VIRTUE AND DUTY
§ 1. Before, however, we attempt to define particular virtues or
departments of duty, it will be well to examine further the notions
of Duty and Virtue in general, and the relations between the two, as
we find them implicitly conceived by the common sense of mankind,
which we are endeavouring to express. Hitherto I have taken Duty to
be broadly convertible with Right conduct: I have noticed, however,
that the former term--like “ought” and “moral obligation”--implies at
least the _potential_ presence of motives prompting to wrong conduct;
and is therefore not applicable to beings to whom no such conflict of
motives can be attributed. Thus God is not conceived as performing
duties, though He is conceived as realising Justice and other kinds of
Rightness in action. For a similar reason, we do not commonly apply the
term ‘duty’ to right actions--however necessary and important--when
we are so strongly impelled to them by non-moral inclinations that no
moral impulse is conceived to be necessary for their performance. Thus
we do not say generally that it is a duty to eat and drink enough:
though we do often say this to invalids who have lost their appetite.
We should therefore perhaps keep most close to usage if we defined
Duties as ‘those Right actions or abstinences, for the adequate
accomplishment of which a moral impulse is conceived to be at least
occasionally necessary.’ But as this line of distinction is vague, and
continually varying, I shall not think it necessary to draw attention
to it in the detailed discussion of duties: it seems sufficient to
point out that we shall be chiefly concerned with such right conduct as
comes within the definition just suggested.
It may be said, however, that there is another implication in the term
“duty” which I have so far overlooked, but which its derivation--and
that of the equivalent term ‘obligation’--plainly indicates: viz.
that it is “due” or owed to some one. But I think that here the
derivation does not govern the established usage: rather, it is
commonly recognised that duties owed _to_ persons, or “relative”
duties, are only one species, and that some duties--as (_e.g._)
Truth-speaking--have no such relativity. No doubt it is possible
to view any duty as relative to the person or persons immediately
affected by its performance; but it is not usual to do this where
the immediate effects are harmful--as where truth-speaking causes a
physically injurious shock to the person addressed--: and though it
may still be conceived to be ultimately good for society, and so “due”
to the community or to humanity at large, that truth should even in
this case be spoken, this conception hardly belongs to the intuitional
view that ‘truth should be spoken regardless of consequences.’ Again,
it may be thought by religious persons that the performance of duties
is owed not to the human or other living beings affected by them, but
to God as the author of the moral law. And I certainly would not deny
that our common conception of duty involves an implied relation of an
individual will to a universal will conceived as perfectly rational:
but I am not prepared to affirm that this implication is necessary, and
an adequate discussion of the difficulties involved in it would lead to
metaphysical controversies which I am desirous of avoiding. I propose,
therefore, in this exposition of the Intuitional method, to abstract
from this relation of Duty generally to a Divine Will: and, for reasons
partly similar, to leave out of consideration the particular “duties to
God” which Intuitionists have often distinguished and classified. Our
view of the general rules of “duty to man” (or to other animals)--so
far as such rules are held to be cognisable by moral intuition--will,
I conceive, remain the same, whether or not we regard such rules as
imposed by a Supreme Rational Will: since in any case they will be
such as we hold it rational for all men to obey, and therefore such
as a Supreme Reason would impose. I shall not therefore treat the
term “Duty” as implying necessarily a relation either to a universal
Imponent or to the individuals primarily affected by the performance
of duties: but shall use it as equivalent generally to Right conduct,
while practically concentrating attention on acts and abstinences for
which a moral impulse is thought to be more or less required.
The notion of Virtue presents more complexity and difficulty, and
requires to be discussed from different points of view. We may begin
by noticing that there seem to be some particular virtues (such as
Generosity) which may be realised in acts objectively--though not
subjectively--wrong, from want of insight into their consequences: and
even some (such as Courage) which may be exhibited in wrong acts that
are known by the agent to be such. But though the contemplation of such
acts excites in us a quasi-moral admiration, in the latter case we
certainly should not call them virtuous, and it is doubtful whether we
should do so in the former case, if we were using the term strictly.
It will therefore involve no material deviation from usage, if we
limit the term “Virtue” to qualities exhibited in right conduct:[172]
accordingly I propose to adopt this limitation in subsequent
discussions.
