your Lordships, and that is the question of Greece. A severe charge
has been made against the Congress, and particularly against the
English Plenipotentiaries, for not having sufficiently attended to the
interests and claims of Greece. My Lords, I think you will find,
on reflection, that that charge is utterly unfounded. The English
Government were the first that expressed the desire that Greece should
be heard at the Congress. But, while they expressed that desire, they
communicated confidentially to Greece that it must on no account
associate that desire on the part of the Government with any
engagement for the redistribution of territory. That was repeated,
and not merely once repeated. The Greek inhabitants, apart from the
kingdom of Greece, are a considerable element in the Turkish Empire,
and it is of the greatest importance that their interests should be
sedulously attended to. One of the many evils of that large Slav
State--the Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty--was, that it would have
absorbed, and made utterly to disappear from the earth, a considerable
Greek population. At the Congress the Greeks were heard, and they were
heard by representatives of considerable eloquence and ability; but it
was quite clear, the moment they put their case before the Congress,
that they had totally misapprehended the reason why the Congress had
met together, and what were its objects and character. The Greek
representatives, evidently, had not in any way relinquished what they
call their great idea--and your Lordships well know that it is one
that has no limit which does not reach as far as Constantinople. But
they did mention at the Congress, as a practical people, and feeling
that they had no chance of obtaining at that moment all they
desired--that they were willing to accept as an instalment the two
large provinces of Epirus and Thessaly, and the island of Crete. It
was quite evident to the Congress, that the representatives of Greece
utterly misunderstood the objects of our labours--that we were not
there to partition Turkey, and give them their share of Turkey, but
for a very contrary purpose--as far as we could to re-establish
the dominion of the Sultan on a rational basis, to condense and
concentrate his authority, and to take the opportunity--of which we
have largely availed ourselves--of improving the condition of his
subjects. I trust, therefore, when I have pointed out to your
Lordships this cardinal error in the views of Greece, that your
Lordships will feel that the charge made against the Congress has
no substantial foundation. But the interests of Greece were not
neglected, and least of all by Her Majesty's Government. Before the
Congress of Berlin, believing that there was an opportunity of which
considerable advantage might be made for Greece without deviating into
partition, we applied to the Porte to consider the long-vexed question
of the boundaries of the two States. The boundaries of Greece have
always been inadequate and inconvenient; they are so formed as to
offer a premium to brigandage--which is the curse of both countries,
and has led to misunderstanding and violent intercourse between
the inhabitants of both. Now, when some redistribution--and a
considerable redistribution--of territories was about to take
place--now, we thought, was the opportunity for Greece to urge her
claim; and that claim we were ready to support, and to reconcile the
Porte to viewing it in a large and liberal manner. And I am bound to
say that the manner in which our overtures were received by the Porte
was encouraging, and more than encouraging. For a long period Her
Majesty's Government have urged upon both countries, and especially
upon Greece, the advantage of a good understanding between them. We
urged that it was only by union between Turks and Greeks that any
reaction could be obtained against that overpowering Slav interest
which was then exercising such power in the Peninsula, and which had
led to this fatal and disastrous war. More than this, on more than
one occasion--I may say, on many occasions--we have been the means of
preventing serious misunderstandings between Turkey and Greece, and on
every occasion we have received from both States an acknowledgement of
our good offices. We were, therefore, in a position to assist Greece
in this matter. But, of course, to give satisfaction to a State which
coveted Constantinople for its capital, and which talked of accepting
large provinces and a powerful island as only an instalment of its
claims for the moment, was difficult. It was difficult to get the
views of that Government accepted by Turkey, however inclined it might
be to consider a reconstruction of frontiers on a large and liberal
scale. My noble friend the Secretary of State did use all his
influence, and the result was that, in my opinion, Greece has obtained
a considerable accession of resources and strength. But we did not
find, on the part of the representatives of Greece, that response
or that sympathy which we should have desired. Their minds were
in another quarter. But though the Congress could not meet such
extravagant and inconsistent views as those urged by Greece--views
which were not in any way within the scope of the Congress or the
area of its duty--we have still, as will be found in the Treaty,
or certainly in the Protocol, indicated what we believe to be a
rectification of frontier, which would add considerably to the
strength and resources of Greece. Therefore, I think, under all the
circumstances, it will be acknowledged that Greece has not been
neglected. Greece is a country so interesting that it enlists the
sympathies of all educated men. Greece has a future, and I would say,
if I might be permitted, to Greece, what I would say to an individual
who has a future--'Learn to be patient.'
