ORGANISATION IN FRANCE
While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany began,
as we have seen in Chapter X., to improve her own system of military
rail-transport, with a view to remedying the faults developed
therein, France applied herself with equal, if not with even greater,
determination and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a
system which, in her case, had been entirely lacking.
Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative need to prepare
for future contingencies, and the still more important part that
railways would inevitably play in the next great war in which she might
be engaged, France resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an
indispensable factor in her scheme of national defence, a system of
military transport comprehensive in its scope, complete in its working
details, and leaving nothing to chance. Everything was to be foreseen,
provided for, and, as far as circumstances would permit, tested in
advance.
The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, and as recommended
by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point for what was to be done. From
that time, also, every new regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to
military transport, and every important alteration made in the Prussian
system, was promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the
ably-conducted French military papers; though in the actual creation
of her own system there was no mere following by France of Prussian
examples. What was considered worth adopting certainly was adopted;
but the organisation eventually built up, as the result of many years
of pertinacious efforts, was, in reality, based on French conditions,
French requirements, and the most progressive ideas of French military
science. The French were, also, to show that, when they applied
themselves to the task, they had a genius for organisation in no way
inferior to that of the Germans themselves.
In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared that, while
the education of France in the use of railways in time of war had still
to be completed, the basis for such education had already been laid
down by Marshal Niel's "Commission Centrale" of 1869. The two essential
conditions were (1) unification of control in the use of railways for
military purposes, whether for the transport of men or of supplies; and
(2) association of the military element and the technical element,--an
association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every
phase of the railway service, so that before any order was given there
should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement, and this,
also, without prejudice to other transport orders already given or
likely to become necessary.
It was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the
organisation which France created.
As early as November, 1872, there was called into existence a
_Commission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer_ consisting of
twelve members, who represented the Ministry of Public Works, the Army,
the Navy, and the great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of
War, and charged with the task of studying all questions relating to
the use of railways by the Army, the Commission had for its first duty
a revision of the proposals made by Marshal Niel's Commission of 1869.
Following on this came a succession of laws, decrees and instructions
dealing with various aspects of the situation in regard to military
transport and the military organization of the railways, the number
issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer than seventeen. These,
however, represented more or less tentative or sectional efforts made in
combination with the railway companies, who gave to the Chambers and to
the administrative authorities their most earnest support and the full
benefit of all their technical knowledge and experience in regard to
the many problems which had to be solved.
In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 29) which
codified, modified or further developed the various legislative
or administrative measures already taken, and laid down both the
fundamental principles and the leading details of a comprehensive
scheme which, after additional modifications or amendments, based on
later experiences, was to develop into the system of organised military
rail-transport as it exists in France to-day.
These later modifications were more especially effected by three
decrees which, based on the law of December 28, 1888, dealt with (1)
the composition and powers of the Commission Militaire Superieure des
Chemins de Fer; (2) the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway
Troops; and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways.
Since its original formation in 1872, the _Superior Military Commission_
had already undergone reconstruction in 1886, and still further changes,
in addition to those made by the decree of February 5, 1889, were to
follow. In its final form the Commission still retains the principle of
representation thereon alike of the military and the technical (railway)
element. Presided over by the Chief of the General Staff--who, with
the help of a special department of that Staff, exercises the supreme
direction of the military transport services, subject to the authority
of the War Minister--the Commission is composed of six Generals or other
military officers of high rank, three representatives of the Ministry of
Public Works, and the members of the Line Commission appointed for each
of the great railway systems and, also, for the Chemin de Fer d'État.
All the members of the Commission are nominated by the Minister of
War. The function they discharge is a purely consultative one. Their
business it is to give to the Minister their views on all such questions
as he may submit to them for consideration in regard to the use of the
railways by the Army, and more especially in regard to--
1. Preparations for military transports.
2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and
alterations of existing lines, as well as all projects which concern
railway facilities (stations, platforms, water supply, locomotive sheds,
etc.)
3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock
in view of military requirements, and the alterations which may be
necessary to adapt it thereto.
4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their
travelling by rail.
5. Agreements to be made between railway companies and the War
Department in respect to transport of troops, provisions, etc.
6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special corps of
railwaymen (for repairs, etc.).
7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of
railways and their approaches.
8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway.
Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War can attend
meetings of the Commission, in a consultative capacity, in respect to
matters coming within their jurisdiction, and the Commission can, in
turn, apply to the Minister for the attendance of any person it may
desire to hear.
As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning the transport
of troops and supplies in time of war, from the moment of mobilisation
onward, are thus prepared, examined or provided for in advance. In
article 8 of the Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports
by Railway ("Réglement sur les transports stratégiques par chemin de
fer") it is, in fact, stated that--
All the arrangements relating to the organisation and
carrying out of transport for mobilisation, concentration,
revictualling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time
of peace. The Minister gives, to this effect, all the necessary
instructions to the General Staff, to the commanders of Army
Corps, and to the different services. A like course is adopted,
in time of peace, with regard to the study of the conditions
under which the railways will be operated on the lines of
communication.
