ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND
The difference between the geographical conditions of the British Isles
and those of the principal countries on the Continent of Europe led to
the systematic organisation of rail transport for military purposes
being taken in hand at a later date in the United Kingdom than was,
more especially, the case in Germany. Here there was no question of
building lines of invasion or lines to facilitate the massing of troops
on a neighbour's frontiers. The questions that alone seemed to arise
in England were--(1) the relations between the State and the companies
in regard to the use of the railways for the transport of troops and
military necessaries under conditions either of peace or of war; (2)
the employment of railways both for resisting invasion and for the
conveyance of expeditionary forces to the port of embarkation; (3)
the adoption of such means as would ensure the efficient working of
the railways under war conditions; and (4) the creation of an Army
engineering force providing for the construction, repair, operation
or destruction of railways either at home, in case of invasion, or to
facilitate operations in overseas expeditions through the building and
working of military railways.
With these various considerations it may be convenient to deal in the
order as here given.
THE STATE AND THE RAILWAYS
In the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, (5 and 6 Vict., c. 55,) entitled
"An Act for the better Regulation of Railways and for the Conveyance of
Troops," it was provided, by section 20:--
Whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers
or soldiers of her Majesty's forces of the line ... by any
railway, the directors shall permit them, with baggage, stores,
arms, ammunition and other necessaries and things, to be
conveyed, at the usual hours of starting, at such prices or upon
such conditions as may be contracted for between the Secretary
at War and such railway companies on the production of a route
or order signed by the proper authorities.
This was the first provision made in the United Kingdom in respect to
the conveyance of troops by rail. It was succeeded in 1844 by another
Act (7 and 8 Vict., c. 85,) by which (sec. 12) railway companies were
required to provide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares
not exceeding a scale given in the Act, and maximum fares were also
prescribed in regard to public baggage, stores, ammunition, (with
certain exceptions, applying to gunpowder and explosives,) and other
military necessaries. In 1867 these provisions were extended to the Army
Reserve. Further revision of the fares and charges took place under
the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict., c. 34,) entitled "An Act
to amend the Law Relating to Railway Passenger Duty and to amend and
consolidate the law relating to the conveyance of the Queen's forces by
railway."
State control of the railways in case of war was provided for under the
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, (34 and 35 Vict., c. 86,) "An Act
for the Regulation of the Regular and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown, and
for other purposes relating thereto." Section 16 laid down that--
When her Majesty, by Order in Council, declares that an
emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public
service that her Majesty's Government should have control
over the railroads of the United Kingdom, or any of them, the
Secretary of State may, by warrant under his hand, empower any
person or persons named in such warrant to take possession in
the name or on behalf of her Majesty of any railroad in the
United Kingdom, and of the plant belonging thereto, or of any
part thereof, and may take possession of any plant without
taking possession of the railroad itself, and to use the same
for her Majesty's service at such times and in such manner as
the Secretary of State may direct; and the directors, officers
and servants of any such railroad shall obey the directions of
the Secretary of State as to the user of such railroad or plant
as aforesaid for her Majesty's service.
Any warrant granted by the said Secretary of State in
pursuance of this section shall remain in force for one week
only, but may be renewed from week to week so long as, in the
opinion of the said Secretary of State, the emergency continues.
Provision was also made for the payment of "full compensation" to the
interests concerned.
The powers of control thus acquired by the Government followed, in
effect, closely upon the precedent already established in the United
States, (see p. 16,) even although they were not defined with the same
elaborate detail. On the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the
English Act on the provision that the Government "may take possession
of any plant without taking possession of the railroad itself." This
gives them the right to take over the locomotives and rolling stock of
any railway in any part of the United Kingdom, even though the lines
in question may not themselves be wanted for the purposes of military
transport.
Under the provisions of the National Defence Act, 1888, (51 and 52
Vict., c. 31,) traffic for naval and military purposes is to have
precedence over other traffic on the railways of the United Kingdom
whenever an Order for the embodiment of the Militia is in force.
It was by virtue of the above section of the Act of 1871 that the
Government took control over the railways of Great Britain on the
outbreak of war in 1914.
As regards the earlier Acts of 1842 and 1844, these were mainly domestic
measures relating to the conveyance of troops in time of peace rather
than war. The beginnings of organisation of military rail-transport
for the purposes of war followed, rather, on a realisation both of the
possibilities of invasion and of the weakness of the position in which
England at one time stood from the point of view of national defence.
INVASION PROSPECTS AND HOME DEFENCE
In 1847 the Duke of Wellington, (then Commander-in-Chief,) addressed
to Sir John Burgoyne a letter in which he said he had endeavoured to
awaken the attention of different Administrations to the defenceless
state of the country. We had, he declared, no defence, or hope of chance
of defence, except in our Fleet, and he was especially sensible both of
the certainty of failure if we did not, at an early moment, attend to
the measures necessary to be taken for our defence and of "the disgrace,
the indelible disgrace," of such failure. Then, in words that greatly
impressed the country, he added:--
I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in
honour; I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being the
witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contemporaries
to take measures to avert.
As the result alike of this pathetic warning; of a "Letter on the
Defence of England by Volunteer Corps and Militia" issued in pamphlet
form by Sir Charles Napier in 1852; and of the Indian Mutiny in 1857,
which event called attention to the defenceless condition of the Empire
as a whole, continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of
Volunteer Corps for the purposes of defence. For a period of twelve
years these efforts met with persistent discouragement, the Government
refusing official recognition to certain corps of riflemen tentatively
formed; but in 1859 the prospect of an early invasion of this country by
France aroused public feeling to such an extent that on May 12 the then
Secretary of State for War, General Peel, addressed a circular to the
Lord-Lieutenants of counties in Great Britain announcing that Volunteer
Corps might be formed under an Act passed in 1804, when a like course
had been adopted as a precautionary measure against the threatened
invasion of England by Napoleon.
The formation of Volunteer Corps was thereupon taken up with the
greatest zeal, and by the end of 1860 the number of Volunteers enrolled
throughout Great Britain was no fewer than 120,000. Other results of the
national awakening in 1859 were the public discussion of the questions
of coast defence and armoured trains, (of which mention has been made in
Chapter VII,) and the appropriation, in 1860, of a loan of seven and a
half millions for the improvement of our coast defences and notably the
fortifications of Portsmouth and Plymouth.
ENGINEER AND RAILWAY STAFF CORPS
Already in December, 1859, the necessity for some definite engineering
instruction for Volunteers was being pointed out, and in January, 1860,
the first corps of Volunteer Engineers was created, under the title
of the 1st Middlesex Volunteer Engineers. Similar corps were formed
in various parts of the country, and by 1867 the number of Volunteer
Engineers enrolled was 6,580.
At the beginning of 1860 a further proposal was made for the formation
of a body which, composed of eminent civil engineers, the general
managers of leading lines of railway, and the principal railway
contractors or other employers of labour, would undertake a variety of
duties considered no less essential in the interests of national defence.
There was, in the first place, the question of the transport by rail
alike of Volunteers and of the regular forces, either on the occasion of
reviews or for the protection of our coasts against an invader. While
it was evident that the railways could be efficiently worked only by
their own officers, it was no less obvious that plans for the movement
of large bodies of men, and especially of troops, with horses, guns,
ammunition and stores, should be well considered and prepared long
beforehand, and not left for the occasion or the emergency when the need
for them would arise.
In the next place it was suggested that the engineering talent of the
country should be made available for the purpose of supplementing the
services of the Royal Engineers in carrying out various defensive
works, such as the destruction of railway lines, bridges and roads, the
throwing up of earthworks, or the flooding of the lowland districts,
with a view to resisting the advance of a possible invader.
Finally the great contractors were to be brought into the combination
so that they could provide the labour necessary for the execution of
these defensive works under the direction of the civil engineers, who
themselves would act under the direction of the military commanders.
Each of the three groups was to discharge the function for which it
was specially adapted, while the co-ordination of the three, for the
purpose of strengthening the country's powers of resisting invasion, was
expected to add greatly to the value of the proposed organisation.
The author of this scheme was Mr. Charles Manby, F.R.S., (1804-1884,) a
distinguished civil engineer who for nearly half a century was secretary
of the Institution of Civil Engineers and was closely associated with
the leading civil engineers, contractors and railway interests of the
country. He submitted his ideas to several members of the Council
of his Institution, and though, at first, the scheme was not well
received, he was subsequently so far encouraged that in August, 1860,
he laid his plan before Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Minister at War in
Lord Palmerston's second administration. Mr. Herbert expressed cordial
approval of the project, giving the assurance, on behalf of the War
Office, that an organisation on the basis suggested could not fail to be
of public benefit; but Mr. Manby still met with difficulties alike from
several members of the Council, who either offered direct opposition
to the scheme or else gave unwilling consent to join, and, also, from
the railway companies, who thought that arrangements for rail-transport
might very well be left to themselves, and that there was no necessity
for the suggested system so far as they, at least, were concerned.
In these circumstances Mr. Manby made, at first, very little progress;
but he was unremitting in his efforts to demonstrate alike to civil
engineers and to the railway companies the practical benefits from
the point of view of public interests that would result from the
organisation he advocated, and in 1864 he felt sufficiently encouraged
to lay his views once more before the War Office. Earl de Grey, then in
charge of that Department, thereupon instructed the Inspector-General
of Volunteers, Colonel McMurdo, (afterwards General Sir W. M. McMurdo,
C.B.,) to inquire into and report to him on the subject.
In the result there was created, in January, 1865, a body known as the
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, constituted, according to
its rules, "for the purpose of directing the application of skilled
labour and of railway transport to the purposes of national defence,
and for preparing, in time of peace, a system on which such duties
should be conducted." The Corps was to consist of officers only, and its
members were to be civil engineers and contractors, officers of railway
and dock companies, and, under special circumstances, Board of Trade
Inspectors of Railways. Civil engineers of standing and experience who
had directed the construction of the chief railways and other important
works, general managers of railways and commercial docks, and Board
of Trade Inspectors of Railways, were alone eligible for the rank of
Lieutenant-Colonel. Other civil engineers and contractors connected
chiefly with railway works, and, also, railway officers other than
general managers, take the rank of Major. Col. McMurdo was appointed
Honorary Colonel of the Corps on February 9, 1865.[29] As ultimately
constituted, the corps consisted of an Honorary Colonel (now Maj.-Gen.
D. A. Scott, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.C.), thirty Lieutenant-Colonels including
a Commandant, (now Lieut.-Col. Sir William Forbes, general manager of
the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway) and twenty Majors.[30]
FUNCTIONS AND PURPOSES
That the Corps thus created was the direct outcome, first, of the
Volunteer movement, and, through that movement, of the state of
semi-panic into which the country had drifted in 1859, as the result
both of the anticipations of invasion and the admitted weakness, at
that time, of our national defences, has thus been clearly established.
Writing in 1869, Major-General McMurdo, who had been raised to that
rank in 1868, said in a pamphlet he issued under the title of "Rifle
Volunteers for Field Service" that the Corps was "prepared to work,
not for Volunteers alone, but for the entire defensive forces of the
country."
