BENEVOLENCE
§ 1. We have seen that the virtue of Practical Wisdom comprehends all
others, so far as virtuous conduct in each department necessarily
results from a clear knowledge and choice of the true ultimate end or
ends of action, and of the best means to the attainment of such end
or ends.[187] From this point of view, we may consider the names of
the special virtues as denoting special departments of this knowledge;
which it is now our business to examine more closely.
When, however, we contemplate these, we discern that there are
other virtues, which, in different ways, may be regarded as no less
comprehensive than Wisdom. Especially in modern times, since the
revival of independent ethical speculation, there have always been
thinkers who have maintained, in some form, the view that Benevolence
is a supreme and architectonic virtue, comprehending and summing up
all the others, and fitted to regulate them and determine their proper
limits and mutual relations.[188] This widely supported claim to
supremacy seems an adequate reason for giving to Benevolence the first
place after Wisdom, in our examination of the commonly received maxims
of Duty and Virtue.
The general maxim of Benevolence would be commonly said to be, “that
we ought to love all our fellow-men,” or “all our fellow-creatures”:
but, as we have already seen, there is some doubt among moralists as
to the precise meaning of the term “love,” in this connexion: since,
according to Kant and others, what is morally prescribed as the Duty
of Benevolence is not strictly the affection of love or kindness, so
far as this contains an emotional element, but only the determination
of the will to seek the good or happiness of others. And I agree that
it cannot be a strict duty to feel an emotion, so far as it is not
directly within the power of the Will to produce it at any given time.
Still (as I have said) it seems to me that this emotional element is
included in our common notion of Charity or Philanthropy, regarded
as a Virtue: and I think it paradoxical[189] to deny that it raises
the mere beneficent disposition of the will to a higher degree of
excellence, and renders its effects better. If this be so, it will be
a duty to cultivate the affection so far as it is possible to do so:
and indeed this would seem (no less than the permanent disposition to
do good) to be a normal effect of repeated beneficent resolves and
actions: since, as has often been observed, a benefit tends to excite
love in the agent towards the recipient of the benefit, no less than
in the recipient towards the agent. It must be admitted, however, that
this effect is less certain than the production of the benevolent
disposition; and that some men are naturally so unattractive to others
that the latter can feel no affection, though they may entertain
benevolent dispositions, towards the former. At any rate, it would
seem to be a duty generally, and till we find the effort fruitless,
to cultivate kind affections towards those whom we ought to benefit;
not only by doing kind actions, but by placing ourselves under any
natural influences which experience shows to have a tendency to produce
affection.
But we have still to ascertain more particularly the nature of the
actions in which this affection or disposition of will is shown. They
are described popularly as ‘doing good.’ Now we have before[190]
noticed that the notion ‘good,’ in ordinary thought, includes,
undistinguished and therefore unharmonised, the different conceptions
that men form of the ultimate end of rational action. It follows
that there is a corresponding ambiguity in the phrase ‘doing good’:
since, though many would unhesitatingly take it to mean the promotion
of Happiness, there are others who, holding that Perfection and not
Happiness is the true ultimate Good, consistently maintain that the
real way to ‘do good’ to people is to increase their virtue or aid
their progress towards Perfection. There are, however, even among
anti-Epicurean moralists, some--such as Kant--who take an opposite
view, and argue that my neighbour’s Virtue or Perfection cannot be
an end to me, because it depends upon the free exercise of his own
volition, which I cannot help or hinder. But on the same grounds it
might equally well be argued that I cannot _cultivate_ Virtue in
myself, but only practise it from moment to moment: whereas even Kant
does not deny that we can cultivate virtuous dispositions in ourselves,
and that in other ways than by the performance of virtuous acts: and
Common Sense always assumes this to be possible and prescribes it as a
duty. And surely it is equally undeniable that we can cultivate virtue
in others: and indeed such cultivation is clearly the object not only
of education, but of a large part of social action, especially of our
expression of praise and blame. And if Virtue is an ultimate end for
ourselves, to be sought for its own sake, benevolence must lead us to
do what is possible to obtain it for our neighbour. And indeed we see
that in the case of intense individual affection, the friend or lover
generally longs that the beloved should be excellent and admirable
as well as happy: perhaps, however, this is because love involves
preference, and the lover desires that the beloved should be really
worthy of preference as well as actually preferred by him, as otherwise
there is a conflict between Love and Reason.
On the whole then, I do not find, in the common view of what
Benevolence bids us promote for others, any clear selection indicated
between the different and possibly conflicting elements of Good as
commonly conceived. But we may say, I think, that the promotion of
Happiness is practically the chief part of what Common Sense considers
to be prescribed as the external duty of Benevolence: and for
clearness’ sake we will confine our attention to this in the remainder
of the discussion.[191] It should be observed that by happiness we are
not to understand simply the gratification of the actual desires of
others, for men too often desire what would tend to their unhappiness
in the long run: but the greatest possible amount of pleasure or
satisfaction for them on the whole--in short, such happiness as was
taken to be the rational end for each individual in the system of
Egoistic Hedonism. It is this that Rational Benevolence bids us provide
for others; and if one who loves is led from affectionate sympathy
with the longings of the beloved to gratify those longings believing
that the gratification will be attended with an overplus of painful
consequences, we commonly say that such affection is weak and foolish.