The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field Railway Sections
and Railway Troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an
organised force able to take up the duties of constructing, repairing,
destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force being
established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to
qualify them for the discharge of those various duties. France, in fact,
was now, in this respect, to follow the example of Germany, just as
Germany had already been inspired by the example of the United States.
Under a decree of February 5, 1889, _Field Railway Sections_ ("Sections
de chemins de fer de campagne") were defined as permanent military corps
charged, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops,
with the construction, renovation and operation of those railways of
which the working could not be assured by the national companies. Their
personnel was to be recruited from among the engineers, officials
and men employed by the railway companies and by the State Railways
Administration, such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily
or by reason of liability to render military service; and they were to
form a distinct corps, having its own governing body with, as its head,
a commandant exercising the functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of
peace there were to be nine sections, each designated by a distinctive
number according to the particular railway system or systems from which
it was formed; though authority was given to the Minister of War to call
further sections into being in case of war. The number in peace was
increased, in 1906, by the formation of a tenth section from among the
staffs of railways in the "secondary" group, including local lines and
tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the operation of these
railways or tramways for military transport in time of war.
In time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections,
musters, reviews and assemblies, as ordered by the Minister of War. A
further provision in the decree of 1889 says:--"All the arrangements
relative to the mobilisation of each section shall be studied and
planned in time of peace. Each section should always be ready, in the
most complete manner, to render its services to the Minister of War."
Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a
complete unit on the following basis: (1) A central body; (2) three
distinct divisions, namely, (_a_) "movement," (_b_) "voie," and (_c_)
"traction"; (3) a central depôt common to the three divisions and the
central body; and (4) complementary territorial subdivisions in the same
three classes, and attached to the central depôt of the section. The
territorial subdivisions are designed to provide a reserve force of men
who can complete or strengthen the existing sections, or, alternatively,
be constituted into additional sections, if so desired by the Minister
of War. The total strength of each section (including 141 allotted to
the central depôt) was fixed as 1,466.
The administration of a section rests with an Administrative Council
formed by the president and the heads of the several departments, and
meeting at least once in every three months in time of peace, and once
a week in time of war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the
Field Railway Commissions to which they are attached.[26]
Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military
service are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises,
but may be assembled for inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of
instruction in railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be
summoned by the Minister of War for "a period of exercises" in railway
work in time of peace; and the fact may be recalled that advantage of
this power was taken during the French railway troubles of 1910, when
the strikers were required to assume the rôle of soldiers doing railway
work under military authority and control.
The _Railway Troops_ ("Troupes de chemin de fer") now constitute a
Railway Regiment ("5e régiment du génie") organised under the decree
of July 11, 1899, and comprising on a peace footing, three Battalions,
each of four Companies.
Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or other of the
following classes: (1) Young soldiers who were in the railway service
before they joined the Army; (2) an annual contingent of railway
employés selected by the Minister of War from lists supplied for this
purpose by the administrations of the five great railway companies
and of the State railways, the number so selected not to exceed 240,
distributed as follows: Compagnie du Nord, 42; Est, 18; P. L. M., 54;
Orléans, 42; Midi, 15; État, 69; and (3) soldiers belonging to Infantry
Regiments who, after one year of training therein, are sent to the
Railway Regiment, those chosen for this purpose being, by preference,
men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for railway work.
The railway administrations are also required to provide from among
their officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned
officers to form a reserve for the Regiment.
A most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged.[27] It
is divided into (1) military instruction and (2) technical instruction,
the purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the
Railway Troops to undertake at the theatre of war, subject to the
authority of the Director-General of Railways and Communications,
works of repair or destruction of railway lines, or, in case of need,
the provisional working of the railways. In time of peace it is the
duty of the Superior Military Commission for Railways to advise on all
questions concerning the organisation, instruction and employment of the
special troops for railway work. To enable it to discharge this function
the Commission receives, through the Chief of the General Staff, all
programmes, proposals or reports that may be issued in regard to the
technical instruction of the troops, giving its views thereon, and
making such recommendations as it may consider desirable.
Such technical instruction comprises (_a_) that which is given to the
whole of the troops; (_b_) instruction in particular branches of railway
work given to a limited number of individuals; (_c_) instruction to
groups of men operating in companies or otherwise, and (_d_) instruction
obtained on the ordinary railways. It is further divided into (i)
theoretical and (ii) practical.
Among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of the general
scheme, mention might be made of the issuing of special series of
textbooks; the regular working by the Regiment of about forty miles of
railway--including an important junction--between Chartres and Orléans,
on the State Railway system; and arrangements made with the railway
administrations under which (1) a certain number of Companies belonging
to the Regiment are attached to the ordinary railway systems every
year, for periods of two or three months; and (2) power is given to the
railway administrations to engage the services of the Railway Troops
in carrying out repairs or construction works on their lines, a mutual
advantage thus being obtained.