How far, then, are we to regard the spheres of Duty and Virtue (thus
defined) as co-extensive? To a great extent they undoubtedly are so,
in the common application of the terms, but not altogether: since in
its common use each term seems to include something excluded from the
other. We should scarcely say that it was virtuous--under ordinary
circumstances--to pay one’s debts, or give one’s children a decent
education, or keep one’s aged parents from starving; these being duties
which most men perform, and only bad men neglect. On the other hand,
there are acts of high and noble virtue which we commonly regard as
going beyond the strict duty of the agent; since, while we praise their
performance, we do not condemn their non-performance. Here, however,
a difficulty seems to arise; for we should not deny that it is, in
some sense, a man’s strict duty to do whatever action he judges most
excellent, so far as it is in his power.
But can we say that it is as much in a man’s power to realise Virtue
as it is to fulfil Duty?[173] To some extent, no doubt, we should
say this: no quality of conduct is ever called a virtue unless it
is thought to be _to some extent_ immediately attainable at will
by all ordinary persons, when circumstances give opportunity for
its manifestation. In fact the line between virtues and other
excellences of behaviour is commonly drawn by this characteristic of
voluntariness;--an excellence which we think no effort of will could at
once enable us to exhibit in any appreciable degree is called a gift,
grace, or talent, but not properly a virtue. Writers like Hume,[174]
who obliterate this line, diverge manifestly from common sense. Still
I regard it as manifestly paradoxical to maintain that it is in the
power of any one at any time to realise virtue in the highest form or
degree; (_e.g._) no one would affirm that any ordinary man can at will
exhibit the highest degree of courage in the sense in which courage
is a virtue--when occasion arises. It would seem, therefore, that we
can distinguish a margin of virtuous conduct, which may be beyond the
strict duty of any individual as being beyond his power.
Can we then, excluding this margin, say that virtuous conduct, so
far as it is in a man’s power, coincides completely with his duty?
Certainly we should agree that a truly moral man cannot say to himself,
“This is the best thing on the whole for me to do, but yet it is not
my duty to do it though it is in my power”: this would certainly seem
to common sense an immoral paradox.[175] And yet there seem to be acts
and abstinences which we praise as virtuous, without imposing them as
duties upon all who are able to do them; as for a rich man to live very
plainly and devote his income to works of public beneficence.
Perhaps we may harmonise these inconsistent views by distinguishing
between the questions ‘what a man ought to do or forbear’ and ‘what
other men ought to blame him for not doing or forbearing’: and
recognising that the standard normally applied in dealing with the
latter question is laxer than would be right in dealing with the
former. But how is this double standard to be explained? We may
partly explain it by the different degrees of our knowledge in the
two cases: there are many acts and forbearances of which we cannot
lay down definitely that they ought to be done or forborne, unless
we have the complete knowledge of circumstances which a man commonly
possesses only in his own case, and not in that of other men. Thus I
may easily assure myself that I ought to subscribe to a given hospital:
but I cannot judge whether my neighbour ought to subscribe, as I do
not know the details of his income and the claims which he is bound
to satisfy. I do not, however, think that this explanation is always
applicable: I think that there are not a few cases in which we refrain
from blaming others for the omission of acts which we do not doubt that
we in their place should have thought it our duty to perform. In such
cases the line seems drawn by a more or less conscious consideration of
what men ordinarily do, and by a social instinct as to the practical
effects of expressed moral approbation and disapprobation: we think
that moral progress will on the whole be best promoted by our praising
acts that are above the level of ordinary practice, and confining our
censure--at least if precise and particular--to acts that fall clearly
below this standard. But a standard so determined must be inevitably
vague, and tending to vary as the average level of morality varies
in any community, or section of a community: indeed it is the aim of
preachers and teachers of morality to raise it continually. Hence it is
not convenient to use it in drawing a theoretical line between Virtue
and Duty: and I have therefore thought it best to employ the terms so
that virtuous conduct may include the performance of duty as well as
whatever good actions may be commonly thought to go beyond duty; though
recognising that Virtue in its ordinary use is most conspicuously
manifested in the latter.
