The first step of the affair was to persuade Giangaleazzo Visconti to

give in his adherence to the Antipope Clement. The Lord of Milan was

still in name an Urbanite; but he had suffered the Antipope Clement to

arrange the marriage of his daughter and to grant the dispensation that

made it lawful; and his wife Caterina was a devoted Clementine. Visconti

gives it to be understood that he will fight for Clement if it be made

worth his while. Meanwhile the king takes fire:—honest, practical,

religious, the idea of thus forcibly putting an end to heresy and schism

greatly commends itself to him. There were three Royal visits to Avignon

that year. The Antipope suggests to Charles VI. an Imperial Crown for a

second Charlemagne.[24] Froissart hears of the royal intention, “de

mener notre Saint Père à Rome,“ and on the 23rd of February, 1391, the

King signs a quittance of 2,000 francs, “pour nous aider à abiller et

mestre est estat pour aller en la compagnie d’icelui seigneur au voyage

qu’il a intencion de faire au païs de Lombardie.”

Footnote 24:

Clairambault. sceaux, vol. cxiii. p. 8821. See De Circourt, _op. cit._

But nothing can be done without the indispensable Visconti. What is his

plan? At first he holds back, loving by nature the attitude of suspense.

But in 1392 the moment came to decide. Armagnac at that moment was

invading Italy in defence of the rights of his sister Beatrice and the

elder branch of Visconti. He suffered defeat, indeed, and death at the

hands of Milan, but not before he had inflicted so severe a check upon

his victor that Giangaleazzo no longer saw his triumph clear. Nay,

unwelcome as the ghost of Banquo at the board of Macbeth, the pale

figures of the dead Armagnac, the once laughing Beatrice, the poisoned

Bernabò, intrude themselves between him and his end. Do not such sights

as these clamour for revenge?—and Armagnac and Beatrice have a living

brother; Bernabò Visconti has left a troop of sons. Milan may yet be

snatched from his grasp. He is not safe in Lombardy, and he would fain

be King of Italy. But how to obtain that crown? Already Armagnac has

forced him to restore Padua to the Carraresi. And Florence, the

irreconcileable enemy, is grouping round her a league of hostile states.

In August, 1392, Florence, Padua, Faenza, Ravenna—a little later the

Malatestas and Forli—are united against Visconti. He is not safe in

Milan till he wear the crown of Florence too.

Then he sends to the Pope and to the King of France and announces his

plan. How did the Lord of Milan hear of the secret Adrian project? Did

Anjou, passing through Pavia, drop a word? Did one of the many Angevines

sheltered in the house of Orleans, familiar with Asti and Milan, broach

the plan? We know not, but this was the scheme of Visconti: _Naples for

Anjou_; _Rome for the Frenchman Clement VII._; _Adria_, that is to say

the centre of Italy from Spoleto to Ferrara, and from Massa to Ancona,

_Adria for Orleans, the North for Visconti_. That is to say, Italy for

the father of Valentine and his allies.[25] As Walsingham tells us

Visconti secured for himself the double crown of Tuscany and Lombardy.

But in the very moment when the reluctant Pope (less hasty and less

egoistic now than at Sperlonga), had promised thus to alienate the

Church lands as the price of his restoration, a Divine Hand, as it must

have seemed, interposed to save the Church. On the 28th of August, 1394,

Pope and Cardinals had approved the Schedule of Orleans. A fortnight

later, on the 16th of September, suddenly, Clement VII. died at Avignon.

Footnote 25:

For all this question of the kingdom of Adria, too vast for this

incidental line, see the excellent paper of M. Paul Durrieu in the

“Revue des Questions Historiques” for July, 1880; also the scarce

volume of Champollion-Figeac, “Louis et Charles, Ducs d’Orléans,”

Paris, 1844; and especially the box of Manuscripts in the Paris

National Archives labelled Carton J. 495. I may also indicate an

interesting passage in Walsingham’s “Historia Anglicana,” vol. ii. p.

201, communicated to me by Comte Albert de Circourt, “Item Dominus

Papa significat Regi per prædictum nuncio, qualiter Rex Franciæ et

Antipapa pacta inierunt hinc inde: Videlicet quod idem Rex, per

fortitudinum Ducum (Burgundiæ et Turoniæ, poni faciat Antipapem in

Sedem Petri et Antipapa promisit Regem Imperio coronare, et Duci

Burgundiæ) magnalia et investiet Ducem Turoniæ de omnibus terris

ecclesiæ in partibus Italiæ, et _quendam alium_ coronare Regem Tusciæ

et Lombardiæ, et Ducem Andexaciæ (Andegaviæ) firmare in Regno

Siciliæ.” The passage in brackets exists only in the Brit. Mus. MS.

