answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed.
The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen
to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all,
as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to
have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part
of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels
to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir
Francis Villiers:
The Minister for Foreign Affairs thanks me for the
communication, and replies that Belgium will, to the
utmost of her power, maintain neutrality, and expects and
desires other Powers to observe and uphold it. He begged
me to add that the relations between Belgium and the
neighbouring Powers were excellent, and there was no
reason to suspect their intentions, but that the Belgian
Government believe, in the case of violation, they were in
a position to defend the neutrality of their country.
It now appears from the news I have received to-day--which has come
quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me
in an accurate form--that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by
Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations
with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of
German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things
absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all
that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full,
complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in
the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given
that, after the war, Belgium integrity would be preserved, that
would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever
interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.
Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following
telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our
King--King George:
Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's
friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly
attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship
she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to
the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government
to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.
Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can
diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in
the independence--and integrity is the least part--of Belgium. If
Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated,
of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted
the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so
under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but
one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and
independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that
their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with.
If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those
countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate
its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the
war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.
I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought
about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in _Hansard_,
volume 203, page 1787. I have not had time to read the whole speech
and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no
context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone
said:
We have an interest in the independence of Belgium
which is wider than that which we may have in the literal
operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to
the question whether, under the circumstances of the case,
this country, endowed as it is with influence and power,
would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of
the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and
thus become participators in the sin.
No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature
of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her
neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her
independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the
independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of
view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. If France
is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses
her position as a Great Power, becomes subordinate to the will and
power of one greater than herself--consequences which I do not
anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend
herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has
shown so often--still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell
under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then
Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just
opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured
aggrandizement of any Power?
It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our
strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at
the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust
them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away
from those obligations of honour and interest as regards the Belgian
Treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the
end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we
should have lost. And do not believe, whether a Great Power stands
outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end
of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet,
which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores,
and to protect our interests,--if we are engaged in war, we shall
suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.
We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we
are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop,
not because the trade-routes are closed, but because there is no
trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war--all their
populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a
desperate struggle--they cannot carry on the trade with us that they
are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war
or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end
of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be
in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to
undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole
of the west of Europe opposite to us--if that had been the result of
the war--falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am
quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us
all respect.
I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat
hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if
the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is
quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its
utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if
they are undisputed.
I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken
definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the
House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to
sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization
of the Fleet has taken place; mobilization of the Army is taking
place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I do feel that
in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented,
with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the
Empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown
factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which
we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we
know how we stand. One thing I would say.
The one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is
Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland--and I would like this
to be clearly understood abroad--does not make the Irish question a
consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have
told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the
conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House,
and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality
of Belgium.
What other policy is there before the House?
There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the
present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it
should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality.
We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have
read to the House which prevents us from doing that. We have got the
consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional
neutrality, and, without those conditions absolutely satisfied and
satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of
all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying,
'We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter' under no
conditions--the Belgian Treaty obligations, the possible position in
the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may
happen to France from our failure to support France--if we were to say
that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say
we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and
good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the
most serious and grave economic consequences.
My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place
before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment
conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete
as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that
we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of
having to use all the strength we have at any moment--we know not how
soon--to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts
all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending
aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at
a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use
of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are
concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right
hon. friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever
that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at
a higher mark than they are to-day, and never was there a time when
confidence was more justified in the power of the Navy to protect our
commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of
the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe
will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us.
The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is
infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by
the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.
The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in
deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed
our mind to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the
information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that
we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as
probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up
to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how
persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week, the
House will see from the Papers that will be before it.
But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are
now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it
may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the
House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and
whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts
or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the
situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue.
It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and
Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out
of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know
are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom
Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good
deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that
the German Ambassador has left Paris. The situation has developed so
rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is
most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to
bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct,
and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have put the vital
facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are
forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then
I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real
issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of
Europe, which I have endeavoured to describe to the House, we shall
be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the
determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the
whole country.
HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH
AUGUST 6, 1914
INFAMOUS PROPOSALS
In asking the House to agree to the resolution which Mr. Speaker has
just read from the Chair, I do not propose, because I do not think
it is in any way necessary, to traverse the ground again which was
covered by my right hon. friend the Foreign Secretary two or three
nights ago. He stated--and I do not think any of the statements
he made are capable of answer and certainly have not yet been
answered--the grounds upon which with the utmost reluctance and with
infinite regret His Majesty's Government have been compelled to put
this country in a state of war with what, for many years and indeed
generations past, has been a friendly Power. But, Sir, the papers
which have since been presented to Parliament, and which are now in
the hands of hon. members, will, I think, show how strenuous, how
unremitting, how persistent, even when the last glimmer of hope seemed
to have faded away, were the efforts of my right hon. friend to secure
for Europe an honourable and a lasting peace. Every one knows in the
great crisis which occurred last year in the east of Europe, it was
largely, if not mainly, by the acknowledgement of all Europe, due to
the steps taken by my right hon. friend that the area of the conflict
was limited, and that, so far as the Great Powers are concerned, peace
was maintained. If his efforts upon this occasion have, unhappily,
been less successful, I am certain that this House and the country,
and I will add posterity and history, will accord to him what is,
after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any statesman: that,
never derogating for an instant or by an inch from the honour and
interests of his own country, he has striven, as few men have
striven, to maintain and preserve the greatest interest of all
countries--universal peace. These papers which are now in the hands of
hon. members show something more than that. They show what were the
terms which were offered to us in exchange for our neutrality. I trust
that not only the members of this House, but all our fellow subjects
everywhere will read the communications, will read, learn, and mark
the communications which passed only a week ago to-day between Berlin
and London in this matter. The terms by which it was sought to buy
our neutrality are contained in the communication made by the German
Chancellor to Sir Edward Goschen on the 29th July, No. 85 of the
published Paper. I think I must refer to them for a moment. After
referring to the state of things as between Austria and Russia, Sir
Edward Goschen goes on:
He then proceeded to make the following strong bid
for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far
as he was able to judge the main principle which governed
British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by
and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might
be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany
aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were
certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government--
Let the House observe these words:
aimed at no territorial acquisition at the expense of France
should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.
Sir Edward Goschen proceeded to put a very pertinent question:
I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies--
What are the French colonies? They mean every part of the dominions
and possessions of France outside the geographical area of Europe--
and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking
in that respect.
Let me come to what, in my mind, personally, has always been the
crucial and almost the governing consideration, namely, the position
of the small States:
As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that
so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity
and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to
give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she
would do likewise.
Then we come to Belgium:
It depended upon the action of France what operations
Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but,
when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected
if she had not sided against Germany.
Let the House observe the distinction between those two cases. In
regard to Holland it was not only independence and integrity but
also neutrality; but in regard to Belgium, there was no mention of
neutrality at all, nothing but an assurance that after the war came
to an end the integrity of Belgium would be respected. Then his
Excellency added:
Ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his
policy had been to bring about an understanding with
England. He trusted that these assurances--the
assurances I have read out to the House--
might form the basis of that understanding which he so
much desired.
What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with
the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of
exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make
clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What
did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That
behind the back of France--they were not made a party to these
communications--we should have given, if we had assented to that, a
free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war,
the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France.
What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has
addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil
our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have
given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We
should have been obliged to say that without her knowledge we had
bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep
our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of
course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed
by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that
appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their
lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day
in the face of that spectacle if we had assented to this infamous
proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of
our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get
in return? A promise--nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would
do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed--I am sorry to
have to say it, but it must be put upon record--given by a Power which
was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own
treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had
dallied or temporized, we, as a Government, should have covered
ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of
this country, of which we are trustees. I am glad, and I think the,
country will be glad, to turn to the reply which my right hon. friend
made, and of which I will read to the House two of the more salient
passages. This document, No. 101 of my Paper, puts on record a week
ago the attitude of the British Government, and, as I believe, of the
British people. My right hon. friend says:
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain
the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves
to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in
effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are
taken if France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take
French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the
material point of view--
My right hon. friend, as he always does, used very temperate language:
such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further
territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so
crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and
become subordinate to German policy.
That is the material aspect. But he proceeded:
Altogether, apart from that, it would be a disgrace for
us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of
France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country
would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us
to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as
regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain
that bargain either.
He then says:
We must preserve our full freedom to act, as circumstances
may seem to us to require.
And he added, I think, in sentences which the House will appreciate:
You should ... add most earnestly that the one way of
maintaining the good relations between England and
Germany is that they should continue to work together to
preserve the peace of Europe.... For that object this
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and
goodwill.
If the peace of Europe can be preserved and the present
crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote
some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile
policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France,
Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have
desired this and worked for it--
The statement was never more true--
as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and
Germany having a corresponding object, our relations
sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian
to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present
crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone
through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful
that the relief and reaction which will follow may make
possible some more definite _rapprochement_ between the
Powers than has been possible hitherto.