§ 2. It remains to ask towards whom this disposition or affection is to
be maintained, and to what extent. And, firstly, it is not quite clear
whether we owe benevolence to men alone, or to other animals also. That
is, there is a general agreement that we ought to treat all animals
with kindness, so far as to avoid causing them unnecessary pain; but it
is questioned whether this is directly due to sentient beings as such,
or merely prescribed as a means of cultivating kindly dispositions
towards men. Intuitional moralists of repute have maintained this
latter view: I think, however, that Common Sense is disposed to regard
this as a hard-hearted paradox, and to hold with Bentham that the
pain of animals is _per se_ to be avoided. Passing to consider how
our benevolence ought to be distributed among our fellow-men, we may
conveniently make clear the Intuitional view by contrasting it with
that of Utilitarianism. For Utilitarianism is sometimes said to resolve
all virtue into universal and impartial Benevolence: it does not,
however, prescribe that we should love all men equally, but that we
should aim at Happiness generally as our ultimate end, and so consider
the happiness of any one individual as equally important with the
equal happiness of any other, as an element of this total; and should
distribute our kindness so as to make this total as great as possible,
in whatever way this result may be attained. Practically of course the
distribution of any individual’s services will, even on this view,
be unequal: as each man will obviously promote the general happiness
best by rendering services to a limited number, and to some more than
others: but the inequality, on the Utilitarian theory, is secondary
and derivative. Common Sense, however, seems rather to regard it as
immediately certain without any such deduction that we owe special dues
of kindness to those who stand in special relations to us. The question
then is, on what principles, when any case of doubt or apparent
conflict of duties arises, we are to determine the nature and extent of
the special claims to affection and kind services which arise out of
these particular relations of human beings. Are problems of this kind
to be solved by considering which course of conduct is on the whole
most conducive to the general happiness, or can we find independent
and self-evident principles sufficiently clear and precise to furnish
practical guidance in such cases? The different answers given to this
fundamental question will obviously constitute the main difference
between the Intuitional and Utilitarian methods; so far as the ‘good’
which the benevolent man desires and seeks to confer on others is
understood to be Happiness.
When, however, we come to investigate this question we are met with
a difficulty in the arrangement of the subject, which, like most
difficulties of classification, deserves attentive consideration,
as it depends upon important characteristics of the matter that has
to be arranged. In a narrower sense of the term, Benevolence is not
unfrequently distinguished from--and even contrasted with--Justice; we
may of course exercise both towards the same persons, but we commonly
assume that the special function of Benevolence begins where Justice
ends; and it is rather with this special function that we are concerned
in considering claims to affection, and to kind services normally
prompted by affection. At the same time, if we consider these services
as strictly due to persons in certain relations, the moral notion under
which these duties are presented to us is not easily distinguishable
from that of Justice; while yet these duties can hardly be withdrawn
from the sphere of Benevolence in the narrowest sense. It is sometimes
given as a distinction between Justice and Benevolence, that the
services which Justice prescribes can be claimed as a right by their
recipient, while Benevolence is essentially unconstrained: but we
certainly think (_e.g._) that parents have a right to filial affection
and to the services that naturally spring from it. It is further said
that the duties of Affection are essentially indefinite, while those
we classify under the head of Justice are precisely defined: and no
doubt this is partly true. We not only find it hard to say exactly
how much a son owes his parents, but we are even reluctant[192] to
investigate this: we do not think that he ought to ask for a precise
measure of his duty, in order that he may do just so much and no
more; while a great part of Justice consists in the observance of
stated agreements and precise rules. At the same time it is difficult
to maintain this distinction as a ground of classification; for the
duties of Affection are admittedly liable to come into competition with
each other, and with other duties; and when this apparent conflict of
duties occurs, we manifestly need as precise a definition as possible
of the conflicting obligations, in order to make a reasonable choice
among the alternatives of conduct presented to us. Accordingly in the
following chapter (§ 2) I shall show how this competition of claims
renders our common notion of Justice applicable to these no less than
to other duties: meanwhile, it seems proper to treat here separately
of all duties that arise out of relations where affection normally
exists, and where it ought to be cultivated, and where its absence is
deplored if not blamed. For all are agreed that there are such duties,
the non-performance of which is a ground for censure, beyond the
obligations imposed by law, or arising out of specific contract, which
will come under a different head.
Beyond these duties, again, there seems to be a region of performance
where the services rendered cannot properly be claimed as of debt, and
blame is not felt to be due for non-performance: and with regard to
this region, too,--which clearly belongs to Benevolence as contrasted
with Justice--there is some difficulty in stating the view of Common
Sense morality. There are two questions to be considered. We have to
ask, firstly, whether services rendered from affection, over and above
what strict Duty is thought to require, are to be deemed Virtuous;
and secondly, whether the affection itself is to be considered worthy
of admiration as a moral excellence, and therefore a mental condition
that we should strive to attain. I think that Common Sense clearly
regards as virtuous the disposition to render substantial positive
services to men at large, and promote their well-being,--whether such
a disposition springs out of natural kindliness of feeling towards
human beings generally, or whether it is merely the result of moral
effort and resolve--provided it is accompanied by an adequate degree
of intellectual enlightenment.[193] And the same may be said of the
less comprehensive affection that impels men to promote the well-being
of the community of which they are members; and again of the affection
that normally tends to accompany the recognition of rightful rule or
leadership in others. In some ages and countries Patriotism and Loyalty
have been regarded as almost supreme among the virtues; and even now
Common Sense gives them a high place.
But when we pass to more restricted, and, ordinarily more intense,
affections, such as those which we feel for relations and friends, it
becomes more difficult to determine whether they are to be considered
as moral excellences and cultivated as such.
First, to avoid confusion, we must remark that Love is not merely a
desire to do good to the object beloved, although it always involves
such a desire. It is primarily a pleasurable emotion, which seems
to depend upon a certain sense of union with another person, and it
includes, besides the benevolent impulse, a desire of the society of
the beloved: and this element may predominate over the former, and
even conflict with it, so that the true interests of the beloved may
be sacrificed. In this case we call the affection selfish, and do
not praise it at all, but rather blame. If now we ask whether intense
Love for an individual, considered merely as a benevolent impulse,
is in itself a moral excellence, it is difficult to extract a very
definite answer from Common Sense: but I think it inclines on the
whole to the negative. We are no doubt generally inclined to admire
any kind of conspicuously ‘altruistic’ conduct and any form of intense
love, however restricted in its scope; yet it hardly seems that the
susceptibility to such individualised benevolent emotions is exactly
regarded as an essential element of moral Perfection, which we ought
to strive after and cultivate like other moral excellences; we seem,
in fact, to doubt whether such effort is desirable in this case, at
least beyond the point up to which such affection is thought to be
required for the performance of recognised duties. Again, we think it
natural and desirable that--as generally speaking each person feels
strong affection for only a few individuals,--in his efforts to promote
directly the well-being of others he should, to a great extent, follow
the promptings of such restricted affection: but we are hardly prepared
to recommend that he should render services to special individuals
beyond what he is bound to render, and such as are the natural
expression of an eager and overflowing affection, without having any
such affection to express: although, as was before said, in certain
intimate relations we do not approve of the limits of duty being too
exactly measured.
