The invader of Afghanistan may count as inevitable a national rising
against him, but the Afghans are a people so immersed in tribal quarrels
and domestic blood-feuds that the period of the outbreak is curiously
uncertain. The British force which placed Shah Soojah on the throne and
supported him there, was in Afghanistan for more than two years before
the waves of the national tempest rose around it. The national
combination against Roberts' occupation was breaking its strength
against the Sherpur defences while as yet the Cabul field force had not
been within sight of the capital for more than two months. There seems
no relation between opportunity and the period of the inevitable
outburst. If in November 1841 the Cabul Sirdars had restrained
themselves for a few days longer two more regiments would have been
following on Sale's track, and the British force in the cantonments
would have been proportionately attenuated. Roberts might have been
assailed with better chance of success when his force was dispersed
between the Siah Sung camp, the Balla Hissar, and Sherpur, than when
concentrated in the strong defensive position against which the Afghans
beat in vain. Perhaps the rising ripened faster in 1879 than in 1841
because in the former period no Macnaghten fomented intrigues and
scattered gold. Perhaps Shere Ali's military innovations may have
instilled into the masses of his time some rough lessons in the art and
practice of speedy mobilisation. The crowning disgrace of 1842 was that
a trained army of regular soldiers should have been annihilated by a few
thousand hillmen, among whom there was no symptom either of real valour
or of good leadership. To Roberts and his force attaches the credit of
having defeated the persistent and desperate efforts of levies at least
ten times superior in numbers, well armed, far from undisciplined,
courageous beyond all experience of Afghan nature, and under the
guidance of a leader who had some conception of strategy, and who
certainly was no mean tactician.
In the Afghan idiosyncrasy there is a considerable strain of practical
philosophy. The blood of the massacred mission was not dry when it was
recognised in Cabul that stern retribution would inevitably follow.
Well, said the Afghans among themselves, what must be must be, for they
are all fatalists. The seniors recalled the memory of the retribution
Pollock exacted--how he came, destroyed Istalif, set a 'mark' on Cabul
by sending the great bazaar in fragments into the air, and then
departed. This time Istalif was not compromised; if Roberts Sahib should
be determined to blow up the Char Chowk again, why, that infliction must
be endured. It had been rebuilt after Pollock Sahib's engineers had
worked their will on it; it could be rebuilt a second time when Roberts
Sahib should have turned his back on the city, as pray God and the
Prophet he might do with no more delay than Pollock Sahib had made out
yonder on the Logur plain. So after a trial of Roberts' mettle at
Charasiah, and finding the testing sample not quite to their taste, the
Afghans fell into an attitude of expectancy, and were mightily relieved
by his proclamation read at the Balla Hissar durbar of October 12th.
After a reasonable amount of hanging and the exaction of the fine laid
on the city, it was assumed that he would no doubt depart so as to get
home to India before the winter snows should block the passes. But the
expected did not happen. The British General established a British
Governor in Cabul who had a heavy hand, and policed the place in a
fashion that stirred a lurid fury in the bosoms of haughty Sirdars who
had been wont to do what seemed good in their own eyes. He engaged in
the sacrilegious work of dismantling the Balla Hissar, the historic
fortress of the nation, within whose walls were the royal palace and the
residences of the principal nobles. Those were bitter things, but they
could be borne if they were mere temporary inflictions, and if the hated
Feringhees would but take themselves away soon. But that hope was
shattered by the proclamation of October 28th, when the abdication of
the Ameer was intimated and the British _raj_ in Afghanistan was
announced. Yes, that pestilent _zabardasti_ little General, who would
not follow the example of good old Pollock Sahib, and who held Yakoub
Khan and sundry of his Sirdars in close imprisonment in his camp, had
now the insolence to proclaim himself virtually the Ameer of
Afghanistan! Far from showing symptom of budging, he was sending out his
governors into the provinces, he was gathering tribute in kind, and he
had taken possession of Shere Ali's monumental cantonment, under the
shadow of the Behmaroo heights on which Afghan warriors of a past
generation had slaughtered the Feringhee soldiers as if they had been
sheep; and it was the Feringhee General's cantonment now, which he was
cunningly strengthening as if he meant to make it his permanent
fortress.
Yakoub Khan had gained little personal popularity during his brief and
troubled reign, but he was an Afghan and a Mahomedan; and his
deportation to India, followed shortly afterwards by that of his three
Ministers, intensified the rancour of his countrymen and co-religionists
against the handful of presumptuous foreigners who arrogantly claimed to
sway the destinies of Afghanistan. _Cherchez la femme_ is the keynote
among Western peoples of an investigation into the origin of most
troubles and strifes; the watchword of the student of the springs of
great popular outbursts among Eastern nations must be _Cherchez les
prêtres_. The Peter the Hermit of Afghanistan was the old Mushk-i-Alum,
the fanatic Chief Moulla of Ghuznee. This aged enthusiast went to and
fro among the tribes proclaiming the sacred duty of a _Jehad_ or
religious war against the unbelieving invaders, stimulating the pious
passions of the followers of the Prophet by fervent appeals, enjoining
the chiefs to merge their intestine strifes in the common universal
effort to crush the foreign invaders of the Afghan soil. The female
relatives of the abdicated Ameer fomented the rising by appeals to
popular sympathy, and by the more practical argument of lavish
distribution of treasure. The flame spread, tribesmen and disbanded
soldiers sprang to arms, the banner of the Prophet was unfurled, and the
nation heaved with the impulse of fanaticism. Musa Khan, the boy heir of
Yakoub, was in the hands of the Mushk-i-Alum, and the combination of
fighting tribes found a competent leader in Mahomed Jan, a Warduk
general of proved courage and capacity. The plan of campaign was
comprehensive and well devised. The contingent from the country to the
south of the capital, from Logur, Zurmat, and the Mangal and Jadran
districts, was to seize that section of the Cabul ridge extending from
Charasiah northward to the cleft through which flows the Cabul river.