Finally there is a Railway School ("École de chemins de fer") which
has charge of all the materials, tools, etc., used in the technical
instruction of the troops; draws up, under the orders of the Colonel,
programmes of practical work and instruction; and provides (1) a library
which is supplied with books and periodicals dealing with military,
railway, scientific and historical subjects, together with maps,
plans, decrees, regulations, etc., relating to the military operation
of railways; (2) a collection of tools, instruments and models; (3)
photographic and lithographic departments; (4) stores of railway
construction material for instruction purposes; (5) other stores of like
material for use in case of war; (6) workshops for practical instruction
in railway repairs, etc.; and (7) practice grounds reserved exclusively
for the Railway Troops.
The fact of these two bodies of Field Railway Sections and Railway
Troops being organised on so practical and comprehensive a basis
secured to France the control of forces certain to be of the greatest
service to her in the next war in which she might be engaged. It would,
also, even suffice by itself to prove the earnestness, the vigour and
the thoroughness with which, after 1870-71, France entered upon the
improvement of her system of military rail-transport for national
defence. There was, however, much more to be done, besides, before that
system could be considered complete; and here, again, a vast amount of
study, foresight and energy was shown.
Following, indeed, the laws, decrees, regulations, orders, and
instructions issued down to 1889 came so many others--dealing, in some
instances, with even the minutest detail concerning some particular
phase of the organisation in course of being perfected--that a collected
series of those still in force in 1902 formed a volume of over 700
pages.[28] Since the issue of this somewhat formidable collection, still
further changes have been introduced, the general conditions being
finally modified by decrees passed on December 8, 1913.
Without attempting to indicate all the successive stages in this
prolonged series of legislative and administrative efforts, it may
suffice to offer a general sketch of the French organisation of military
rail-transport on the basis of the laws, regulations and practices in
operation on the outbreak of war in 1914.
Connected with each of the great railway systems there is a permanent
_Line Commission_ ("Commission de réseau") which consists of (1) a
technical member who, in practice, is the general manager of the line;
and (2) a military member, who is a member of the General Staff of the
Army. The former is chosen by the railway administration, subject to
the approval of the War Minister, and the latter by the War Minister
himself. Each Line Commission controls the services of a combined
technical and military staff, and each Commissioner has a deputy who
can take his place and exercise his powers in case of need. While the
Military Commissioner is specially responsible for measures adopted
from a military point of view, the Railway Commissioner is specially
responsible for putting at the command of the Army, as far as may be
necessary or practicable, all the resources of the particular railway
system he represents.
The authority of a Line Commission on any one of the great railway
systems extends to the smaller, or secondary, lines situate within the
same territory; but the smaller companies may themselves claim to be
represented on the Commission by a duly credited agent.
Among the duties to be discharged by a Line Commission in time of peace
are the following:--
1. Investigation of all matters to which military transport on the line
or the system can give rise.
2. Study of all the available resources of the system, in material and
men, from the point of view of military requirements.
3. Preparation of plans, estimates, and other data in connection with
the movement of troops, etc.
4. Verification of reports concerning extent of lines, rolling stock,
and station or traffic facilities.
5. Special instruction of the railway staff.
6. Inspection of lines, bridges, etc.
7. The carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a view to
ameliorating or accelerating the facilities offered by the system in
respect to military transports.
Should several Line Commissions be interested in some particular
question concerning military movements by rail, the Chief of the
General Staff can summon them to a joint conference as often as may be
necessary. The fact, also, that the members of the Line Commissions are
members of the Superior Commission assures co-ordination in the studies
carried on as regards the railways in general, and provides a ready
means by which the central body can obtain the information it desires
concerning any one system or group of systems.
As their district executives, the Line Commissions have such number of
_Sub-Line Commissions_ as may be found necessary. Each of these is,
in turn, composed of a military member, nominated by the Minister,
and a technical member, chosen by the Line Commission. Then, also, to
discharge the function of local executive, there is at every important
centre of traffic a _Station Commission_ ("Commission de gare") which
consists of a military officer and the stationmaster. It receives from
the Line or Sub-Line Commission all orders or instructions concerning
military transport to, from, or passing through, such station, and is
the recognised intermediary for carrying them into effect and seeing
that efficiency is ensured and good order maintained.
A staff, formed of military men and railwaymen acting in combination,
is allotted to each Line, Sub-Line or Station Commission. Concerning
the representation of these two elements, military and civil, on the
one body, article 10 of the decree of December 8, 1913, on Military
Transports says:--
The special function of each of the agents, military or
technical, on the Commissions or Sub-Commissions must, in the
operation of the service, be maintained in the most absolute
manner. At the same time these agents should not lose from their
view the fact that their association is designed to effect
harmony between the exigencies alike of military requirements
and of rail transport, subordinating those of the one to those
of the other, according to circumstances.
From the time that mobilisation begins--or even earlier, on the order
of the War Minister--the members of the Superior Commission take up
their posts _en permanence_ at the War Office, and those of the Line,
Sub-Line and Station Commissions locate themselves at the stations
which will have been allotted to them in time of peace. Thenceforward
each Station Commission is in constant communication by telegraph with
the Line or Sub-Line Commission under which it acts, supplementing
such communication by daily written reports. Among the duties to be
discharged by the Station Commissions are those of superintending the
entrainment or detrainment of troops and the loading or unloading
of material; seeing that the trains required for transport purposes
are provided; preventing congestion of the lines or of the station
approaches; and ensuring the security of the station and of the lines
within a certain radius thereof.
