RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY
The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the Federal Government
of the United States, in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a
Construction Corps for the combined purposes of repairing, destroying
and operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct
of war, attracted great attention in Europe, and more especially so in
Germany, which was the first country on this side of the Atlantic to
follow the American precedent, since adopted more or less completely by
all nations possessed alike of railways and a standing army.
Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for such a corps
had not been realised in Europe; but the advantages which might be
gained therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when,
in 1866, there was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia
and Austria, one of the first steps taken by the former country was to
provide, under a decree of May 6, 1866, for a _Field Railway Section_,
("Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to be formed, and designed to operate,
on a basis closely approximating to that which had applied to the
corresponding American corps. The special purposes to be served were
defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by
the enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought expedient to
prevent the enemy from using. The section was to be under the orders
of the General Staff either of the Army or of an Army Corps. It was,
however, not to come into being until its services were really required,
and it was then to act for the duration of the war only.
On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps were
mobilised, under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June 1, one division
being allotted to each of the three Prussian armies operating in
different parts of the theatre of war. The composition of the corps was
partly military and partly civil. The military element was supplied by
officers of the Engineers (one of whom acted as chief), non-commissioned
officers, and a detachment of Pioneers, the last-mentioned being either
carpenters or smiths. The civil element comprised railway engineers,
thoroughly acquainted with the construction and repair of permanent
way, bridges, etc.; assistant railway engineers, performing the duties
of clerks of the works; head platelayers, foremen, locomotive drivers,
machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-stock, water pumps
and water tanks), and others. The members of the civil section were
chosen from the staff of the Prussian State railways by the Minister of
Commerce, their services being placed by him at the disposal of the War
Minister. Each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit.
On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force
available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna
a book, by Oberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom
militärischen Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that
details on the following points, among others, concerning railways
should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference
in case of need:--Permanent way: system and construction; gauge and
number of lines; whether lines single or double. Stations: size and
construction; which of them best fitted to serve as depôts. Bridges:
underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most easily
destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared beforehand
for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if provided
with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes;
nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of
landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in
rock; nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large
bridges and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or
not the piers are mined.[24] Where men, tools, stores and materials can
be obtained, and to what extent.
These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They
were quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book on "Die Kriegführung
unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French
translation was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins
de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the
outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian
Northern Army recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed,
the Minister of War replied that "the repair of railways was work which
should be done by the railway companies concerned."
All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting
the rail communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics
and was followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were
destroyed, rails torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried
away, tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless.
At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed
through a deep cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each
bank detached great masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled
up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about
250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blasting, they had
been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in
ballast trucks.
The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to
permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance
just mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line
clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was
caused.
Each division of the Construction Corps had at its disposal two
locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open trucks, provision thus
being made for the transport of, among other things, six light covered
carts (for use on the roads in the country to be invaded, horses being
requisitioned therein as necessary); tools; supplies of blasting powder
or gun-cotton; and rails, sleepers, bolts, etc., for 250 yards of
railway, reserve materials for a further quarter of a mile of track
being left at intermediate depôts, supplemented by an unlimited supply
at the base of operations. The construction trains also carried timber,
ropes, nails, scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair of
small bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at
convenient centres.
How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the
enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by Captain C.
E. Webber, R.E., in his "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866":--
The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted,
keeps up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by
cavalry scouts on each side of the line.
The greater portion of the train in charge of the
department, with one engine in front and another behind,
advances slowly, preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a
trolley carrying one of the officers, four men to work it, and
a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals
to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing
towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning
to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the
whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear
to send messages or bring up fresh supplies.
But for the successes already gained in the same direction by the
Federals in the United States, the speed with which repairs were
carried out by the Prussian Construction Corps--then so recently
organised--would have been regarded as remarkable. In various instances
communication was restored within from one and a half to three days
after the destruction even of important bridges.
As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown an excess of
zeal in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up
of the rails would have answered the same purpose, the hesitation
of the responsible Austrian officer to fire the mines which had
already been laid to the bridge over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of
great advantage to the Prussians, leaving them the use of the line
from Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Brünn between July 18 and July
27, on which latter date the bridge was at last destroyed by order
of the governor of Theresienstadt. This particular bridge was one of
exceptional strategical importance, and, according to Captain Webber,
the construction even of a temporary substitute--had the Austrians blown
up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it--would have taken no
less than six weeks. The omission, also, of the Austrians to remove or
to destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at Prague, on
their retirement from that city, conferred a further benefit on the
Prussians. These examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying
out destruction at a critical moment may be no less important on the one
side than efficient organisation on the other for accomplishing the work
of restoration in the shortest possible time.
