WISDOM AND SELF-CONTROL
§ 1. Wisdom was always placed by the Greek philosophers first in the
list of virtues, and regarded as in a manner comprehending all the
others: in fact in the post-Aristotelian schools the notion of the
Sage or ideally Wise man (σοφός) was regularly employed to
exhibit in a concrete form the rules of life laid down by each system.
In common Greek usage, however, the term just mentioned would signify
excellence in purely speculative science, no less than practical
wisdom[183]: and the English term Wisdom has, to some extent, the same
ambiguity. It is, however, chiefly used in reference to practice: and
even when applied to the region of pure speculation suggests especially
such intellectual gifts and habits as lead to sound practical
conclusions: namely, comprehensiveness of view, the habit of attending
impartially to a number of diverse considerations difficult to estimate
exactly, and good judgment as to the relative importance of each. At
any rate, it is only Practical Wisdom which we commonly class among
Virtues, as distinguished from purely intellectual excellences. How
then shall we define Practical Wisdom? The most obvious part of its
meaning is a tendency to discern, in the conduct of life generally,
the best means to the attainment of any ends that the natural play
of human motives may lead us to seek: as contrasted with technical
skill, or the faculty of selecting the best means to given ends in a
certain limited and special department of human action. Such skill in
the special arts is partly communicable by means of definite rules,
and partly a matter of tact or instinct, depending somewhat on natural
gifts and predispositions, but to a great extent acquired by exercise
and imitation; and similarly practical Wisdom, if understood to be
Skill in the Art of Life, would involve a certain amount of scientific
knowledge, the portions of different sciences bearing directly on
human action, together with empirical rules relating to the same
subject-matter; and also the tact or trained instinct just mentioned,
which would even be more prominent here, on account of the extreme
complexity of the subject-matter. But it does not appear from this
analysis why this skill should be regarded as a virtue: and reflection
will show that we do not ordinarily mean by wisdom merely the faculty
of finding the best means to any ends: for we should not call the
most accomplished swindler wise; whereas we should not hesitate to
attribute to him cleverness, ingenuity, and other purely intellectual
excellences. So again we apply the term “worldly-wise” to a man who
skilfully chooses the best means to the end of ambition; but we should
not call such a man ‘wise’ without qualification. Wisdom, in short,
appears to me to imply right judgment in respect of ends as well as
means.
Here, however, a subtle question arises. For the assumption on which
this treatise proceeds is that there are several ultimate ends of
action, which all claim to be rational ends, such as every man ought
to adopt. Hence, if Wisdom implies right judgment as to ends, it is
clear that a person who regards some one end as the sole right or
rational ultimate end will not consider a man wise who adopts any
other ultimate end. Can we say then that in the common use of the word
Wisdom any one ultimate end is distinctly implied to the exclusion of
others? It may be suggested, perhaps, that in the moral view of Common
Sense which we are now trying to make clear, since Wisdom itself is
prescribed or commended as a quality of conduct intuitively discerned
to be right or good, the ultimate end which the wise man prefers must
be just this attainment of rightness or goodness in conduct generally;
rather than pleasure for himself or others, or any other ulterior end.
I think, however, that in the case of this notion it is impossible to
carry out that analysis of ordinary practical reasoning into several
distinct methods, each admitting and needing separate development,
upon which the plan of this treatise is founded. For, as we saw, it
is characteristic of Common Sense to assume coincidence or harmony
among these different competing methods. And hence, while as regards
most particular virtues and duties, the exercise of moral judgment in
ordinary men is _prima facie_ independent of hedonistic calculations,
and occasionally in apparent conflict with their results,--so that the
reconciliation of the different procedures presents itself as a problem
to be solved--in the comprehensive notion of Wisdom the antagonism is
latent. Common Sense seems to mean by a Wise man, a man who attains
at once all the different rational ends; who by conduct in perfect
conformity with the true moral code attains the greatest happiness
possible both for himself and for mankind (or that portion of mankind
to which his efforts are necessarily restricted). But if we find this
harmony unattainable,--if, for example, Rational Egoism seems to
lead to conduct opposed to the true interests of mankind in general,
and we ask whether we are to call Wise the man who seeks, or him who
sacrifices, his private interests,--Common Sense gives no clear reply.