The northern contingent from the Kohistan and Kohdaman was to occupy the
Asmai heights and the hills further to the north-west; while the troops
from the Maidan and Warduk territories, led by Mahomed Jan in person,
were to come in from the westward across the Chardeh valley, take
possession of Cabul, and rally to their banners the disaffected
population of the capital and the surrounding villages. The
concentration of the three bodies effected, the capital and the ridge
against which it leans occupied, the next step would be the investment
of the Sherpur cantonment, preparatory to an assault upon it in force.
The British general through his spies had information of those projects.
To allow the projected concentration to be effected would involve
serious disadvantages, and both experience and temperament enjoined on
Roberts the offensive. The Logur contingent was regarded as not of much
account, and might be headed back by a threat. Mahomed Jan's force,
which was reckoned some 5000 strong, needed to be handled with greater
vigour. Meer Butcha and his Kohistanees were less formidable, and might
be dealt with incidentally. Roberts took a measure of wise precaution in
telegraphing to Colonel Jenkins on the 7th December to march his Guides
(cavalry and infantry) from Jugdulluk to Sherpur.
On the 8th General Macpherson was sent out toward the west with a column
consisting of 1300 bayonets, three squadrons, and eight guns. Following
the Ghuznee road across the Chardeh valley, he was to march to Urgundeh,
in the vicinity of which place it was expected that he would find
Mahomed Jan's levies, which he was to attack and drive backward on
Maidan, taking care to prevent their retreat to the westward in the
direction of Bamian. On the following day General Baker marched out with
a force made up of 900 infantrymen, two and a half squadrons, and four
guns, with instructions to march southward toward the Logur valley, deal
with the tribal gathering there, then bend sharply in a south-westerly
direction and take up a position across the Ghuznee road in the Maidan
valley on the line of retreat which it was hoped that Macpherson would
succeed in enforcing on Mahomed Jan. In that case the Afghan leader
would find himself between two fires, and would be punished so severely
as to render it unlikely that he would give further trouble. To afford
time for Baker to reach the position assigned to him Macpherson remained
halted during the 9th at Aushar, a village just beyond the debouche of
the Nanuchee Pass, at the north-western extremity of the Asmai heights.
On that day a cavalry reconnaissance discovered that the Kohistanee
levies in considerable strength had already gathered about Karez Meer,
some ten miles north-west of Cabul, and that masses of Afghans
presumably belonging to the force of Mahomed Jan were moving northward
in the Kohistan direction, apparently with the object of joining Meer
Butcha's gathering at Karez. It was imperative that the latter should be
dispersed before the junction could be effected, and Sir Frederick
Roberts had no option but to order Macpherson to alter his line of
advance and move against the Kohistanees. Necessary as was this
divergence from the original plan of operation, it had the effect of
sending to wreck the combined movement from which so much was hoped, and
of bringing about a very critical situation. If Lockhart's
reconnaissance had been made a day earlier, Macpherson might probably
have utilised to good purpose by dispersing the Kohistanees, the day
which as it was he spent halted at Aushar. He might have accomplished
that object equally well if, instead of the cavalry reconnaissance made
by Lockhart, Macpherson himself had been instructed to devote the 9th to
a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Karez Meer.
[Illustration: Map of Cabul and surroundings.]
The country being held unsuited for the action of wheeled artillery and
cavalry, Macpherson left his details of those arms at Aushar, and
marched on the morning of the 10th on Karez with his infantry and
mountain guns. As his troops crowned the Surkh Kotul they saw before
them an imposing spectacle. The whole terrain around Karez swarmed with
masses of armed tribesmen, whose banners were flying on every hillock.
Down in the Pughman valley to the left rear, were discerned bodies of
the hostile contingent from the west, between which and the Kohistanees
no junction had fortunately as yet been made. Macpherson's dispositions
were simple. His mountain guns shelled with effect the Kohistanee
tribesmen, and then he moved forward from the Surkh Kotul in three
columns. His skirmishers drove back the forward stragglers, and then the
main columns advancing at the double swept the disordered masses before
them, and forced them rearward into their entrenched position in front
of the Karez village. There the resistance was half-hearted. After a
brief artillery preparation the columns carried the position with a
rush, and the Kohistanees were routed with heavy loss. Meer Butcha and
his Kohistanees well beaten, Macpherson camped for the night near Karez.