His successor was less able; and the scheme of Adria was abandoned.

Valentine would never reign as Queen of Adria. Yet, as Duchess of Genoa,

she would be nearer home. Then in all manner of subtle and secret ways

Orleans and Visconti immediately manœuvred to secure the Ligurian

province. Armies in the field, diplomats in the Cabinet, worked for one

end alone. In November, 1394, Savona had submitted to Orleans. Now Genoa

must be gained. The young Duke had already a strong faction in his

favour. The Lomellini, Spinole, Flischi, figure in the rolls of Orleans’

army.[28] But, at the same time, they were intriguing with an

unsuspected enemy.[29] In August, 1395, the Doge of Genoa sent to Paris

offering to Charles himself the suzerainty of Genoa. There was in France

a strong current of popular opinion running in favour of Italian

colonization. Why should Orleans have Genoa?—asked the people. Why not

the King? Why not all of us? Why not France? The King, as we know, was

never a very solid creature. Honest, but feeble, he let himself be

dominated by the nearest influence. The Duke of Burgundy was in Paris,

and he, it is probable, persuaded Charles[26] to abandon his brother and

to accept the gift of the Doge. In October, Genoa was united to the

Crown of France. In December the King bought from Orleans his rights in

Savona and Genoa.[27] This was checkmate both to Orleans and Visconti.

Footnote 26:

“Arch. Nat.,” K K. 315.

Footnote 27:

“Arch. Nat.,” J. 497, No. 15. February, 1392, Lomellini, Flisco, and

other nobles of Genoa sign an instrument offering Genoa to the King of

France.

Footnote 28:

Paul Durrieu, “Le Royaume d’Adria.” See also an important passage,

“Religieux de St. Denis,” t. ii. p. 402.

Footnote 29:

“Arch. Nat.,” K. 54, No. 37. December 12, 1396: “Comme depuis que

nostre très-cher et très amé frère le Duc d’Orleans eut, pour les

causes et les concideracions qui le meurent, entrepriz d’avoir la

Seigneurie des cité, pays et territoire de Gennes. Et tant fait pour

venir à son entencion.... Savoir faisons que pour contenter et

deffraier nostre dit frère des trés-grans fraiz missions et despenses

par luy en plusieurs manières faiz et soustenuz ... nous avons avec

nostre dit frère traicté et accordé sur de et pour ces choses et leurs

dependances la somme de trois cents mile frans d’or pour une foiz.”

Burgundy and the Queen were triumphant. The Queen wrote to the

Florentines that affairs were going well, that her enemy and theirs was

fallen in disgrace, and on the 29th December the King joined the

Florentines against his late ally. For there was now great irritation in

France against Visconti, who, furious at the treachery which had

outwitted his plans for Genoa, played a double game with France. Signing

with one hand a fraternal alliance with King Charles,[30] with the other

he stirred up the Genoese to rebel against his yoke. But the Genoese

suspected his counsels, and revealed the whole intrigue to the Court of

Paris. Hence fury among the nobles, an ardent desire to punish the false

friend.[31] Hence among the populace the best will in the world to

believe the Duke of Milan a wizard and his daughter a witch, an infernal

spirit bringing death and madness upon the beloved King.

Footnote 30:

August 31, 1395. Lünig Codex Italiæ Diplomaticus, i. col. 421.

Footnote 31:

“Religieux de St. Denis,” ii. p. 436, _et. seq._

IX.