In this same publication Major-General McMurdo gave an account of the
functions and purposes the Corps had been designed to serve. Alluding
first to the Volunteer movement, he showed how the railway carriage must
both carry and shelter the Volunteer when moving from one part of the
country to another; and he proceeded:--
I will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a
Bradshaw's railway map, and you will see that throughout the
network of rails that overspreads the land none of the meshes,
so to speak, in any vital parts of the country, exceed fifteen
miles across, from rail to rail; but as the eye approaches the
Metropolis, or any of the commercial centres, these meshes are
diminished to about one-half the area of the others.
He then dealt with the operations which the movement of troops along
these lines of railway would involve, and continued:--
The railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate
operations would emanate from the Council of the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps....
During peace the railway branch of this body is employed in
working out hypothetical plans of campaign, in the development
of which they manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock
and railway resources of the country, elaborated by special
time-tables and technical reports.
The share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to
providing merely for the class of railway works contingent on
war, whether of construction, demolition, or of reconstruction,
but in supplying the military engineers with information, advice
and labour. No one, for example, can be more familiar with the
features and character of a district than the engineer who has
constructed a line of railway through it. No one is so well able
to point out the results of _letting in_ that which he had been
so often employed in _keeping out_, viz., the inundations of the
sea. None better acquainted with the existing distribution of
labour power throughout the country, and of the means by which
it could be concentrated upon given points, for the construction
of works of defence. All these elements, in short, by which
the gigantic resources of our country may be safely wielded
for her defence, are now being silently considered and woven
into strategical schemes of operations by these eminent and
patriotic men, the value of whose voluntary services will not be
fully comprehended or appreciated till the day comes when the
discomfiture of the invader shall be accomplished through their
instrumentality.
The same distinguished authority wrote concerning the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in an article on "Volunteers" which he
contributed to the "Encyclopædia Britannica" (ninth edition):--
The ready labour power of this useful Corps is estimated
at from 12,000 to 20,000 navvies, with tools, barrows and
commissariat complete. It has already performed important
service in tabulating, and printing at great private cost,
complete time-tables and special reports for six general
concentrations against possible invasion. A special return
was also prepared by the Corps (the first of its kind) of the
entire rolling stock of all the railways in Great Britain.
This important work--which is corrected and republished
annually--shows where the requisite number of carriages of every
description can be obtained for the composition of troop trains.
In the official catalogue of books in the War Office Library there is an
item which reads:--"Time Tables for Special Troop Trains, etc. Compiled
by the Railway Companies. 311 pp. 8vo. London, 1866." This, presumably,
refers to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the
"Encyclopædia Britannica" article as having been compiled by the Corps.
It is evident, from the date given, that the Corps must have got quickly
to work after its formation in 1865.
At one time there was an expectation that the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would develop into a body exercising still wider
and more responsible duties than those already mentioned. On this point
we have the testimony of the late Sir George Findlay, formerly general
manager of the London and North-Western Railway Company, and himself a
Lieutenant-Colonel in the Corps.
Col. J. S. Rothwell had written some articles[31] in which, while
admitting their practically unlimited resources, he questioned the
ability of the British railways, at a few hours notice, to transport to
any part of our coasts which might be the scene of a hostile invasion a
sufficient body of troops to dispute the advance of an army upon London,
and he further suggested that the whole question was one which had not
yet received the mature consideration it deserved. Col. Rothwell said,
in the course of what he wrote:--
Though the actual working of our railways must be left in
the hands of the proper railway officials, it does not follow
that the planning of the arrangements for the military traffic
should also be entrusted to them exclusively. This, however,
appears to be contemplated, as, under existing circumstances,
such arrangements would rest with the members of a body called
the "Volunteer Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."... Though the
efficiency of these gentlemen in their own sphere is undeniable,
it appears open to question whether they are likely to have
sufficient leisure personally to work out the details of a
large concentration of troops by rail, and whether the special
requirements of military transport will be fully appreciated by
them, or by the subordinates whom they presumably will employ.
Much, he argued, required to be done before the country could be
considered ready to meet a possible invader; and he concluded:--
If the invasion of England is to be regarded as an event
which is within the bounds of possibility, it is surely not
unreasonable to ask that those precautionary measures which
require time for their elaboration shall be thoroughly worked
out before there is any risk of our wanting to employ them. The
organisation for the conveyance of our troops by railway is such
a measure.
To these criticisms Sir George Findlay replied in an article "On the
Use of Railways in the United Kingdom for the Conveyance of Troops,"
published in the _United Service Magazine_ for April, 1892. The complete
network of railways covering these islands, admirably equipped and
efficiently worked as they were, would, he declared, be found equal
to any part they might be called upon to play in a scheme of national
defence. As regarded the attention already paid to the question he
said:--
The War Office, so far from having in any way neglected
the subject, have devoted considerable attention to it, and a
complete scheme for the working of our railways for transport
purposes in time of war has been elaborated, and would at once
be put in operation, if ever the emergency arose.
Passing on to describe the composition and duties of the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, he spoke of its members as meeting in
council at their headquarters to discuss from time to time details of
railway organisation and other matters delegated to their consideration,
afterwards reporting their conclusions to the War Office; and he went on
to say that for the operation of the railways, under State control, on
any occasion of national energy or danger--
A draft scheme has been prepared, has been worked out in
detail, and would, in all probability, be adopted and put in
operation if, unhappily, the necessity should ever arise.
This scheme in its main features provides that, at such
time as we are contemplating, the principal railway officials
in Great Britain and Ireland would at once become, for the
time being, the officers of the State, and in addition to the
general managers of the leading railways, who are officers of
the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, military rank
of some kind would be conferred upon the engineers, locomotive
superintendents, chief passenger superintendents and goods
managers of the principal railway companies, as well as on the
managers of the principal Irish railways.
The railways of the country would be divided into sections,
and for each section there would be a committee composed
of the general managers of the railways included in the
section, together with the principal engineers, locomotive
superintendents and other chief officers. The railways would
be worked and controlled for military purposes by these
committees of sections, each committee having as its president a
Lieutenant-Colonel of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff
Corps, who would be directly responsible for providing transport
for troops and stores over the section of which his committee
had charge, while if the operation to be carried out required
the co-operation of one or more sections of the railways, the
committees of those sections would act in unison. In such a
case the Quartermaster-General's requisition for the service to
be performed would be made upon the president of the section
embracing the point of departure, that officer and his committee
taking the initiative and arranging with the other committees
for the performance of the service.
For each section, or group, of railways, a military officer
of rank would be appointed, with full power to arrange for
food, forage and water for the troops and horses _en route_,
and having at his disposal a sufficient number of soldiers or
labourers to assist in loading and unloading baggage, stores,
etc., at the points of entrainment and detrainment within his
section. He would also be able to command the services of the
Royal or Volunteer Engineers to assist in the erection of
temporary platforms or landings, or the laying down of temporary
rails, and would be instructed to co-operate with, and assist
in every way, the committee of section having charge of his
district, but not in any way to attempt to interfere with the
working of the line or the movement of the trains or traffic.
The number of sections into which the railways were to be divided for
the purposes of this scheme was nine. After defining the various areas,
Sir George continued:--
It is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as
we are now discussing, the Council of the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps would be sitting _en permanence_ at its
headquarters, and, with a full knowledge of the nature and
extent of the operations to be carried out, would have power to
regulate the supply and distribution of rolling stock throughout
the area affected, all the vehicles in the country being, for
the time being, treated as a common stock.
This is a mere outline of the scheme, with the further
details of which it is not necessary to trouble the reader,
though probably enough has been said to show that the subject,
far from having been neglected, as Colonel Rothwell appears to
assume, has been carefully studied and thought out.
Had the scheme in question been matured and adopted on the lines here
stated, a still greater degree of importance would have been attached
to the position and proceedings of a Corps then--and still--almost
unknown to the world at large, since its chief function was to carry out
investigations at the request of the authorities, and prepare reports,
statements and statistics which have invariably got no further than the
War Office and the Horse Guards, where, alone, the value of the services
rendered has been fully understood and appreciated. The scheme was,
however, allowed to drop, the policy eventually adopted being based,
preferably, (1) on the railways of Great Britain being operated in war
time as one group instead of in a series of groups or sections; and (2)
on such operation being entrusted to a body specially created for the
purpose; though prior to the adoption of the latter course there was to
be a fresh development in another direction.
THE WAR RAILWAY COUNCIL
While the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps remained, down to
1896, the only organised body which (apart from the individual railway
companies) Government departments could consult as to the technical
working and traffic facilities of the railways, from the point of view
of military transport, it was thought desirable, in the year mentioned,
to supplement that Corps by a smaller body known at first as the "Army
Railway Council" and afterwards as the "War Railway Council."
Designed to act in a purely advisory capacity, without assuming any
administrative or executive functions, this Council was eventually
constituted as follows:--The Deputy Quartermaster-General (president);
six railway managers, who represented the British railway companies
and might or might not already be members of the Engineer and Railway
Staff Corps; one Board of Trade Inspector of Railways; two members
(not being railway managers) of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps;
the Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General; one mobilisation officer;
two Naval officers; and one officer of the Royal Engineers, with a
representative of the Quartermaster-General's Department as secretary.
The Council approximated closely to the "Commission Militaire Superieure
des Chemins de Fer" in France, of which an account has been given in
Chapter IX. It also undertook many of the duties which in the case of
the German Army would be performed by a special section of the General
Staff; though some of these duties it took over from the Engineer and
Railway Staff Corps, reducing the functions and the importance of that
body proportionately.
In time of peace the Council was (1) generally to advise the Secretary
of State for War on matters relating to military rail-transport; (2) to
draw up, in conjunction with the different railway companies concerned,
and on the basis of data to be supplied to them by the War Office, a
detailed scheme for the movement of troops on mobilisation; (3) to
arrange in advance as to the composition of the trains which would be
required for any such movement; (4) to determine the nature of the
data to be asked for from the railway companies,[32] and to prepare
the necessary regulations and instructions in regard to the said troop
movements; (5) to draw up rules for the organisation of a body of
Railway Staff Officers who, located at railway stations to be selected
by the Council, would act there as intermediaries between the railway
officials and the troops; and (6) to confer with the different railway
companies as to the provision of such extra sidings, loading platforms,
ramps, barriers, etc., as might be necessary to facilitate military
transport, and to decide on the best means by which the provision
thereof could be arranged. Information on these subjects was to be
carefully compiled, elaborated, and, with explanatory maps, placed on
record for use as required.
In the event of mobilisation, or of some national emergency, the Council
was, also, to advise the Secretary of State for War in regard to matters
relating to the movement of troops by rail; to act as a medium of
communication between the War Office and the railway companies, and to
make all the necessary arrangements in connection with such movements.
Other questions likely to arise, and requiring consideration in time
of peace, included the guarding of the railways against possible
attack; the prompt repair of any damage that might be done to them; the
equipment of armoured trains, and the provision of ambulance trains on
lines where they might be required.
All these and various other matters were dealt with at the periodical
meetings held by the Council, which, within the range of its limitations
as an advisory body, rendered good service to the War Office; though
that Department was still left to deal with the individual railway
companies in regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly
concerning them.
