with much distrust and alarm by Her Majesty's Government--that they
believed it was calculated to bring about a state of affairs dangerous
to European independence, and injurious to the interests of the
British Empire. Our impeachment of that policy is before your
Lordships and the country, and is contained in the Circular of my
noble Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in April last.
Our present contention is that we can show that, by the changes and
modifications which have been made in the Treaty of San Stefano by the
Congress of Berlin and by the Convention of Constantinople, the menace
to European independence has been removed, and the threatened injury
to the British Empire has been averted. Your Lordships will recollect
that by the Treaty of San Stefano about one-half of Turkey in Europe
was formed into a State called Bulgaria--a State consisting of upwards
of 50,000 geographical square miles, and containing a population of
4,000,000, with harbours on either sea--both on the shores of the
Euxine and of the Archipelago. That disposition of territory severed
Constantinople and the limited district which was still spared to the
possessors of that city--severed it from the Provinces of Macedonia
and Thrace by Bulgaria descending to the very shores of the Aegean;
and, altogether, a State was formed, which, both from its natural
resources and its peculiarly favourable geographical position, must
necessarily have exercised a predominant influence over the political
and commercial interests of that part of the world. The remaining
portion of Turkey in Europe was reduced also to a considerable degree
by affording what was called compensation to previous rebellious
tributary Principalities, which have now become independent States--so
that the general result of the Treaty of San Stefano was, that while
it spared the authority of the Sultan so far as his capital and its
immediate vicinity, it reduced him to a state of subjection to the
Great Power which had defeated his Armies, and which was present at
the gates of his capital. Accordingly, though it might be said that
he still seemed to be invested with one of the highest functions
of public duty--the protection and custody of the Straits--it was
apparent that his authority in that respect could be exercised by him
only in deference to the superior Power which had vanquished him, and
to whom the proposed arrangements would have kept him in subjection.
My Lords, in these matters the Congress of Berlin have made great
changes. They have restored to the Sultan two-thirds of the territory
which was to have formed the great Bulgarian State. They have restored
to him upwards of 30,000 geographical square miles, and 2,500,000 of
population--that territory being the richest in the Balkans, where
most of the land is rich, and the population one of the wealthiest,
most ingenious, and most loyal of his subjects. The frontiers of his
State have been pushed forward from the mere environs of Salonica and
Adrianople to the lines of the Balkans and Trajan's Pass; the new
Principality, which was to exercise such an influence, and produce a
revolution in the disposition of the territory and policy of that part
of the globe is now merely a State in the Valley of the Danube, and
both in its extent and its population is reduced to one-third of what
was contemplated by the Treaty of San Stefano. My Lords, it has been
said that while the Congress of Berlin decided upon a policy so bold
as that of declaring the range of the Balkans as the frontier of what
may now be called New Turkey, they have, in fact, furnished it with
a frontier which, instead of being impregnable, is in some parts
undefended, and is altogether one of an inadequate character. My
Lords, it is very difficult to decide, so far as nature is concerned,
whether any combination of circumstances can ever be brought about
which would furnish what is called an impregnable frontier. Whether it
be river, desert, or mountainous range, it will be found, in the long
run, that the impregnability of a frontier must be supplied by the
vital spirit of man; and that it is by the courage, discipline,
patriotism, and devotion of a population that impregnable frontiers
can alone be formed. And, my Lords, when I remember what race of men
it was that created and defended Plevna, I must confess my confidence
that, if the cause be a good one, they will not easily find that the
frontier of the Balkans is indefensible. But it is said that although
the Congress has furnished--and it pretended to furnish nothing
more--a competent military frontier to Turkey, the disposition was so
ill managed, that, at the same time, it failed to secure an effective
barrier--that in devising the frontier, it so arranged matters that
this very line of the Balkans may be turned. The Congress has been
charged with having committed one of the greatest blunders that could
possibly have been accomplished by leaving Sofia in the possession of
a Power really independent of Turkey; and one which, in the course
of time, might become hostile to Turkey. My Lords, this is, in my
opinion, an error on the part of those who furnish information of
an authentic character to the different populations of Europe, who
naturally desire to have correct information on such matters. It is
said that the position of Sofia is of a commanding character, and that
of its value the Congress were not aware, and that it was yielded to
an imperious demand on the part of one of the Powers represented at
the Congress. My Lords, I can assure your Lordships that there is
not a shadow of truth in the statement. I shall show that when the
Congress resolved to establish the line of the Balkans as the frontier
of Turkey, they felt that there would have been no difficulty, as a
matter of course, in Turkey retaining the possession of Sofia. What
happened was this. The highest military authority of the Turks--so
I think I may describe him--was one of the Plenipotentiaries at the
Congress of the Porte--I allude to Mehemet Ali Pasha. Well, the moment
the line of the Balkans was spoken of, he brought under the notice of
his Colleagues at the Conference--and especially, I may say, of the
Plenipotentiaries of England--his views on the subject; and, speaking
as he did not only with military authority, but also with consummate
acquaintance with all these localities, he said nothing could be more
erroneous than the idea that Sofia was a strong strategical position,
and that those who possessed it would immediately turn the Balkans and
march on Constantinople. He said that as a strategical position it
was worthless, but that there was a position in the Sandjak of Sofia
which, if properly defended, might be regarded as impregnable, and
that was the Pass of Ichtiman. He thought it of vital importance to
the Sultan that that position should be secured to Turkey, as then His
Majesty would have an efficient defence to his capital.