On the outbreak of war the railway companies must place at the service
of the State either the whole or such of their lines, rolling stock, and
other means of transport as may be needed for the conveyance of troops,
stores, etc., to any points served by them. Thenceforward the lines so
required for "strategic transports"--including therein mobilisation,
concentration, reinforcements, supplies and evacuations from the theatre
of war--can be used for ordinary passengers and goods only to such
extent as the Minister may approve.
Following on the order for mobilisation the Minister, after consultation
with the Commander-in-Chief, divides the railways of the country into
two zones--the "Zone of the Interior," and the "Zone of the Armies." Of
these the former passes under the supreme control of the War Minister,
and the latter under that of the Commander-in-Chief. The location of
the _Stations of Transition_, dividing the one zone from the other,
can be varied from time to time by the Minister, in consultation with
the Commander-in-Chief, according to the developments of the military
situation.
The _Zone of the Interior_ is that part of the railway system which,
though not situated at the theatre of war, is subject to military
control by reason of the services required of it in the forwarding of
troops, supplies, guns, ammunition and other necessaries. Operation
by the ordinary staffs of the railway systems is continued, but the
transports ordered by the War Minister are regulated by the Chief of the
General Staff. The execution of the orders given is entrusted from the
day of mobilisation to the Line Commissions, each of which, acting under
the authority of the War Minister, takes charge over the whole of the
services on the lines comprised in its particular territory.
The _Zone of the Armies_ is, in turn, divided into two sections (1)
the "Zone de l'avant," in which military operation of the railways is
necessary on account of their nearness to the fighting-line; and (2)
the "Zone de l'Arrière," in which the railways can still be operated by
the ordinary railway staffs, under the direction of Line and Station
Commissions, as in the adjoining Zone of the Interior.
Orders given by the Commander-in-Chief in respect to transport in the
Zone of the Armies are carried out under the supreme control of an
officer now known as the _Directeur de l'Arrière_. The history of this
important functionary affords an excellent example of the way in which
the whole scheme of operations has been evolved.
The "Règlement général" of July 1, 1874,--one of the earliest attempts
to meet the difficulties which had arisen in 1870-71 in respect to
military rail-transport--was found to be defective inasmuch as it
did not apply, also, to those road and rear services ("Services de
l'Arrière") which are necessarily associated with the rail services
and themselves constitute so important a phase of military transport
as a whole. In 1878 an attempt was made to meet this defect by the
inauguration of a system of "Services des Étapes"; but here, again,
the existence of separate organisations for rail service and road
service, without any connecting and controlling link, was found to be
unsatisfactory. In 1883 a Commission, presided over by General Fay,
was appointed to consider what would be the best course to adopt, and,
in the result, there was issued, on July 7, 1884, a Decree creating
a "Directeur Général des Chemins de Fer et des Étapes," whose duties
were more clearly defined under a Decree of February 21, 1900. In
1908 the title of this officer was changed to that of "Directeur de
l'Arrière," and, after further revisions, the scope of his authority and
responsibility was eventually fixed by the Regulation of December 8,
1913.
Taking up his position at the head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief,
and keeping in close touch, also, with the Minister of War through the
Chief of the General Staff, the Directeur de l'Arrière has for his
special function that of securing complete co-ordination alike between
rail services and road services and between the services in the Zone of
the Interior and those in the Zone of the Armies. Both from the Minister
and from the Commander-in-Chief he receives information as to operations
projected or in progress, and as to the needs of the armies in
_personnel_ and _matériel_. His business it is to see that these needs,
according to their order of urgency--as further communicated to him--are
supplied under conditions which shall provide for all contingencies
and guard against all possible confusion or delays. He fixes, among
other things, the lines of communication; he keeps in close touch with
the road services, and--having, within the limit of his instructions,
complete control over the railways in the Zone of the Armies--he decides
on the conditions to be adopted in respect to all transport alike
from the interior to the armies and from the armies to the interior.
As between, also, the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief, he
maintains a constant exchange of information concerning time-tables for
military trains and other such matters.
In the discharge of these duties the Directeur de l'Arrière is aided by
a staff which comprises both the technical and the military elements;
but he is not himself responsible for the actual working of either the
rail or the road services.
Railway services in the Zone of the Armies are--subject to the supreme
authority of the Directeur de l'Arrière--under the control of a
_Director of Railways_ who is assisted by (1) a combined military and
technical staff; (2) a Line Commission for that section of the zone
where the railways can still be worked by their ordinary staffs; and (3)
one or more _Field Line Commissions_ ("Commissions de chemins de fer de
campagne"), together with Railway Troops, for the section where military
operation is necessary.