RAILWAY TRANSPORT OFFICERS
In the foregoing statement as to the functions to be discharged by the
War Railway Council it is mentioned that these were to include the
drawing up of rules for the organisation of a body of Railway Staff
Officers who were to act as intermediaries between the troops and the
railway station staffs in the conduct of military rail-transport.
We touch here upon those questions of control and organisation of
military traffic which had been a fruitful source of trouble in earlier
wars, and more especially so on the French railways in the war of
1870-71. There was, indeed, much wisdom in the attempt now being made,
as a precautionary measure, to provide well in advance against the risk
of similar experiences in regard to movements of British troops by rail,
while the course adopted led to the creation of a system which was to
ensure excellent results later on.
In the first instance the officers appointed under the system here in
question were known as "Railway Control Officers," (R.C.O.'s,) their
chief as the "Director of Railways," (D.R.,) and the organisation itself
as the "Railway Control Establishment"; but the titles of Railway
Transport Officers (R.T.O.'s), Director of Railway Transport (D.R.T.)
and Transport Establishments were afterwards substituted.
The functions of the Director of Railway Transport are thus defined in
Field Service Regulations, Part II, section 23 (1913):--
Provision of railway transport and administration of
railway transport personnel. Control, construction, working and
maintenance of all railways. Provision of telegraph operators
for railway circuits. Control and working of telephones and
telegraphs allotted to the railway service. For the erection
and maintenance of all telegraph circuits on railways which are
worked by the troops, a representative of the Director of Army
Signals will be attached to his headquarters and the necessary
signal troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the I.G.C.
(Inspector-General of Communications).
As regards the Railway Transport Establishments, the Regulations say
(section 62):--
In railway matters, the authority of each member of a
railway transport establishment will be paramount on that
portion of a railway system where he is posted for duty.
Railway technical officials will always receive the demands
of the troops for railway transport through the railway
transport establishment.
Except when fighting is imminent or in progress, a member of
the railway transport establishment will receive orders from the
Director of Railway Transport only, or his representative.
An officer, or officers, of the railway transport
establishment, recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked
R.T.O., will be posted for duty at each place where troops are
constantly entraining, detraining, or halting _en route_. Their
chief duties will be:--
1. To facilitate the transport of troops, animals and
material.
2. To act as a channel of communication between the military
authorities and the technical railway personnel.
3. To advise the local military authorities as to the
capacity and possibilities of the railway.
4. To bring to the notice of the Director of Railway
Transport any means by which the carrying power of the railway
may, for military purposes, be increased.
All details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the
loading and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction with the
technical officials by the railway transport establishment, who will
meet all troops arriving to entrain, inform commanders of the times
and places of entrainment, and allot trucks and carriages to units in
bulk. They will see that the necessary rolling stock is provided by
the railway officials, that only the prescribed amount of baggage is
loaded, and that no unauthorised person travels by rail. They will meet
all troop trains, and see that troops and stores are detrained with the
utmost despatch.
It will be observed from these regulations that, whatever his own rank
may be, the R.T.O., subject to the instructions he has received from his
superior Transport Officer, exercises at the railway station to which he
is delegated an authority that not even a General may question or seek
to set aside by giving orders direct to the station staff. The R.T.O.
alone is the "channel of communication" between the military and the
railway elements. He it is who, acting in conjunction with the railway
people, must see that all the details in connection with entraining and
detraining are properly arranged and efficiently carried out, while the
operations of the station staff are, in turn, greatly facilitated alike
by his co-operation and by the fact that there is now only one military
authority to be dealt with at a station instead, possibly, of several
acting more or less independently of one another.
VOLUNTEER REVIEWS
While all these developments had been proceeding, the railway companies
had, since the formation of the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff
Corps, given repeated evidence of their capacity to move large bodies
of Volunteers with complete efficiency. They specially distinguished
themselves in this respect on the occasion of the great Volunteer
reviews held from time to time. In a book entitled "England's Naval
and Military Weakness," (London, 1882,) Major James Walter, of the 4th
Lancashire Artillery Volunteers, was highly eulogistic of what was done
by the railways on the occasion of the reviews in Edinburgh and Windsor
in 1881. In regard to the Windsor review he wrote:--
The broad result has been, so far as the railway part of
the business goes, to prove that it is perfectly feasible to
concentrate fifty thousand men from all parts of the kingdom
in twenty-four hours.... The two lines most concerned in the
Windsor review--the Great Western and the South Western--carried
out this great experiment with ... the regularity and dispatch
of the Scotch mail.
Major Walter seems to have had the idea, rightly or wrongly, that the
success of this performance was mainly due to the Engineer and Railway
Volunteer Staff Corps. He says concerning that body:--
Not the least valued result of the Windsor and Edinburgh
reviews of 1881 is the having introduced with becoming
prominence to public knowledge the necessary and indispensable
services of the "Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps."
Until these reviews bore testimony to the national importance of
this Corps, few knew anything of its duties, or even existence,
beyond a list of officers recorded in the Army List.... Since
the embodiment of the Volunteers the Engineer and Railway
Transport Corps has done much service, invariably thorough and
without a hitch.... These several officers of the Railway Staff
Corps set about their transport work of the 1881 reviews in a
manner worthy of their vocation. They proved to the country that
their Corps was a reality and necessity.
In 1893 the authors of the "Army Book for the British Empire" wrote (p.
531):--
There is every reason to believe that, in case of the
military forces in the United Kingdom being mobilised for the
purposes of home defence, and being concentrated in any part
or parts of the country for the purpose of guarding against or
confronting an invasion, the railway arrangements would work
satisfactorily. The remarkable success which has attended the
concentration of large bodies of Volunteers gathered from all
quarters of the Kingdom for military functions and reviews, on
more than one occasion, has shown the extraordinary capabilities
of the British railway system for military transport on a great
scale. Rolling stock is abundant. The more important lines in
England have a double line of rails; some have four or more
rails. Gradients, moreover, as a rule are easy, an important
point, since troop trains are very heavy.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR
While no one was likely to dispute these conclusions, it had to be
remembered that the transport by rail even of exceptionally large bodies
of Volunteers, carrying their rifles only, was a very different matter
from the conveyance, under conditions of great pressure, of large forces
of troops accompanied by horses, guns, ammunition, road wagons, stores
and other necessaries for prospective actual warfare. So the accepted
capacity of the British railways had still to stand the test of actual
war conditions, with or without the accompaniment of invasion; and this
test was applied, to a certain extent, by the South African War.
The bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed over the lines
of the London and South Western Railway Company, troops from all parts
of the country being conveyed by different routes and different lines of
railway to Southampton, whence they and their stores, etc., were shipped
to the Cape. Such was the magnitude of this traffic that between the
outbreak of the war, in 1899, and the end of 1900 there were carried on
the London and South Western, and despatched from Southampton, 6,160
officers; 229,097 men; 29,500 horses; and 1,085 wheeled vehicles. The
conveyance of this traffic involved the running of 1,154 special trains,
in addition to a large number of others carrying baggage, stores,
etc. At times the pressure was very great. On October 20, 1899, five
transports sailed from Southampton with 167 officers and 4,756 men,
besides guns horses and wagons. Yet the whole of the operations were
conducted with perfect smoothness, there being no overtaxing either of
the railway facilities or of the dock accommodation.[33]
Much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact that the War
Office had, in accordance with the principle adopted on the appointment
of the War Railway Council, stationed at Southampton a Railway Transport
Officer who was to act as a connecting link, or intermediary, between
the railway, the docks, the military and the Admiralty authorities,
co-ordinating their requirements, superintending the arrivals by train,
arranging for and directing the embarkation of the troops and their
equipment in the transports allotted to them, and preventing any of
that confusion which otherwise might well have arisen. Similar officers
had also been stationed by the War Office at leading railway stations
throughout the country to ensure co-operation between the military and
the railway staffs and, while avoiding the possibility of friction or
complications, facilitate the handling of the military traffic.
In the account to be given in Chapter XVI. of "Railways in the Boer
War," it will be shown that a like course was pursued in South Africa
for the duration of the campaign.
ARMY MANOEUVRES OF 1912
Further evidence as to what the British railways were capable of
accomplishing was afforded by the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia
in 1912. This event also constituted a much more severe test than
the Volunteer reviews of former days, since it meant not only the
assembling, in the manoeuvre area, of four divisions of the Army and
some thousands of Territorials, but the transport, at short notice, and
within a limited period, of many horses, guns, transport wagons, etc.,
together with considerable quantities of stores. Certain sections of
the traffic were dealt with by the Great Northern and the London and
North-Western Companies; but the bulk of it was handled by the Great
Eastern and was carried in nearly 200 troop trains, consisting in all
of about 4,000 vehicles. Of these trains 50 per cent. started before
or exactly to time, while the others were only a few minutes late in
leaving the station. Such was the regularity and general efficiency with
which the work of transportation was carried out that in the course of
an address to the Generals, at Cambridge, his Majesty the King referred
to the rapid concentration of troops by rail, without dislocating
the ordinary civilian traffic, as one of the special features of the
manoeuvres. The dispersal of the forces on the conclusion of the
manoeuvres was effected in a little over two days, and constituted
another smart piece of work.[34]
A RAILWAYS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
In view of all such testimony and of all such actual achievements,
there was no reason to doubt that the railway companies, with their
great resources in material and personnel, and with the excellence of
their own organisation, would themselves be able to respond promptly
and effectively to such demands as might be made upon them in a time of
national emergency.
There still remained, however, the singular fact that although, so
far back as 1871, the Government had acquired power of control over
the railways, in the event of an emergency arising, a period of forty
years had elapsed without any action being taken to create, even as
a precautionary measure, the administrative machinery by which that
control would be exercised by the State. Such machinery had been
perfected in Germany, France, and other countries, but in England it
had still to be provided. Not only had section 16 of the Act of 1871
remained practically a dead letter, but even the fact that it existed
did not seem to be known to so prominent a railway manager as Sir George
Findlay when he wrote "Working and Management of an English Railway"
and the article he contributed to the _United Service Magazine_ of
April, 1892, his assumption that the State would control the railways
in time of war being based, not on the Act of 1871--which he failed to
mention--but on the Act of 1888, which simply gives a right of priority
to military traffic, under certain conditions.
Notwithstanding, too, the draft scheme spoken of by Sir George Findlay,
under which the operation of the railways was to be entrusted, in case
of emergency, to the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, that body and,
also, the War Railway Council, continued to occupy a purely advisory
position.
So it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized efficiency of
the railways themselves by the creation of a central executive body
which, whenever the State assumed control of the railways, under the Act
of 1871, would (1) secure the necessary co-operation between Government
departments and the railway managements; (2) ensure the working of the
various railway systems on a national basis; and (3) co-ordinate such
various needs as naval and military movements to or from all parts of
the Kingdom; coal supply for the Fleet; transport of munitions; the
requirements of the civil population, etc.
The necessity for this machinery--which could not possibly be created at
a moment's notice--became still more apparent in the autumn of 1911, and
steps were taken to provide what was so obviously a missing link in the
existing organisation.