On the whole, then, I conclude that--while we praise and admire
enthusiastic Benevolence and Patriotism, and are touched and charmed
by the spontaneous lavish outflow of Gratitude, Friendship, and the
domestic affections--still what chiefly concerns us as moralists,
under the present head, is the ascertainment of the right rules of
distribution of services and kind acts, in so far as we consider
the rendering of these to be morally obligatory. For provided a man
fulfils these duties (and observes the other recognised rules of
morality) Common Sense is not prepared to say how far it is right or
good that he should sacrifice any other noble and worthy aim--such as
the cultivation of knowledge or any of the fine arts--to the claims
of philanthropy or personal affection: there seem to be no generally
accepted “intuitional” principles for determining such a choice of
alternatives.[194]
§ 3. What then are the duties that we owe to our fellow-men--so far as
they do not seem to come under the head of Justice more properly than
Benevolence? Perhaps the mere enumeration of them is not difficult.
We should all agree that each of us is bound to show kindness to
his parents and spouse and children, and to other kinsmen in a less
degree: and to those who have rendered services to him, and any others
whom he may have admitted to his intimacy and called friends: and to
neighbours and to fellow-countrymen more than others: and perhaps we
may say to those of our own race more than to black or yellow men, and
generally to human beings in proportion to their affinity to ourselves.
And to our country as a corporate whole we believe ourselves to owe
the greatest sacrifices when occasion calls (but in a lower stage
of civilisation this debt is thought to be due rather to one’s king
or chief): and a similar obligation seems to be recognised, though
less definitely and in a less degree, as regards minor corporations
of which we are members. And to all men with whom we may be brought
into relation we are held to owe slight services, and such as may be
rendered without inconvenience: but those who are in distress or urgent
need have a claim on us for special kindness. These are generally
recognised claims: but we find considerable difficulty and divergence,
when we attempt to determine more precisely their extent and relative
obligation: and the divergence becomes indefinitely greater when we
compare the customs and common opinions now existing among ourselves
in respect of such claims, with those of other ages and countries. For
example, in earlier ages of society a peculiar sacredness was attached
to the tie of hospitality, and claims arising out of it were considered
peculiarly stringent: but this has changed as hospitality in the
progress of civilisation has become a luxury rather than a necessary,
and we do not think that we owe much to a man because we have asked
him to dinner. Or again we may take an instance where the alteration
is perhaps actually going on--the claims of kindred in respect of
bequest. We should now commonly think that a man ought usually to
leave his property to his children: but that if he has no children we
think he may do what he likes with it, unless any of his brothers or
sisters are in poverty, in which case compassion seems to blend with
and invigorate the evanescent claim of consanguinity. But in an age
not long past a childless man was held to be morally bound to leave
his money to his collateral relatives: and thus we are naturally led
to conjecture that in the not distant future, any similar obligation
to children--unless they are in want or unless their education is not
completed--may have vanished out of men’s minds. A similar change might
be traced in the commonly recognised duty of children to parents.
It may however be urged that this variation of custom is no obstacle to
the definition of duty, because we may lay down that the customs of any
society ought to be obeyed so long as they are established, just as the
laws ought, although both customs and laws may be changed from time to
time. And no doubt it is generally expedient to conform to established
customs: still, on reflection, we see that it cannot be laid down as
an absolute duty. For the cases of Custom and Law are not similar: as
in every progressive community there is a regular and settled mode of
abrogating laws that are found bad: but customs cannot be thus formally
abolished, and we only get rid of them through the refusal of private
individuals to obey them; and therefore it must be sometimes right to
do this, if some customs are vexatious and pernicious, as we frequently
judge those of antique and alien communities to be. And if we say that
customs should generally be obeyed, but that they may be disobeyed
when they reach a certain degree of inexpediency, our method seems to
resolve itself into Utilitarianism: for we cannot reasonably rest the
general obligation upon one principle, and determine its limits and
exceptions by another. If the duties above enumerated can be referred
to independent and self-evident principles, the limits of each must be
implicitly given in the intuition that reveals the principle.
§ 4. In order then to ascertain how far we possess such principles, let
us examine in more detail what Common Sense seems to affirm in respect
of these duties.
They seem to range themselves under four heads. There are (1)
duties arising out of comparatively permanent relationships not
voluntarily chosen, such as Kindred and in most cases Citizenship
and Neighbourhood: (2) those of similar relationships voluntarily
contracted, such as Friendship: (3) those that spring from special
services received, or Duties of Gratitude: and (4) those that seem due
to special need, or Duties of Pity. This classification is, I think,
convenient for discussion: but I cannot profess that it clearly and
completely avoids cross divisions; since, for example, the principle
of Gratitude is often appealed to as supplying the _rationale_ for
the duties owed by children to parents. Here, however, we come upon a
material disagreement and difficulty in determining the maxim of this
species of duty. It would be agreed that children owe to their parents
respect and kindness generally, and assistance in case of infirmity or
any special need: but it seems doubtful how far this is held by Common
Sense to be due on account of the relationship alone, or on account of
services rendered during infancy, and how far it is due to cruel or
neglectful parents. Most perhaps would say, here and in other cases,
that mere nearness of blood constituted a certain claim: but they would
find it hard to agree upon its exact force.[195]
But, apart from this, there seems great difference of opinion as to
what is due from children to parents who have performed their duty; as,
for example, how far obedience is due from a child who is no longer in
its parents’ guardianship or dependent on them for support:--whether
(_e.g._) a son or a daughter is bound not to oppose a parent’s wishes
in marrying or choosing a profession. Practically we find that parental
control is greater in the case of persons who can enrich their children
by testament: still we can hardly take this into consideration in
determining the ideal of filial duty: for to this, whatever it may be,
the child is thought to be absolutely bound, and not as a _quidproquo_
in anticipation of future benefits: and many would hold that a parent
had no moral right to disinherit a child, except as a penalty for a
transgression of duty.