Now, my Lords, I have touched upon most of the points connected with
Turkey in Europe. My summary is that at this moment--of course, no
longer counting Servia or Roumania, once tributary principalities, as
part of Turkey; not counting even the new Bulgaria, though it is a
tributary principality, as part of Turkey; and that I may not be
taunted with taking an element which I am hardly entitled to place in
the calculation, omitting even Bosnia--European Turkey still remains
a Dominion of 60,000 geographical square miles, with a population of
6,000,000, and that population in a very great degree concentrated and
condensed in the provinces contiguous to the capital. My Lords, it
was said, when the line of the Balkans was carried--and it was not
carried until after long and agitating discussions--it was said by
that illustrious statesman who presided over our labours, that 'Turkey
in Europe once more exists'. My Lords, I do not think that, so far as
European Turkey is concerned, this country has any right to complain
of the decisions of the Congress, or, I would hope, of the labours of
the Plenipotentiaries. You cannot look at the map of Turkey as it had
been left by the Treaty of San Stefano, and as it has been rearranged
by the Treaty of Berlin, without seeing that great results have
accrued. If these results had been the consequences of a long war--if
they had been the results of a struggle like that we underwent in the
Crimea--I do not think they would have been even then unsubstantial
or unsatisfactory. My Lords, I hope that you and the country will not
forget that these results have been obtained without shedding the
blood of a single Englishman; and if there has been some expenditure,
it has been an expenditure which, at least, has shown the resources
and determination of this country. Had you entered into that war--for
which you were prepared--and well prepared--probably in a month you
would have exceeded the whole expenditure you have now incurred.
My Lords, I now ask you for a short time to quit Europe and to visit
Asia, and consider the labours of the Congress in another quarter of
the world. My Lords, you well know that the Russian arms met with
great success in Asia, and that in the Treaty of San Stefano
considerable territories were yielded by Turkey to Russia. In point of
population, they may not appear to be of that importance that they are
generally considered; because it is a fact which should be borne
in mind that the population which was yielded to Russia by Turkey
amounted only to about 250,000 souls; and, therefore, if you look to
the question of population, and to the increase of strength to a
State which depends on population, you would hardly believe that the
acquisition of 250,000 new subjects is a sufficient return for the
terrible military losses which inevitably must accrue from campaigns
in that country. But although the amount of population was not
considerable, the strength which the Russians acquired was of very
different character. They obtained Kars by conquest--they obtained
Ardahan--another stronghold--they obtained Bayazid--and the Valley
of Alashkerd with the adjoining territory, which contain the great
commercial routes in that part of the world. They also obtained the
port of Batoum. Now, my Lords, the Congress of Berlin have so far
sanctioned the Treaty of San Stefano that, with the exception of
Bayazid and the valley which I have mentioned--no doubt very
important exceptions, and which were yielded by Russia to the views
of the Congress--they have consented to the yielding of the places I
have named to Russia. The Congress have so far approved the Treaty of
San Stefano that they have sanctioned the retention by Russia of Kars
and Batoum. Now the question arises--the Congress having come to that
determination--was it a wise step on the part of the Plenipotentiaries
of Her Majesty to agree to that decision? That is a question which may
legitimately be asked. We might have broken up the Congress, and said,
'We will not consent to the retention of these places by Russia, and
we will use our force to oblige her to yield them up.' Now, my Lords,
I wish fairly to consider what was our position in this state of
affairs. It is often argued as if Russia and England had been at war,
and peace was negotiating between the two Powers. That was not the
case. The rest of Europe were critics over a Treaty which was a real
treaty that existed between Russia and Turkey. Turkey had given up
Batoum, she had given up Kars and Ardahan, she had given up Bayazid.
In an examination of the question, then, we must remember that Russia
at this moment, so far as Europe is concerned, has acquired in Europe
nothing but a very small portion of territory, occupied by 130,000
inhabitants. Well, she naturally expected to find some reward in her
conquests in Armenia for the sacrifices which she had made. Well, my
Lords, consider what those conquests are. There was the strong fort of
Kars. We might have gone to war with Russia in order to prevent her
acquiring Kars and Batoum, and other places of less importance. The
war would not have been, probably, a very short war. It would have
been a very expensive war--and, like most wars, it would probably have
ended in some compromise, and we should have got only half what we had
struggled for. Let us look these two considerable points fairly in the
face. Let us first of all take the great stronghold of Kars. Three
times has Russia captured Kars. Three times, either by our influence
or by other influences, it has been restored to Turkey. Were we to go
to war for Kars and restore it to Turkey, and then to wait till the
next misunderstanding between Russia and Turkey, when Kars should have
been taken again? Was that an occasion of a _casus belli_? I do not
think your Lordships would ever sanction a war carried on for such an
object and under such circumstances.