§ 2. So far I have been considering the term ‘Virtuous’ as applied to
conduct. But both this general term, and the names connoting particular
virtues--“just,” “liberal,” “brave,” etc.--are applied to persons as
well as to their acts: and the question may be raised which application
is most appropriate or primary. Here reflection, I think, shows that
these attributes are not thought by us to belong to acts considered
apart from their agents: so that Virtue seems to be primarily a
quality of the soul or mind, conceived as permanent in comparison
with the transient acts and feelings in which it is manifested. As so
conceived it is widely held to be a possession worth aiming at for
its own sake; to be, in fact, a part of that Perfection of man which
is by some regarded as the sole Ultimate Good. This view I shall
consider in a subsequent chapter.[176] Meanwhile it may be observed
that Virtues, like other habits and dispositions, though regarded as
comparatively permanent attributes of the mind, are yet attributes of
which we can only form definite notions by conceiving the particular
transient phenomena in which they are manifested. If then we ask in
what phenomena Virtuous character is manifested, the obvious answer is
that it is manifested in voluntary actions, so far as intentional; or,
more briefly, in volitions. And many, perhaps most, moralists would
give this as a complete answer. If they are not prepared to affirm with
Kant that a good will is the only absolute and unconditional Good,
they will at any rate agree with Butler that “the object of the moral
faculty is actions, comprehending under that name active or practical
principles: those principles from which men would act if occasions
and circumstances gave them power.” And if it be urged that more than
this is included (_e.g._) in the Christian conception of the Virtue
of Charity, the “love of our neighbour,” they will explain with Kant
that by this love we must not understand the emotion of affection, but
merely the resolution to benefit, which alone has “true moral worth.”
I do not, however, think that the complete exclusion of an emotional
element from the conception of Virtue would be really in harmony
with the common sense of mankind. I think that in our common moral
judgments certain kinds of virtuous actions are held to be at any
rate adorned and made better by the presence of certain emotions in
the virtuous agent: though no doubt the element of volition is the
more important and indispensable. Thus the Virtue of Chastity or
Purity, in its highest form, seems to include more than a mere settled
resolution to abstain from unlawful lust; it includes some sentiment
of repugnance to impurity. Again, we recognise that benefits which
spring from affection and are lovingly bestowed are more acceptable to
the recipients than those conferred without affection, in the taste of
which there is admittedly something harsh and dry: hence, in a certain
way, the affection, if practical and steady, seems a higher excellence
than the mere beneficent disposition of the will, as resulting in more
excellent acts. In the case of Gratitude even the rigidity of Kant[177]
seems to relax, and to admit an element of emotion as indispensable to
the virtue: and there are various other notions, such as Loyalty and
Patriotism, which it is difficult--without paradox--either to exclude
from a list of virtues or to introduce stripped bare of all emotional
elements.
A consideration of the cases last mentioned will lead us to conclude
that, in the view of Common Sense, the question (raised in the
preceding chapter), whether an act is virtuous in proportion as it
was done from regard for duty or virtue, must be answered in the
negative: for the degree in which an act deserves praise as courageous,
loyal, or patriotic does not seem to be reduced by its being shown
that the predominant motive to the act was natural affection and not
love of virtue as such. Indeed in some cases I think it clear that we
commonly attribute virtue to conduct where regard for duty or virtue
is not consciously present at all: as in the case of a heroic act of
courage--let us say, in saving a fellow-creature from death--under an
impulse of spontaneous sympathy. So again, when we praise a man as
“genuinely humble” we certainly do not imply that he is conscious of
fulfilling a duty--still less that he is conscious of exhibiting a
virtue--by being humble.
It further appears to me that in the case of many important virtues
we do not commonly consider the ultimate spring of action--whether it
be some emotional impulse or the rational choice of duty as duty--in
attributing a particular virtue to particular persons: what we regard
as indispensable is merely a settled resolve to will a certain kind
of external effects. Thus we call a man veracious if his speech
exhibits, in a noteworthy degree, a settled endeavour to produce in
the minds of others impressions exactly correspondent to the facts,
whatever his motive may be for so doing: whether he is moved, solely
or mainly, by a regard for virtue, or a sense of the degradation of
falsehood, or a conviction that truth-speaking is in the long run the
best policy, or a sympathetic aversion to the inconveniences which
misleading statements cause to other people. I do not mean that we
regard these motives as of equal moral value: but that the presence or
absence of any one or other of them is not implied in our attribution
of the virtue of veracity. Similarly we attribute Justice, if a man
has a settled habit of weighing diverse claims and fulfilling them in
the ratio of their importance; Good Faith if he has a settled habit
of strictly keeping express or tacit engagements: and so forth. Even
where we clearly take motives into account, in judging of the degree
of virtue it is often rather the force of seductive motives resisted
than the particular nature of the prevailing springs of action which
we consider. Thus we certainly think virtue has been manifested in a
higher degree in just or veracious conduct, when the agent had strong
temptations to be unjust or unveracious; and in the same way there are
certain dispositions or habits tending to good conduct which are called
virtues when there are powerful seductive motives operating and not
otherwise; _e.g._ when we attribute the virtue of temperance to a man
who eats and drinks a proper amount, it is because we also attribute to
him appetites prompting to excess.