And this leads to what we may conveniently examine next, the duty
of parents to children. This too we might partly classify under a
different head, viz. that of duties arising out of special needs: for
no doubt children are naturally objects of compassion, on account
of their helplessness, to others besides their parents. But on the
latter they have a claim of a different kind, springing from the
universally recognised duty of not causing pain or any harm to other
human beings, directly or indirectly, except in the way of deserved
punishment: for the parent, being the cause of the child’s existing in
a helpless condition, would be indirectly the cause of the suffering
and death that would result to it if neglected. Still this does not
seem an adequate explanation of parental duty, as recognised by
Common Sense. For we commonly blame a parent who leaves his children
entirely to the care of others, even if he makes ample provision for
their being nourished and trained up to the time at which they can
support themselves by their own labour. We think that he owes them
affection (as far as this can be said to be a duty) and the tender and
watchful care that naturally springs from affection: and, if he can
afford it, somewhat more than the necessary minimum of food, clothing,
and education. Still it does not seem clear how far beyond this he
is bound to go. It is easy to say broadly that he ought to promote
his children’s happiness by all means in his power: and no doubt it
is natural for a good parent to find his own best happiness in his
children’s, and we are disposed to blame any one who markedly prefers
his own interest to theirs: still it seems unreasonable that he should
purchase a small increase of their happiness by a great sacrifice of
his own: and moreover there are other worthy and noble ends which may
(and do) come into competition with this. To take instances of actual
occurrence: one parent is led to give up some important and valuable
work, which perhaps no one else can or will do, in order to leave his
children a little more wealth: another brings them to the verge of
starvation in order to perfect an invention or prosecute scientific
researches. We seem to condemn either extreme: yet what clear and
accepted principle can be stated for determining the true mean?
Again, as we have seen, some think that a parent has no right to
bequeath his inheritance away from his children, unless they have been
undutiful: and in some states this is even forbidden by law. Others,
however, hold that children as such have no claims to their parents’
wealth: but only if there is a tacit understanding that they will
succeed to it, or, at any rate, if they have been reared in such habits
of life and social relations as will render it difficult and painful
for them to live without inherited wealth.
It would be tedious to go in detail through all the degrees of
consanguinity, as it is clear that our conception of the mutual duties
of kinsmen becomes vaguer as the kinship becomes more remote. Among
children of the same parents, brought up together, affection of more
or less strength grows up so naturally and commonly, that we regard
those who feel no affection for their brothers and sisters with a
certain aversion and moral contempt, as somewhat inhuman: and we think
that in any case the services and kind acts which naturally spring
from affection ought to be rendered to some extent; but the extent
seems quite undefined. And even towards remoter kinsmen we think that
a certain flow of kindly feeling will attend the representation of
consanguinity in men of good dispositions. Some indeed still think that
cousins have a moral right to a man’s inheritance in default of nearer
heirs, and to assistance in any need; but it seems equally common to
hold that they can at most claim to be selected _ceteris paribus_ as
the recipients of bounty, and that an unpromising cousin should not be
preferred to a promising stranger.
§ 5. I have placed Neighbourhood along with Kindred among the relations
out of which a certain claim for mutual services is thought to spring.
However, no one perhaps would say that mere local juxtaposition is in
itself a ground of duties: it seems rather that neighbours naturally
feel more sympathy with one another than with strangers, as the tie of
common humanity is strengthened even by such conjunction and mutual
association as mere neighbourhood (without co-operation or friendship)
may involve, and a man in whom this effect is not produced is thought
more or less inhuman. And so in large towns where this mutual sympathy
does not so naturally grow up (for all the townsmen are in a sense
neighbours, and one cannot easily sympathise with each individual
in a multitude), the tie of neighbourhood is felt to be relaxed, and
neighbour only claims from neighbour, as the nearest man, what one
man may claim from another. For there are some services, slight in
ordinary times but greater in the case of exceptional need, which
any man is thought to have a right to ask from any other: so that a
comparatively trifling circumstance may easily give a special direction
to this general claim, and make it seem reasonable that the service
should be asked from one person rather than another. Thus any degree
of kinship seems to have this effect (since the representation of this
tends to produce a feeling of union and consequent sympathy), and so
even the fact of belonging to the same province, as creating a slight
probability of community of origin; and again similarities of various
kinds, as one sympathises more easily with one’s like, and so persons
naturally seek aid in distress from those of the same age, or sex, or
rank, or profession. The duty of neighbourhood seems therefore only a
particular application of the duty of general benevolence or humanity.
And the claim of fellow-countrymen is of the same kind: that is, if
they are taken as individuals; for one’s relation to one’s country as
a whole is thought to be of a different kind, and to involve much more
stringent obligations.