Then, my Lords, look at the case of Batoum, of which your Lordships
have heard so much. I should have been very glad if Batoum had
remained in the possession of the Turks, on the general principle that
the less we had reduced its territory in that particular portion of
the globe, the better it would be as regards the prestige on which the
influence of the Ottoman Porte much depends there. But let us see what
is this Batoum of which you have heard so much? It is generally
spoken of in society and in the world as if it were a sort of
Portsmouth--whereas, in reality, it should rather be compared with
Cowes. It will hold three considerable ships, and if it were packed
like the London Docks, it might hold six; but in that case the danger,
if the wind blew from the north, would be immense. You cannot increase
the port seaward; for though the water touching the shore is not
absolutely fathomless, it is extremely deep, and you cannot make any
artificial harbour or breakwater. Unquestionably, in the interior the
port might be increased, but it can only be increased by first-rate
engineers, and by the expenditure of millions of capital; and if we
were to calculate the completion of the port by the precedents which
exist in many countries, and certainly in the Black Sea, it would not
be completed under half a century. Now is that a question for which
England would be justified in going to war with Russia? My Lords,
we have, therefore, thought it advisable not to grudge Russia those
conquests that have been made--especially after obtaining the
restoration of the town of Bayazid and its important district.
But it seemed to us the time had come when we ought to consider
whether certain efforts should not be made to put an end to these
perpetually recurring wars between the Porte and Russia, ending, it
may be, sometimes apparently in comparatively insignificant results;
but always terminating with one fatal consequence--namely, shaking to
the centre the influence and the prestige of the Porte in Asia and
diminishing its means of profitably and advantageously governing that
country. My Lords, it seemed to us that as we had now taken, and
as Europe generally had taken, so avowedly deep an interest in the
welfare of the subjects of the Porte in Europe, the time had come when
we ought to consider whether we could not do something which would
improve the general condition of the dominions of the Sultan in Asia;
and, instead of these most favoured portions of the globe every year
being in a more forlorn and disadvantageous position, whether it
would not be possible to take some steps which would secure at least
tranquillity and order; and, when tranquillity and order were secured,
whether some opportunity might not be given to Europe to develop the
resources of a country which Nature has made so rich and teeming. My
Lords, we occupy with respect to this part of the world a peculiar
position, which is shared by no other Power. Our Indian Empire is on
every occasion on which these discussions occur, or these troubles
occur, or these settlements occur--our Indian Empire is to England a
source of grave anxiety, and the time appeared to have arrived when,
if possible, we should terminate that anxiety. In all the questions
connected with European Turkey we had the assistance and sympathy
sometimes of all, and often of many, of the European Powers--because
they were interested in the question who should possess
Constantinople, and who should have the command of the Danube and
the freedom of the Mediterranean. But when we came to considerations
connected with our Oriental Empire itself, they naturally are not so
generally interested as they are in those which relate to the European
portion of the Dominions of the Porte, and we have to look to our own
resources alone. There has been no want, on our part, of invitations
to neutral Powers to join with us in preventing or in arresting war.
Besides the great Treaty of Paris, there was the Tripartite Treaty,
which, if acted upon, would have prevented war. But that treaty could
not be acted upon, from the unwillingness of the parties to it to
act; and therefore we must clearly perceive that if anything could be
effectually arranged, as far as our Oriental Empire is concerned, the
arrangements must be made by ourselves. Now, this was the origin of
that Convention at Constantinople which is on your Lordship's table,
and in that Convention our object was not merely a military or chiefly
a military object. Our object was to place this country certainly in a
position in which its advice and in which its conduct might at least
have the advantage of being connected with a military power and
with that force which it is necessary to possess often in great
transactions, though you may not fortunately feel that it is necessary
to have recourse to that force. Our object in entering into that
arrangement with Turkey was, as I said before, to produce tranquillity
and order. When tranquillity and order were produced, we believed that
the time would come when the energy and enterprise of Europe might be
invited to what really is another Continent, as far as the experience
of man is concerned, and that its development will add greatly not
merely to the wealth and the prosperity of the inhabitants, but to the
wealth and prosperity of Europe. My Lords, I am surprised to hear--for
though I have not heard it myself from any authority, it is so
generally in men's mouths that I am bound to notice it--that the step
we have taken should be represented as one that is calculated to
excite the suspicion or enmity of any of our Allies, or of any State.