Thus it was that in 1912 the War Railway Council was succeeded by a
Railways Executive Committee which, constituted of the general managers
of leading railway companies, was to prepare plans "with a view to
facilitate the working" of the provisions of the Act of 1871, and would,
also, in the event of the Government assuming control over the railways
of Great Britain, under the provisions of that Act, constitute the
executive body for working them on behalf of the State, becoming the
recognised intermediary (1) for receiving the instructions of Government
departments in respect to military and naval requirements; and (2) for
taking the necessary measures in order to give effect to them through
the individual companies, each of which, subject to the instructions
it received from the Committee, would retain the management of its own
line.
In accordance with the principle thus adopted, it was through the
Railways Executive Committee that the Government, subject to certain
financial arrangements which need not be dealt with here, established
their control over the railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war
in 1914, the announcement to this effect issued from the War Office,
under date August 4, stating:--
An Order in Council has been made under Section 16 of
the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it is
expedient that the Government should have control over the
railroads in Great Britain. This control will be exercised
through an Executive Committee composed of general managers of
railways which has been formed for some time, and has prepared
plans with a view to facilitating the working of this Act.
In a notification issued by the Executive Committee, of which the
official chairman was the President of the Board of Trade and the acting
chairman was Mr. (now Sir Herbert A.) Walker, general manager of the
London and South Western Railway, it was further stated:--
The control of the railways has been taken over by the
Government for the purpose of ensuring that the railways,
locomotives, rolling stock and staff shall be used as one
complete unit in the best interests of the State for the
movement of troops, stores and food supplies.... The staff on
each railway will remain under the same control as heretofore,
and will receive their instructions through the same channels as
in the past.
As eventually constituted, the Committee consisted of the following
general managers:--Mr. D. A. Matheson, Caledonian Railway; Sir Sam
Fay, Great Central Railway; Mr. C. H. Dent, Great Northern Railway;
Mr. F. Potter, Great Western Railway; Mr. Guy Calthrop, London and
North Western Railway; Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway; Sir Herbert A. Walker, London and South Western Railway; Sir
William Forbes, London, Brighton and South Coast Railway; Sir Guy
Granet, Midland Railway; Sir A. K. Butterworth, North Eastern Railway,
and Mr. F. H. Dent, South Eastern and Chatham Railway, with Mr. Gilbert
S. Szlumper as secretary.
1860 AND 1914
Such, then, was the final outcome of a movement which, started in 1860,
by individual effort, as the result of an expected invasion of England
by France, was, in 1914, and after undergoing gradual though continuous
development, to play an important part on behalf of the nation in
helping France herself, now England's cherished Ally, to resist the
invader of her own fair territory.
With what smoothness the transport of our troops was conducted cannot
yet be told in detail; but the facts here narrated will show that the
success attained was mainly due to three all-important factors,--(1)
the efficiency of the railway organisation; (2) the willingness of the
Government, on assuming control of the railways under the Act of 1871,
to leave their management in the hands of railway men; and (3) the ready
adoption, alike by the railway interests and by State departments,
of the fundamental principle enforced by a succession of wars from
the American Civil War of 1861-65 downwards,--that in the conduct of
military rail transport there should be, in each of its various stages,
intermediaries between the military and the railway technical elements,
co-ordinating their mutual requirements, constituting the recognised
and only channel for orders and instructions, and ensuring, as far as
prudence, foresight and human skill can devise, the perfect working of
so delicate and complicated an instrument as the railway machine.
RAILWAY TROOPS
While Germany, inspired by the American example, had begun the creation
of special bodies of Railway Troops in 1866, it was not until 1882 that
a like course was adopted in England. Prior to the last-mentioned year
it was, possibly, thought that the labour branch of the Engineer and
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps would suffice to meet requirements in
regard to the destruction or the re-establishment of railways at home in
the event of invasion; but the arrangements of the Corps did not provide
for the supply of men to take up railway construction and operation on
the occasion of military expeditions to other countries.
It was this particular need that led, in the summer of 1882, to
the conversion of the 8th Company of Royal Engineers into the 8th
(Railway) Company, R.E., the occasion therefore being the dispatch of
an expeditionary force under Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley to
Egypt, where the necessity for railway work of various kinds was likely
to arise. This pioneer corps of British Railway Troops was formed of
seven officers, one warrant officer, two buglers, and ninety-seven
N.C.O.'s and sappers. So constituted, it was thought better adapted
for railway work under conditions of active service than a body of
civilian railwaymen would be. There certainly was the disadvantage that
those constituting the 8th were not then proficient in railway matters;
but, before they left, both officers and men were given the run of the
London, Chatham and Dover Railway lines, and were there enabled to pick
up what they could of railway working in the locomotive and traffic
departments, while on the London and South Western and the South Eastern
Railways they were initiated, as far as could be done in the time, into
the art of platelaying. The Corps took out to Egypt four small tank
locomotives; two first-class, two second-class and six third-class
carriages; forty cattle trucks; four brake vans; two travelling cranes;
two breakdown vans, and five miles of permanent way, complete, with
accessories, tools, etc. Excellent work was done in carrying on regular
train services, repairing damaged track, etc., running an armoured
train, constructing supplementary short lines, and conveying troops,
sick and wounded, and stores, the practical utility of such an addition
to the engineering forces of the Army being thus fully assured.
In January, 1885, the 10th Company, Royal Engineers, was converted
into the 10th (Railway) Company, and sent to Egypt to assist in the
construction of the then contemplated Suakin-Berber line, to which
further reference will be made in Chapter XV. Both companies also
rendered good service in the South African War.
According to the "Manual of Military Railways," issued with Army Orders
dated March 1st, 1889, the duties likely to be required from the Royal
Engineers with regard to railways are as follows:-- (1) Laying, working,
and maintaining a military line of railway between two places; (2)
restoring an existing line which has been damaged or destroyed by an
enemy; (3) destroying an existing line as much as possible with a given
number of men and in a specified time, and (4) working and maintaining
an existing line. The "Manual" itself gave much technical information as
to the construction, maintenance, destruction and working of railways.
It was re-issued by the War Office in 1898 as Part VI of "Instruction
in Military Engineering," and was stated to embody a portion of the
course of instruction in railways at the school of Military Engineering,
Chatham. In the "Manual of Military Engineering," issued by the General
Staff of the War Office in 1905, instructions are given (Chap. XVII,
pars. 238-244) on the "hasty demolition, without explosives," of
railways, stations, buildings, rolling stock, permanent way, water
supply, etc.; and in Chapter XXIII, "Railways and Telegraphs," the
statement is made that--
The duties likely to be required of troops in the field with
regard to railways (apart from large railway schemes, for which
special arrangements would be necessary,) may be considered as
either temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of line
to join up breaks, the construction of additional works, such
as platforms, etc., to adapt the line for military use, or the
demolition of an existing line.
Detailed information is given, for the benefit of R.E. officers,
concerning railway construction, repair and reconstruction, and the
main principles on which such work should be carried out for military
purposes are explained. The best system to adopt for the effecting of
rapid repairs is said to be that of establishing construction trains.
"The reconstruction staff live in these trains, which rapidly advance
along the line as it is being repaired, conveying, also, the necessary
material."
The peace training[35] of the Companies includes: reconnaissance, survey
and final location of a railway; laying out station yards; laying out
deviations; rapid laying of narrow-gauge "military" lines; construction
of all kinds of railway bridges; signal installation; water supply;
repairs to telegraphs and telephones necessary for working construction
lines; working of electric block instruments; fitting up armoured
trains; construction of temporary platforms, and working and maintenance
of construction trains.
Instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to officers
while at head-quarters, and a certain number of N.C.O.'s and men are
also instructed in railway survey work. Parties, each commanded by an
officer, are sent to carry out a reconnaissance and final location of
a railway between two points about forty miles apart on the assumption
that it is an unmapped country, and complete maps and sections are
prepared. The Companies have also undertaken the construction and
maintenance of the Woolmer Instructional Military Railway,--a 4 ft. 8½
in. gauge military line, about six miles in length, connecting Bordon
(London and South Western Railway) with Longmore Camp. All the plant
necessary for railway work and workshops for the repair of rolling stock
are provided at Longmore.
In time of war the chief duties of a Railway Company, R.E., would be to
survey, construct, repair and demolish railways and to work construction
and armoured trains.
In the South African campaign, when the military had to operate the
railways of which they took possession in the enemy's country, some
difficulty was experienced in obtaining from the ranks of the Army a
sufficient number of men capable of working the lines. As the result
of these conditions, it was arranged, in 1903, between the War Office
and certain of the British railway companies that the latter should
afford facilities in their locomotive departments and workshops for the
training of a number of non-commissioned officers and men as drivers,
firemen and mechanics, (capable of carrying out repairs,) in order to
qualify them better for railway work in the field, in case of need. This
arrangement was carried out down to the outbreak of war in 1914. The
period of training lasted either six or nine months. In order to avoid
the raising of any "labour" difficulties, no wages were given during
this period to Army men who were already receiving Army pay as soldiers,
but a bonus was granted to them by the railway companies, when they
left, on their obtaining from the head of the department to which they
had been attached a certificate of their efficiency.
STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS
The subject of strategical railways will be dealt with, both generally
and in special reference to their construction in Germany, in Chapter
XVIII. In regard to Great Britain it may be said that the position as
explained by Sir George Findlay in his article in the _United Service
Magazine_ for April, 1892, is that whilst Continental countries have
been spending large sums of money on the building of strategical
lines for the defence of their frontiers, (or, he might have added,
for the invasion, in some instances, of their neighbours' territory,)
Great Britain, more fortunate, possesses already a system of railways
which, though constructed entirely by private enterprise, could not,
even if they had been laid out with a view to national defence, "have
been better adapted for the purpose, since there are duplicated lines
directed from the great centres of population and of military activity
upon every point of the coast, while there are lines skirting the coast
in every direction, north, east, south and west."
Some years ago there were certain critics who recommended the building
of lines, for strategical purposes, along sections of our coast which
the ordinary railways did not directly serve; but the real necessity for
such lines was questioned, the more so because the transport of troops
by rail on such short-distance journeys as those that would have been
here in question might, with the marching to and from the railway and
the time occupied in entraining and detraining, take longer than if the
troops either marched all the way, or (in the event of there being only
a small force) if they went by motor vehicles to the coast.
One point that was, indeed, likely to arise in connection with the
movement of troops was the provision of facilities for their ready
transfer from one railway system to another, without change of carriage,
when making cross-country journeys or travelling, for instance, from the
North or the Midlands to ports in the South.
We have seen that in France many such links were established, subsequent
to the war of 1870-71, expressly for strategical reasons; but in
Great Britain a like result has been attained, apart from military
considerations, from the fact that some years ago the different railway
companies established physical connections between their different
systems with a view to the ready transfer of ordinary traffic. When,
therefore, the necessity arose for a speedy mobilisation, or for the
transport of troops from any part of Great Britain to any particular
port for an overseas destination, the necessary facilities for through
journeys by rail, in the shortest possible time, already existed.