Still the duties of Patriotism are difficult to formulate. For the
mere obedience to the laws of a country which morality requires from
all its inhabitants seems to come under another head: and aliens are
equally bound to this. And in the case of most social functions which
men undertake, patriotism is at least not a prominent nor indispensable
motive: for they undertake them primarily for the sake of payment; and
having undertaken them, are bound by Justice and Good Faith to perform
them adequately. However, if any of the functions of Government are
unpaid, we consider that men exhibit patriotism in performing them:
for though it is plausible to say that they get their payment in
social distinction, still on reflection this view does not appear to
be quite appropriate; since social distinction is intended to express
feelings of honour and respect, and we cannot properly render these as
part of a bargain, but only as a tribute paid to virtue or excellence
of some kind. But how far any individual is bound to undertake such
functions is not quite clear: and the question seems generally decided
by considerations of expediency,--except in so far as duties of this
kind devolve, legally or constitutionally, upon all the citizens in a
free country, as is ordinarily the case to some extent. Among these the
duty of fighting the national enemies is prominent in many countries:
and even where this function has become a salaried and voluntarily
adopted profession, it is often felt to be in a special sense the
‘service of one’s country,’ and we think it at least desirable and
best that it should be performed with feelings of patriotism: as we
find it somewhat degrading and repulsive that a man should slaughter
his fellow-men for hire. And in great crises of national existence
the affection of Patriotism is naturally intensified: and even in
ordinary times we praise a man who renders services to his country
over and above the common duties of citizenship. But whether a
citizen is at any time morally bound to more than certain legally or
constitutionally determined duties, does not seem to be clear: nor,
again, is there general agreement on the question whether by voluntary
expatriation[196] he can rightfully relieve himself of all moral
obligations to the community in which he was born.
Nor, finally, does there seem to be any _consensus_ as to what each man
owes to his fellow-men, as such. The Utilitarian doctrine, as we have
seen, is that each man ought to consider the happiness of any other
as _theoretically_ of equal importance with his own, and only of less
importance _practically_, in so far as he is better able to realise
the latter. And it seems to me difficult to say decidedly that this
is _not_ the principle of general Benevolence, as recognised by the
common sense of mankind. But it must be admitted that there is also
current a lower and narrower estimate of the services that we are held
to be strictly bound to render to our fellow-men generally. This lower
view seems to recognise (1)--as was before noticed--a negative duty to
abstain from causing pain or harm to any of our fellow-men, except in
the way of deserved punishment; to which we may add, as an immediate
corollary, the duty of making reparation for any harm that we may
have done them:[197] and (2) a positive duty to render, when occasion
offers, such services as require either no sacrifice on our part, or
at least one very much less in importance than the service rendered.
Further, a general obligation of being ‘useful to society’ by some kind
of systematic work is vaguely recognised; rich persons who are manifest
drones incur some degree of censure from the majority of thoughtful
persons. Beyond this somewhat indefinite limit of Duty extends the
Virtue of Benevolence without limit: for excess is not thought to be
possible in doing good to others, nor in the disposition to do it,
unless it leads us to neglect definite duties.
Under the notion of Benevolence as just defined, the minor rules of
Gentleness, Politeness, Courtesy, etc. may be brought, in so far as
they prescribe the expression of general goodwill and abstinence from
anything that may cause pain to others in conversation and social
demeanour. There is, however, an important part of Politeness which
it may be well to notice and discuss separately; the duty, namely, of
showing marks of Reverence to those to whom they are properly due.
Reverence we may define as the feeling which accompanies the
recognition of Superiority or Worth in others. It does not seem to be
necessarily in itself benevolent, though often accompanied by some
degree of love. But its ethical characteristics seem analogous to
those of benevolent affection, in so far as, while it is not a feeling
directly under the control of the will, we yet expect it under certain
circumstances and morally dislike its absence, and perhaps commonly
consider the expression of it to be sometimes a duty, even when the
feeling itself is absent.
Still, as to this latter duty of expressing reverence, there seems to
be great divergence of opinion. For the feeling seems to be naturally
excited by all kinds of superiority,--not merely moral and intellectual
excellences, but also superiorities of rank and position: and indeed
in the common behaviour of men it is to the latter that it is more
regularly and formally rendered. And yet, again, it is commonly said
that Reverence is more properly due to the former, as being more real
and intrinsic superiorities: and many think that to show any reverence
to men of rank and position rather than to others is servile and
degrading: and some even dislike the marks of respect which in most
countries are exacted by official superiors from their subordinates,
saying that obedience legally defined is all that is properly owed in
this relation.
A more serious difficulty of a somewhat similar kind arises when
we consider how far it is a duty to cultivate the affection of
Loyalty: meaning by this term--which is used in various senses--the
affection that is normally felt by a well-disposed servant or official
subordinate towards a good master or official superior. On the one hand
it is widely thought that the duties of obedience which belong to these
relations will be better performed if affection enters into the motive,
no less than the duties of the family relations: but in the former
case it seems to be a tenable view that the habits of orderliness and
good faith--ungrudging obedience to law and ungrudging fulfilment of
contract--will ordinarily suffice, without personal affection; and,
on the other hand, a disposition to obey superiors, beyond the limits
of their legal or contractual rights to issue commands, may easily be
mischievous in its effects, if the superiors are ill-disposed. In the
case of a wise and good superior it is, indeed, clearly advantageous
that inferiors should be disposed to obey beyond these limits; but it
is not therefore clear that this disposition is one which it should
be made a duty to cultivate beyond the degree in which it results
spontaneously from a sense of the superior’s goodness and wisdom. Nor
do I think that any decided enunciation of duty on this point can be
extracted from Common Sense.