My Lords, I am convinced that when a little time has elapsed, and
when people are better acquainted with this subject than they are at
present, no one will accuse England of having acted in this matter but
with frankness and consideration for other Powers. And if there be
a Power in existence to which we have endeavoured to show most
consideration from particular circumstances in this matter it is
France. There is no step of this kind that I would take without
considering the effect it might have upon the feelings of France--a
nation to whom we are bound by almost every tie that can unite a
people, and with whom our intimacy is daily increasing. If there could
be any step which of all others was least calculated to excite the
suspicion of France it would appear to be this--because we avoided
Egypt, knowing how susceptible France is with regard to Egypt; we
avoided Syria, knowing how susceptible France is on the subject of
Syria; and we avoided availing ourselves of any part of the _terra
firma_, because we would not hurt the feelings or excite the
suspicions of France. France knows that for the last two or three
years we have listened to no appeal which involved anything like an
acquisition of territory, because the territory which might have come
to us would have been territory which France would see in our hands
with suspicion and dislike. But I must make this observation to
your Lordships. We have a substantial interest in the East; it is a
commanding interest, and its behest must be obeyed. But the
interest of France in Egypt, and her interest in Syria are, as she
acknowledges, sentimental and traditionary interests; and, although I
respect them, I wish to see in the Lebanon and in Egypt the influence
of France fairly and justly maintained, and although her officers and
ours in that part of the world--and especially in Egypt--are acting
together with confidence and trust, we must remember that our
connexion with the East is not merely an affair of sentiment and
tradition, but that we have urgent and substantial and enormous
interests which we must guard and keep. Therefore, when we find that
the progress of Russia is a progress which, whatever may be the
intentions of Russia, necessarily in that part of the world produces
such a state of disorganization and want of confidence in the Porte,
it comes to this--that if we do not interfere in the vindication
of our own interests, that part of Asia must become the victim of
anarchy, and ultimately become part of the possessions of Russia.
Now, my Lords, I have ventured to review the chief points connected
with the subject on which I wished to address you--namely, what was
the policy pursued by us, both at the Congress of Berlin and in the
Convention of Constantinople. I am told, indeed, that we have incurred
an awful responsibility by the Convention into which we have entered.
My Lords, a prudent Minister certainly would not recklessly enter
into any responsibility; but a Minister who is afraid to enter into
responsibility is, to my mind, not a prudent Minister. We do not, my
Lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary responsibility; but there is
one responsibility from which we certainly shrink; we shrink from the
responsibility of handing to our successors a diminished or a weakened
Empire. Our opinion is that the course we have taken will arrest the
great evils which are destroying Asia Minor and the equally rich
countries beyond. We see in the present state of affairs the Porte
losing its influence over its subjects; we see a certainty, in our
opinion, of increasing anarchy, of the dissolution of all those ties
which, though feeble, yet still exist and which have kept society
together in those countries. We see the inevitable result of such a
state of things, and we cannot blame Russia for availing herself
of it. But, yielding to Russia what she has obtained, we say to
her--'Thus far, and no farther.' Asia is large enough for both of us.
There is no reason for these constant wars, or fears of wars, between
Russia and England. Before the circumstances which led to the recent
disastrous war, when none of those events which we have seen agitating
the world had occurred, and when we were speaking in 'another place'
of the conduct of Russia in Central Asia, I vindicated that conduct,
which I thought was unjustly attacked, and I said then, what I repeat
now--there is room enough for Russia and England in Asia. But the
room that we require we must secure. We have, therefore, entered into
an alliance--defensive alliance--with Turkey, to guard her against
any further attack from Russia. We believe that the result of this
Convention will be order and tranquillity. And then it will be
for Europe--for we ask no exclusive privileges or commercial
advantages--it will then be for Europe to assist England in availing
ourselves of the wealth which has been so long neglected and
undeveloped in regions once so fertile and so favoured. We are told,
as I have said before, that we are undertaking great responsibilities.
From those responsibilities we do not shrink. We think that, with
prudence and discretion, we shall bring about a state of affairs as
advantageous for Europe as for ourselves; and in that conviction
we cannot bring ourselves to believe that the act which we have
recommended is one that leads to trouble and to warfare. No, my Lords.
I am sure there will be no jealousy between England and France upon
this subject.
In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian. We
have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance
of our Empire and for its preservation in peace. If that be our first
consideration, our next is the development of the country. And upon
that subject I am told that it was expected to-night that I should
in detail lay before the House the minute system by which all those
results, which years may bring about, are instantly to be acquired.
I, my Lords, am prepared to do nothing of the kind. We must act with
considerable caution. We are acting with a Power, let me remind the
House, which is an independent Power--the Sultan--and we can
decide nothing but with his consent and sanction. We have been in
communication with that prince--who, I may be allowed to remind the
House, has other things to think about, even than Asia Minor; for no
man was ever tried, from his accession to the throne till this moment,
so severely as the Sultan has been; but he has invariably during his
reign expressed his desire to act with England and to act with Europe,
and especially in the better administration and management of his
affairs. The time will come--and I hope it is not distant--when my
noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may be able to
communicate to the House details of these matters, which will be most
interesting. But we must protest against being forced into statements
on matters of importance which are necessarily still immature. And we
must remember that, formally speaking, even the Treaty of Berlin has
not been ratified, and there are many things which cannot even be
commenced until the ratification of that treaty has occurred.