In the interests of that co-ordination to which so much importance is
rightly attached, the Director of Railways refers to the Directeur
de l'Arrière all demands for transport that concern the railways of
both the Zone of the Interior and the Zone of the Armies or involve
conveyance by road as well as by rail. He also passes on to the
Commissions in charge of either section of the railways included in the
Zone of the Armies the orders he himself receives from the Directeur de
l'Arrière in respect to such transport requirements as may concern them.
Time-tables drawn up, and other arrangements made, by these Commissions
are subject to his approval. He further decides as to the distribution,
within the Zone of the Armies, of the rolling stock and the railway
personnel placed at his disposal by the Commander-in-Chief.
The _Field Line Commissions_ are the executive agents of the Director
of Railways in the discharge of the various duties assigned to him. The
number of these Commissions is decided by the Directeur de l'Arrière,
and the date of their entering on their functions is fixed by the
Director of Railways. Each Commission consists of a staff officer and
a railway engineer. Of these the former is military president of the
Commission and has the controlling voice. When he considers it necessary
that he should accept, in addition to his own responsibility, that of
the technical commissioner, the latter must defer to his views and
to the orders he gives. The president has an assistant--also a staff
officer--who can replace him when necessary, while the Commission has
a staff of secretaries and orderlies as approved by the Minister of
War. The personnel of the Commissions includes Railway Troops ("Sapeurs
de chemins de fer" and "Sections de chemins de fer de campagne"); a
telegraphy staff; Station Commissions; and "gendarmerie" to undertake
police duties in the stations and on the trains.
In addition to making traffic arrangements and undertaking the operation
of those lines at the theatre of war that may pass under full military
control, the Field Line Commissions are required to carry out such
construction, repair, maintenance or destruction work on the railways as
should be found necessary.
On the _Lines of Communication_ passing through the two zones and
ensuring direct communication between the interior and such accessible
points on the railway as may, from time to time, be nearest to the
armies in the field, the leading stations _en route_ are required to
serve a variety of military purposes; though in each and every such
instance the system of organisation is such that the duties to be
discharged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are undertaken by,
or are under the control of, a Commission formed on the now established
basis of representation thereon of both the military and the technical
elements.
For the conveyance of troops, there are, in the first place,
_Mobilisation Stations_ and _Junction Stations_, whence the men
within a certain district are sent to the _Embarkation Stations_, at
which complete units for the front are made up. These are followed by
_Stations for Meals_ ("Stations haltes-repas"), for men and horses;
though in this case the "stations" may really be goods or locomotive
sheds, able to accommodate a large number of men. At the end of the
railway line, so far as it is available for troops, come the _Detraining
Stations_.
In regard to supplies and stores, the first link in the chain of
organisation is constituted by the _Base Supply Stations_ ("gares de
rassemblement"). Here the supplies going from a certain district outside
the theatre of operations to any one Army Corps must be delivered; and
here they are checked, made up into full train loads, or otherwise dealt
with in such a way as to simplify and facilitate their further transport.
In certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assembling stations
pass through to destination, after being checked; but the general
practice is for the consignments forwarded from base supply stations to
go to the _Supply Depôts_ ("Stations-magasins"), serving the purposes
of storehouses from which supplies, whether received from the base or
collected locally, can be despatched in just such quantities, and at
just such intervals, as circumstances may require. These depôts are
organised on a different basis according to the particular service or
purpose for which they are designed,--Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery,
Medical, Telegraph Corps; provisions, live stock, clothing, camp
equipment, etc. Their number, character, and location are decided by
the Minister of War in time of peace. On the outbreak of war those in
the Zone of the Armies pass under the control of the Commander-in-Chief
together with the railway lines within that zone. The situation of
the depôts may be changed, or additional depôts may be opened, by the
Directeur de l'Arrière, with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief.
Each station depôt is under the charge of the military member of the
Station Commission. His special function it is to supply therefrom the
wants of the Army in accordance with the demands he receives. These
demands he distributes among the different departments of the depôt,
giving instructions as to the time by which the railway wagons must
be loaded. He also takes, with the stationmaster, all the necessary
measures for ensuring the making up, the loading, and the departure of
the trains; but he must not interfere with the internal administration
of the station or with the technical direction and execution of the
railway services.
Provision is also made for the immediate unloading of trains bringing
supplies to the station depôts for storage there, the military
commissioner being expressly instructed to guard against any block on
the lines in or near to the station. Wagons need not be unloaded if
they are to be sent on after only a brief detention, or if they contain
ammunition forming part of the current needs of the Army.
From the supply depôts the supplies and stores pass on to the
_Regulating Station_ ("gare régulatrice"). This is located at such point
on each line of communication as, while allowing of a final regulation
of supplies going to the front, does not--owing to its nearness to the
fighting line--permit of any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond
that point. The locality of the regulating station is changed from day
to day, or from time to time, according to developments in the military
situation.
The regulating station is in charge of a _Regulating Commission_
("Commission régulatrice"), constituted on the same basis as a Sub-Line
Commission. Receiving orders or instructions as to the nature and
quantities of the supplies and stores required by the troops at the
front, and drawing these from the supply depôts, the Commission must
always have on hand a sufficiency to meet requirements. It is, also,
left to the Commission to arrange for the further despatch of the
supplies from the regulating station by means of such trains as, in the
circumstances of the moment, may be found practicable.