§ 6. We have next to consider the duties of Affection that arise out of
relationships voluntarily assumed. Of these the most important is the
Conjugal Relation. And here we may begin by asking whether it be the
duty of human beings generally to enter into this relation. It is no
doubt normal to do so, and most persons are prompted to it by strong
desires: but in so far as it can be said to be prescribed by Common
Sense, it does not seem an independent duty, but derivative from and
subordinate to the general maxims of Prudence and Benevolence.[198] And
in all modern civilised societies, law and custom leave the conjugal
union perfectly optional: but the conditions under which it may be
formed, and to a certain extent the mutual rights and duties arising
out of it, are carefully laid down by law; and it is widely thought
that this department of law more than others ought to be governed
by independent moral principles, and to protect, as it were, by an
outer barrier, the kind of relation which morality prescribes. If
we ask what these principles are, Common Sense--in modern European
communities--seems to answer that the marriage union ought to be (1)
exclusively monogamic, (2) at least designed to be permanent, and (3)
not within certain degrees of consanguinity. I do not, however, think
that any of these propositions can on reflection be maintained to be
self-evident. Even against incest we seem to have rather an intense
sentiment than a clear intuition; and it is generally recognised that
the prohibition of all but monogamic unions can only be rationally
maintained on utilitarian grounds.[199] As regards the permanence
of the marriage-contract all would no doubt agree that fidelity is
admirable in all affections, and especially in so close and intimate
a relation as the conjugal: but we cannot tell _a priori_ how far it
is possible to prevent decay of love in all cases: and it is certainly
not self-evident that the conjugal relation ought to be maintained
when love has ceased; nor that if the parties have separated by mutual
consent they ought to be prohibited from forming fresh unions. In so
far as we are convinced of the rightness of this regulation, it is
always, I think, from a consideration of the generally mischievous
consequences that would ensue if it were relaxed.
Further, in considering the evils on the opposite side we are led
to see that there is no little difference of opinion among moral
persons as to the kind of feeling which is morally indispensable to
this relation. For some would say that marriage without intense and
exclusive affection is degrading even though sanctioned by law: while
others would consider this a mere matter of taste, or at least of
prudence, provided there was no mutual deception: and between these two
views we might insert several different shades of opinion.
Nor, again, is there agreement as to the external duties arising out of
the relationship. For all would lay down conjugal fidelity, and mutual
assistance (according to the customary division of labour between men
and women--unless this should be modified by mutual agreement). But
beyond this we find divergence: for some state that “the marriage
contract binds each party, whenever individual gratification is
concerned, to prefer the happiness of the other party to its own[200]”:
while others would say that this degree of unselfishness is certainly
admirable, but as a mere matter of duty it is enough if each considers
the other’s happiness equally with his (or her) own. And as to the
powers and liberties that ought to be allowed to the wife, and the
obedience due from her to the husband--I need scarcely at the present
time (1874) waste space in proving that there is no _consensus_ of
moral opinion.
§ 7. The conjugal relation is, in its origin, of free choice, but
when it has once been formed, the duties of affection that arise out
of it are commonly thought to be analogous to those arising out of
relations of consanguinity. It therefore holds an intermediate position
between these latter, and ordinary friendships, partnerships, and
associations, which men are equally free to make and to dissolve.
Now most associations that men form are for certain definite ends,
determined by express contract or tacit understanding: accordingly the
duty arising out of them is merely that of fidelity to such contract
or understanding, which will be considered later under the heads of
Justice and Good Faith. But this does not seem to be the case with what
in a strict sense of the term are called Friendships[201]: for although
Friendship frequently arises among persons associated for other ends,
yet the relation is always conceived to have its end in itself, and to
be formed primarily for the development of mutual affection between the
friends, and the pleasure which attends this. Still, it is thought that
when such an affection has once been formed it creates mutual duties
which did not previously exist: we have therefore to inquire how far
this is the case, and on what principles these can be determined.
Now here a new kind of difficulty has to be added to those which we
have already found in attempting to formulate Common Sense. For we
find some who say that, as it is essential to Friendship that the
mutual kindly feeling, and the services springing from it, should be
spontaneous and unforced, neither the one nor the other should be
imposed as a duty; and, in short, that this department of life should
be fenced from the intrusion of moral precepts, and left to the free
play of natural instinct. And this doctrine all would perhaps admit to
a certain extent: as, indeed, we have accepted it with regard to all
the deeper flow and finer expression of feeling even in the domestic
relations: for it seemed pedantic and futile to prescribe rules for
this, or even (though we naturally admire and praise any not ungraceful
exhibition of intense and genuine affection) to delineate an ideal of
excellence for all to aim at. Still, there seemed to be an important
sphere of strict duty--however hard to define--in the relations of
children to parents, etc., and even in the case of friendship it
seems contrary to common sense to recognise no such sphere; as it not
unfrequently occurs to us to judge that one friend has behaved wrongly
to another, and to speak as if there were a clearly cognisable code of
behaviour in such relations.
Perhaps, however, we may say that all clear cases of wrong conduct
towards friends come under the general formula of breach of
understanding. Friends not unfrequently make definite promises of
service, but we need not consider these, as their violation is
prohibited by a different and clearer moral rule. But further, as all
love is understood to include[202] a desire for the happiness of its
object, the profession of friendship seems to bind one to seek this
happiness to an extent proportionate to such profession. Now common
benevolence (cf. _ante_, § 5) prescribes at least that we should render
to other men such services as we can render without any sacrifice,
or with a sacrifice so trifling as to be quite out of proportion to
the service rendered. And since the profession of friendship--though
the term is used to include affections of various degree--must imply
a greater interest in one’s friend’s happiness than in that of men
in general, it must announce a willingness to make more or less
considerable sacrifices for him, if occasion offers. If then we decline
to make such sacrifices, we do wrong by failing to fulfil natural and
legitimate expectations. So far there seems no source of difficulty
except the indefiniteness inevitably arising from the wide range of
meanings covered by the term Friendship. But further questions arise in
consequence of the changes of feeling to which human nature is liable:
first, whether it is our duty to resist such changes as much as we can;
and secondly, whether if this effort fails, and love diminishes or
departs, we ought still to maintain a disposition to render services
corresponding to our past affection. And on these points there does
not seem to be agreement among moral and refined persons. For, on the
one hand, it is natural to us to admire fidelity in friendship and
stability of affections, and we commonly regard these as most important
excellences of character: and so it seems strange if we are not to aim
at these as at all other excellences, as none more naturally stir us to
imitation. And hence many would be prepared to lay down that we ought
not to withdraw affection once given, unless the friend behaves ill:
while some would say that even in this case we ought not to break the
friendship unless the crime is very great. Yet, on the other hand, we
feel that such affection as is produced by deliberate effort of will is
but a poor substitute for that which springs spontaneously, and most
refined persons would reject such a boon: while, again, to conceal the
change of feeling seems insincere and hypocritical.
