FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71
When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, her military
rail-transport was still governed by regulations which, adopted as far
back as 1851 and 1855, related only to such matters of detail as the
financial arrangements between the Army and the railway companies,
the length of troop trains, etc., without making any provision for an
organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time
of war. It certainly had been under these regulations that the French
troops were conveyed to Italy when they took part in the campaign of
1859; but the defects then developed, coupled with the further lessons
taught by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, had shown the need for
bringing these early French regulations into harmony with the conditions
and requirements of modern warfare.
Impressed by these considerations, and realising the disadvantages and
dangers of the position into which his country had drifted, the French
Minister of War, Marshal Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a "Commission
Centrale des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the Army,
the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal railway companies,
for the purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on
military transports but of preparing a new one to take their place. The
Commission held twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme
on lines closely following those already adopted in Germany and Austria
and based, especially, on the same principle of a co-ordination of the
military with the railway technical element. This provisional scheme
was subjected to various tests and trials with a view to perfecting
it before it was placed on a permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died;
no new regulation was adopted; the projected scheme was more or less
forgotten; time was against the early completion of the proposed
experiments, while political and military developments succeeded one
another with such rapidity that, on the outbreak of war in 1870, it was
no longer possible to carry out the proposed plans. So the studies of
the Commission came to naught, and France embarked on her tremendous
conflict with no organisation for military transport apart from the
out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under which her troops had
already suffered in the Italian war of 1859.
There was an impression that the talent of the French soldier would
enable him to "se débrouiller"--to "pull," if not (in the English sense)
to "muddle," through. But the conditions were hopeless, and the results
speedily brought about were little short of chaos.
So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, the railway
companies themselves did marvels. "The numerical superiority of
Germany," as Von der Goltz says in his "Nation in Arms," "was known in
Paris, and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness
and rapidity. The idea was a good one ... but ... it was needful that
the Germans should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies
were massed." That the railway managements and staffs did their best to
secure this result is beyond any possibility of doubt.
On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed the Est, Nord
and Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their means of transport at the
disposal of the War Minister, suspending as far as necessary their
ordinary passenger and goods services; and the Ouest and Orléans
Companies were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the
three other companies. The Est, to which the heaviest part in the work
involved was to fall, had already taken various measures in anticipation
of an outbreak of war; and such was the energy shown by the companies,
as a whole, that the first troop train was started from Paris at 5.45
p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty-four hours of the
receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public Works. Between July 16
and July 26 there were despatched 594 troop trains, conveying 186,620
men, 32,410 horses, 3,162 guns and road vehicles, and 995 wagon-loads of
ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the whole concentration
period (July 16-August 4) the companies carried 300,000 men, 64,700
horses, 6,600 guns and road vehicles, and 4,400 wagon-loads of
ammunition and supplies.
All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, however,
neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for
regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic, so far as concerned
the military authorities themselves.
The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at the station
at 2 p.m. for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. The men had been
accompanied through the streets by an immense crowd shouting "À Berlin!"
and, with so much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or
were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns, where the
consumption of liquor was such that, by the time the train started, most
of the men were excessively drunk. In addition to this, many had been
relieved of their ammunition--taken from them, perhaps, as "souvenirs"
of an historic occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put to
bad use in the days of the Commune, later on.
If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the station three hours
before there was any need, other occasions were to arise when they kept
trains waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to
start.
Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point
in the interior, and their transport thence by rail to the frontier
in complete units, took place as separate and distinct operations. In
France the two movements were conducted simultaneously; and this, in
itself, was a prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the
railways. The troops came to the stations on a peace footing and in
various strengths. One regiment might have only one-third the strength
of another despatched earlier the same day or on the previous day,
although the railway company would have provided the same number of
vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as between removing
two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure which time or the station
arrangements did not always permit); sending the train away only
partially loaded; or filling up the available space either with men
belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available
at the moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it was the
last mentioned of the three courses that was generally adopted. Men
of different arms--Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery; mobilised troops,
reservists, and individuals, separated, it might be, from their own
officers and not willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline
of other officers--were thus transported at the same time as, possibly,
a miscellaneous collection of horses, material and commissariat
supplies. Other trains, again, went away so overcrowded that they could
not accommodate all the men who should have gone by them, many being
left behind in consequence.
Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining
of the troops were rendered the more complete because the railway
staffs failed to get an adequate degree of support from the military
authorities. According to one of the articles in those regulations of
1855 which were still in force, "officers were responsible for the
prescribed movements in connection with the entraining, and should
personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regulations
referring thereto"; but, according to Baron Ernouf, ("Histoire des
Chemins de Fer Français pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne,") there
were officers who refused absolutely to concern themselves with the
entraining of their men at the Est station in Paris, declaring that this
was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials with the help
of subordinate officers, if they wanted it.
Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of troops got
hopelessly separated from their men, who themselves might have been
sent off with no knowledge of their proper destination. One General
telegraphed to Paris on July 21:--"Have arrived at Belfort. Not found
my Brigade. Not found General of Division. What should I do? Don't know
where my Regiments are." As for the men, it was not many days before
the stations _en route_ to the front were occupied by a floating mass
of "lost" soldiers, who pretended to be looking for their corps but too
often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station buffets, and
there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots. Such proportions did this
evil assume that in August, 1870, the railway station at Reims had to be
protected against a mob of from 4,000 to 5,000 "lost" ones, who wanted
to plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front.
Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity
of orders--too often contradictory or impossible to carry out--which
bombarded the railway officials, and must have driven them at times
almost to distraction. Orders came direct from anybody and everybody
possessed of the slightest degree of military authority. They came from
the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Administrative Staff;
from the Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat; from
officers and non-commissioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and
Engineers; while each individual invariably gave his orders based on
the range of his own particular sphere, or the convenience of his own
particular troops, without any regard for the situation as a whole,
for what might be wanted in other spheres, or for whether or not it
was physically possible for the railway staffs to do at all what was
asked of them, even if they were not being overwhelmed with those other
orders, besides. Commanding officers of different corps especially
distinguished themselves by presenting to the railway managements claims
for priority in the despatch of Infantry, Artillery or supplies, as the
case might be, threatening them with grave consequences if, in each
instance, they did not yield such priority at once, though leaving them
to meet an obviously impracticable position as best they could. Then it
might happen that when all the necessary arrangements--involving much
interference with other traffic--had been made, another order would come
countermanding the first one, or postponing the execution of it until a
later occasion.
As though, again, the orders from all these independent military
authorities were not sufficient, the railways were further worried by
local authorities who wanted special trains for some such service as the
conveyance of detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve
miles to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by
road. There were even demands from certain of the local authorities that
they should be allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops.
M. Jacqmin, general manager of the Chemin de Fer de l'Est, relates in
his book, "Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," that at
the moment when the Compagnie de l'Est was providing for the transport
of Bourbacki's forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris,
the préfet of the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to
house the garde nationale mobilised on the plain of Vénissieux, on the
left bank of the Rhone, there having been a delay in the delivery of
the material for barracks. The company refused the request, and they
had with the departmental authorities a lively controversy which was
only settled by the decision of the Bordeaux Government that those
authorities were in the wrong.
Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not only in
Paris but elsewhere in France, were the circumstances under which the
Nineteenth Army Corps, of 32,000 men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was
sent from Cherbourg to Alençon. The troops were late in arriving at the
station; the officers neglected to look after the men; the men refused
to travel in goods trucks; orders and counter-orders succeeded one
another in rapid succession; two or three hours were required for the
despatch of each train, and delays occurred which must have disorganised
the traffic all along the line.
Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it
was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains
were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they
could be unloaded there with such despatch as to avoid congestion.
No transfer stations--constituting the points beyond which only the
supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should
be taken, the remainder being forwarded as wanted--had been arranged,
and the consignors, military or civil, had assumed that all supplies
should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible.
There were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier where the
rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons,
the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals.
Many of these wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or storehouses on
wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent on the German
lines, though with this difference--that whereas in Germany there were
at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce
the prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corresponding
authority. It suited the officers or the military department concerned
to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted; and this
arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their
point of view because if the army moved forward--or backward--the
supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the
wagons.
For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most
stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their
contents were actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern
to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere,
and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experiencing a
shortage in their own supplies.
When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be
impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no
military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from
among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of
which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must
often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the
supplies stored in the first instance.
Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The
Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery
sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no
platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further
train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before
their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At
stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or
they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made
for receiving a battalion of infantry.
In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival
at their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable
in the carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so
long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could
pass. Sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines
for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at
least one occasion when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it
was his troops were to go.
Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the
state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become
historic.
The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four
miles of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in
twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first
infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five
hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination.
The men detrained, and the wagons containing road vehicles, officers'
luggage, etc., were left unloaded and sent into the sidings. Other
trains followed in rapid succession, bringing troops and supplies, and
the block began to assume serious proportions.
The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload
the wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told
that this could not be done because no orders had been received. The
Commissariat force for the division also declined to unload the wagons,
saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were
intended would remain at Metz or go further on.
Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by
the higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to
prepare for the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done,
and forty trains were located at various points along the line. An order
was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of
the troops leaving at once. Within four hours every train was ready, and
its locomotive was standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared.
The order was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was
countermanded over again.
All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been
arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which,
having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first
the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines
themselves. Everything was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where
any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, how to get
the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of
vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed the Commissary-General to Paris, "there
is neither coffee, nor sugar; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little
bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to Thionville."
Yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in
some or other of the trucks on hand, had the Commissary-General only
known where they were and how to get them.
The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the
consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road--only to
have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance
elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some
magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to
the railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource,
and in order both to reduce the block and to get further use out of
the wagons, the railway officials began to unload them and put their
contents on the ground alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of
supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz.
Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At Dôle (Dep. Jura)
an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings
but blocked up a large portion of the main line. When the evacuation
was decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons
to be moved. Orders given one hour were countermanded the next; trains
which had been made up were moved forward and backward, instead of being
got out of the way at once; and, eventually, a considerable quantity of
rolling stock, which might and should have been removed, had to be left
behind.
On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded trucks had
accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt,
and the whole of these, together with the provisions and the materials
they contained, fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul
of wagons, including those captured at Metz and other places, numbered
no fewer than 16,000. The wagons thus taken were first used by them
for their own military transport during the remainder of the war;
were then utilised for ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were
eventually returned to France. Not only, therefore, had the French
failed to get from these 16,000 railway wagons the benefit they should
have derived from their use but, in blocking their lines with them
under such conditions that it was impossible to save them from capture,
they conferred a material advantage on the enemy, providing him with
supplies, and increasing his own means both of transport and of attack
on themselves.
The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, probably, have been
larger still had not some of the French railway companies, on seeing the
advance the enemy was making, assumed the responsibility of stopping
traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock
to a place of safety. In taking this action they adopted a course
based alike on precedent and prudence, and one fully warranted by the
principle of keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of
defence from being utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack.