with scaling
ladders, and were to make a false attack which might become a real one,
against the western section of the southern front. The principal
assault, however, was to be made against the eastern face of the
Behmaroo village--unquestionably the weakest part of the defensive
position. The 23d was the last day of the Mohurrum--the great Mahomedan
religious festival, when fanaticism would be at its height; and further
to stimulate that incentive to valour, the Mushk-i-Alum would himself
kindle the beacon fire on the Asmai height which was to be the signal to
the faithful to rush to the assault.
The information proved perfectly accurate. All night long the shouts and
chants of the Afghans filled the air. Purposeful silence reigned
throughout the cantonment. In the darkness the soldiers mustered and
quietly fell into their places; the officers commanding sections of the
defence made their dispositions; the reserves were silently standing to
their arms. Every eye was toward the Asmai heights, shrouded still in
the gloom of the night. A long tongue of flame shot up into the air,
blazed brilliantly for a few moments, and then waned. At the signal a
fierce fire opened from the broken ground before one of the gateways of
the southern face, the flashes indicating that the marksmen were plying
their rifles within 200 yards of the enciente. The bullets sped
harmlessly over the defenders sheltered behind the parapet, and in the
dusk of the dawn reprisals were not attempted. But this outburst of
powder-burning against the southern face was a mere incident; what men
listened and watched for was the development of the true assault on the
eastern end of the great parallelogram. The section commanders there
were General Hugh Gough in charge of the eastern end of the Behmaroo
heights, and Colonel Jenkins from the village down to the Native
Hospital and beyond to the bastion at the south-eastern corner. The
troops engaged were the Guides from the ridge down to Behmaroo village
and beyond to the Native Hospital, in which were 100 men of the 28th
Punjaub Infantry, and between the Hospital and the corner bastion the
67th, reinforced by two companies of 92d Highlanders from the reserve,
which later sent to the defence of the eastern face additional
contributions of men and guns. 'From beyond Behmaroo and the eastern
trenches and walls,' writes Mr Hensman, 'came a roar of voices so loud
and menacing that it seemed as if an army fifty thousand strong was
charging down on our thin line of men. Led by their ghazees, the main
body of Afghans hidden in the villages and orchards on the east side of
Sherpur had rushed out in one dense mob, and were filling the air with
their shouts of "Allah-il-Allah." The roar surged forward as their line
advanced, but it was answered by such a roll of musketry that it was
drowned for the moment, and then merged into the general din which told
us that our men with Martinis and Sniders were holding their own against
the attacking force.' When the first attack thus graphically described
was made the morning was still so dark and misty that the outlook from
the trenches was restricted, and the order to the troops was to hold
their fire till the assailants should be distinctly visible. The
detachment of the 28th opened fire somewhat prematurely, and presently
the Guides holding Behmaroo and the trenches on the slopes followed the
example, and sweeping with their fire the terrain in front of them broke
the force of the attack while its leaders were still several hundred
yards away. Between the Hospital and the corner bastion the men of the
67th and 92d awaited with impassive discipline the word of permission to
begin firing. From out the mist at length emerged dense masses of men,
some of whom were brandishing swords and knives, while others loaded and
fired while hurrying forward. The order to fire was not given until the
leading ghazees were within eighty yards, and the mass of assailants not
more distant than 200 yards. Heavily struck then by volley on volley,
they recoiled but soon gathered courage to come on again; and for
several hours there was sharp fighting, repeated efforts being made to
carry the low eastern wall. So resolute were the Afghans that more than
once they reached the abattis, but each time were driven back with heavy
loss. About ten o'clock there was a lull and it seemed that the
attacking force was owning the frustration of its attempts, but an hour
later there was a partial recrudescence of the fighting and the
assailants once more came on. The attack, however, was not pushed with
much vigour and was soon beaten down, but the Afghans still maintained a
threatening attitude and the fire from the defences was ineffectual to
dislodge them. The General resolved to take their positions in flank,
and with this intent sent out into the open through the gorge in the
Behmaroo heights, four field-guns escorted by a cavalry regiment.