In effect, the nearest approach to purely strategical lines in Great
Britain is to be found, perhaps, in those which connect military camps
with the ordinary railways; yet, while these particular lines may
have been built to serve a military purpose, they approximate less to
strategical railways proper, as understood in Germany, than to branch
lines and sidings constructed to meet the special needs of some large
industrial concern.
Generally speaking, the attitude of Parliament and of British
authorities in general has not been sympathetic to suggestions of
strategical railways, even when proposals put forward have had the
support of the War Office itself.
This tendency was well shown in connection with the Northern Junction
Railway scheme which was inquired into by a Select Committee of the
House of Commons in 1913. Under the scheme in question, a railway was
to be constructed from Brentford, on the west of London, to Wood Green,
on the north, passing through Acton, Ealing, Wembley Park, Hampstead
and Finchley, and establishing connections with and between several of
the existing main-line systems. In this respect it compared with those
"outer circle" railway systems which, as a further result of the war of
1870-71, were expressly designed by the French Government for the better
defence of Paris.
The Northern Junction scheme was introduced to the Select Committee
as one which, among other considerations, "would be important from a
military point of view for moving troops from one point to another
without taking them through London." Lieut.-General Sir J. S. Cowans,
Quartermaster-General, a member of the Army Council responsible for
the movement of troops, and deputed by the Secretary for War to give
evidence, said:
The proposed line would be a great advantage in time of
emergency if it was constructed in its entirety. The Army
Council felt that it would provide important routes between
the South of England and East Anglia and the North. At present
trains had to come from Aldershot to Clapham Junction by the
South-Western line, and be there broken up and sent over
congested City lines on to the Great Northern. By the proposed
line military trains could be handled without dividing them and
be transferred to the Great Northern or Great Eastern without
being sent over the congested City lines.
Strong opposition was offered, however, on the ground that the
construction of the line would do "irreparable damage" to the amenities
of the Hampstead Garden Suburb; and, after a sitting which extended
over several days, the Committee threw out the Bill, the Chairman
subsequently admitting that "they had been influenced very largely by
the objection of the Hampstead Garden Suburb."
In 1914 the scheme was introduced afresh into the House of Commons, with
certain modifications, the proposed line of route no longer passing
through the Hampstead Garden Suburb, though near to it. One member
of the House said he had collaborated in promoting the Bill because
"he most earnestly believed this railway was of vital import to the
mobilisation of our troops in time of emergency"; but another declared
that the alleged military necessity for the railway was "all fudge,"
while much was now said as to the pernicious effect the line would have
on the highly-desirable residential district of Finchley. In the result
strategical considerations were again set aside, and the House rejected
the Bill by a majority of seventy-seven.
FOOTNOTES:
[29] Colonel McMurdo had special qualifications for the post.
Becoming a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army in October, 1853, he was
Assistant-Adjutant-General at Dublin from May, 1854, to January,
1855. On February 2, 1855, he was entrusted with the duties of
Director-General of the new Land-Transport Corps, and was sent out to
the Crimea, with the local rank of Colonel, to reorganize the transport
service, then in a deplorably defective condition. He is said to have
accomplished this task with great energy and success. Before the close
of the campaign his corps numbered 17,000 men, with 28,000 horses,
mules, etc. He also took over the working of the pioneer military
railway in the Crimea. In 1857 the Land-Transport Corps was converted
into the Military Train, with Colonel McMurdo as Colonel-Commandant.
Early in 1860, when the Volunteer movement was assuming a permanent
character, Colonel McMurdo was appointed Inspector of Volunteers,
and in June of the same year he became Inspector-General, a post he
retained until January, 1865. He was chosen as Colonel of the Inns of
Court Volunteers on January 23, 1865, and his further appointment to
the post of Colonel of the newly-formed Engineer and Railway Volunteer
Staff Corps followed, as stated above, in February, 1865. He was created
K.C.B. in 1881 and G.C.B. in 1893. He died in 1894.
[30] The names of present members of the Corps will be found in "Hart's
Army List." Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act of 1907
the Corps became part of the Territorial Force, and the designation
"Volunteer" was dropped from its title, which since that date has been
"The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps."
[31] "The Conveyance of Troops by Railway." By Col. J. S. Rothwell,
R.A., Professor of Military Administration, Staff College, _United
Service Magazine_, Dec., 1891, and Jan., 1892.
[32] Detailed information as to the capacity of British rolling stock;
composition of trains required for units at war strength; truck space
taken up by Army vehicles; standard forms of reports on existing
railways, and other matters, is published in the official publication
known as "Railway Manual (War)."
[33] _The Railway Magazine_, May, 1901.
[34] For details as to the nature of the organisation by which these
results were effected, see an article on "The Great Eastern Railway
and the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia--1912," by H. J. Prytherch,
in the _Great Eastern Railway Magazine_ for November, 1912. In the
_Great Western Railway Magazine_ for November, 1909, there are given,
under the heading, "The Transport of an Army," some details concerning
the military transport on the Great Western system during the Army
manoeuvres of that year. The traffic conveyed was, approximately, 514
officers, 14,552 men, 208 officers' horses, 2,474 troop horses, 25 guns,
34 limbers, and 581 wagons and carts. "The military authorities and the
Army contractors," it is said, "expressed their pleasure at the manner
in which the work was performed by the Company's staff."
[35] "General Principles, Organisation and Equipment of Royal
Engineers," _Royal Engineers Journal_, February, 1910.
CHAPTER XV
MILITARY RAILWAYS
By the expression "military railways" is meant lines of railways which,
as distinct from commercial lines serving public purposes, have been
designed expressly for military use. The fact that any line forming
part of the ordinary railway system of the country is employed for the
conveyance of troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some port
for embarkation therefrom does not constitute that line a "military"
railway, in the strict sense of the term, whatever the extent of its
use for military transport for the time being. Such line remains a
commercial railway, all the same, and the application to it of the
designation "military" is erroneous.
Military railways proper fall mainly into two groups--(1) "field"
or "siege" railways, constructed on the theatre of war for moving
heavy guns, platform materials, etc., to their position; conveying
ammunition and supplies to siege batteries, magazines, advanced
trenches or bombproofs; bringing up reinforcements rapidly in case of
a sortie; conveying working-parties to and from their work; removing
sick and wounded to the rear, and other kindred purposes, the loads
being generally hauled by animals, by gasoline motor or by men; and
(2) "supply" railways, specially constructed to convey troops, stores,
etc., from the base to the front, in time of war, or from an ordinary
main-line railway to a military camp or depôt in time of peace, where
local lines of railway are not available for the purpose.
These two main groups include various types of railways coming under
one or the other designation, and ranging from a very light portable
tramway, put down at express speed to serve an emergency, and worked
by small engines, mules or horses, to substantially built lines, of
standard gauge, designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry
the largest possible number of troops or amount of freight.
In any case, the details of construction, equipment and operation of
a military railway vary from those of a commercial railway since the
one would be intended to serve only a specific and possibly temporary
purpose, in the attainment of which the question of speed would be a
secondary consideration, whereas the other would require to assume
a permanent form, be capable of higher speeds, and afford adequate
guarantee of safety for the public, by whom it would be used. The
building, also, of a military railway may be, and generally is, carried
out by a corps of Railway Troops to which are specially delegated
the duties of laying, working, maintaining, repairing, restoring or
destroying railways; and, provided the desired lines were built with
sufficient dispatch, and answered the desired purpose, the military
commanders who would alone be concerned might well be satisfied.
In many different ways the resort to military railways, whatever
their particular type, has greatly extended the range of advantages
to be gained from the application of rail-power to war. A full record
of all that has been accomplished in this direction could hardly be
attempted here; but a few typical examples of what has been done in this
direction--though not always with conspicuous success--may be offered.
THE CRIMEAN WAR
The earliest instance of a purely military railway being constructed
to serve the purpose of a campaign occurred in the Crimean War; and,
although the line then made would to-day be regarded as little more than
an especially inefficient apology for a railway, it was looked upon at
the time as a remarkable innovation in warfare. It further established a
precedent destined to be widely followed in later years.
Between the camp of the allies at Sebastopol and their base of supplies
at Balaklava the distance was only seven or eight miles; yet in the
winter of 1854-55 the fatigue parties sent for rations, clothing, fuel,
huts, ammunition and other necessaries were frequently no less than
twelve hours in doing the return journey. The reason was that during
the greater part of that time they were floundering in a sea of mud.
The soil of the Crimea is clay impregnated with salt, and, under the
combined influence of climatic conditions and heavy traffic, the route
between camp and base had been converted into a perfect quagmire.
Horses, mules and carts were, at first, alone available for transport
purposes; but, although plenty of animals were to be obtained in the
surrounding country, only a limited number could be employed by reason
of the lack of forage, a totally inadequate supply having been sent
out from England. As for the animals that were used, their sufferings,
as the result of those terrible journeys, their own shortage of food,
and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved bodies, were
terrible. "In the rear of each Division," says General Sir Edward
Hamley, in "The War in the Crimea," "a scanty group of miserable ponies
and mules, whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle,
shivered, and starved, and daily died." They died, also, on every
journey to or from the base. The toil of going through the quagmire
even for their own forage, or of bringing it back when they had got it,
was too great for them, and the whole line of route was marked by their
remains.
As for the troops, they experienced great hardships owing to the
inadequate supplies of provisions and fuel at the camp, although there
might be plenty of both at the base. Apart from the physical conditions
of the roads, or apologies for roads, between the two points, the
campaign was begun without transport arrangements of any kind whatever.
A transport corps formed for the British Army in 1799, under the title
of the Royal Wagon Train, had been disbanded in 1833, and, whether from
motives of economy or because the need for war preparations in time
of peace was not sufficiently appreciated, no other corps had been
created to take its place. Hence the troops sent to the Crimea were
required, at the outset, to look after the transport themselves, and in
many instances they even had to do the work of mules and horses. It was
not until January 24, 1855, that a Land Transport Corps, composed of
volunteers from various arms of the service, was raised by Royal Warrant
and began to provide for a defect in the military organisation which
had, in the meantime, involved the allies, and especially the British,
in severe privations owing to the frequent shortage of supplies.
The original intention to establish a depôt at head-quarters before
Sebastopol had had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any
attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a store.
Such were the conditions that the pioneer military railway was designed
to remedy. Built, at a very slow rate, by English contractors, who
arrived at the Crimea with their men and material during the month
of January, 1855, the line was a single-track one, with a 4 feet 8½
inch gauge. For the first two miles from Balaklava it was worked by a
locomotive. Then the trucks were drawn up an incline, eight at a time,
by a stationary engine. Six horses next drew two trucks at a time up
another incline. After this came a fairly level piece of road, followed
by two gullies where each wagon was detached in succession and made to
run down one side of the gully and up the other by its own momentum.
Then horses were again attached to the trucks and so drew them, finally,
to the end of the line on the Upland.
Five locomotives, of from 12 to 18 tons weight, were provided, and
there were about forty ordinary side-tip ballast wagons--all entirely
unsuitable for use on a military railway.