At the same time I admit that Common Sense seems liable to some
perplexity as to the relation of virtue to the moral effort required
for resisting unvirtuous impulses. On the one hand a general assent
would be given to the proposition that virtue is especially drawn out
and exhibited in a successful conflict with natural inclination: and
perhaps even to the more extreme statement that there is no virtue[178]
in doing what one likes. On the other hand we should surely agree
with Aristotle that Virtue is imperfect so long as the agent cannot
do the virtuous action without a conflict of impulses; since it is
from a wrong bent of natural impulse that we find it hard to do what
is best, and it seems absurd to say that the more we cure ourselves
of this wrong bent, the less virtuous we grow. Perhaps we may solve
the difficulty by recognising that our common idea of Virtue includes
two distinct elements, the one being the most perfect ideal of moral
excellence that we are able to conceive for human beings, while the
other is manifested in the effort of imperfect men to attain this
ideal. Thus in proportion as a man comes to like any particular kind of
good conduct and to do it without moral effort, we shall not say that
his conduct becomes less virtuous but rather more in conformity with
a true moral ideal; while at the same time we shall recognise that in
this department of his life he has less room to exhibit that other kind
of virtue which is manifested in resistance to seductive impulses, and
in the energetic striving of the will to get nearer to ideal perfection.
So far I have been considering the manifestation of virtue in emotions
and volitions, and have not expressly adverted to the intellectual
conditions of virtuous acts: though in speaking of such acts it is of
course implied that the volition is accompanied with an intellectual
representation of the particular effects willed. It is not, however,
implied that in willing such effects we must necessarily think of
them as right or good: and I do not myself think that, in the view of
common sense, this is an indispensable condition of the virtuousness
of an act; for it seems that some kinds of virtuous acts may be done
so entirely without deliberation that no moral judgment was passed
on them by the agent. This might be the case, for instance, with
an act of heroic courage, prompted by an impulse of sympathy with
a fellow-creature in sudden peril. But it is, I conceive, clearly
necessary that such an act should not be even vaguely thought to be
bad. As I have already said, it is more doubtful how far an act which
is conceived by the agent to be good, but which is really bad, is ever
judged by common sense to be virtuous[179]: but if we agree to restrict
the term to acts which we regard as right, it is again obvious
that the realisation of virtue may not be in the power of any given
person at any given time, through lack of the requisite intellectual
conditions.[180]
To sum up the results of a rather complicated discussion: I consider
Virtue as a quality manifested in the performance of duty (or good
acts going beyond strict duty): it is indeed primarily attributed to
the mind or character of the agent; but it is only known to us through
its manifestations in feelings and acts. Accordingly, in endeavouring
to make precise our conceptions of the particular virtues, we have
to examine the states of consciousness in which they are manifested.
Examining these, we find that the element of volition is primarily
important, and in some cases almost of sole importance, but yet
that the element of emotion cannot be altogether discarded without
palpable divergence from common sense. Again, concentrating our
attention on the volitional element, we find that in most cases what
we regard as manifestations of virtue are the volitions to produce
certain particular effects; the general determination to do right as
right, duty for duty’s sake, is indeed thought to be of fundamental
importance as a generally necessary spring of virtuous action; but it
is not thought to be an indispensable condition of the existence of
virtue in any particular case. Similarly in considering the emotional
element, though an ardent love of virtue or aversion to vice generally
is a valuable stimulus to virtuous conduct, it is not a universally
necessary condition of it: and in the case of some acts the presence
of other emotions--such as kind affection--makes the acts better than
if they were done from a purely moral motive. Such emotions, however,
cannot be commanded at will: and this is also true of the knowledge of
what ought to be done in any particular case,--which, if we restrict
the term ‘virtuous’ to right acts, is obviously required to render
conduct perfectly virtuous. For these and other reasons I consider that
though Virtue is distinguished by us from other excellences by the
characteristic of voluntariness--it must be _to some extent_ capable
of being realised at will when occasion arises--this voluntariness
attaches to it only in a certain degree; and that, though a man can
always do his Duty if he knows it, he cannot always realise virtue in
the highest degree.
