policy that we have pursued, both in the Congress of Berlin and at
Constantinople. They are intimately connected with each other, and
they must be considered together. I only hope that the House will not
misunderstand--and I think the country will not misunderstand--our
motives in occupying Cyprus, and in encouraging those intimate
relations between ourselves and the Government and the population of
Turkey. They are not movements of war; they are operations of peace
and civilization. We have no reason to fear war. Her Majesty has
fleets and armies which are second to none. England must have seen
with pride the Mediterranean covered with her ships; she must have
seen with pride the discipline and devotion which have been shown to
her and her Government by all her troops, drawn from every part of her
Empire. I leave it to the illustrious duke, in whose presence I speak,
to bear witness to the spirit of Imperial patriotism which has been
exhibited by the troops from India, which he recently reviewed at
Malta. But it is not on our fleets and armies, however necessary they
may be for the maintenance of our Imperial strength, that I alone or
mainly depend in that enterprise on which this country is about to
enter. It is on what I most highly value--the consciousness that in
the Eastern nations there is confidence in this country, and that,
while they know we can enforce our policy, at the same time they know
that our Empire is an Empire of liberty, of truth, and of justice.
SIR EDWARD GREY
AUGUST 3, 1914
NEGOTIATIONS
Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this
country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so
rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical
accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace
of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have
declared war upon each other.
Before I proceed to state the position of His Majesty's Government, I
would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the
House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the
House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or
the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter.
First of all let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently
worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to
preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have
always done it. During these last years, as far as His Majesty's
Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that
we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission,
we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe
was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true
that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points
of view. It took much, time and labour and discussion before they
could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace
was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble
rather than accentuate differences rapidly.
In the present crisis, it has not been possible to secure the peace
of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been
a disposition--at any rate in some quarters on which I will not
dwell--to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate, to the great
risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the
policy of peace, as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned,
is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it,
and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which Powers were most
in favour of peace, which were most disposed to risk or endanger
peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which
we are now, from the point of view of British interests, British
honour, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace
has not been preserved.
We shall publish Papers as soon as we can regarding what took place
last week when we were working for peace; and when those Papers are
published, I have no doubt that to every human being they will make
it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts
for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own
judgement as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.
I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have
assured the House--and the Prime Minister has assured the House more
than once--that, if any crisis such as this arose, we should come
before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it
was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would
have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and
tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement,
there was an obligation of honour upon the country. I will deal with
that point to clear the ground first.
There has been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance
and what came to be called the 'Triple Entente', for some years past.
The Triple Entente was not an Alliance--it was a diplomatic group. The
House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis, also a Balkan
crisis, originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to
London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I
told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair,
I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify
us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More
was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never
promised.
In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no
promise of anything more than diplomatic support--up till yesterday no
promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question
of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan
crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it
came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government
when a General Election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered
over the country, and I--spending three days a week in my constituency
and three days at the Foreign Office--was asked the question whether
if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany we would
give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any
foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted
support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in
my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of
Morocco--a question which had just been the subject of agreement
between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on
both sides--that if out of that agreement war was forced on France
at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have
rallied to the material support of France.
I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as
far as I remember, almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador
and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used
no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted
by the French Government, but they said to me at the time--and I think
very reasonably--'If you think it possible that the public opinion
of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you
in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in
advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish
to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have
already taken place between naval and military experts.' There was
force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations
to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which
passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government
or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether
or not they would give that support when the time arose.
As I have told the House, upon that occasion a General Election was in
prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without
the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given.
I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I
consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State
for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of
the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that,
on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government
free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between
military and naval experts took place was later on--I think much
later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of
importance--but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the
Cabinet.
The Agadir crisis came--another Morocco crisis--and throughout that
I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But
subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the
Cabinet it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding
in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter,
that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the
freedom of either Government; and on the 22nd of November, 1912, I
wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the
House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The
letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known
to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between
military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the
Government:
My dear Ambassador,--From time to time in recent years
the French and British naval and military experts have consulted
together. It has always been understood that such
consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government
to decide at any future time whether or not to assist
the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation
between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as
an engagement that commits either Government to action in
a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise.
The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
engagement to co-operate in war.
You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government
had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by
a third Power, it might become essential to know whether
it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of
the other.
I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to
expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something
that threatened the general peace, it should immediately
discuss with the other whether both Governments
should act together to prevent aggression and to
preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be
prepared to take in common.