As a matter of daily routine, and without further instructions, the
supply depôts send one train of provisions each day to the regulating
station, and the latter sends on one train daily to the front, always,
however, keeping a further day's supply on hand, at or near the
regulating station, to meet further possible requirements. Additional
trains, whether from the supply depôts or from the regulating station
(where rolling stock is kept available) are made up as needed.
Supplementing these arrangements, the Regulating Commission may, at
the request of the Director of Road Services, further keep permanently
within its zone of action a certain number of wagons of provisions in
readiness to meet contingencies, the wagons so utilised as _Stores
on wheels_ being known as "en-cas mobiles." Should the Directeur de
l'Arrière so desire, railway wagons with ammunition can, in the same
way, be kept loaded at any station within the Zone of the Armies, or,
by arrangement with the Minister of War, in the Zone of the Interior.
It is, however, stipulated that the number of these wagons should
be reduced to a minimum, in order to avoid congestion either of the
stations or of the railway lines.
Beyond the regulating station comes _Railhead_, which constitutes the
furthest limit of possible rail-transport for the time being, and
the final point of connection between rail and road services, the
latter being left with the responsibility of continuing the line of
communication thence to the armies on the field of battle.
It is the duty of the Regulating Commission, as soon as it enters on the
discharge of its functions and as often afterwards as may be necessary,
to advise both the General in command of the Army served by the line
of communication and the Director of Road Services as to the station
which can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for the
accommodation, unloading, and loading of wagons. On the basis of the
information so given the General-in-Command decides each day, or as the
occasion requires, on the particular station which shall be regarded
as railhead for the purposes of transport. He advises the Regulating
Commission and the Director of Road Services accordingly, and he
further notifies to them his wishes in regard to the forwarding of
supplies to the point thus fixed.
These elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance of efficiency
along the whole line of communication from the interior to the front
equally apply to transport of all kinds from the theatre of war to the
interior. In principle, evacuations from the army of sick and wounded,
prisoners, surplus stores, and so on, are effected from railhead by
means of the daily supply-trains returning thence to the regulating
station, where the Regulating Commission takes them in charge, and
passes them on by the trains going back to the Depôt Stations, or
beyond. Should special trains be necessary for the removal of a
large number of wounded, or otherwise, the Director of Road Services
communicates with the Regulating Commission, which either makes up the
desired specials from the rolling stock it has on hand or, if it cannot
do this, itself applies, in turn, to the Director of Railways.
For dealing with the sick and wounded, every possible provision is made
under the authority of the Minister of War and the Director-General,
the arrangements in advance, as detailed in the decrees relating to
this branch of the subject, being on the most comprehensive scale.
Among other measures provided for is the setting up of _Evacuation
Hospitals_ ("hôpitaux d'évacuation") in the immediate neighbourhood of
the Regulating Stations, if not, also, at railhead. Elsewhere along
the line certain stations become _Infirmary Stations_, ("infirmaries
de gare") where, in urgent cases, and under conditions laid down by
the War Minister, the sick and wounded _en route_ to the interior can
receive prompt medical attention in case of need. From the _Distribution
Stations_ ("gares de répartition"), the sick and wounded are sent to the
hospitals in the interior to which they may be assigned.
It will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of organisation aims at
preventing the recurrence of any of those defects or deficiencies which
characterised the military rail-transport movements of France in the war
of 1870-71.
The presence, at every important link in the chain of rail
communication, of a Commission designed to secure regularity and
efficiency in the traffic arrangements should avoid confusion,
congestion and delay.
The association, on each of these Commissions, of the military and
technical elements, with a strict definition of their respective powers,
duties and responsibilities, should ensure the best use of the available
transport facilities under conditions in themselves practicable, and
without the risk either of friction between the representatives of the
two interests or, alternatively, of any interference with the railway
services owing to contradictory or impossible orders being given by
individual officers acting on their own responsibility.
The setting up of the supply depôts and regulating stations along the
line of communication should prevent (i) the rushing through of supplies
in excessive quantities to the extreme front; (ii) the congestion of
railway lines and stations; (iii) the undue accumulation of provisions
at one point, with a corresponding deficiency elsewhere, and (iv) the
possibility of large stocks being eventually seized by the enemy and
made use of by him to his own advantage.
The measures adopted both to prevent any excessive employment of railway
wagons as storehouses on wheels and to secure their prompt unloading
should afford a greater guarantee of the best utilisation of rolling
stock under conditions of, possibly, extreme urgency.
Finally, the unification of control, the co-ordination of the many
different services involved, and the harmony of working established
between all the various sections on the line of communication linking up
the interior of the country with the troops in the fighting line should
assure, not only the nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in
the transport conditions, but the conferring of great advantages on the
armies concerned, with a proportionate increase of their strength in the
field.
The effect of all these things on the military position of France must
needs be great. Had France controlled a rail-transport organisation such
as this--instead of none at all--in 1870-71; and had Germany controlled
a system no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly imperfect
one she put into operation on that occasion, the results of the
Franco-German war and the subsequent course of events in Europe might
alike have been wholly different.