Thus the machinations of Milan served to exasperate the French. And the

indignity and insult offered to Valentine were as great a cause of

irritation to Visconti. He and his daughter, with their Lombard

indifference to superstition, could have nothing but contempt for the

panic of the French. “Et l’une des plus dolentes et courroucées qui y

fust, c’estoit la Duchesse d’Orleans,“ writes Juvenal des Ursins. Twice

or thrice the Duke of Milan sent his ambassadors to the King of France,

offering to find a knight to fight at outrance with any man who would

accuse Madame Valentine of any treason. So sore and angry were the

father and the brother-in-law of Valentine that there was a talk of a

Milanese invasion. Great counter preparations were made in France, and

the League was signed with the Florentines against Milan. The King,

being in good health then, went to Boulogne to celebrate the marriage of

his daughter Isabel, a child of seven, with Richard II. of England, a

man some years older than himself. Richard was very bitter against

Milan. He offered to send an English contingent to the King’s aid, if he

invaded Lombardy. He warned the King again and again against the spells

and sorceries of Lombardy; and he produced so strong an impression upon

the enfeebled mind of Charles, that on the 29th of October, as the two

kings were sitting together at dinner, the King of France perceiving

among the heralds one with the Serpent of Milan on his shield, had him

stripped of his arms, menaced with death, and chased out of the royal

presence. The Duke of Milan retaliated with the famous Investiture of

1396, which excludes the children of Valentine of Orleans from the

succession to Milan. With things at this pitch of hostility, war seemed

imminent, and the route was made out for the invasion of Lombardy. But

that war never took place. “And that journey,” says Froissart, “took

none effect; for the discomfiture of the battle before Nicopoly in

Turkey, and the death and the taking of the Lords of France. And also

they saw well that the Duke of Milan was in favour with the Great Turk,

Lamorabaquy; wherefore they durst not displease him, so let him alone.”

It became immediately necessary to make peace with Milan,[32] the one

power in Europe that could mediate with Turkey. The ambassadors of the

King, Burgundy, Orleans, and the Sultan, caused a continual come-and-go

in Milan. Visconti took his position of peace-maker in good part. In

March, 1397, he procured a third and less hostile investiture. The talk

of magic was hushed for a while, and Valentine returned in peace to

Court.

Footnote 32:

“Delaville Le Roulx. La France en Orient,“ vol. i. p. 290-304.

Yet now, perhaps, for the first time the French people, not

unjustifiably, might have heaped their odium on Valentine. For her

latest historian supports a theory suggested long ago by Froissart.[35]

While the French were projecting their invasion of Lombardy—while the

son of that Burgundy who had advised the King in the affair of Genoa was

leading against the Turks a French Crusade which might easily return

homewards _viâ_ Lombardy and Milan—Giangaleazzo, furious and humiliated,

sought any means of salvation and revenge. He, like many another

Italian, was in correspondence with the Turk; and an idea, successfully

practised by many another Italian,[34] may not unnaturally have

suggested itself to him. If France joined the Florentine League then

adieu for ever to the hopes of Visconti. And Burgundy, as he knew, was

in favour of Florence. And the son of Burgundy was captain of the French

army. Small hope here; yet, if the French army could be destroyed in

Turkey, Milan would be safe! Then the astute Visconti would smile to

think of his daughter in France. Valentine who wrote him everything—also

told him doubtless (as the author of Maistre Jehan de Meun tells us[33])

of the vain young aristocrats, ruined by free living and fine carousing,

who were starting on that terrible journey, thinking of nothing more

serious than the elegant spectacle of their departure:

“Mais que le partir soit joly

Vous ne regardez point la fin!”

Gay young gallants, unfit for privation, who, when they reach Palestine,

will be too weak to strike three strokes with the magnificent swords so

much too heavy for their hands.

“Les Sarrazins s’arment légier;

Sy c’est bon courage et fier.”

But the panoply of these splendid youths—these _gens de paraige_—was for

decoration rather than for battle. Valentine, the confidant of her

father—who in the long afternoons of exile would turn with the expansion

of relief to her one kinsman, her staunch protector—would tell him of

the weakness that underlay the glory of this martial going-off. She

would write to him the plan of campaign, the route decided on, the means

of attack and defence. She would inform him not only of the quality but

of the number of the army. And Giangaleazzo was aware that these details

transmitted to the Turks would ensure the disaster of the French, and

draw away the gathering storm that threatened to break on Milan.

Footnote 33:

_Vide_ “Jean sans Peur, Duc de Bourgogne, Lieutenant et

Procureur-général du Diable cès parties d’Occident,” par M. Paul

Durrieu, Paris, 1887.

Footnote 34:

For example Carlo Zeno in 1403, Gattilusio in 1399, each of whom

informed the Turks concerning the plan of campaign of a Christian

enemy.

Footnote 35:

“L’Apparicion de Maistre Jehan de Meun.” Bib. Nat. Fr. 811, No. 7203.

This is an illuminated manuscript in defence of Valentine of Orleans,

and dedicated to her.

The Duke of Milan was not scrupulous; he was “moult bien” in the

friendship of the Turk. The Turk gained a singular acquaintance with the

disposition of the French army. No need to dwell here on the terrible

disaster of that unforgotten battle: the twelve to twenty thousand dead;