§ 2. Let us now return to the question whether Wisdom, as exhibited
in right judgment as to ends, is in any degree attainable at will,
and so, according to our definition, a Virtue. At first sight, the
perception of the right end may seem not to be voluntary any more than
the cognition of any other kind of truth; and though in most cases
the attainment of truth requires voluntary effort, still we do not
generally think it possible for any man, by this alone, to attain even
approximately the right solution of a difficult intellectual problem.
It is often said, however, that the cognition of Moral truth depends
largely upon the ‘heart,’ that is, upon a certain condition of our
desires and other emotions: and it would seem to be on this view that
Wisdom is regarded as a Virtue; and we may admit it as such, according
to the definition before given, so far as this condition of feeling
is attainable at will. Still, on closer scrutiny, there hardly seems
to be agreement as to the right emotional conditions of the cognition
of ends: as some would say that prayer or ardent aspiration produced
the most favourable state, while others would urge that emotional
excitement is likely to perturb the judgment, and would say that we
need for right apprehension rather tranquillity of feeling: and some
would contend that a complete suppression of selfish impulses was the
essential condition, while others would regard this as chimerical and
impossible, or, if possible, a plain misdirection of effort. On these
points we cannot decide in the name of Common Sense: but it would be
generally agreed that there are certain violent passions and sensual
appetites which are known to be liable to pervert moral apprehensions,
and that these are to some extent under the control of the Will; so
that a man who exercises moral effort to resist their influence,
when he wishes to decide on ends of action, may be said to be so far
voluntarily wise.
And this applies to some extent even to that other function of Wisdom,
first discussed, which consists in the selection of the best means
to the attainment of given ends. For experience seems to show that
our insight in practical matters is liable to be perverted by desire
and fear, and that this perversion may be prevented by an effort of
self-control: so that unwisdom, even here, is at least not altogether
involuntary. Thus in a dispute which may lead to a quarrel, I may
be entirely unable to show foresight and skill in maintaining my
right in such a manner as to avoid needless exasperation, and so far
may be unable to conduct the dispute wisely: but it is always in my
power, before taking each important step, to reduce the influence of
anger or wounded _amour propre_ on my decisions, and I may avoid much
unwisdom in this way. And it is to be observed that volition has a more
important part to play in developing or protecting our insight into the
right conduct of life, than it has in respect of the technical skill to
which we compared Practical Wisdom; in proportion as the reasonings in
which Practical Wisdom is exhibited are less clear and exact, and the
conclusions inevitably more uncertain. For desire and fear could hardly
make one go wrong in an arithmetical calculation; but in estimating a
balance of complicated practical probabilities it is more difficult to
resist the influence of strong inclination: and it would seem to be
a more or less definite consciousness of the continual need of such
resistance, which leads us to regard Wisdom as a Virtue.
We may say then that Practical Wisdom, so far as it is a virtue,
involves a habit of resistance to desires and fears which is commonly
distinguished as Self-control. But suppose a man has determined with
full insight the course of conduct that it is reasonable for him to
adopt under any given circumstances, the question still remains whether
he will certainly adopt it. Now I hardly think that Common Sense
considers the _choice_, as distinct from the _cognition_, of right ends
to belong to Wisdom; and yet we should scarcely call a man wise who
deliberately chose to do what he knew to be contrary to reason. The
truth seems to be that the notion of such a choice, though the modern
mind admits it as possible,[184] is somewhat unfamiliar in comparison
with either (1) impulsive irrationality, or (2) mistaken choice of bad
for good. In the last case, if the mistake is entirely involuntary,
the choice has, of course, no subjective wrongness: often, however,
the mistaken conclusion is caused by a perverting influence of desire
or fear of which the agent is obscurely conscious, and which might be
resisted and dispelled by an effort of will. As so caused, the mistake
falls under the head of culpable unwisdom, due to want of self-control
similar in kind--though not in degree--to that which is exhibited in
the rarer phenomenon of a man deliberately choosing to do what he knows
to be bad for him.
The case of impulsive wrongdoing is somewhat different. It is clear
that a resolution made after deliberation, in accordance with our
view of what is right, should not be abandoned or modified except
deliberately--at least if time for fresh deliberation be allowed--:
and the self-control required to resist impulses prompting to such
abandonment or modification--which we may perhaps call Firmness,--is
an indispensable auxiliary to Wisdom. But the gusts of impulse that
the varying occasions of life arouse sometimes take effect so rapidly
that the resolution to which they run counter is not actually recalled
at the time: and in this case the self-control or firmness required to
prevent unreasonable action seems to be not attainable at will, when
it is most wanted. We can, however, cultivate this important habit
by graving our resolves deeper in the moments of deliberation that
continually intervene among the moments of impulsive action.