_Tests_ of what were being planned or projected in France as
precautionary measures, for application in war, could not, of course,
be carried out exhaustively in peace; but many parts of the machinery
designed came into daily use as a matter of ordinary routine. Full
advantage was taken, also, of whatever opportunities did present
themselves--in the form of exercises in partial mobilisation, reviews,
and other occasions involving the movement by rail of large bodies
of troops--to effect such trials as were possible of regulations and
instructions already based on exhaustive studies by the military and
railway authorities. In 1892 the results attained were so satisfactory
that a German authority, Lieutenant Becker, writing in his book on "Der
nächste Krieg und die deutschen Bahnverwaltungen," (Hanover, 1893,)
concerning the trials in France, in that year, of the new conditions
introduced by the law of December 28, 1888, was not only greatly
impressed thereby but even appeared disposed to think that the French
were becoming superior to the Germans in that very organisation which
the latter had regarded as their own particular province. The following
passages from his book may be worth recalling:--
Towards the middle of September, 1892, from a military
railway station improvised for the occasion, there were sent off
in less than eight hours forty-two trains conveying a complete
Army Corps of 25,000 men.
In their famous mobilisation test of 1887 the French
despatched from the Toulouse station 150 military trains without
interrupting the ordinary traffic, and without any accident.
Such figures speak a significant language. They show what
enormous masses of troops the railway can carry in the course of
a few hours to a given point....
If I have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours
on their railway systems, it is not because I have the least
fear as to the final issue of the next war. Quite the contrary;
but the fact does not prevent me from asking why the German
Army cannot base on the railways of that country the same hopes
which neighbouring countries are able to entertain in regard to
theirs.
The favourable impression thus given, even to a German critic, by the
progress France was making in her creation, not so much _de novo_ as _ab
ovo_, of a system of organised military rail-transport, were confirmed
by many subsequent trials, experiments and experiences, all, in turn,
leading to further improvements in matters of detail; but it was,
indeed, the "nächste Krieg" concerning which Lieutenant Becker wrote
that was to be the real test of the organisation which, during more than
forty years of peace, France followed up with a zeal, a pertinacity and
a thoroughness fully equal to those of Germany herself.
In any case it would seem that France, though having to make up for
the headway gained by Germany, finally created a system of military
rail-transport which would be able to stand the fullest comparison with
even the now greatly-improved system of her traditional foe; while the
organisation she thus elaborated, not for the purposes of aggression
but as an arm of her national defence, illustrates in a striking degree
the ever-increasing importance of the problem of rail-power, and the
comprehensive nature of the measures for its effective exercise which a
great Continental nation regards as indispensable under the conditions
of modern warfare.
DEFENSIVE RAILWAYS
The measures adopted included, also, the improvement of the French
railway system, since this was no less in need of amendment and
additions in order to adapt it to the needs of the military situation.
Whilst, as we have seen in Chapter I, the important part that railways
were likely to play in war was recognised in France as early as 1833,
and whilst, in 1842, attention was called in that country to the
"aggressive lines" which Germany was then already building in the
direction of the French frontiers, the French railway system itself
was, prior to the war of 1870-71, developed on principles which
practically ignored strategical considerations, were based mainly on
economic, political and local interests, and not only refrained from
becoming "aggressive" in turn, but even failed to provide adequately, as
they should have done, for the legitimate purposes of national defence.
Apart from the absence of any designs on the part of France against
her neighbours' territory, during this period of her history, one of
the main reasons for the conditions just mentioned is to be found in
the predominant position of Paris as the capital and centre-point of
French life and French movement. Germany at this time consisted of a
collection of States each of which had its own chief city and built its
railways to serve its own particular interests, without much regard
for the interests of its sister States, even if it escaped the risk
of cherishing more or less jealousy towards them. In France there was
but one State and one capital, and Paris was regarded as the common
centre from which the main lines were to radiate in all directions.
Communication was thus established as between the capital and the
principal inland towns or important points on the frontiers or on the
coasts of France; but the inadequate number of lateral or transverse
lines linking up and connecting these main lines placed great difficulty
in the way of communication between the provincial centres themselves
otherwise than viâ Paris.
Some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome under a law
passed in 1868 which approved the construction of seventeen new lines
having a total length of 1,840 km. (1,143 miles). When, however, war
broke out in 1870, comparatively little had been done towards the
achievement of this programme, and France entered upon the conflict with
a railway system which had been even less developed towards her eastern
frontiers than towards the north, the west and the south, while for the
purposes of concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction
she had available only three lines, and of these three one alone was
provided with double-track throughout. Such were the inadequacies of the
system at this time that the important line between Verdun and Metz had
not yet been completed.
No sooner had the war come to an end than the French Government started
on the improvement of the railway system in order to adapt it to the
possible if not prospective military requirements of the future, so that
they should never again be taken at a disadvantage; and in carrying on
this work--in addition to the reorganisation of their military-transport
system in general--they showed an unexampled energy and thoroughness.