That position was secured. It is a pass which, if properly defended,
will prevent any host, however powerful, from taking Constantinople
by turning the Balkans. But, in consequence of that arrangement, it
became the duty of the Plenipotentiaries to see what would be the
best arrangement in regard of Sofia and its immediate districts.
The population of Sofia and its district are, I believe, without
exception, Bulgarian, and it was thought wise, they being Bulgarians,
that, if possible, it should be included in Bulgaria. That was
accomplished by exchanging it for a district in which the population,
if not exclusively, are numerically, Mohammedan, and which, so far as
the fertility of the land is concerned, is an exchange highly to the
advantage of the Porte. That, my Lords, is a short account of an
arrangement which I know has for a month past given rise in Europe,
and especially in this country, to a belief that it was in deference
to Russia that Sofia was not retained, and that by its not having been
retained Turkey had lost the means of defending herself, in the event
of her being again plunged into war.
My Lords, it has also been said, with regard to the line of the
Balkans, that it was not merely in respect of the possession of Sofia
that an error was committed, but that the Congress made a great
mistake in not retaining Varna. My Lords, I know that there are
in this Assembly many Members who have recollections--glorious
recollections--of that locality. They will know at once that if the
line of the Balkans were established as the frontier, it would be
impossible to include Varna, which is to the North of the Balkans.
Varna itself is not a place of importance, and only became so in
connexion with a system of fortifications which are now to be razed.
No doubt, in connexion with a line of strongholds, Varna formed a
part of a system of defence; but of itself Varna is not a place of
importance. Of itself it is only a roadstead, and those who dwell upon
the importance of Varna and consider that it was a great error on the
part of the Congress not to have secured it for Turkey, quite forget
that between the Bosphorus and Varna, upon the coast of the Black Sea,
the Congress has allotted to Turkey a much more important point on the
Black Sea--the harbour of Burgos. My Lords, I think I have shown that
the charges made against the Congress on these three grounds--the
frontiers of the Balkans, the non-retention of Sofia, and the giving
up of Varna--have no foundation whatever.
Well, my Lords, having established the Balkans as the frontier of
Turkey in Europe, the Congress resolved that South of the Balkans,
to a certain extent, the country should be formed into a Province to
which should be given the name of Eastern Roumelia. At one time it was
proposed by some to call it South Bulgaria; but it was manifest that
with such a name between it and North Bulgaria there would be constant
intriguing to bring about a union between the two Provinces. We,
therefore, thought that the Province of East Roumelia should be
formed, and that there should be established in it a Government
somewhat different from that of contiguous provinces where the
authority of the Sultan might be more unlimited. I am not myself
of opinion that, as a general rule, it is wise to interfere with a
military Power which you acknowledge: but, though it might have been
erroneous, as a political principle, to limit the military authority
of the Sultan, yet there are in this world other things besides
political principles--there are such things as historical facts,
and he would not be a prudent statesman who did not take into
consideration historical facts as well as political principles. The
province which we have formed into Eastern Roumelia had been the scene
of many excesses, by parties on both sides, to which human nature
looks with deep regret; and it was thought advisable, in making these
arrangements for the peace of Europe, that we should take steps to
prevent the probable recurrence of such events. Yet to do this, and
not give the Sultan a direct military authority in the province, would
have been, in our opinion, a grievous error. We have, therefore,
decided that the Sultan should have the power to defend the barrier of
the Balkans with all his available force. He has power to defend his
frontiers by land and by sea, both by the passes of the mountains and
the ports and strongholds of the Black Sea. No limit has been placed
on the amount of force he may bring to bear with that object. No one
can dictate to him what the amount of that force shall be; but, in
respect to the interior and the internal government of the province,
we thought the time had arrived when we should endeavour to carry
into effect some of those important proposals intended for the better
administration of the States of the Sultan, which were discussed and
projected at the Conference of Constantinople.