Baker had reached his assigned position in the Maidan valley, and there
seemed a fair prospect that the operation against Mahomed Jan as
originally designed might be carried out notwithstanding the
interruption to its prosecution which had been found necessary. For
there was good reason to believe that the Afghan commander and his
force, whose strength was estimated at about 5000 men, were in the
vicinity of Urgundeh, about midway between Macpherson at Karez and Baker
in the Maidan valley. If Mahomed Jan would be so complaisant as to
remain where he was until Macpherson could reach him, then Roberts'
strategy would have a triumphant issue, and the Warduk general and his
followers might be relegated to the category of negligable quantities.
Orders were sent to Macpherson to march as early as possible on the
morning of the 11th, follow up the enemy who had been observed retiring
toward the west and south, and endeavour to drive them down toward
General Baker. He was further informed that the cavalry and
horse-artillery which he had left at Aushar would leave that village at
nine A.M. under the command of Brigadier-General Massy, and would cross
the Chardeh valley by the Urgundeh road, on which he was directed to
join them on his march. The specific instructions given to General Massy
were as follows: 'To advance from Aushar by the road leading directly
from the city of Cabul toward Urgundeh and Ghuznee' (the main Ghuznee
road), 'to proceed cautiously and quietly feeling for the enemy, to
communicate with General Macpherson, and to act in conformity with that
officer's movements, but on no account to commit himself to an action
until General Macpherson had engaged the enemy.'
Macpherson marched at eight A.M., moving in a south-westerly direction
toward Urgundeh by a direct track in rear of the range of hills bounding
the western edge of the Chardeh valley. To the point at which it was
probable that he and Massy should meet he had considerably further to
travel than had the latter from the Aushar camp, and Macpherson's force
consisted of infantry while that of Massy was cavalry and
horse-artillery. Massy left Aushar at nine A.M. in consideration of the
shorter distance he had to traverse, and he headed for Killa Kazee, a
village near the foothills of the western ridge about four miles from
Aushar as the crow flies. He did not comply with the letter of his
instructions to follow the Ghuznee road because of the wide detour
marching by it would have involved, but instead made his way straight
across country. That he should have done this was unfortunate, since the
time he thus gained threw him forward into a position involving danger
in advance of any possible co-operation on the part of Macpherson, who
was still far away from the point of intended junction while Massy was
comparatively near it. Massy's force consisted of two squadrons 9th
Lancers and a troop of 14th Bengal Lancers, escorting four
horse-artillery guns. He had detached a troop of 9th Lancers to
endeavour to open communication with Macpherson, in compliance with his
instructions. As he approached Killa Kazee, Captain Gough commanding the
troop of 9th Lancers forming the advance guard, sent back word that the
hills on either side of the Ghuznee road some distance beyond the
village were occupied by the enemy in considerable force. Massy, in his
unsupported condition and destitute of any information as to
Macpherson's whereabouts, would have shown discretion by halting on
receipt of this intelligence pending further developments. But he
probably believed that the Afghans flanking the road were casual
tribesmen from the adjacent villages who were unlikely to make any
stand, and he determined to move on.
What he presently saw gave him pause. A great mass of Afghans some 2000
strong were forming across the Ghuznee road. From the hills to right and
left broad streams of armed men were pouring down the hillslopes and
forming on the plain. The surprise was complete, the situation full of
perplexity. That gathering host in Massy's front could be none other
than Mahomed Jan's entire force. So far from being in retreat southward
and westward, so far from waiting supinely about Urgundeh until
Macpherson as per programme should drive it on to the muzzles of Baker's
Martinis, here it was inside our guard, in possession of the interior
line, its front facing toward turbulent Cabul and depleted Sherpur, with
no obstruction in its path save this handful of lancers and these four
guns! Massy's orders, it was true, were to act in conformity with
Macpherson's movements, and on no account to commit himself to an action
until that officer had engaged the enemy. Yes, but could the framer of
those orders have anticipated the possibility of such a position as that
in which Massy now found himself? There was no Macpherson within ken of
the perplexed cavalryman, nor the vaguest indication of his movements.
The enemy had doubled on that stout and shrewd soldier; it was clear
that for the moment he was not within striking distance of his foe,
whether on flank or on rear. No course of action presented itself to
Massy that was not fraught with grave contingencies. If he should keep
to the letter of his orders, the Afghan host might be in Cabul in a
couple of hours. Should he retire slowly, striving to retard the Afghan
advance by his cannon fire and by the threatening demonstrations of his
cavalry, the enemy might follow him up so vigorously as to be beyond
Macpherson's reach when that officer should make good his point in the
direction of Urgundeh. If on the other hand he should show a bold front,
and departing from his orders in the urgent crisis face to face with
which he found himself should strain every nerve to 'hold' the Afghan
masses in their present position, there was the possibility that, at
whatever sacrifice to himself and his little force, he might save the
situation and gain time for Macpherson to come up and strike Mahomed Jan
on flank and in rear.