While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its existence,
the sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular
war, and for the period of the war only, was considered inadequate for
a country where a large standing Army had to be maintained in readiness
for action at any moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought
desirable that Prussia should have a Field Railway Section established
on a permanent and well-organised footing. There was the further
reason for adopting this course because the Pioneers, composed almost
exclusively of reservists, had received no special training in railway
work, while the railway men themselves, accustomed to building lines in
a solid way for public use, were at a disadvantage when called on to
carry out, with great rapidity, and in a rough and ready manner, work
that was wanted only to serve the temporary purposes of the Army with
which they were associated.
It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a civil element,
had escaped the supervision and control of the Executive Commission
at Berlin which had for its function the regulation of all matters
concerning military rail-transport. Nor did the Construction _and_
Destruction Corps constitute, as well, an Operation Corps, providing
for the working of railways at the theatre of war, and especially of
railways taken from the enemy. The Prussians had, indeed, been able to
command the services of Austrian railwaymen in working the railways
seized in that country; but there was no certainty that the adoption of
a like expedient would be possible in any future war.
By this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of
railway lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting
attention among military authorities and writers in Germany. A
translation of McCallum's report was published, and the issue was begun
of what was to develop into a long series of technical papers, pamphlets
or books--such as, for example, Wilhelm Basson's "Die Eisenbahnen
im Kriege, nach den Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges" (Ratibor,
1867)--dealing with the art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways
in time of war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the
attainment of either end.
These various considerations and developments were, no doubt, the reason
for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a Prussian Royal Decree which
created a permanent cadre of _Railway Troops_ to be constituted of
Pioneers who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating
to the construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new
Battalion of Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and the whole
scheme was to be carried into effect in the course of 1871.
When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the preparations for
the creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding; but the
Prussians were, nevertheless, able to enter on the campaign with four
sections of Railway Troops, subsequently increased to six, including one
Bavarian section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, railwaymen
and auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform having the letter "E"
("Eisenbahntruppen") on the shoulder, and carried rifles. Prussia, in
fact, once more started, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy
as might result from her control of a Railway Construction Corps. At the
outset France had no similar body, and though, during the progress of
the war, she hurriedly set about the creation of a Construction Corps
of her own, that corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz
and Strasburg a great store of railway materials which was afterwards
to fall into the hands of the Prussians, and assist them in their own
operations.
Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practical benefits
secured by the Germans, although important in their effect on the
final issue, were far from being as great as the Army leaders may have
anticipated or desired. The destruction work carried out by the French
on their own railways, on their retirement, was much more serious
than anything experienced in the Prussian campaign in Austria. Thus
the works for the re-establishment of the Paris-Strasburg line (of
primary importance to the Germans for the siege of Paris) extended
from September 17 to November 22. The French had blocked the tunnel
of Nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which brought down
the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about 4,000
square yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were a
failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather,
and eventually the Construction Corps built a loop line which avoided
the tunnel, and so restored communication. The defence of some of the
principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of
the invaders; though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have
been greater still if the French had always adopted the best and most
scientific methods of interrupting rail communications, as, presumably,
they would have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised
corps prepared in advance for the work that required to be done.
At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there was, for example,
a bridge of seven arches, effective destruction of which would have made
a very serious check in the communications along the principal line
between Germany and Paris; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in the
middle, the men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) brought down
two arches at the side of the bridge, causing a break which the Germans
were able to fill in with stones and earth, restoring communication
in about seventeen days. Then, although several of the tunnels in the
Vosges mountains were mined, the mines had not been charged, and before
instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by those awaiting
them, the Germans were on the spot and took possession.
On the other hand the absence on the side of the French of an organised
corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the
carrying out of some very bold and highly successful work by parties of
_franc tireurs_, who showed alike their appreciation of the importance
of rail communications and their skill in impeding them.
One especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a
company known as the "Franc Tireurs of the Meuse."
Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through Lanois (on
the line between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 1870, they resolved to
effect its destruction. How they operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser,
R. E.,[25] who arrived on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the
story from some of the men engaged on the work.
Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. Hence a
different course had to be adopted. Selecting a spot where the line ran
along a 12-ft. high embankment, to which a well-wooded slope came down
on one side, the _franc tireurs_ took up a pair of rails, removed the
sleepers, cut a deep trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron
at the bottom of the trench, placed on the iron a box containing thirty
kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder, and fixed into the lid of the box a
French field shell in such a way that, when the rail was replaced over
the box, the head of the fuse would be just below the lower flange of
the rail. In restoring the line again in order that there should be
nothing to attract attention, the _franc tireurs_ omitted one sleeper so
that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail down
on to the head of the fuse. The party--some seventy-five strong--then
withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments.
In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed,
the driver not suspecting any danger. When the engine reached the spot
where the "torpedo" had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore
up a mass of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several
carriages down the embankment, and wrecked the train. Those of the
Prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage were shot down by the
_franc tireurs_ under the protection of their cover. The number of the
enemy thus disposed of was said to be about 400.
Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail movements of
the invader, destroyed many miles of line, together with no fewer than
seventy-eight large bridges and tunnels, apart from minor interruptions.
The repairs and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great
amount of labour on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble arose
from time to time on account, not only of the inadequate supply of
materials even for temporary constructions, but, also, by reason of the
shortcomings of the workers themselves. The sections of Railway Troops
had been so recently formed that the men were still without adequate
training. In 1870-71, as in 1866, military members and civilian members
of the Construction Corps were alike unfamiliar with the special class
of work called for in the repair or the rebuilding of railways under the
emergency conditions of actual warfare. This instruction had, in fact,
to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the Corps should
have been prepared to show the greatest efficiency.
Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in operating the
2,500 miles of French railway lines of which they took possession.
There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomotives and of
rolling stock. So far as circumstances would permit, the French, as
they retreated, either took their railway rolling stock with them or
destroyed it, in order that it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts
were made to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements
of engines and wagons from Germany; but even then the organisation for
controlling the use of rolling stock, among other transport details, was
still so defective that commanders who wanted to ensure the movement of
their own troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines
and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line. There
were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the regular services had
to be stopped altogether.
In the next place troubles with the _personnel_ were no less acute
than those with the _matériel_. In proportion as the Germans advanced
towards Paris the bulk of the French population retired, while threats
and offers of liberal pay alike failed to secure from those who remained
assistance either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the
invaders had taken possession. In these circumstances not only engines,
carriages and wagons, but no fewer than 3,500 railwaymen--in addition
to the German Railway Troops already in France--had to be brought
from Germany. Yet even the resort to this expedient started a fresh
lot of troubles. The railwaymen so imported had been in the service
of different German railway companies whose equipment and methods of
operation varied considerably; so that when the men were required to
work together--and that, also, on the lines of a foreign country, with
the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual
misunderstanding--a vast amount of friction arose.
All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived
at even before the campaign of 1870-71--that the real efficiency of
Railway Troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of
peace in readiness for times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond
all possible dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic
promptness.
In accordance with a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there was added to the
Prussian Army, on October 1 of the same year, a _Railway Battalion_
("Eisenbahnbataillon"), the special purposes of which were (1) to afford
to those constituting it the means of obtaining, in time of peace,
such technical training as would enable them to construct any railway
works necessary in time of war, to repair promptly any damage done to
railways, and to undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of
communication; (2) to procure, or prepare, in time of peace, all plant,
materials, tools, etc., likely to be required in time of war; and (3)
to constitute the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war.
The Battalion was formed of non-commissioned officers and men of the now
disbanded sections of Railway Troops who were still liable to military
service, supplemented by three-year volunteers and recruits from all
parts of the territory subject to the Prussian Minister of War, only
those being accepted, however, whose previous occupations fitted them
for one or other of the various grades of railway work. The officers
were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from the Engineers.
Members of that corps, together with others who were mechanical
engineers by profession, were accepted as one-year volunteers.
On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a Staff and four
Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a depôt, and provided with its
own means of transport. One of the Companies consisted exclusively
of platelayers and watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be
enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic Company, giving
a total, on a war footing, of eight Construction and four Traffic
Companies. The Corps also had a reserve division consisting of a Staff,
two Companies and a section of railway employés. All officers having
railway experience who had served in the war of 1870-71 were included in
the reserve.
The training of the Battalion was under the direction of the
Inspector-General of the Engineers Corps. It comprised (1) theoretical
and scientific instruction of the officers in all branches of railway
construction, repair and destruction, coupled with the study of every
branch of railway science likely to be of advantage in military
transport, while special importance was attached to a close and
constant intercourse with the staffs of the various railways, and
(2) practical experience of railway construction and operation. This
experience was afforded (_a_) on the Battalion's practice grounds, where
instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying
railway track; (_b_) through the employment of the men--subject to
the continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military
organisation--on many of the private as well as on the State railways
in Germany, such employment including the repair of bridges, the
laying of track, the enlargement of stations, etc., and (_c_) by the
construction, operation and management of a short line of railway which,
on completion, was devoted to the public service. The period of training
was for either one or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a
normal standard of about 500 men by a succession of recruits. These
recruits were generally men of a good type, admission to the Battalion
being regarded with the greater favour inasmuch as the experience gained
was found to be of advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment
on their return to civil life.
In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially
kept in view was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war
conditions, and providing for them accordingly. Thus in the laying of
rails for any new line built by the Railway Troops great importance was
attached to the speed with which the work could be done, the records of
the time taken being very closely watched.
To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all
developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and
conveying information thereon to those under instruction. A further
important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of
textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A
beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails,
bridge materials, etc., for use as required.
In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, comprising a
single Company attached to the 1st Bavarian Corps. The constitution
and the operations of this Battalion followed closely the precedents
established by Prussia.