Bending to the right, the guns came into action on the right flank of
the Afghans, and the counter-stroke had immediate effect. The enemy
wavered and soon were in full retreat. The Kohistanee contingent, some
5000 strong, cut loose and marched away northward, with obvious
recognition that the game was up. The fugitives were scourged with
artillery and rifle fire, and Massy led out the cavalry, swept the
plain, and drove the lingering Afghans from the slopes of Siah Sung. The
false attack on the southern face from the King's Garden and the Mahomed
Shereef fort never made any head. Those positions were steadily shelled
until late in the afternoon, when they were finally evacuated, and by
nightfall all the villages and enclosures between Sherpur and Cabul were
entirely deserted. Some of those had been destroyed by sappers from the
garrison during the afternoon, in the course of which operation two
gallant engineer officers, Captain Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, were
unfortunately killed by the premature explosion of a mine.
Mahomed Jan had been as good as his word; he had delivered his stroke
against Sherpur, and that stroke had utterly failed. With its failure
came promptly the collapse of the national rising. Before daybreak of
the 24th the formidable combination which had included all the fighting
elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan, and under whose banners it was
believed that more than 100,000 armed men had mustered, was no more. Not
only had it broken up; it had disappeared. Neither in the city, nor in
the adjacent villages, nor on the surrounding heights, was a man to be
seen. So hurried had been the Afghan dispersal that the dead lay
unburied where they had fallen. His nine days on the defensive had cost
General Roberts singularly little in casualties; his losses were
eighteen killed and sixty-eight wounded. The enemy's loss from first to
last of the rising was reckoned to be not under 3000.
On the 24th the cavalry rode far and fast in pursuit of the fugitives,
but they overtook none, such haste had the fleeing Afghans made. On the
same day Cabul and the Balla Hissar were reoccupied, and General Hills
resumed his functions as military governor of the city. Cabul had the
aspect of having undergone a sack at the hands of the enemy; the bazaars
were broken up and deserted and the Hindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters had
been relentlessly wrecked. Sir Frederick Roberts lost no time in
despatching a column to, the Kohistan to punish Meer Butcha by
destroying that chief's forts and villages, and to ascertain whether the
tribesmen of the district had dispersed to their homes. This was found
to be the case, and the column returned after having been out five days.
After making a few examples the General issued a proclamation of
amnesty, excluding therefrom only five of the principal leaders and
fomentors of the recent rising, and stipulating that the tribesmen
should send representatives to Sherpur to receive explanations regarding
the dispositions contemplated for the government of the country. This
policy of conciliation bore good fruit; and a durbar was held on January
9th, 1880, at which were present about 200 sirdars, chiefs, and headmen
from the Kohistan, Logur, and the Ghilzai country. Rewards were
presented to those chiefs who had remained friendly; the General
received the salaams of the assembled sirdars and then addressed them in
a firm but conciliatory speech.
The country remained still in a disturbed state, but there was little
likelihood of a second general rising. General Roberts was resolved,
however, to be thoroughly prepared to cope with that contingency should
it occur. Sherpur was encircled by a military road, and all cover and
obstructions for the space of 1000 yards outside the enciente were swept
away. Another road was constructed from Behmaroo village to the Siah
Sung heights and yet another from the south-eastern gateway direct to
the Balla Hissar, on both of which there were bridges across the Cabul
river. Along the northern face of Cabul from Deh Afghan to the Balla
Hissar, a road broad enough for guns was made, and another broad road
cut through the lower Balla Hissar. Another military road was built
through the Cabul gorge to the main Ghuznee and Bamian road in the
Chardeh valley. Strong forts were built on the Asmai and Sher Derwaza
heights and on the spur above the Balla Hissar, which, well garrisoned
and supplied adequately with provisions, water, and ammunition, would
enable Cabul as well as Sherpur to be held. The latter was greatly
strengthened, the eastern point of the Behmaroo heights being converted
into something like a regular fortress. Later, in March, when the Cabul
force had increased to a strength of about 11,500 men and twenty-six
guns, the command was formed into two divisions, of which the first
remained under the Lieutenant-General, the second being commanded by
Major-General John Ross. The line of communications was in charge of
Major-General Bright, and Brigadier-General Hugh Gough was the cavalry
commander in succession to Brigadier-General Massy. On the 2d of May,
Sir Donald Stewart arriving at Cabul from Candahar, took over the chief
command in North-Eastern Afghanistan from Sir Frederick Roberts. Sir
Donald's march from Candahar, which was an eventful one, is dealt with
in the next chapter.