the rare fugitives stealing homewards, dukes and barons, in the dress of

beggar-men; the harder lot of those taken by the Turks, sold into

slavery, or massacred in vengeance for the Faithful slain at Christian

hands; of the heartsick waiting of the few—a very few, of the richest

and noblest—set aside for ransom. One of these, Jacques de Heilly, was

sent by the Sultan on parole to France, to inform the King of the

disaster and to bring back the news of their intentions with respect to

ransom. He was bidden to pass by Milan[36] in order to convey to

Giangaleazzo Visconti the salutations of the Sultan. On Christmas night

he arrived in Paris; the Court were feasting and dancing. In the prison

of the Châtelet, hungry and cold, there were men who spent their

Christmas in a dungeon for having spread false news, as it was said, of

a great defeat in Turkey. But the tale of D’Heilly told, all that was

changed: the prisoners were freed, the Court was in tears. The bells

rang in all the churches for the dead. The universal thought was how to

redeem the flower of France from a savage captivity. On the 20th of

January, 1397, a French embassy was sent to Milan. A few days earlier

Jacques de Heilly, laden with propitiatory gifts, had returned to the

Sultan. Nothing was spoken of but mediation and reconciliation. And

Valentine—so long the innocent scapegoat of her party—was recalled to

favour in the very hour when all men might have suspected her as the

involuntary origin of misery.

Footnote 36:

“Delaville Le Roulx. La France en Orient,” Paris, 1886, vol. i. p.

291.

X.

Actual war with Milan was averted; but the rumours against the King’s

brother continued still in France.

On the 24th of March, 1403, Ives Gilemme, a priest; Demoiselle Marie de

Blansy, Perrin Hémery, a locksmith, and Guillaume Floret, a clerk, were

publicly burned for sorcery. And still the King was mad. Were those who

bewitched _him_, the head of the State, to keep their immunity? There

_was_ such a crime as witchcraft, and people legally suffered for it.

The King was bewitched: who was the wizard?

To this incessant question Burgundy ever helped to point the answer. Who

was the person who profited most by the sickness of the King?

The Duke of Orleans had become very powerful. In January, 1393, an

ordonnance had promised him the Regency in case of the death of the

King.[37] His prestige, his wealth, his faction increased with every

year. This young man who, in 1385, possessed no more than 12,000 livres

a year, was Duke of Orleans (1391), Count of Valois and Count of

Beaumont (1386), Count of Asti and Count of Vertus (1387), Count of

Soissons (1391), Count of Blois (1391), Count of Dreux, Count of

Angoulême (1394). In 1394 he was very nearly King of Adria. He was Count

of Perigord in 1398. He was Seigneur of Savona (1394), Seigneur of Coucy

(1391); he possessed both lands and castles in Hainault, at Pierrefonds,

and at Ferté-Millon (1392). The Duchy of Luxembourg (1402), the Duchy of

Aquitaine (1407) lay immediately before him.

Footnote 37:

“Ordonnances des rois de France,” t. vii. p. 535. The Duke of Orleans

was never Regent, despite the line of the Monk of St. Denis which

assures us that in 1402 the King made his brother Lieutenant-General

of the Kingdom. During the frequent relapses of Charles VI. the

kingdom was governed by a Council. There was no Regency before the

year 1415.

The princes of Europe appealed to the Duke of Orleans as to an

independent sovereign. The Duke of Guelders concluded a separate

alliance with him (1401). The King of the Romans offered him for his son

the heiress of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland (1397). Henry of Lancaster,

an exile in Paris (1399), paid more court to him than to the King of

France. And in 1405 the Venetians sent two secret ambassadors to

Orleans, who in return despatched a certain Pierre de Scrovignes with

private despatches to the Signory of Venice. Since 1401 the Venetians

had never sent a message to the King. Burgundy began to fear that

Orleans would induce the new Antipope at Avignon to depose Charles VI.

in his own favour.

There is, I think, no evidence of such an intention, and yet the

suspicions of Burgundy may not impossibly have been correct. In 1400 the

Germans deposed their drunken Wenzel, in 1398 the English had deposed

their incapable Richard. Why should not France depose a king continually

lapsing into madness? In the year 1399 the king had six relapses.

Orleans may have been no less ambitious than his sworn friend and

brother, Henry of Lancaster, who had so lately conquered for himself the

throne of England.

* * * * *

Orleans and Burgundy turn by turn usurped the direction of affairs.