At first the men belonging to the contractors' staff--navvies and
others--were entrusted with the working of the line. The question had
been raised as to whether their services should not be made use of in
other directions, as well. On their being sent out from England the
idea was entertained that they might construct trenches and batteries,
in addition to building the railway, and there was a suggestion that
they should, also, join the siege parties in the attack on Sebastopol.
In order to test the question (as recorded by Major-General Whitworth
Porter, in his "History of the Corps of Royal Engineers"), Sir John
Burgoyne wrote to Mr. Beattie, principal engineer of the Railway
Department, asking if he would approve of an invitation being given to
the men to undergo such training as would qualify them to defend any
position in which they might happen to be. In his answer Mr. Beattie
wrote:--
The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously
discussed in London before I left, and it was determined _not_
to arm the men. They were considered too valuable to be used as
soldiers, and were distinctly told that they would not be called
upon to fight.
Their value, however, did not stand the test it underwent when they
were called on to work the railway they had built. They were found to
be lacking in any sense of discipline; they repeatedly struck work when
their services were most urgently needed, and they had to be got rid of
accordingly. They were replaced by men from the Army Works Corps and the
Land Transport Corps, then in operation in the Crimea, and the members
of the new staff--constituting a disciplined force--worked admirably.
Major Powell, who became traffic manager of the line in March, 1855,
and chief superintendent in the following July, has said concerning
them[36]:--
Many lost their lives in the execution of their duty. When
I required them to work night and day to throw forward supplies
for the great struggle--the capture of Sebastopol--several of
them remained seventy-two hours continuously at work.
The quantities of ammunition and stores which could be carried were
below the requirements of the troops engaged in the siege operations;
but during the last bombardment of Sebastopol--when the line was worked
continuously, night and day, by a staff increased to about 1,000 men, of
whom 400 were Turks--the transport effected rose from 200 tons a day,
the limit attained under operation by the undisciplined navvies, to
700 tons. The line also did excellent work on the re-embarkment of the
troops at the end of the campaign.
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
In the American War of Succession, the existing lines of railway
were supplemented in various instances by "surface railroads," which
consisted of rails and sleepers laid on the ordinary ground without
any preparation of a proper road bed, yet serving a useful purpose,
notwithstanding the rough and ready way in which they were put together.
THE ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN
How a railway specially constructed for the purpose may assist a
military expedition in the prosecution of a "little war" in an
uncivilised country, practically devoid of roads, and offering great
physical difficulties, was shown on the occasion of the British Campaign
in Abyssinia in 1867-68; though the circumstances under which the
line in question was built were not in themselves creditable to the
authorities concerned.
Sent to effect the release of the British prisoners whom King Theodore
was keeping in captivity at Magdala, the expedition under Sir Robert
Napier (afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala) entered upon what was to be
quite as much an engineering as a military exploit. Not only was Magdala
300 miles from Annesley Bay, the base of operations on the Red Sea, but
it stood, as a hill fortress, on a plateau more than 9,000 feet above
the sea-level. To reach it meant the construction of roads in three
sections. The first, which, in parts, had to be cut in the mountain
side, rose to a height of 7,400 feet in 63 miles; the second allowed
of no more than a cart road, and the third and final stage was a mere
mountain track where the only transport possible was that of mules or
elephants.
When, in October, 1867, the advance Brigade landed at Zoulla, the port
in Annesley Bay from which the advance inland was to be made, they took
with them the materials for some tramway lines intended to connect
two landing piers with the depôts it was proposed to establish a mile
inland. In November these plans were altered in favour of a line of
railway, twelve miles in length, from the landing-place to Koomayleh, at
the entrance of the Soroo Pass, the route to be taken by the expedition
on its journey to the Abyssinian highlands. All the necessary plant
was to be supplied by the Government of Bombay, who also undertook to
provide the labour; but it was the middle of January, 1868, before a
real start could be made with the work.
Even then, as told by Lieut. Willans, R.E.,[37] who took part in the
expedition, the progress made was extremely slow. The rails obtained
from different railway companies in India were of five different
patterns, of odd lengths, and varying in weight from 30 lb. to 65 lb.
a yard. Some of them had been in use many years on the harbour works
at Karachi, had been taken up and laid down several times, and had,
also, been bent to fit sharp curves or cut to suit the original line.
Some single-flanged rails had been fitted in the Government workshops
at Bombay with fish-plates and bolts; but the holes in the plates and
rails were not at uniform distances, and the bolts fitted the holes so
tightly as to allow of no play. Then, when the rails arrived, no spikes
came with them, and without spikes they could not be laid. When the
spikes followed, it was found that the augurs for boring holes in the
sleepers had been left at Bombay, to come on by another ship; though
this particular difficulty was met by the artisans of the 23rd Punjab
Pioneer Regiment making augurs for themselves.
If the rails gave much trouble--and even when they had been laid it was
no unusual thing for them to break between two sleepers and throw the
engine off the line--the locomotives and rolling stock caused still
more.
Six locomotives were shipped from Bombay; but, owing to the great
difficulty in landing and the labour involved in putting them together,
only four were used. Of these, one was a tank engine which, although
just turned out from the railway workshops at Bombay, required new
driving wheels after it had been running a fortnight. Another came with
worn-out boiler tubes, and these had to be replaced at Zoulla. The
two others, tank engines with only four wheels each, had previously
seen many years' service at Karachi. All the engines were very light,
weighing with coal and water from 16 to 20 tons each. The best of them
could do no more than draw fifteen small loaded trucks up an incline of
one in sixty.
The sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no springs, no
spring buffers and no grease boxes. Their axle-boxes were of cast iron,
and wore out within a fortnight, owing to the driving sand. As the
railway came into use, every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity,
and the combination of this weight with the jarring and oscillation on a
very rough line led either to the breaking of the coupling chains or to
the coupling bars being pulled from the wagons at starting. When fresh
coupling chains were asked for it was found that the boxes containing
them had either been left behind at Bombay or were buried beneath
several hundred tons of other supplies on board ship. At least forty per
cent. of the trucks were either constantly under repair or had to be put
aside as unfit for use. In May a number of open wagons with springs and
spring buffers arrived from Bombay. Some of these were converted into
passenger carriages.
Difficulties arose in other directions, besides.
The plant forwarded was adapted to the Indian standard gauge of 5 feet
6 inches, and was heavy and difficult to handle, especially under the
troublesome conditions of landing. To-day, of course, a narrow-gauge
railway, easily dealt with, would be employed in circumstances such as
those of the Abyssinian expedition.
The Indian natives who had been sent in the first instance to construct
the line were found unsuitable, and had to be replaced by gangs of
Chinese picked up in Bombay. The latter worked well and gave no trouble.
The country through which the line was laid was timberless, if not,
also, practically waterless. Wells had to be sunk for the water wanted
for the locomotives and the working-parties.
The heat was excessive. The temperature at times was 180 degrees Fahr.
in the sun. English navvies could not have made the line at all.
The two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be unloaded got
so congested with traffic that it was only with the greatest trouble
railway material could be landed.
Use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was ready, and the
traffic at the shore end at once became so heavy that it was difficult
to get materials and supplies through to the construction parties at
the other end. Officers, also, who should have been superintending the
construction had to devote a good deal of time, instead, to details of
operation, or to looking after the repairs of rolling stock.
In all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the slow rate of
progress made. One may, rather, wonder that the line got built at all.
As it was, four months were spent on eleven miles of railway, or a total
of twelve miles including sidings. There remained still another mile or
so to be built when, at the end of April, news arrived that the object
of the expedition had been attained, and that Magdala had fallen. It was
then decided not to complete the line, but to devote all energies to
preparing for the heavy traffic to be dealt with in the conveyance of
troops, baggage and stores on the return journey.
From the middle of May to the middle of June the resources of the line
were severely taxed; but a great improvement had been made in the
working arrangements, and a railway which had involved so much trouble
in the making was eventually found to be of great practical service.
Lieutenant Willans says of it:--
The Abyssinian railway was a great success, if one may gauge
it by the amount of assistance it gave to the expedition, by
the celerity and dispatch with which, by its aid, stores were
landed and brought up to the store sheds, and by the rapidity
and ease with which the troops and their baggage were brought
back and re-embarked at once....
As an auxiliary to the expedition, and as an additional
means of transport, no one who had anything to do in connection
with it can have doubted its extreme utility.
Faulty, therefore, as had been the conditions under which the line
was constructed, the results nevertheless established definitely the
principle that, in such campaigns as the one in Abyssinia, military
railways might serve an extremely useful purpose in facilitating the
transport of troops and supplies.
The Abyssinian experiences did, however, further show the desirability
of any country likely to find itself in a position requiring the
construction of military railways--as an aid to wars small or
great--creating in advance an organisation designed to enable it, as far
as possible, to meet promptly whatever emergency might arise, without
the risk of having to deal with defective material, unsatisfactory
labour, and administrative mismanagement.
The same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions in which
England has taken part, and, down to the period when improvements in
our system--or lack of system--began to be effected, there was much
scope for criticism as to the way in which military railways, designed
to facilitate operations undertaken in countries having a lack of
communications, had been either constructed or worked. Writing, in
1882, in the "Professional Papers" of the Royal Engineers (Chatham) on
"Railways for Military Communication in the Field," Col. J. P. Maquay,
R.E., observed in regard to what had been the experiences to that date:--
In most of the wars that England has undertaken during
the past thirty years, attempts have been made to construct
railways for the transport of stores and materials from the base
of operations. This base must necessarily be on the sea coast
for a country situated as England is. These railways have not
been successful chiefly because, when war had broken out, such
material was hastily got together as seemed most suitable to
the occasion; and, further, the construction of these lines was
not carried out on any system. It is not surprising, therefore,
that our military railways were never completed in time to be
of much use to the troops they were intended to serve.
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR
In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the Germans constructed two military
railways--(1) a line, twenty-two miles in length, connecting Remilly, on
the Saarbrück Railway, with Pont à Mousson, on the Metz-Frouard line;
and (2) a loop line, three miles long, passing round the tunnel at
Nanteuil, blown up by the French.
Special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch as they were the
result of construction work done, not in anticipation of a war, or even
immediately preceding hostilities, but during the course of an active
campaign. In addition to this, they afforded an opportunity for showing
what Prussia could do, under pressure, with the Construction Corps she
had formed in order, among other things, to meet just such contingencies
as those that now arose.
At the beginning of the war the Prussian General Staff had (according to
Rüstow) assumed that Metz would offer a prolonged resistance, and that
the defenders would be certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail
communication between Germany and her troops in the field. To meet the
position which might thus be created, it was decided to build from Pont
à Mousson to Remilly a field railway which, avoiding Metz, would link up
at Remilly with the line proceeding thence to Saarbrück, and so ensure
the maintenance of direct rail communication to and from Germany. On
August 14, 1870, the day of the rearguard action at Borny, the survey
and the levelling of the ground were begun, and three days later a start
was made with the construction. Altogether some 4,200 men were employed
on the work, namely, 400 belonging to two Field Railway Companies; 800
forming four Fortress Pioneer Companies, and about 3,000 miners from the
colliery districts of Saarbrück who had been thrown out of work owing to
the war and accepted employment on the railway. The building corps had
at their disposal a park of 330 wagons and other vehicles, and patrol
and requisition duties were performed for them by a squadron of Cavalry.