For better or for worse Massy committed himself to the rasher
enterprise, and opened fire on the swiftly growing Afghan masses. The
first range was held not sufficiently effective, and in the hope by
closer fire of deterring the enemy from effecting the formation they
were attempting, the guns were advanced to the shorter ranges of 2500
and 2000 yards. The shells did execution, but contrary to precedent did
not daunt the Afghans. They made good their formation under the shell
fire. Mahomed Jan's force had been estimated of about 5000 strong;
according to Massy's estimate it proved to be double that number. The
array was well led; it never wavered, but came steadily on with waving
banners and loud shouts. The guns had to be retired; they came into
action again, but owing to the rapidity of the Afghan advance at shorter
range than before. The carbine fire of thirty dismounted lancers 'had no
appreciable effect.' The outlook was already ominous when at this moment
Sir Frederick Roberts came on the scene. As was his wont, he acted with
decision. The action, it was clear to him, could not be maintained
against odds so overwhelming and in ground so unfavourable. He
immediately ordered Massy to retire slowly, to search for a road by
which the guns could be withdrawn, and to watch for an opportunity to
execute a charge under cover of which the guns might be extricated. He
despatched an aide-de-camp in quest of Macpherson, with an order
directing that officer to wheel to his left into the Chardeh valley and
hurry to Massy's assistance; and he ordered General Hills to gallop to
Sherpur and warn General Hugh Gough, who had charge in the cantonment,
to be on the alert, and also to send out at speed a wing of the 72d to
the village of Deh Mazung, in the throat of the gorge of the Cabul
river, which the Highlanders were to hold to extremity.
The enemy were coming on, the guns were in imminent danger, and the
moment had come for the action of the cavalry. The gallant Cleland gave
the word to his lancers and led them straight for the centre of the
Afghan line, the troop of Bengal Lancers following in support. Gough,
away on the Afghan left, saw his chief charging and he eagerly
'conformed,' crushing in on the enemy's flank at the head of his troop.
'Self-sacrifice' the Germans hold the duty of cavalry; and there have
been few forlorner hopes than the errand on which on this ill-starred
day our 200 troopers rode into the heart of 10,000 Afghans flushed with
unwonted good fortune. Through the dust-cloud of the charge were visible
the flashes of the Afghan volleys and the sheen of the British lance
heads as they came down to the 'engage.' There was a short interval of
suspense, the stour and bicker of the _mêlée_ faintly heard, but
invisible behind the bank of smoke and dust. Then from out the cloud of
battle riderless horses came galloping back, followed by broken groups
of troopers. Gallantly led home, the charge had failed--what other
result could have been expected? Its career had been blocked by sheer
weight of opposing numbers. Sixteen troopers had been killed, seven were
wounded, two officers had been slain in the hand-to-hand strife. Cleland
came out with a sword cut and a bullet wound. Captain Stewart Mackenzie
had been crushed under his fallen horse, but distinguished himself
greatly, and brought the regiment out of action. As the dust settled it
was apparent that the charge had merely encouraged the enemy, who as
they steadily pressed on in good order, were waving their banners in
triumph and brandishing their tulwars and knives. The fire from the
Sniders and Enfields of their marksmen was well directed and deliberate.
While Cleland's broken troopers were being rallied two guns were brought
into action, protected in a measure by Gough's troop and the detachment
of Bengal Lancers, which had not suffered much in the charge. But the
Afghans came on so ardently that there was no alternative but prompt
retreat. One gun had to be spiked and abandoned, Lieutenant Hardy of the
Horse Artillery remaining by it until surrounded and killed. Some 500
yards further back, near the village of Baghwana, the three remaining
guns stuck fast in a deep watercourse. At General Roberts' instance a
second charge was attempted, to give time for their extrication; but it
made no head, so that the guns had to be abandoned, and the gunners and
drivers with their teams accompanied the retirement of the cavalry. Some
fugitives both of cavalry and artillery hurried to the shelter of the
cantonment somewhat precipitately; but the great majority of Massy's
people behaved well, rallying without hesitation and constituting the
steady and soldierly little body with which Roberts, retiring on Deh
Mazung as slowly as possible to give time for the Highlanders from
Sherpur to reach that all-important point, strove to delay the Afghan
advance. This in a measure was accomplished by the dismounted fire of
the troopers, and the retirement was distinguished by the steady
coolness displayed by Cough's men and Neville's Bengal Lancers. Deh
Mazung was reached, but no Highlanders had as yet reached that place.
The carbines of the cavalrymen were promptly utilised from the cover the
village afforded; but they could not have availed to stay the Afghan
rush. There was a short interval of extreme anxiety until the 200 men of
the 72d, Brownlow leading them, became visible advancing at the double
through the gorge. 'It was literally touch and go who should reach the
village first, the Highlanders or the Afghans,' who were streaming
toward it 'like ants on a hill,' but the men of the 72d swept in, and
swarming to the house tops soon checked with their breechloaders the
advancing tide. After half-an-hour of futile effort the Afghans saw fit
to abandon the attempt to force the gorge, and inclining to their right
they occupied the Takht-i-Shah summit, the slopes of the Sher Derwaza
heights, and the villages in the south-eastern section of the Chardeh
valley.