It should, however, be observed that even when it is beyond our
power to realise virtue immediately at will, we recognise a duty of
cultivating it and seeking to develop it: and this duty of cultivation
extends to all virtuous habits or dispositions in which we are found
to be deficient, so far as we can thus increase our tendency to do the
corresponding acts in future; however completely such acts may on each
occasion be within the control of the will. It is true that for acts of
this latter kind, so far as they are perfectly deliberate, we do not
seem to need any special virtuous habits; if only we have knowledge of
what is right and best to be done, together with a sufficiently strong
wish to do it.[181] But, in order to fulfil our duties thoroughly,
we are obliged to act during part of our lives suddenly and without
deliberation: on such occasions there is no room for moral reasoning,
and sometimes not even for explicit moral judgment; so that in order to
act virtuously, we require such particular habits and dispositions as
are denoted by the names of the special virtues: and it is a duty to
foster and develop these in whatever way experience shows this to be
possible.
The complicated relation of virtue to duty, as above determined, must
be borne in mind throughout the discussion of the particular virtues,
to which I shall proceed in the following chapters. But, as we have
seen, the main part of the manifestation of virtue in conduct consists
in voluntary actions, which it is within the power of any individual
to do--so far as they are recognised by him as right,--and which
therefore come within our definition of Duty, as above laid down; it
will not therefore be necessary, during the greater part of the ensuing
discussion, to distinguish between principles of virtuous conduct and
principles of duty; since the definitions of the two will coincide.
§ 3. Here, however, a remark is necessary, which to some extent
qualifies what was said in the preceding chapter, where I characterised
the common notions of particular virtues--justice, etc.--as too vague
to furnish exact determinations of the actions enjoined under them. I
there assumed that rules of duty ought to admit of precise definition
in a universal form: and this assumption naturally belongs to the
ordinary or jural view of Ethics as concerned with a moral code: since
we should agree that if obligations are imposed on any one he ought at
least to know what they are, and that a law indefinitely drawn must
be a bad law. But so far as we contemplate virtue as something that
goes beyond strict duty and is not always capable of being realised at
will, this assumption is not so clearly appropriate: since from this
point of view we naturally compare excellence of conduct with beauty
in the products of the Fine Arts. Of such products we commonly say,
that though rules and definite prescriptions may do much, they can
never do all; that the highest excellence is always due to an instinct
or tact that cannot be reduced to definite formulæ. We can describe
the beautiful products when they are produced, and to some extent
classify their beauties, giving names to each; but we cannot prescribe
any certain method for producing each kind of beauty. So, it may be
said, stands the case with virtues: and hence the attempt to state an
explicit maxim, by applying which we may be sure of producing virtuous
acts of any kind, must fail: we can only give a general account of
the virtue--a description, not a definition--and leave it to trained
insight to find in any particular circumstances the act that will
best realise it. On this view, which I may distinguish as Æsthetic
Intuitionism, I shall have something to say hereafter.[182] But I
conceive that our primary business is to examine the larger claims of
those Rational or Jural Intuitionists, who maintain that Ethics admits
of exact and scientific treatment, having for its first principles
the general rules of which we have spoken, or the most fundamental
of them: and who thus hold out to us a hope of getting rid of the
fluctuations and discrepancies of opinion, in which we acquiesce
in æsthetic discussions, but which tend to endanger seriously the
authority of ethical beliefs. And we cannot, I think, decide on the
validity of such claims without examining in detail the propositions
which have been put forward as ethical axioms, and seeing how far they
prove to be clear and explicit, or how far others may be suggested
presenting these qualities. For it would not be maintained, at least
by the more judicious thinkers of this school, that such axioms are
always to be found with proper exactness of form by mere observation of
the common moral reasonings of men; but rather that they are at least
implied in these reasonings, and that when made explicit their truth
is self-evident, and must be accepted at once by an intelligent and
unbiassed mind. Just as some mathematical axioms are not and cannot
be known to the multitude, as their certainty cannot be seen except
by minds carefully prepared,--but yet, when their terms are properly
understood, the perception of their absolute truth is immediate and
irresistible. Similarly, if we are not able to claim for a proposed
moral axiom, in its precise form, an explicit and actual assent of
“_orbis terrarum_,” it may still be a truth which men before vaguely
apprehended, and which they will now unhesitatingly admit.