My Lords, I will not enter into any minute details on these questions.
They might weary you at this moment, and I have several other matters
on which I must yet touch; but, generally speaking, I imagine there
are three great points which we shall have before us in any attempt to
improve the administration of Turkish Dominion. First of all, it
is most important--and we have so established it in Eastern
Roumelia--that the office of Governor shall be for a specific period,
and that, as in India, it should not be for less than five years.
If that system generally obtained in the dominions of the Sultan, I
believe it would be of incalculable benefit. Secondly, we thought it
desirable that there should be instituted public assemblies, in which
the popular element should be adequately represented, and that the
business of those assemblies should be to levy and administer the
local finances of the province. And, thirdly, we thought it equally
important that order should be maintained in this province, either by
a _gendarmerie_ of adequate force or by a local militia, in both cases
the officers holding their commissions from the Sultan. But the whole
subject of the administration of Eastern Roumelia has been referred to
an Imperial Commission at Constantinople, and this Commission, after
making its investigations, will submit recommendations to the Sultan,
who will issue Firmans to carry those recommendations into effect. I
may mention here--as it may save time--that in all the arrangements
which have been made to improve the condition of the subject-races
of Turkey in Europe, inquiry by local commissions in all cases where
investigation may be necessary is contemplated. Those commissions are
to report their results to the Chief Commission; and, after the Firman
of the Sultan has been issued, the changes will take place. It is
supposed that in the course of three months from the time of the
ratification of the Treaty of Berlin, the principal arrangements may
be effected.
My Lords, I may now state what has been effected by the Congress in
respect of Bosnia--that being a point on which I think considerable
error prevails. One of the most difficult matters we had to encounter
in attempting what was the object of the Congress of Berlin--namely,
to re-establish the Sultan as a real and substantial authority--was
the condition of some of his distant provinces, and especially of
Bosnia. The state of Bosnia, and of those provinces and principalities
contiguous to it, was one of chronic anarchy. There is no language
which can describe adequately the condition of that large portion
of the Balkan peninsula occupied by Roumania, Servia, Bosnia,
Herzegovina, and other provinces. Political intrigues, constant
rivalries, a total absence of all public spirit, and of the pursuit of
objects which patriotic minds would wish to accomplish, the hatred of
races, the animosities of rival religions, and, above all, the absence
of any controlling power that could keep these large districts in
anything like order--such were the sad truths, which no one who has
investigated the subject could resist for a moment. Hitherto--at
least until within the last two years--Turkey had some semblance of
authority which, though it was rarely adequate, and when adequate, was
unwisely exercised, still was an authority to which the injured could
appeal, and which sometimes might control violence. But the Turkey of
the present time was in no condition to exercise that authority. I
inquired into the matter of those most competent to give an opinion,
and the result of my investigation was a conviction that nothing short
of an army of 50,000 men of the best troops of Turkey would produce
anything like order in those parts, and that, were the attempt to
be made, it would be contested and resisted, and might finally be
defeated. But what was to be said at a time when all the statesmen of
Europe were attempting to concentrate and condense the resources of
the Porte with the view of strengthening them--what would have been
the position of the Porte if it had to commence its new career--a
career, it is to be hoped, of amelioration and tranquillity--by
dispatching a large army to Bosnia to deal with those elements of
difficulty and danger? It is quite clear, my Lords, that such an
effort at this moment by Turkey might bring about its absolute ruin.
Then what was to be done? There have been before, in the history of
diplomacy, not unfrequent instances in which, even in civilized parts
of the globe, States having fallen into decrepitude, have afforded no
assistance to keep order and tranquillity, and have become, as these
districts have become, a source of danger to their neighbours. Under
such circumstances, the Powers of Europe have generally looked to
see whether there was any neighbouring Power of a character entirely
different from those disturbed and desolated regions, but deeply
interested in their welfare and prosperity, who would undertake the
task of attempting to restore their tranquillity and prosperity. In
the present case, you will see that the position of Austria is one
that clearly indicates her as fitted to undertake such an office.