Macpherson, marching from the Surkh Kotul toward Urgundeh, had observed
parties of Afghans crossing his front in the direction of the Chardeh
valley, and when the sound reached him of Massy's artillery fire he
wheeled to his left through a break in the hills opening into the
Chardeh valley, and approached the scene of the discomfiture of Massy's
force. This he did at 12.30 P.M., four and a half hours after leaving
the Surkh Kotul. As the length of his march was about ten miles, it may
be assumed that he encountered difficulties in the rugged track by which
he moved, for Macpherson was not the man to linger by the way when there
was the prospect of a fight. Had it been possible for him to have
marched two hours earlier than he did--and his orders were to march as
early as possible--his doing so would have made all the difference in
the world to Massy, and could scarcely have failed to change the face of
the day. He did not discover the lost guns, but he struck the Afghan
rear, which was speedily broken and dispersed by the 67th and 3d Sikhs.
Macpherson's intention to spend the night at Killa Kazee was changed by
the receipt of an order from General Roberts calling him in to Deh
Mazung, where he arrived about nightfall. Sir Frederick Roberts then
returned to Sherpur, for the defence of which General Hugh Gough had
made the best dispositions in his power, and the slender garrison of
which was to receive in the course of the night an invaluable accession
in the shape of the Guides, 900 strong, whom Jenkins had brought up by
forced marches from Jugdulluk.
The misfortunes of the day were in a measure retrieved by a well-timed,
ready-witted, and gallant action on the part of that brilliant and
lamented soldier Colonel Macgregor. A wing of the 72d had been called
out to hold the gorge of the Cabul river, but the Nanuchee Pass, through
which led the direct road from the scene of the combat to Sherpur,
remained open; and there was a time when the Afghan army was heading in
its direction. Macgregor had hurried to the open pass in time to rally
about him a number of Massy's people, who had lost their officers and
were making their way confusedly toward the refuge of Sherpur. Remaining
in possession of this important point until all danger was over, he
noticed that the ground about Bagwana, where the guns had been
abandoned, was not held by the enemy, and there seemed to him that the
opportunity to recover them presented itself. Taking with him a
detachment of lancers and artillerymen, he rode out and met with no
molestation beyond a few shots from villagers. From Macpherson's baggage
guard, met as it crossed the valley toward Sherpur, he requisitioned
sixty infantrymen who entered and held Bagwana, and covered him and the
gunners during the long and arduous struggle to extricate the guns from
their lair in the deep and rugged watercourse. This was at length
accomplished, scratch teams were improvised, and the guns, which were
uninjured although the ammunition boxes had been emptied, were brought
into the cantonment to the general joy.
The result of the day's operations left General Baker momentarily
belated. But on the morning of the 11th that officer, finding that no
Afghans were being driven down upon him in accordance with the
programme, quitted the Maidan country and marched northward toward
Urgundeh. An attack on his baggage and rear-guard was foiled; but as he
reached his camping ground for the night at Urgundeh the Afghans were
found in possession of the gorge opening into the Chardeh valley,
through which ran his road to Cabul. They were dislodged by a dashing
attack of part of the 92d Highlanders led by Lieutenant Scott Napier. It
was not until the morning of the 12th that Baker was informed by
heliograph from Sherpur of the occurrences of the previous day, and
received directions to return to the cantonment without delay. In the
course of a few hours he was inside Sherpur, notwithstanding that his
march had been constantly molested by attacks on his rear-guard.
The casualties of the 11th had been after all not very serious. All told
they amounted to thirty men killed and forty-four wounded; fifty-one
horses killed and sixteen wounded. But the Afghans were naturally elated
by the success they had unquestionably achieved; the national rising had
been inaugurated by a distinct triumph, the news of which would bring
into the field incalculable swarms of fierce and fanatical partisans. It
was clear that Mahomed Jan had a quick eye for opportunities, and some
skill in handling men. That he could recognise the keypoint of a
position and act boldly and promptly on that recognition, his tactics of
the 11th made abundantly obvious, and his commanding position on the
morning of the 12th still further demonstrated his tactical ability.
_L'audace, encore l'audace, et toujours l'audace_ is the game to be
played by the commander of disciplined troops against Asiatic levies,
and no man was more sensible of this than the gallant soldier who now
from the bastion of Sherpur could see the Afghan standards waving on the
summit of the Takht-i-Shah. Indeed he was impressed so thoroughly by the
force of the maxim as to allow himself to hope that some 560 soldiers,
of whom about one-third were Europeans, backed by a couple of mountain
guns, would be able to carry by assault the lofty peak, strongly held by
resolute Afghans in protected positions, supported by several thousands
of their fellows lying out of sight until an attack should develop
itself, to meet which they were at hand to reinforce the garrison of the
Takht-i-Shah. From the gorge of the Cabul river there runs due south to
near Charasiah a lofty and rugged range, the highest point of which, the
Takht-i-Shah, is about midway from either extremity. From this main
ridge there project eastward at right angles two lateral spurs. The
shorter and more northerly of those runs down to the Balla Hissar, the
longer and more southerly obtruding itself into the plain as far as the
village of Beni Hissar. This latter spur quits the main ridge no great
distance south of the Takht-i-Shah peak, and on the 12th the Afghan
reserves were massed in rear of the peak, both on the main ridge and on
this spur. The steep faces of the mountain were strewn with great smooth
boulders and jagged masses of rock; the ascent, everywhere laborious,
was complicated in places by sheer scarps, and those formidable
impediments were made still more difficult by frequent sungahs, strong
stone curtains behind which the defenders lay safe or fired with a
minimum of exposure. On the summit was a great natural cavity which had
been made bomb proof by art, and further cover was afforded by caves and
lines of rock. The most northerly portion of the ridge described is
known as the Sher Derwaza heights, which Macpherson had occupied on the
morning of the 12th, and his brigade it was which furnished the little
force already mentioned as charged to attempt the task of storming the
Takht-i-Shah.
For several hours Morgan's two mountain guns industriously shelled that
peak, and then the infantry made their effort. The Afghans fought
stubbornly in defence of a lower hill they held in advance of the
Takht-i-Shah, but after a hard struggle they had to abandon it to
Macpherson's resolute men. But the exertions of the latter to ascend the
peak were baulked by its rugged steepness and the fire of the Afghans
holding the sungahs on its face. Sir Frederick Roberts had to recognise
that the direct attack by so weak a force unaided by a diversion, could
not succeed, and he ordered further efforts to be deferred. The
casualties of the abortive attempt included three officers, one of whom,
Major Cook, V.C. of the Goorkhas, than whom the British army contained
no better soldier, died of his wound. Macpherson was directed to hold
the ground he had won, including the lower advanced hill, and was
informed that on the following morning he was to expect the co-operation
of General Baker from the direction of Beni Hissar.
The lesson of the result of attempting impossibilities had been taken to
heart, and the force which Baker led out on the morning of the 13th was
exceptionally strong, consisting as it did of the 92d Highlanders and
Guides infantry, a wing of the 3d Sikhs, a cavalry regiment, and eight
guns. Marching in the direction of the lateral spur extending from the
main ridge eastward to Beni Hissar, Baker observed that large masses of
the enemy were quitting the plain villages about Beni Hissar in which
they had taken shelter for the night, and were hurrying to gain the
summit of the spur which constituted the defensive position of the
Afghan reserve. Baker's _coup d'oeil_ was quick and true. By gaining the
centre of the spur he would cut in two the Afghan line along its summit,
and so isolate and neutralise the section of it from the centre to the
Beni Hissar extremity, toward which section the reinforcements from the
plain villages were climbing. But to accomplish this shrewd stroke it
was necessary that he should act with promptitude and energy. His guns
opened fire on the summit. The Sikhs, extended athwart the plain,
protected his right flank. His cavalry on the left cut into the bodies
of Afghans hurrying to ascend the eastern extremity of the spur. With
noble emulation the Highlanders and the Guides sprang up the rugged
slope, their faces set towards the centre of the summit line. Major
White, who already had earned many laurels in the campaign, led on his
Highlanders; the Guides, burning to make the most of their first
opportunity to distinguish themselves, followed eagerly the gallant
chief who had so often led them to victory on other fields. Lieutenant
Forbes, a young officer of the 92d heading the advance of his regiment,
reached the summit accompanied only by his colour-sergeant. A band of
ghazees rushed on the pair and the sergeant fell. As Forbes stood
covering his body he was overpowered and slain. The sudden catastrophe
staggered for a moment the soldiers following their officer, but
Lieutenant Dick Cunyngham rallied them immediately and led them forward
at speed. For his conduct on this occasion Cunyngham received the
Victoria Cross.
With rolling volleys Highlanders and Guides reached and won the summit.
The Afghans momentarily clung to the position, but the British fire
swept them away and the bayonets disposed of the ghazees, who fought and
died in defence of their standards. The severance of the Afghan line was
complete. A detachment was left to maintain the isolation of some 2000
of the enemy who had been cut off; and then swinging to their right
Baker's regiments swept along the summit of the spur toward the main
ridge and the Takht-i-Shah, the Highlanders leading. As they advanced
they rolled up the Afghan line and a panic set in among the enemy, who
sought safety in flight. Assailed from both sides, for Macpherson's men
from the conical hill were passing up the north side of the peak, and
shaken by the steady fire of the mountain guns, the garrison of the
Takht-i-Shah evacuated the position. Baker's soldiers toiled vigorously
upward toward the peak, keen for the honour of winning it; but the
credit of that achievement justly fell to their comrades of Macpherson's
command, who had striven so valiantly to earn it the day before, and who
had gained possession of the peak and the Afghan standards flying on its
summit, a few minutes before the arrival of White's Highlanders and
Jenkins' Guides. As the midday gun was fired in the cantonment the flash
of the heliograph from the peak told that the Takht-i-Shah was won.