Notwithstanding that so considerable a force was available for the
purpose, the work of building the twenty-two miles of railway took
forty-eight days, the line not being ready for operation until October
4. This was in no way a great achievement, and it did not compare
favourably with much that was done by the Federal Construction Corps
employed in the American War of Secession. It is true that the
irregularities of the ground were such as to render necessary numerous
cuttings and embankments, and that two bridges and two viaducts had
to be provided; but the cuttings were only about 3 feet deep, and the
embankments were only 5 feet high, except near one of the viaducts,
where they were 10 feet high. The viaducts and bridges were of timber,
with spans of about 16 feet. The building of the line was, therefore, in
no way a formidable undertaking, from an engineering point of view.
Not only, however, did it take over 4,000 men nearly fifty days to make
twenty-two miles of line, but the work had been done in such a way that
when the autumn rains came on the track settled in many places; traffic
on the lines became very dangerous; one of the bridges was washed away
by the floods, and almost as many men had to be put on to do repairs as
had previously been employed for the construction. Traffic of a very
moderate description--each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a
time--was carried on for just twenty-six days, and then, happily for the
engineers concerned, the developments in and around Metz rendered the
line no longer necessary.
How the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the explosion of
French mines in the tunnel at Nanteuil occupied from September 17 to
November 22 has already been told on page 128.
RUSSO-TURKISH WAR
In the opinion of one English military critic, what short lines were
made in the Franco-German War "were neither so speedily constructed
nor so successful in result as to encourage the idea that lines of any
length could be made during a campaign"; but a different impression
is to be derived from the story of what was accomplished in the same
direction in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78.
Russia planned her campaign against Turkey in the hope and expectation
that it would be short, sharp and decisive. She started her mobilisation
in good time, that is to say, in November, 1876, although she did
not declare war until April 24, 1877. Making the mistake, however,
of despising her foe, she anticipated no serious opposition from the
Turks, but expected, rather, to paralyse them by a rapid advance, have a
triumphal march to Constantinople, secure the desired safeguards for the
Christians in Turkey, and see the war over before the end of the summer.
One reason why Russia specially desired to bring the campaign to so
early a conclusion lay in the deficient and precarious nature of the
rail communication. Under a convention which had been agreed to with
Rumania on April 16, 1877, Russia was to have a free passage for her
troops through that country. She was, also, to have the use of the
Rumanian railways and of all their transport facilities. But the only
line then running through Rumania was one that went from Galatz, on the
Russo-Rumanian frontier, to Bucharest, and thence (with a branch to
Slatina) to Giurgevo, on the Danube, where it connected with a Bulgarian
line from Rustchuk, on the south of the river, to Varna, the Turkish
base of supplies on the Black Sea. Not only was the Rumanian railway
system thus limited in extent, but the lines had been indifferently
constructed, they were badly maintained, and they had an inadequate
personnel together with an insufficiency both of rolling stock and of
terminal facilities. Still further, the fact that the Russian railways
had a broader gauge than the railways of Rumania (among other European
countries) caused great delay in the transfer, at the frontier, from the
one system to the other, not alone of 200,000 men, but of the 850 field
and 400 siege guns, of the ammunition, and of much other material the
troops required to take with them. The alternative to dependence on the
railway was a resort to roads impassable in wet weather.
What really caused the Russian plans to miscarry, however, was the
obstinate defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha, who took up his position
there on July 19, subjected the Russians to successive repulses, and did
not capitulate until December 10, the siege costing the Russians 55,000
men and the Rumanians 10,000.
When it was realised that the check at Plevna rendered certain a
prolongation of the campaign, Russia set about the construction of
a series of new lines of railway during the course of the war. The
principal lines thus taken in hand were:--
1. A line in Russia, from Bender, on the Dniester, to Galatz,
establishing direct communication between the Odessa railways and the
Rumanian frontier, and affording improved facilities for the sending of
reinforcements to the seat of war.
2. A line from Fratesti, on the Bucharest-Giurgevo Railway, to Simnitza,
the point on the north bank of the Danube where, on the night of June
26-7, the Russians built the bridge which enabled them to cross the
river.
3. A line from Sistova, on the south side of the Danube, to Tirnova
(Bulgaria), situate about thirty miles south-east of Plevna, and about
twenty-five north of the Shipka Pass.
Of these three lines the construction of the first, 189 miles in
length, was begun at the end of July, 1877. The original intention
was to build a railway to serve the purposes of the war only; but the
conclusion that ulterior strategical and commercial purposes would
alike be served by linking up Odessa with the Rumanian frontier led
to the building of a railway likely to be of permanent usefulness.
The line was a single-track one, with a sufficient number of stations
and passing places to allow of the running of seven trains in each
direction in the twenty-four hours. The construction, carried out by
contract, involved the building of a number of timber bridges and the
provision of several embankments, one of which was over three miles in
length. Great difficulties were experienced in regard to labour, and
especially by reason of the refusal of the men to work either on Sundays
or on their numerous saints' days. Trains were, nevertheless, running
on the line within 100 days of the construction being started, and this
notwithstanding the fact that the number of actual working days had been
only fifty-eight. Whereas, therefore, the Germans had, in 1870, with the
help of a Construction Corps over 4,000 strong, taken forty-eight days
to build twenty-two miles of railway between Pont à Mousson and Remilly,
the Russians in 1877 built, by contract, 189 miles of railway in just
over double the same period.
A railway from Fratesti to Simnitza had become indispensable inasmuch
as the main line of communication for the Russian Army could not be
continued for an indefinite period along the forty miles of defective
roads--speedily worn out by the heavy traffic--which separated the
Bucharest-Giurgevo line from the bridge built across the Danube. The
only important earthwork necessary was an embankment a mile and a half
long and fourteen feet high. The bridges to be provided included one
of 420 feet and two of 210 feet each. In this instance the troubles
experienced were due to the difficulty in getting the necessary
materials for the work of construction owing partly to the existing
Rumanian lines being blocked with military traffic, and partly to the
state of the roads and to the use of all available draught horses for
Army transport purposes. There could thus be no great celerity shown in
construction, and the forty miles of railway, begun in the middle of
September, were, in fact, not ready for working until the beginning of
December.
Like difficulties were experienced, though to a still more acute degree,
in regard to the Sistova-Tirnova line, the length of which was to be
seventy-five miles; and here only the earthworks could be finished
before the end of the campaign.
What, however, had been accomplished during the time the war was in
progress was (1) the completion of 229 miles of new railway, and the
making of the road-bed for another seventy-five miles, together with the
carrying out of a number of minor railway works; (2) the acquisition,
by purchase in different countries, of 120 locomotives and 2,150 wagons
and trucks, all new, and (3) the provision of a steam railway ferry
across the Danube.[38]
So the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was
carried still further by this construction, during the course of the
Russo-Turkish conflict, of a greater length of railways, designed for
military use, than had ever been built under like conditions before.
The world gained a fresh lesson as to the importance of the rôle played
by railways in war, and it was offered, also, a striking example of
what could be done in the way of rapidly providing them in a time of
emergency.
On the other hand it had to be remembered that, of the three railways in
question, the one which included 189 miles out of the total 229 miles
built was constructed on Russian territory where there was no danger of
interruption by the enemy, while the delays which occurred with the two
other lines, owing to the congestion of traffic, under war conditions,
on existing railways depended upon for the supply of materials, seemed
to point (1) to the risk that might, from this cause, be run if the
building of lines necessary or desirable in the interests of some
prospective campaign were left until the outbreak of hostilities, and
(2) to the wisdom of constructing all such lines, as far as necessary
and practicable, in time of peace.
THE SUDAN
If we turn now to the Sudan, we gain examples of military railways
which, designed for the purposes of war, and constructed, in part,
during the progress of active hostilities, first rendered great services
in facilitating the conquest of a vast area, and then developed into a
system of Government railways operated, in turn, for the purposes of
peace, and accomplishing results as conspicuously successful in the
latter direction as they had previously done in the former.
During the time that Saïd Pasha was Viceroy of Egypt (1854-63) there
was brought forward a scheme for the linking up of Egypt and the Sudan
by means of a single line of railway from Cairo to Khartoum, with a
branch to Massowa, on the Red Sea. It was an ambitious proposal, and,
if it could have been carried into effect, the opening up of the Sudan
to civilisation, by means of an iron road, might have altered the
whole subsequent history of that much-suffering land. But the cost was
regarded as prohibitive, and the scheme was abandoned for a time, to
be revived, however, in a modified form in 1871, when Ismail Pasha was
Khedive. It was then proposed that the line should start at Wady Halfa
and be continued to Matemmeh (Shendy), situate about 100 miles north of
Khartoum--a total distance of 558 miles. In 1875 a beginning was made
with the building of this railway, which was to consist of a single
line, with a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches, and was to be made with 50-lb.
rails and 7-ft. sleepers; but when, in 1877, after an expenditure of
about £400,000, the railway had been carried no farther than Sarras,
thirty-three and a half miles from the starting-point, it was stopped
for lack of funds.
In the autumn of 1884 the British expedition to Khartoum, where General
Gordon was endeavouring to maintain his position against the Mahdi's
followers, was resolved upon, and it was then decided to extend the
Sudan Railway beyond the point already reached, at Sarras, in order to
facilitate still further the journey of the troops along the valley of
the Nile, which had been selected as the route of the expedition.
Platelaying for the extension was begun in September by a party of
English and Egyptian infantry and native labourers, afterwards joined
by the 4th Battalion Egyptian Army and the 8th (Railway) Company of the
Royal Engineers. While, however, materials previously stored at Sarras
were found to be still available, the trucks containing rails, etc.,
for the extension work had to be pushed by hand from Sarras to railhead
owing to the absence of engines; sleepers were carried on the backs of
camels, of which 300 were employed for the purpose, and the coolie work
was entrusted to 700 native labourers, mainly old men and boys, most
of whom had deserted by the end of October, when further platelaying
was discontinued. By that time the extension works had reached the
thirty-ninth mile, and the line from Sarras to this point was opened on
December 4.
Following on the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in January,
1885, came the decision to extend the line to Firket (103 miles), in
view of a then projected further campaign in the autumn of that year.
The extension was sanctioned towards the end of February; fifty-two
miles of permanent way were ordered from England; 300 platelayers
and railway mechanics were obtained from India, to supplement the
construction forces already available; and on August 7 the extension was
completed as far as Akasha (87 miles).
Meanwhile, however, there had been a change of policy which affected
the whole situation. On the return of the expeditionary force to
Korti (situate at the southern extremity of the great Nile bend), the
whole of the country to the south thereof passed under the control of
the Dervishes; and the British Government, reluctant at that time to
enter on the formidable task of reconquest, decided that no further
military operations should be taken in hand, and that the Sudan must be
definitely abandoned. Orders were accordingly given by Lord Wolseley in
May, 1885, for the withdrawal of the troops from all stations south of
Dongola, which itself was abandoned on June 15, the retreat continuing
as far as Akasha. Beyond this point, therefore, platelaying for the
proposed railway extension was not carried, although the formation
levels had been completed to Firket.