Such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in
Germany to the formation of these Railway Troops that the Chief of the
Great General Staff was their Inspector-General from the time of the
first Prussian Battalion being created down to the year 1899.
In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway Battalion into
a _Railway Regiment_. It was felt that the cadres of the former did
not respond sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport
situation, and they were accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two
Battalions, with a regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in
each Battalion. In 1887 the Prussian Regiment was increased from two
Battalions to four, and the Bavarian Battalion expanded to the extent
of two companies in place of one. In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further
became a _Brigade_ of two Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number
of units thus remaining the same as before; though in 1893 the Prussian
Brigade was augmented by two more Battalions, increasing its force to
three Regiments, each of two Battalions with four Companies in each
Battalion, or a total of twenty-four Companies, of which one was a
Würtemberg Company and two were Saxon Companies, while the Bavarian
Battalion acquired three Companies in the place of two.
In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping together, as
_Communication Troops_ ("Verkerstrüppen"), all the technical units
concerned in the railway, the telegraphic and the air-craft services.
This new arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank
of a General of Division and receiving his orders direct from the
Emperor. A change was also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog
railway--a single-track line, 70 km. (44 miles) in length, which,
originally constructed mainly by the Railway Troops, was operated by
them as a means of acquiring experience in railway working. Prior to
the passing of the law of March 25, 1899, troops for the working staff
were supplied by the Brigade, and the frequent changes were a cause of
some inconvenience. Under the new law a section constituted of three
Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment, with a Lieutenant-Colonel as
director, was specially created for the operation of the line.
Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty-one Companies,
having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commissioned officers and men; but
these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists (subjected
to frequent revision) of all reservists possessing railway experience
and still liable for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies
thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified
to undertake railway work of one kind or another in time of war.
Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a body of Railway
Troops was called into question some years ago, on the ground, partly,
that it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the
number of non-combatants closely associated with the Army; and,
partly, because of the view--favoured by Von der Goltz, in his
"Kriegführung"--that much of the construction work which the Railway
Troops would carry out might be left to contractors, without hampering
the Army with further bodies of new troops for special purposes.
To these suggestions it was replied, in effect, (1) that in any future
war the movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated
with the provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities;
(2) that Railway Troops, constituted in time of peace, would alone
be capable of ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the
construction of new ones, in time of war; (3) that works of this kind,
done under great pressure, and serving temporary purposes only, would
differ essentially from railway works undertaken in peace by ordinary
contractors; and (4) that Germany required a large body of Railway
Troops on account of her geographical position, inasmuch as she might
have to face an enemy on either, or both, of two fronts--France and
Russia; while if, in the event of a war with Russia, she should want to
send her forces into that country by rail, she would require to have
a large body of Railway Troops available either for the conversion of
the Russian 5 ft. gauge into the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the German lines
(in order that the engines and rolling stock of the latter could be
utilised on Russian territory), or for the construction of special
military railways as substitutes for the Russian lines.
Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the fact remains
that the Railway Troops of Germany, created under the circumstances and
conditions here detailed, have been maintained in steadily increasing
numbers, and, also, in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what
is, in effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great
amount of practical work they have been called upon to do, whether in
the building of strategical lines or in other departments of railway
construction, destruction or working in which they could gain experience
likely to be of advantage in time of war.
There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related by him in his
book on "The German Spy System," a still further purpose that these Army
railwaymen might be called on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief
of the system, the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the
appointment in every portion of the national railway system of France
(and more especially at important junctions or strategical centres) of
German spies who, competent to act as railway workers, would, in the
event of any future war between Germany and France, and on receiving
the necessary instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those
points in such a manner--as planned, of course, in advance--that great
delay would occur in the mobilisation of the French troops owing to
the traffic being paralysed for the time being; the Germans, in the
meantime, rushing their own forces to the frontier. "The extremely
important rôle which would devolve on our railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir,
"at the moment of the declaration of war, in fulfilling their functions
as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army, was already
thoroughly appreciated at this period."
Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was approved by him,
and, so far as the obtaining of appointments on the French railways
by Stieber's agents was concerned, the plan had been quietly carried
into effect by the end of 1883; but a casual incident then led to the
discovery of the conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within a week, as the
result of his communications with General Campenau, Minister of War,
the railway companies received a confidential circular requiring that
they should call upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity
whatever to become naturalised without delay. Those who would not adopt
this course were to be immediately dismissed. The number of foreigners
then in the employ of the railway companies was 1,641, and, although
1,459 of them agreed to become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who
refused so to do. These 182 were at once discharged--the assumption
being that they were the spies, qualified to act as railway workers, by
whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they
might receive word to that effect.
FOOTNOTES:
[24] Captain A. de Formanoir states in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en
Temps de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges. Bruxelles, 1870), that
in France and Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that
they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises.
[25] "Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train
on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the
Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.