While Baker was sweeping the spur and climbing the lofty peak of the
main ridge, his reserve, which remained in the plain, was in sharp
action against masses of assailants from the city and other bodies from
the villages about Beni Hissar. Those were beaten off by the 3d Sikhs
and Baker's flanks were thus cleared, but the resolute Afghans, bent on
interfering with his return march, surged away in the direction of the
Siah Sung ridge and gathered thereon in considerable strength. The guns
of Sherpur shelled them smartly, but they held their ground; and Massy
went out to disperse them with the cavalry. The Afghans showed unwonted
resolution, confronting the cavalry with extraordinary steadiness in
regular formation and withholding their fire until the troopers were
close upon them. But the horsemen were not to be denied. Captains Butson
and Chisholme led their squadrons against the Afghan flanks, and the
troopers of the 9th avenged the mishap which had befallen that gallant
regiment two days before, riding through and through the hostile masses
and scattering them over the plain. But in the charge Butson was killed,
Chisholme and Trower were wounded; the sergeant-major and three men were
killed and seven were wounded. Brilliant charges were delivered by the
other cavalry detachments, and the Siah Sung heights were ultimately
cleared. The Guides' cavalry attacked, defeated, and pursued for a long
distance a body of Kohistanees marching from the north-east apparently
with intent to join Mahomed Jan. The casualties of the day were sixteen
killed and forty-five wounded; not a heavy loss considering the amount
of hard fighting. The Afghans were estimated to have lost in killed
alone from 200 to 300 men.
The operations of the day were unquestionably successful so far as they
went, but the actual results attained scarcely warranted the
anticipation that the Afghans would acknowledge themselves defeated by
breaking up their combination and dispersing to their homes. It was true
that they had been defeated, but they had fought with unprecedented
stubbornness and gave little evidence of being cowed. Throughout the day
the villages around Cabul had evinced a rancorous hostility which had a
marked significance. Not less significant was the participation in the
fighting of the day on the part of the population of Cabul. As Baker was
returning to Sherpur in the evening he had been fired upon from the
Balla Hissar, and his flanking parties had found ambushes of armed
Afghans among the willows between the city and the cantonment. But for
the skill and courage of the non-commissioned officer in charge a convoy
of wounded on its way to Sherpur would certainly have been destroyed.
But there was a stronger argument than any of those indications,
significant as they were of the unbroken spirit of the Afghans, telling
against the probability that the operations of the day would have the
effect of putting down the national rising. The hordes which had
gathered to the banners of the Mushk-i-Alum and Mahomed Jan combined
with the fanaticism of the _jehad_ a fine secular greed for plunder. Was
it likely that they would scatter resignedly, leaving untouched the rich
booty of the city that had been almost within arm's-length as they
looked down on it from the peak of the Takht-i-Shah, and whose minarets
they were within sight of on the spur and in the villages of
Beni Hissar? Was that ever likely? And was it not made more and yet
more unlikely when on the afternoon of the 13th Macpherson, acting on
orders, moved his camp to the Balla Hissar heights, evacuating Deh
Mazung and leaving open to the enemy the road into the city through the
Cabul gorge? The following morning was to show how promptly and how
freely the Afghans had taken advantage of the access to the capital thus
afforded them. It must never be forgotten that at this time our people
in Afghanistan held no more territory than the actual ground they stood
upon and the terrain swept by their fire. No trustworthy intelligence
from outside that region was procurable; and of this there can be no
clearer evidence than that the General was under the belief that the
enemy had been 'foiled in their western and southern operations.'
The morning of the 14th effectually dispelled the optimistic
anticipations indulged in overnight. At daybreak a large body of
Afghans, with many standards, were discerned on a hill about a mile
northward of the Asmai ridge, from which and from the Kohistan road they
were moving on to the crest of that ridge. They were joined there by
several thousands coming up the slopes from out the village of Deh
Afghan, the northern suburb of Cabul. It was estimated that there were
about 8000 men in position along the summit of the ridge, and occupying
also a low conical hill beyond its north-western termination. The array
of Afghans displayed itself within a mile of the west face of the
Sherpur cantonment, and formed a menace which could not be brooked. To
General Baker was entrusted the task of dislodging the enemy from the
threatening position, and there was assigned to him for this purpose a
force consisting of about 1200 bayonets, eight guns, and a regiment of
native cavalry. His first object was to gain possession of the conical
hill already mentioned, and thus debar the Afghan force on the Asmai
heights from receiving accessions either from the masses on the hill
further north or by the Kohistan road. Under cover of the artillery fire
the Highlanders and Guides occupied this conical hill after a short
conflict. A detachment was left to hold it and then Colonel Jenkins, who
commanded the attack, set about the arduous task of storming from the
northward the formidable position of the Asmai heights. The assault was
led by Brownlow's staunch Highlanders, supported on the right by the
Guides operating on the enemy's flank; and the Afghan position was
heavily shelled by four of Baker's guns, and by four more in action near
the south-western corner of the Sherpur cantonment. Macpherson from his
position on the Balla Hissar hill aided the attack by the fire of his
guns, and also by despatching two companies of the 67th to cross the
Cabul gorge and operate against the enemy's left rear.
In the face of a heavy fire the Highlanders and Guides climbed with
great speed and steadiness the rugged hill-side leading upward to the
Afghan breastwork on the northern edge of the summit. Their approach and
the crushing shrapnel fire from the guns near Sherpur had caused
numerous Afghans to move downward from the position toward Deh Afghan,
heavily smitten as they went; but the ghazees in the breastworks made a
strenuous resistance and died under their banners as the Highlanders
carried the defences with a rush. The crest, about a quarter of a mile
long, was traversed under heavy fire and the southern breastwork on the
peak was approached. It was strong and strongly held, but a cross fire
was brought to bear on its garrison, and then the frontal attack led by
a lance-corporal of the 72d was delivered. After a hand-to-hand grapple
in which Highlanders and Guides were freely cut and slashed by the
knives of the ghazees, the position, which was found full of dead, was
carried, but with considerable loss. The whole summit of the Asmai
heights was now in British possession, and everything seemed auspicious.