Subsequently the British retreat was continued to Wady Halfa, which then
became the southern frontier of Egypt, the railway extension thence to
Akasha, together with all posts to the south of Wady Halfa, being also
abandoned.
Excellent service had, nevertheless, been rendered by the railway, as
far as it was carried.
Operation of the line had been taken over by the 8th (Railway) Company,
R.E., who, at the outset, had at their disposal only five more or less
decrepit locomotives, fifty open trucks, five covered goods vans, and
six brake vans. The troops were conveyed in the open trucks, and by the
end of 1884 all the stores for the opening of the campaign had been
passed up. During the course of 1885 additional locomotives and rolling
stock were obtained from the Cape.
Summing up the work done on the Sudan Military Railway for the Nile
Expedition of 1884-5, Lieut. M. Nathan, R.E.,[39] says that it included
(1) the repair and maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of
existing railway; (2) the construction of fifty-three and a half
miles of new line through a nearly waterless desert, with no means of
distributing material except the line itself; (3) the transport, for
the most part with limited and indifferent stock, of about 9,000 troops
round the worst part of the second cataract when going up the river, and
round nearly the whole of it when coming down; and (4) the carriage of
40,000 tons for an average distance of thirty-six and a half miles.
As against what had thus been achieved in the Nile Valley must be set a
failure on the Red Sea.
When, on the fall of Khartoum in January, 1885, the British Government
first decided on an extension of the Nile Valley Railway, they further
resolved on the building of a military railway from Suakin to Berber,
on the Nile, in order to have a second line of communication available
for Lord Wolseley's Army; and an Anglo-Indian force was sent to Suakin,
under the command of General Sir Gerald Graham, in order, first, to
defeat the Dervishes in the Eastern Sudan, and then to protect the
construction of the proposed railway. Such a line would obviously have
been of great strategical value to a Nile expeditionary force; but
the attempt to build it broke down owing, in part, to the defective
nature of the organisation resorted to, though still more to the active
opposition of the enemy.
Sir Andrew Clarke, Inspector-General of Fortifications, had from the
first advocated that the line should be supplied and laid by the
military engineering strength then available; but he was over-ruled, and
the work was given to an English firm of contractors in the expectation,
as Major-General Whitworth Porter tells, in volume two of the "History
of the Corps of Royal Engineers," "that the necessary material would be
supplied more readily, and in shorter time, through civilian agency."
It was, however, decided to send the 10th (Railway) Company of Royal
Engineers both to carry out some local works in the neighbourhood of
Suakin and to assist the contractors in the longer undertaking; and
this military element was strengthened, not only by a force of Indian
coolies, but, also, by the addition of thirty-nine members of Engineer
Volunteer Corps in England who had enlisted for the campaign, all having
had experience in trades qualifying them for railway work.[40] There was
thus practically a dual system, workable, in the opinion of Sir Andrew
Clarke, "only by a species of compromise which was both unscientific and
uneconomical."
As for interruptions by the Dervishes, these took the form of constant
attacks both on the line under construction and on the workers. Several
actions were fought, and at Tofrik, near Suakin, the British sustained a
serious loss of life. Posts were erected as the work slowly progressed,
and the bullet-proof train mentioned on page 76 was used for patrolling
the line at night; but in face of all the difficulties experienced the
work was definitely abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended
railway had been completed. The troops were recalled in June, 1885,
the railway material not used was brought back to England, and a line
linking up Suakin (and Port Sudan) with Berber, via Atbara Junction, was
not finally opened until 1906.
Reverting to the Nile Valley Railway, it is gratifying to be able to
say that the success already spoken of as having been attained in this
direction was but a prelude to still more important developments that
were to follow.
To prevent the carrying out of schemes which the Dervishes were known to
be preparing for an invasion of Egypt, the British Government decided,
early in 1896, to allow Egypt to resume occupation of the country along
the Nile Valley abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in 1885, and
on March 12, 1896, Sir Herbert (now Earl) Kitchener, who had succeeded
to the command of the Egyptian army in 1892, received instructions
to advance to the south from Wady Halfa. Akasha, the point to which
the Nile Valley Railway had been built, was occupied on March 20, the
Dervishes retreating to Firket.
As a means towards realising the objects of the expedition, Sir Herbert
Kitchener resolved to continue the railway along the Nile Valley to
Kerma; but this meant the construction of practically a new railway,
since the Dervishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles of
the original line between Wady Halfa and Akasha, burning the sleepers
and twisting the rails, while the remainder of the line was in such
a condition that it required relaying. The work of construction was
entrusted to a staff of Royal Engineers operating under Lieut. (now
Major-General Sir E. Percy C.) Girouard, and it was pushed forward with
great energy, the line being urgently required for the forwarding of
stores to the front, and especially so on account of the impediments to
navigation along the Nile due to the cataracts.
With the help of the railway, so far as it had then been restored, Sir
Herbert Kitchener concentrated a force of 9,000 men at Akasha, and
early in June he made a successful advance on Firket. The Dervishes
retired to Dongola; but it was thought prudent, before following them
up, to await a further extension of the railway. This was completed as
far as Kosha, 116 miles from Wady Halfa, by August 4, 1896. Three weeks
later some heavy rains, lasting three days, were the cause of floods
which, in a few hours, destroyed twelve miles of the newly-constructed
line. The repairs were completed in about a week, but in the same month
there was an outbreak of cholera which carried off a large number of the
working staff.
Utilising the railway as far as Kosha, Sir Herbert Kitchener
concentrated the whole of his force at Fereig, on the north of the
Kaibar cataract, and from thence a further advance was made to Dongola,
which place the Dervishes made no attempt to defend.
The immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been attained; but, in
the meantime, a further campaign had been resolved upon for the purpose
of breaking down the power of the Khalifa and effecting the conquest
of Khartoum. To this end the railway was continued another hundred
miles, from Kosha to Kerma, which point was reached in May, 1897. Some
216 miles of railway had thus been completed in about thirteen months,
notwithstanding interruptions which had led to very little progress
being made during five months of this period, and notwithstanding, also,
the fact that construction work had to be carried on simultaneously with
the transport of troops and stores so far as the line had been completed.
Before, however, Kerma was reached, Sir Herbert Kitchener instructed
the staff of the Royal Engineers to make a survey of the Nubian Desert
with a view to seeing whether or not it would be practicable to build
an alternative line of railway across it from Wady Halfa direct to Abu
Hamed (a distance of 232 miles), thus giving a direct route to Khartoum.
A survey carried out at the end of 1896 showed that the work was not
likely to present any unsurmountable engineering difficulties, and that
the absence of water could be overcome by the sinking of wells. The
only doubtful point was whether construction could be carried through
without interruption by a still active enemy.
It was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be of far
greater importance, both strategically and politically, than a
continuation of the Wady Halfa-Kerma line round the remainder of the
Nile bend. The cutting off of this bend altogether would confer a great
advantage on the Expeditionary Force. It was thus resolved to build the
line, to run the risk of attacks by the enemy, and to push construction
forward with the greatest energy.
A start was made with the work on May 15, 1897, the staff which had
been engaged on the Nile Valley line to Kerma returning to Wady Halfa
in order to take the desert line in hand. By the end of July, 115 of
the 232 miles of line had been completed, and Sir Herbert Kitchener,
utilising the railway which had already been constructed to Kerma, then
sent a force along the Nile Valley to effect the capture of Abu Hamed.
This was accomplished on August 7, and the constructors of the desert
line were thus enabled to resume their work with greater security and
even accelerated speed. Abu Hamed was reached on October 31, 1897,
the two extreme points of the great Nile bend being thus brought into
communication by a direct line of railway. The construction of the
232 miles of track had been accomplished in five and a half months,
notwithstanding the fact that the work was carried on during the hottest
time of the year. An average length of a mile and a quarter of line
was laid per day, while on one day in October a maximum of three and a
quarter miles was attained. So well, too, had the work been done that
trains carrying 200 tons of stores, drawn by engines weighing, without
tender, fifty tons, were taken safely across the desert at a speed of
twenty-five miles per hour.
From Abu Hamed the line was at once pushed on in the direction of
Berber, and its value from a military point of view was speedily to
be proved. Receiving information, towards the end of 1897, that the
Dervishes were planning an attack on Berber, Sir Herbert Kitchener sent
to Cairo for a Brigade of British troops to join with the Egyptian
forces then at Berber in opposing this advance, and the Brigade arrived
in January, 1898, having travelled by the desert railway not only to Abu
Hamed, but to a point twenty miles farther south, which then constituted
railhead. Early in March the Anglo-Egyptian Army was concentrated
between Berber and the Atbara river, and the battle of Atbara, fought in
the following month, led to the complete annihilation of the forces sent
by the Khalifa to drive the Egyptians out of Berber.
There was known to be still an army of 50,000 men in Omdurman, at the
command of the Khalifa; but it was considered desirable, before any
further advance was made by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, to await not
only the completion of the railway to the Atbara but the rise, also, of
the Nile, so that the river would be available for the bringing up of
steamers and gunboats to take part in the attack on Omdurman.
Once more, therefore, Lieut. Girouard and his staff had to make the most
strenuous efforts, and these were again so successful that the line was
carried to the Atbara early in July. It was of the greatest service in
facilitating the concentration of an Anglo-Egyptian Army, 22,000 strong,
at Wad Hamed, and the victory of Omdurman, on September 2, 1898--when
20,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded--followed by the occupation
of Khartoum, meant the overthrow of the Mahdi, the final reconquest of
the Sudan, and the gaining of a further great triumph in the cause of
civilisation.
In the account of these events which he gives in volume three of the
"History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," Colonel Sir Charles M.
Watson says concerning this ultimate outcome of a rebellion which had
lasted, altogether, for a period of eighteen years:--
Lord Kitchener, of course, by the skill and determination
with which he conducted the operations to a successful
termination, deserves the principal credit for the happy
conclusion of the campaign. But it must not be forgotten that
a large part of the work was carried out by the officers of
the Royal Engineers, especially those who had charge of the
construction and maintenance of that railway without which, it
is fair to say, the campaign could not have been conducted at
all.
The final triumph was the more gratifying because, although the desert
railway had contributed so materially thereto, dependence upon it had
not been without an element of serious risk which cannot be told better
than in the words of Lord Cromer, in his book on "Modern Egypt":--
The interval which elapsed between the occupation of Abu
Hamed and the final advance on Khartoum was a period of much
anxiety. Sir Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely on
the desert railway for its supplies. I was rather haunted with
the idea that some European adventurer, of the type familiar
in India a century and more ago, might turn up at Khartoum and
advise the Dervishes to make frequent raids across the Nile
below Abu Hamed with a view to cutting the communication of the
Anglo-Egyptian force with Wady Halfa. This was unquestionably
the right military operation to have undertaken; neither, I
think, would it have been very difficult of accomplishment.
Fortunately the Dervishes ... failed to take advantage of the
opportunity presented to them. To myself it was a great relief
when the period of suspense was over. I do not think that the
somewhat perilous position in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's army
was undoubtedly placed for some time was at all realised by the
public in general.