But as for services, a refined person would not accept such from a
former friend who no longer loves him: unless in extreme need, when
any kind of tie is, as it were, invigorated by the already strong
claim which common humanity gives each man upon all others. Perhaps,
therefore, there cannot be a duty to offer such services in any case,
when the need is not extreme. Though this inference is not quite clear:
for in relations of affection we often praise one party for offering
what we rather blame the other for accepting. But it seems that
delicate questions of this kind are more naturally referred to canons
of good taste and refined feeling than of morality proper: or at least
only included in the scope of morality in so far as we have a general
duty to cultivate good taste and refinement of feeling, like other
excellences.
On the whole, then, we may say that the chief difficulties in
determining the moral obligations of friendship arise (1) from the
indefiniteness of the tacit understanding implied in the relation,
and (2) from the disagreement which we find as to the extent to which
Fidelity is a positive duty. It may be observed that the latter
difficulty is especially prominent in respect of those intimacies
between persons of different sex which precede and prepare the way for
marriage.
§ 8. I pass now to the third head, Gratitude. It has been already
observed that the obligation of children to parents is sometimes based
upon this: and in other affectionate relationships it commonly blends
with and much strengthens the claims that are thought to arise out
of the relations themselves; though none of the duties that we have
discussed seem referable entirely to gratitude. But where gratitude
is due, the obligation is especially clear and simple. Indeed the
duty of requiting benefits seems to be recognised wherever morality
extends; and Intuitionists have justly pointed to this recognition as
an instance of a truly universal intuition. Still, though the general
force of the obligation is not open to doubt (except of the sweeping
and abstract kind with which we have not here to deal), its nature and
extent are by no means equally clear.
In the first place, it may be asked whether we are only bound to repay
services, or whether we owe the special affection called Gratitude;
which seems generally to combine kindly feeling and eagerness to
requite with some sort of emotional recognition of superiority, as the
giver of benefits is in a position of superiority to the receiver. On
the one hand we seem to think that, in so far as any affection can
possibly be a duty, kindly feeling towards benefactors must be such:
and yet to persons of a certain temperament this feeling is often
peculiarly hard to attain, owing to their dislike of the position of
inferiority; and this again we consider a right feeling to a certain
extent, and call it ‘independence’ or ‘proper pride’; but this feeling
and the effusion of gratitude do not easily mix, and the moralist finds
it difficult to recommend a proper combination of the two. Perhaps
it makes a great difference whether the service be lovingly done: as
in this case it seems inhuman that there should be no response of
affection: whereas if the benefit be coldly given, the mere recognition
of the obligation and settled disposition to repay it seem to suffice.
And ‘independence’ alone would prompt a man to repay the benefit in
order to escape from the burden of obligation. But it seems doubtful
whether in any case we are morally satisfied with this as the sole
motive.
It is partly this impatience of obligation which makes a man desirous
of giving as requital more than he has received; for otherwise his
benefactor has still the superiority of having taken the initiative.
But also the worthier motive of affection urges us in the same
direction: and here, as in other affectionate services, we do not
like too exact a measure of duty; a certain excess falling short of
extravagance seems to be what we admire and praise. In so far, however,
as conflict of claims makes it needful to be exact, we think perhaps
that an equal return is what the duty of gratitude requires, or rather
willingness to make such a return, if it be required, and if it is in
our power to make it without neglecting prior claims. For we do not
think it obligatory to requite services in all cases, even if it be
in our power to do so, if the benefactor appear to be sufficiently
supplied with the means of happiness: but if he either demand it or
obviously stand in need of it, we think it ungrateful not to make an
equal return. But when we try to define this notion of ‘equal return,’
obscurity and divergence begin. For (apart from the difficulty of
comparing different kinds of services where we cannot make repayment
in kind) Equality has two distinct meanings, according as we consider
the effort made by the benefactor, or the service rendered to the
benefited. Now perhaps if either of these be great, the gratitude
is naturally strong: for the apprehension of great earnestness in
another to serve us tends to draw from us a proportionate response
of affection: and any great pleasure or relief from pain naturally
produces a corresponding emotion of thankfulness to the man who has
voluntarily caused this, even though his effort may have been slight.
And hence it has been suggested, that in proportioning the dues of
gratitude we ought to take whichever of the two considerations will
give the highest estimate. But this does not seem in accordance with
Common Sense: for the benefit may be altogether unacceptable, and it
is hard to bind us to repay in full every well-meant blundering effort
to serve us; though we feel vaguely that some return should be made
even for this. And though it is more plausible to say that we ought
to requite an accepted service without weighing the amount of our
benefactor’s sacrifice, still when we take extreme cases the rule seems
not to be valid: _e.g._ if a poor man sees a rich one drowning and
pulls him out of the water, we do not think that the latter is bound to
give as a reward what he would have been willing to give for his life.
Still, we should think him niggardly if he only gave his preserver
half-a-crown: which might, however, be profuse repayment for the cost
of the exertion. Something between the two seems to suit our moral
taste: but I find no clear accepted principle upon which the amount can
be decided.
The last claim to be considered is that of Special Need. This has
been substantially stated already, in investigating the obligation of
General Benevolence or Common Humanity. For it was said that we owe to
all men such services as we can render by a sacrifice or effort small
in comparison with the service: and hence, in proportion as the needs
of other men present themselves as urgent, we recognise the duty of
relieving them out of our superfluity. But I have thought it right
to notice the duty separately, because we are commonly prompted to
fulfil it by the specific emotion of Pity or Compassion. Here, again,
there seems a doubt how far it is good to foster and encourage this
emotion--as distinct from the practical habit of rendering prompt aid
and succour in distress, whenever such succour is judged to be right.