Vainly King and Queen and Court attempted to assuage their rivalry. On

the 14th of June, 1401, the Queen of France (the King being mad), the

King of Sicily, the Dukes of Berri and Bourbon, made a League “pour

apaiser les Ducs d’Orlèans et de Bourgogne.”[38] In vain. The King

himself was powerless, and could only bid his subjects—as in 1405 he

bade the Bailly de Caux—to stand aside and take no part nor lot in the

discord existing between the Dukes of Orleans and Burgundy.[39] This

impartiality was only apparent. The growing influence of Burgundy was

dreaded by Berri and the Queen, no less than by Orleans himself. And in

the winter of 1405, these three persons joined themselves together in an

“Alliance défensive et réciproque, pour se maintenir au pouvoir.”[40]

Thus, if Burgundy had the nation on his side, the authority of the

Queen, the influence of Valentine (all-powerful with the King), was with

Orleans. In 1404 Philip of Burgundy died, and his faction gained new

vigour with the accession of his son, a man less temperate, less

aristocratic than his father. The blood of his Flemish mother worked in

the veins of the young man, restless, violent, demagogic as a burgher of

Ghent. The young Duke of Burgundy had no woman to work for him; it was

even rumoured that the portrait of his own wife hung in that locked

chamber where Orleans kept the pictures of his mistresses. But

Jean-sans-Peur did not need any feminine advocate. He was young, he was

rich. In 1404 his father’s death bequeathed him Burgundy, next year his

mother died and left him Flanders. A small ugly man, alert, blunt,

brutal even, serving public interests to reach his own ends,

Jean-sans-Peur of Burgundy was the hero of the people. “Brun et barbu et

bien aimé,“ writes Burcarius.

Footnote 38:

Arch. Nat. K. 55, No. 16, June 14, 1401.

Footnote 39:

Arch. Nat. K. 55, No. 39, Aug. 21, 1405.

Footnote 40:

Arch. Nat. K. 55, No. 36, Dec. 1, 1405.

Meanwhile the people groaned under the tyranny of Orleans. _Jugum

intollerabile plebis._ And Orleans, sceptical and embittered, had no

respect and no pity for the ignorant populace that reviled him, that

menaced his virtuous wife, that mocked the death of his little child

with cruel and insulting calumnies. The people to him were odious, or,

at best, indifferent; a cup to drain, a fruit to squeeze and throw away

the rind. In 1403 he laid upon them an impost of three hundred thousand

crowns. Out of this he builded for himself two famous castles,

Pierrefonds and Ferté-Millon, beautiful as the towers of heaven in a

picture by Van Eyck.

In 1407, not content, he levied a new tax. The money thus gained

enriched the State far less than him, and great personages accused him

and the Queen of leaving no single florin to rattle in the empty

treasury. When Orleans suggested the new impost, Jean-sans-Peur opposed

him in the royal council: “I ask pity of the poor people. It is tyranny

to aggravate their intolerable yoke.” Jean-sans-Peur declared that, in

_his_ domains at least, the impost should not be collected; rather would

he forfeit the entire amount himself. Struck by this generosity, the

young Duke of Brittany volunteered to postpone his wife’s dowry until

the treasury was full again.

The tax was levied all the same. It was a war levy, and really

necessary. Every man and woman in France was mulcted according to the

value of his goods. In this way a vast sum was raised—twenty-seven

millions. It was lodged in a tower of the Louvre. One night, when the

town was quiet, Orleans, with a band of armed men, entered this tower

and carried off at least two-thirds of the treasure.

When the people heard of it—the people who (the Monk assures us) had

sold the straw of their beds to pay the levy—they prayed publicly in

every town and hamlet: “Jesus Christ in heaven, send thou some one to

deliver us from Orleans!”

Orleans smiled no less bitterly than when he had heard the public

whisper accuse him of sorcery and devil-worship. He proclaimed that

whosoever did not pay the taxes should be cast into prison; to prevent

assassination, no man was to carry another knife than he used for his

eating; a fourth of the provisions of the royal household was to be

supplied daily, without payment, by the people of Paris. These

provisions, as the people knew very well, did not go to feed or clothe

their beloved King. He, in his palace, was as poor, as suffering as

themselves. The Dauphin was no richer: “in penury and want,” says the

Monk, “if such words may be used for so great a personage.” The

insatiable Orleans, the avid little Queen, grasped and kept everything.

“Jesus Christ in heaven,” prayed the people, “send some one to deliver

us from the Duke of Orleans.”

Orleans should have listened. The air was full of warnings to tyrants.

Richard and Wenzel had fallen miserably. The Duke of Milan had died of

the plague; in six months his vast kingdom had fallen into ruins.

Tyranny is, so often, a personal accident—a possession, not an

inheritance. Was it worth while? The King himself added to the list of

these monitions. In August, 1404, he married his eldest son to

Burgundy’s daughter, his daughter to the son of Burgundy.

In the year 1405, on Ascension Day, the people found a voice. An

Augustine monk, Jacques Legrand, preached then before the Court. The

Queen, Valentine, and Orleans were present, but not the King. “O Queen!

O Duke!” said the monk, “you are the curse and derision of your people.

Do you not believe me? Go into the streets and hear them!

The End of the Middle Ages: Essays and Questions in History · 第 10 / 26 段