Lord Charles Beresford: What is the date of that?
Sir E. Grey: The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting-point for
the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it
clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons
was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide
in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or
whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free,
and, _a fortiori_, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I
say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think
it was due, to prove our good faith to the House of Commons, that I
should give, that full information to the House now, and say what I
think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not
construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic
relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom
of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or
restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their
attitude should be.
Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in
the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco
question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which
concerned France--a dispute which concerned France and France
primarily--a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France, out of an
agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole
world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt
we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at
any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France
diplomatically in that question.
The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated
with regard to Morocco.
It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special
agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which
primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute
between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute
confidence--no Government and no country has less desire to be
involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the
Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because
of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia.
Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of
honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to
the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that
Alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared
the ground with regard to the question of obligation.
I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many
years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember
well the feeling in the House--and my own feeling--for I spoke on the
subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with
France--the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that
these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had
cleared these differences away. I remember saying, I think, that it
seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce
the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that
friendship entails obligation--it has been a friendship between
the nations and ratified by the nations--how far that entails an
obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own
feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I
construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any
one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel
about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may
judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House
my own feeling in the matter.
The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and
western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet
being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very
different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has
grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security
that there was nothing to be feared from us.
The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in
the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there
because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed
between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet,
engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not
been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and
battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside and
see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms
folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing! I believe that
would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels
that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling
which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.
But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the
point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going
to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If
we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in
the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us
as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts
absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the
Channel, to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death
between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is
withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European
conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may
arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an
attitude of neutrality, saying, 'No, we cannot undertake and engage to
help either party in this conflict.' Let us suppose the French fleet
is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the
consequences--which are already tremendous in what has happened in
Europe even to countries which are at peace, in fact, equally whether
countries are at peace or at war--let us assume that out of that come
consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment
that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war: and
let us assume--which is quite possible--that Italy, who is now neutral
because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive
war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation
did not arise--let us assume that consequences which are not yet
foreseen--and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own
interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time
when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to
fight, what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might
be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced
upon us because our trade-routes in the Mediterranean might be vital
to this country.
Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any
particular trade-route the keeping open of which may not be vital to
this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a
fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a
combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very
moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and
we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the
present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point
of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was
entitled to know, and to know at once, whether or not in the event
of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she
could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these
compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French
Ambassador the following statement:
I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German
fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to
undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or
shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its
power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy
of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of
Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's
Government to take any action until the above contingency
of action by the German fleet takes place.
I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not
as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding
us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things
move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I
cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the
German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to
neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern
coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the
House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir,
there is the more serious consideration--becoming more serious every
hour--there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.
I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our
position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty
of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history--a history accumulated
since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the
question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were
said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to
Belgium that, confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a
declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty
in existence--that the German Confederation and its allies would
respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that
that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent Powers.
That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of
the sacredness of these treaty rights.
What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of
the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords, and
Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on the 8th of
August, 1870, used these words. He said:
We might have explained to the country and to foreign
nations that we did not think this country was bound
either morally or internationally, or that its interests were
concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium.
Though this course might have had some conveniences,
though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it
might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is
a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible
to adopt in the name of the country with any due
regard to the country's honour or to the country's interests.
Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:
There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is
not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the
complicated question of the nature of the obligations of
that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine
of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts
to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of
a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively
altogether of the particular position in which it may find
itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee
arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to
whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord
Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge
took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable
view of the guarantee. The circumstance that
there is already an existing guarantee in force is of necessity
an important fact, and a weighty element in the case to
which we are bound to give full and ample consideration.
There is also this further consideration, the force of which
we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common
interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any
Power whatever.
The treaty is an old treaty--1839--and that was the view taken of it
in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on
consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the
interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honour
and interests are, at least, as strong to-day as in 1870, and
we cannot take a more narrow view or a lass serious view of our
obligations, and of the importance of those obligations than was taken
by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.
I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject.
When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a
most important element in our policy--a most important subject for the
House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to
both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know
whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared
to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These
are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:
The French Government are resolved to respect the
neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event
of some other Power violating that neutrality that France
might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure
the defence of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance
has been given several times. The President of the
Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the
French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the
assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day.
From the German Government the reply was:
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not
possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and
the Imperial Chancellor.