On the one hand, the emotional impulse tends to make the action of
relieving need not only easier to the agent, but more graceful and
pleasing: on the other hand, it is generally recognised that mistaken
pity is more likely to lead us astray than--_e.g._--mistaken gratitude:
as it is more liable to interfere dangerously with the infliction of
penalties required for the maintenance of social order, or with the
operation of motives to industry and thrift, necessary for economic
well-being.
And when--to guard against the last-mentioned danger--we try to define
the external duty of relieving want, we find ourselves face to face
with what is no mere problem of the closet, but a serious practical
perplexity to most moral persons at the present day. For many ask
whether it is not our duty to refrain from all superfluous indulgences,
until we have removed the misery and want that exist around us, as far
as they are removable by money. And in answering this question Common
Sense seems to be inevitably led to a consideration of the economic
consequences of attempting--either by taxation and public expenditure,
or by the voluntary gifts of private persons--to provide a sufficient
income for all needy members of the community; and is thus gradually
brought to substitute for the Intuitional method of dealing with
problems of this kind a different procedure, having at least much
affinity with the Utilitarian method.[203]
In conclusion, then, we must admit that while we find a number of
broad and more or less indefinite rules unhesitatingly laid down by
Common Sense in this department of duty, it is difficult or impossible
to extract from them, so far as they are commonly accepted, any clear
and precise principles for determining the extent of the duty in any
case. And yet, as we saw, such particular principles of distribution of
the services to which good-will prompts seem to be required for the
perfection of practice no less than for theoretical completeness; in
so far as the duties which we have been considering are liable to come
into apparent conflict with each other and with other prescriptions of
the moral code.
In reply it may perhaps be contended that if we are seeking exactness
in the determination of duty, we have begun by examining the wrong
notion: that, in short, we ought to have examined Justice rather
than Benevolence. It may be admitted that we cannot find as much
exactness as we sometimes practically need, by merely considering the
common conceptions of the duties to which men are prompted by natural
affections; but it may still be maintained that we shall at any rate
find such exactness adequately provided for under the head of Justice.
This contention I will proceed to examine in the next chapter.
NOTE.--It should be borne in mind throughout the discussion carried
on in this and the next six chapters that what we are primarily
endeavouring to ascertain is not true morality but the morality of
Common Sense: so that if any moral proposition is admitted to be
paradoxical, the admission excludes it,--not as being necessarily
false, but as being not what Common Sense holds.
FOOTNOTES:
[187] The qualifications which this proposition requires have been
already noticed, and will be further illustrated as we proceed.
[188] The phase of this view most current at present would seem to be
Utilitarianism, the principles and method of which will be more fully
discussed hereafter: but in some form or degree it has been held by
many whose affinities are rather with the Intuitional school.
[189] See note at end of chapter.
[190] Cf. Book i. chaps. vii. ix.
[191] A further reason for so doing will appear in the sequel; when
we come to survey the general relation of Virtue to Happiness, as the
result of that detailed examination of the particular virtues which
forms the main subject of the present book. Cf. _post_, chap. xiv. of
this Book.
[192] This reluctance, however, seems largely due to the fact that this
precise measure of duty is most frequently demanded when the issue lies
between Duty and Self-interest.
[193] It must be admitted that the more the benevolent impulse is
combined with the habit of considering the complex consequences of
different courses of action that may be presented as alternatives, and
comparing the amounts of happiness to others respectively resulting
from them, the more good, _ceteris paribus_, is likely to be caused
by it on the whole. And so far as there seems to be a certain natural
incompatibility between this habit of calculation and comparison and
the spontaneous fervour of kindly impulse, Common Sense is somewhat
puzzled which to prefer; and takes refuge in an ideal that transcends
this incompatibility and includes the two.
[194] This question will be further discussed in the concluding chapter
of this Book (chap. xiv.).
[195] It may be said that a child owes gratitude to the authors of its
existence. But life alone, apart from any provision for making life
happy, seems a boon of doubtful value, and one that scarcely excites
gratitude when it was not conferred from any regard for the recipient.
[196] In 1868 it was affirmed, in an Act passed by the Congress of
the United States, that “the right of expatriation is a natural and
inherent right of all people.” I do not know how far this would be
taken to imply that a man has a moral right to leave his country
whenever he finds it convenient--provided no claims except those of
Patriotism retain him there. But if it was intended to imply this, I
think the statement would not be accepted in Europe without important
limitations: though I cannot state any generally accepted principle
from which such limitations could be clearly deduced.
[197] How far we are bound to make reparation when the harm is
involuntary, and such as could not have been prevented by ordinary
care on our part, is not clear: but it will be convenient to defer the
consideration of this till the next chapter (§ 5): as the whole of this
department of duty is more commonly placed under the head of Justice.
[198] I raise this question, because if the rule of ‘living according
to Nature’ were really adopted as a first principle, in any ordinary
meaning of the term ‘nature,’ it would certainly seem to be the duty of
all normal human beings to enter into conjugal relations: but just this
instance seems to show that the principle is not accepted by Common
Sense. See Book i. chap. vi. § 2.
[199] The moral necessity of prohibiting polygamy is sometimes put
forward as an immediate inference from the equality of the numbers of
the two sexes. This argument, however, seems to require the assumption
that all men and women ought to marry: but this scarcely any one will
expressly affirm: and actually considerable numbers remain unmarried,
and there is no reason to believe that in countries where polygamy is
allowed, paucity of supply has ever made it practically difficult for
any man to find a mate.
[200] Cf. Wayland, _Elements of Moral Science_, Book ii. part ii. class
2, § 2.
[201] I use the term here to imply a mutual affection more intense
than the kindly feeling which a moral man desires to find towards
all persons with whom he is brought into continual social relations,
through business or otherwise.
[202] It was before observed that this is only one--and not always the
most prominent--element of the whole emotional state which we call love.
[203] See Book iv. chap. iii. § 3.