In this inquiry it is not of great importance in what order we take
the virtues. We are not to examine the system of any particular
moralist, but the Morality (as it was called) of Common Sense; and the
discussion of the general notions of Duty and Virtue, in which we have
been engaged in the present chapter, will have shown incidentally the
great difficulty of eliciting from Common Sense any clear principle
of classification of the particular duties and virtues. Hence I
have thought it best to reserve what I have to say on the subject
of classification till a later period of the discussion; and in the
first place to take the matter to be investigated quite empirically,
as we find it in the common thought expressed in the common language
of mankind. The systems of moralists commonly attempt to give some
definite arrangement to this crude material: but in so far as they are
systematic they generally seem forced to transcend Common Sense, and
define what it has left doubtful; as I shall hereafter try to show.
For the present, then, it seems best, in this empirical investigation,
to take the virtues rather in the order of their importance; and, as
there are some that seem to have a special comprehensiveness of range,
and to include under them, in a manner, all or most of the others, it
will be convenient to begin with these. Of these Wisdom is perhaps the
most obvious: in the next chapter, therefore, I propose to examine our
common conceptions of Wisdom, and certain other cognate or connected
virtues or excellences.
FOOTNOTES:
[172] It is more convenient, for the purpose of expounding the morality
of common sense, to understand by Virtue a quality exhibited in right
conduct; for then we can use the common notions of the particular
virtues as heads for the classification of the most important kinds or
aspects of right conduct as generally recognised. And I think that this
employment of the term is as much in accordance with ordinary usage as
any other equally precise use would be.
[173] In Book i. chap. v. § 3 I have explained the sense in which
Determinists no less than Libertarians hold that it is in a man’s power
to do his duty.
[174] Cf. _Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals_, Appendix iv.
[175] If the phrase in the text were used by a moral person, with a
sincere and predominant desire to do his duty, it must, I conceive, be
used in one of two senses: either (1) half-ironically, in recognition
of a customary standard of virtuous conduct which the speaker is not
prepared expressly to dispute, but which he does not really adopt as
valid--as when we say that it would be virtuous to read a new book,
hear a sermon, pay a visit, etc.; or (2) it might be used loosely to
mean that such and such conduct _would_ be best if the speaker were
differently constituted.
[176] Chap. xiv. of this Book.
[177] Cf. _Met. Anf. d. Tugendlehre_, § 33: “diese Tugend, welche
mit Innigkeit der wohlwollenden Gesinnung zugleich Zärtlichkeit des
Wohlwollens verbindet.”
[178] Or no “merit”:--but so far as this latter notion is precisely
applied, it will be more appropriately considered in ch. v. of this
Book (on Justice).
[179] I have before said that decidedly wrong acts are frequently
considered to exhibit in a high degree the tendencies which, when
exhibited in right acts, we call particular virtues--generosity,
courage, patriotism, etc.: and this is especially true of acts bad
through ignorance.
[180] This, I think, is a conclusion which common sense on the whole
accepts: though I note a considerable reluctance to accept it; which,
however, is not shown in the attribution of virtue to persons who do
clearly wrong acts, but rather in an effort to explain their ignorance
as caused by some previous wilful wrongdoing. We try to persuade
ourselves that if (_e.g._) Torquemada did not know that it was wrong to
torture heretics, he might have known if he had not wilfully neglected
means of enlightenment: but there are many cases in which this kind of
explanation is unsupported by facts, and I see no ground for accepting
it as generally true.
[181] Hence the Socratic doctrine that ‘all virtue is knowledge’; on
the assumption that a rational being must necessarily wish for what is
good.
[182] See chap. xiv. § 1 of this Book.