§ 3. In examining the functions of Wisdom, other subordinate
excellences come into view, which are partly included in our ideal
conception of Wisdom, and partly auxiliary or supplementary. Some of
these, however, no one would exactly call virtues: such as Sagacity in
selecting the really important points amid a crowd of others, Acuteness
in seeing aids or obstacles that lie somewhat hidden. Ingenuity in
devising subtle or complicated means to our ends, and other cognate
qualities more or less vaguely defined and named. We cannot be acute,
or ingenious, or sagacious when we please, though we may become more
so by practice. The same may be said of Caution, so far as Caution
implies taking into due account _material_ circumstances unfavourable
to our wishes and aims: for by no effort of will can we certainly
see what circumstances are material; we can only look steadily and
comprehensively. The term ‘Caution,’ however, may also be legitimately
applied to a species of Self-control which we shall properly regard
as a Virtue: viz. the tendency to deliberate whenever and so long as
deliberation is judged to be required, even though powerful impulses
urge us to immediate action.[185]
And, in antithesis to Caution, we may notice as another minor virtue
the quality called Decision, so far as we mean by Decision the habit of
resisting an irrational impulse to which men are liable, of continuing
to some extent in the deliberative attitude when they know that
deliberation is no longer expedient, and that they ought to be acting.
‘Decision,’ however, is often applied (like ‘Caution’) to denote solely
or chiefly a merely intellectual excellence; viz. the tendency to judge
rightly as to the time for closing deliberation.
I conclude then that so far as such qualities as those which I have
distinguished as Caution, and Decision, are recognised as Virtues and
not merely as intellectual excellences, it is because they are, in
fact, species of Self-control; _i.e._ because they involve voluntary
adoption of and adhesion to rational judgments as to conduct, in spite
of certain irrational motives prompting in an opposite direction. Now
it may seem at first sight that if we suppose perfect correctness of
judgment combined with perfect self-control, the result will be a
perfect performance of duty in all departments; and the realisation of
perfect Virtue, except so far as this involves the presence of certain
special emotions not to be commanded at will.[186] And no doubt a
perfectly wise and self-controlled man cannot be conceived as breaking
or neglecting any moral rule. But it is important to observe that even
sincere and single-minded efforts to realise what we see to be right
may vary in intensity; and that therefore the tendency to manifest a
high degree of intensity in such efforts is properly praised as Energy,
if the quality be purely volitional; or under some such name as Zeal
or Moral Ardour, if the volitional energy be referred to intensity of
emotion, and yet not connected with any emotion more special than the
general love of what is Right or Good.
NOTE.--It is to be observed that in the discussions of this chapter
the question at issue between Intuitional and Utilitarian Ethics is
not yet reached. For, granting that we can elicit by reflection clear
rules of duty under the heads of Wisdom, Caution and Decision, the
rules are obviously not independent; they presuppose an intellectual
judgment otherwise obtained, or capable of being obtained, as to what
is right or expedient to do.
FOOTNOTES:
[183] Indeed Aristotle, who stood alone among the schools sprung from
Socrates in distinguishing sharply ‘theoretic’ from ‘practical’ wisdom,
restricts the term σοφία to the former, and uses another word
(φρόνησις) to denote the latter.
[184] I have already adverted to the difference between ancient and
modern thought in this respect. Cf. _ante_, Book i. chap. v. § 1, p.
59, note.
[185] It may be observed that there is another meaning again in which
the term ‘Caution’ is sometimes used. Since of the various means which
we may use to gain any end, some are more and some less certain;
and some are dangerous--that is, involve a chance of consequences
either antagonistic to our pursuit, or on different grounds to be
avoided--while others are free from such danger; ‘Caution’ is often
used to denote the temper of mind which inclines to the more certain
and less dangerous means. In this sense, in so far as the chance in
each case of winning the end, and the value of the end as compared with
other ends, and as weighed against the detriment which its pursuit may
entail, can be precisely estimated, the limits of the duty of Caution
may obviously be determined without difficulty.
[186] See p. 223, and § 2 of the next chapter.