The Afghans streaming down from the heights toward the city were being
lacerated by shell fire and musketry fire as they descended. When they
took refuge in Deh Afghan that suburb was heavily shelled, and it was
gradually evacuated.
Scarcely had Jenkins won the summit of the Asmai ridge when the fortune
of the day was suddenly overcast; indeed while he was still engaged in
the attainment of that object premonitory indications of serious
mischief were unexpectedly presenting themselves. A vast host of Afghans
described as numbering from 15,000 to 20,000, debouched into the Chardeh
valley from the direction of Indikee, and were moving northwards,
apparently with the object of forming a junction with the masses
occupying the hills to the north-west of the Asmai heights. About the
same time cavalry scouting in the Chardeh valley brought in the
information that large parties of hostile infantry and cavalry were
hurrying across the valley in the direction of the conical hill the
defence of which had been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Clark with 120
Highlanders and Guides. Recognising Clark's weakness, General Baker had
judiciously reinforced that officer with four mountain guns and 100
bayonets. The guns opened fire on the Afghan bodies marching from the
Killa Kazee direction, and drove them out of range. But they coalesced
with the host advancing from Indikee, and the vast mass of Afghans,
facing to the right, struck the whole range of the British position from
near the Cabul gorge on the south to and beyond the conical hill on the
north. The most vulnerable point was the section at and about that
eminence, and the necessity for supplying Clark with further
reinforcements became urgently manifest. Baker sent up a second
detachment, and 200 Sikhs came out from Sherpur at the double. But the
Afghans, creeping stealthily in great numbers up the slope from out the
Chardeh valley, had the shorter distance to travel, and were beforehand
with the reinforcements. Their tactics were on a par with their
resolution. The left of their attack grasped and held a knoll north of
the conical hill, and from this position of vantage brought a cross fire
to bear on Clark's detachment. As their direct attack developed itself
it encountered from the conical hill a heavy rifle fire, and shells at
short range tore through the loose rush of ghazees, but the fanatics
sped on and up without wavering. As they gathered behind a mound for the
final onslaught, Captain Spens of the 72d with a handful of his
Highlanders went out on the forlorn hope of dislodging them. A rush was
made on him; he was overpowered and slaughtered after a desperate
resistance, and the Afghan charge swept up the hill-side. In momentary
panic the defenders gave ground, carrying downhill with them the
reinforcement of Punjaubees which Captain Hall was bringing up. Two of
the mountain guns were lost, but there was a rally at the foot of the
hill under cover of which the other two were extricated. The Afghans
refrained from descending into the plain, and directed their efforts
toward cutting off the occupants of the position on the Asmai summit.
They ascended by two distinct directions. One body from the conical hill
followed the route taken by Jenkins in the morning; another scaled a
spur trending downward to the Chardeh valley from the southern extremity
of the Asmai ridge.
It was estimated that the Afghan strength disclosed this day did not
fall short of 40,000 men; and General Roberts was reluctantly compelled
to abandon for the time any further offensive efforts. His reasons,
stated with perfect frankness, may best be given in his own words. 'Up
to this time,' he wrote, 'I had no reason to apprehend that the Afghans
were in sufficient force to cope successfully with disciplined troops,
but the resolute and determined manner in which the conical hill had
been recaptured, and the information sent to me by Brigadier-General
Macpherson that large masses of the enemy were still advancing from the
north, south, and west, made it evident that the numbers combined
against us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively small
force meeting them. I therefore determined to withdraw from all isolated
positions, and to concentrate the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing
the safety of our large cantonment, and avoiding what had now become a
useless sacrifice of life.' The orders issued to Generals Baker and
Macpherson to retire into the cantonment were executed with skill and
steadiness. Jenkins' evacuation of the Asmai position was conspicuously
adroit. When the order to quit reached that able officer, Major
Stockwell of the 72d was out with a small detachment, maintaining a hot
fire on the Afghan bodies ascending by the southern spur from the
Chardeh valley. He fell back with great deliberation, and when he
rejoined the retirement down the hill face looking toward Sherpur was
leisurely proceeded with, the hostile advance from, the northern side
being held in check by the fire of covering parties from Jenkins' left
flank. General Macpherson's retirement was masterly. Flanking his march
through the Cabul gorge with two companies of the 67th who stalled off a
rush of ghazees from the Asmai crest, he continued his march through
the suburb of Deh Afghan, his baggage in front under a strong guard.
Some few shots were exchanged before the suburb was cleared, but the
casualties were few and presently the brigade entered the cantonment.
General Baker continued to hold a covering position with part of his
force, until the troops from the heights and Macpherson's command had
made good their retirement, and he was the last to withdraw. By dusk the
whole force was safely concentrated within the cantonment, and the
period of the defensive had begun. The casualties of the day were
serious; thirty-five killed, and 107 wounded. During the week of
fighting the little force had lost somewhat heavily; the killed numbered
eighty-three, the wounded 192. Eight officers were killed, twelve were
wounded.