Within five years of the restoration of peace the French railway system
had already undergone an extension which, according to Captain A.
Pernot, as told in his "Aperçu historique sur le service des transports
militaires," would have been possible in but few countries in so short
a period; while of the situation at the time he wrote (1894) the same
authority declared:--"One can say that everything is ready in a vast
organisation which only awaits the word of command in order to prove the
strength of its capacity."
Without attempting to give exhaustive details of all that was done, it
may suffice to indicate generally the principles adopted.
One of the most important of these related to an improvement of the
conditions in and around Paris.
Here the purposes specially aimed at were (1) to establish further
connecting links between the various trunk lines radiating from the
capital, and (2) to obviate the necessity for traffic from, for example,
the south or the west having to pass through Paris _en route_ to the
east or the north.
These aims it was sought to effect by means of a series of circular
railways, or "rings" of railways, joining up the existing lines, and
allowing of the transfer of military transport from one to the other
without coming into Paris at all. An "inner" circular railway ("Chemin
de Fer de Petite Ceinture") had already been constructed within the
fortifications prior to 1870, and this was followed in 1879 by an
"outer" line, ("Chemin de Fer de Grande Ceinture"), which provided a
wider circle at an average distance of about 20 km. (12½ miles) and
established direct rail connection, not only between a large number of
the more remote suburbs, together with the different trunk lines at a
greater distance from the city, but, also, between the various forts
constructed for the defence of Paris.
These circular railways were, in turn, succeeded by a series of
connecting links which ensured the provision of a complete ring of
rail communication at a still greater distance around Paris, the towns
comprised therein including Rouen, Amiens, La Fère, Laon, Reims,
Chalons-sur-Marne, Troyes, Sens, Montargis, Orléans, Dreux, and so on
back to Rouen. Within, again, this outermost ring there was provided
a further series of lines which, by linking up Orléans, Malesherbes,
Montereau, Nogent, Epernay, Soissons, Beauvais and Dreux, established
additional connections between all the lines from Paris to the north and
the east of France, and gave increased facilities for the distribution
in those directions of troops arriving at Orléans from the south-west,
this being once more done without any need for their entering Paris or
even approaching it at a closer distance than about forty miles.
Orléans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical importance
in regard to the movement of troops, and it was, accordingly, provided
with a number of new lines radiating therefrom, and establishing better
connections with other lines. Tours and other centres of military
significance, from the same point of view, were strengthened in a like
manner. At important junctions, and notably so in the case of Troyes
(Champagne), loop lines were built in order that troop trains could be
transferred direct from one line to another without stopping, and with
no need for shunting or for changing the position of the engine.
In the direction of the eastern frontier the line from Verdun to Metz
was completed, and by 1899 the three routes which could alone be made
use of in 1870-71 had been increased to ten. Most of them were provided
with double-track throughout, and all of them were independent of one
another, though having intercommunication by means of cross lines.
Other new railways established connection with or between the forts on
both the eastern and the northern frontiers. Others, again, provided
direct communication between different harbours or between each of
them and strategical points in the interior, thus contributing to the
possibilities of their defence in case of attack from the sea. Still
others were designed for the defence of the French Alps.
Apart from the provision of all these new lines, much was done in
the doubling or even the quadrupling of existing track wherever the
question of military transport came into consideration at all. Then at
railway stations near to arsenals, and at important strategical centres,
specially long platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entraining
of men or material in case of need.
While, also, so much was being done for the improvement of the French
railway system from an avowedly strategical point of view, there were
many additional lines constructed or improvements made which, although
designed to further the interests of trade and travel, also added to the
sum total of available facilities for military transport.
The advantages specially aimed at were (1) the ensuring of a more
rapid mobilisation of troops through the betterment of cross-country
connections; (2) the avoidance of congestion of traffic in Paris; (3)
the securing of a more rapid concentration on the frontiers, especially
when each Army Corps could be assured the independent use of a
double-track line of rails for its own use; and (4) the more effective
defence of all vital points.
National defence, rather than the building of strategical lines
designed to serve "aggressive" purposes, was the fundamental principle
on which the policy thus followed since 1870-71 was based; and if,
as Captain Pernot wrote in 1894, everything was even then ready for
all emergencies, the continuous additions and improvements made since
that time, bringing the railway system of the country more and more
into harmony with the "perfectionnement" aimed at by France in the
organisation of her military transport, must have made the conditions of
preparedness still more complete by 1914.
FOOTNOTES:
[26] For details concerning the functions and duties of the various
divisions, subdivisions, etc., see "Mouvements et Transports. Sections
de chemins de fer de campagne. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er septembre,
1914." Paris: Henri Charles-Lavauzelle.
[27] "Bulletin Officiel du Ministère de la Guerre. Génie. Troupes de
chemins de fer. Volume arrêté à la date du 1er décembre, 1912."
[28] "Transports militaires par chemin de fer. (Guerre et Marine.)
Édition mise à jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre, 1902."
For later publications, dealing, in separate issues, with particular
departments of the military rail-transport organisation, see
Bibliography.