It is not the first time that Austria has occupied provinces at the
request of Europe to ensure that order and tranquillity, which are
European interests, might prevail in them. Not once, twice, or thrice
has Austria undertaken such an office. There may be differences of
opinion as to the policy on which Austria has acted, or as to the
principles of government which she has maintained; but that has
nothing to do with the fact that, under circumstances similar to
those which I have described as existing in Bosnia and the provinces
contiguous to it, Austria has been invited and has interfered in the
manner I have described, and has brought about order and tranquillity.
Austria, in the present case, was deeply interested that some
arrangement should be made. Austria, for now nearly three years, has
had upwards of 150,000 refugees from Bosnia, which have been supported
by her resources, and whose demands notoriously have been of a
vexatious and exhausting character. It was, therefore, thought
expedient by the Congress that Austria should be invited to occupy
Bosnia, and not to leave it until she had deeply laid the foundations
of tranquillity and order. My Lords, I am the last man who would wish,
when objections are made to our proceedings, to veil them under
the decision of the Congress; it was a decision which the
Plenipotentiaries of England highly approved. It was a proposal which,
as your Lordships will see when you refer to the Protocols which I
shall lay on the table to-night, was made by my noble friend the
Secretary of State, that Austria should accept this trust and fulfil
this duty; and I earnestly supported him on that occasion. My Lords,
in consequence of that arrangement, cries have been raised against
our 'partition of Turkey'. My Lords, our object has been directly the
reverse--our object has been to prevent partition. The question of
partition is one upon which, it appears to me, very erroneous ideas
are in circulation. Some two years ago--before, I think, the war had
commenced, but when the disquietude and dangers of the situation were
very generally felt--there was a school of statesmen who were highly
in favour of what they believed to be the only remedy--what they
called the partition of Turkey. Those who did not agree with them were
those who thought we should, on the whole, attempt the restoration
of Turkey. Her Majesty's Government at all times have resisted the
partition of Turkey. They have done so, because, exclusive of the high
moral considerations that are mixed up with the subject, they believed
an attempt, on a great scale, to accomplish the partition of Turkey
would inevitably lead to a long, a sanguinary, and often recurring
struggle, and that Europe and Asia would both be involved in a series
of troubles and sources of disaster and danger of which no adequate
idea could be formed.
These professors of partition--quite secure, no doubt, in their own
views--have freely spoken to us on this subject. We have been taken up
to a high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the earth, and they
have said--'All these shall be yours if you will worship Partition.'
But we have declined to do so for the reasons I have shortly given.
And it is a remarkable circumstance that after the great war, and
after the prolonged diplomatic negotiations, which lasted during
nearly a period of three years, on this matter, the whole Powers of
Europe, including Russia, have strictly, and as completely as ever,
come to the unanimous conclusion that the best chance for the
tranquillity and order of the world is to retain the Sultan as part of
the acknowledged political system of Europe. My Lords, unquestionably
after a great war--and I call the late war a great war, because the
greatness of a war now must not be calculated by its duration, but by
the amount of the forces brought into the field, and where a million
of men have struggled for supremacy, as has been the case recently, I
call that a great war--but, I say, after a great war like this, it is
utterly impossible that you can have a settlement of any permanent
character without a redistribution of territory and considerable
changes. But that is not partition. My Lords, a country may have lost
provinces, but that is not partition. We know that not very long ago
a great country--one of the foremost countries of the world--lost
provinces; yet, is not France one of the Great Powers of the world,
and with a future--a commanding future? Austria herself has lost
provinces--more provinces even than Turkey, perhaps; even England has
lost provinces--the most precious possessions--the loss of which
every Englishman must deplore to this moment. We lost them from bad
government. Had the principles which now obtain between the metropolis
and her dependencies prevailed then, we should not, perhaps, have
lost those provinces, and the power of this Empire would have been
proportionally increased. It is perfectly true that the Sultan of
Turkey has lost provinces; it is true that his armies have been
defeated; it is true that his enemy is even now at his gates; but all
that has happened to other Powers. But a sovereign who has not yet
forfeited his capital, whose capital has not been occupied by his
enemy--and that capital one of the strongest in the world--who has
armies and fleets at his disposal, and who still rules over 20,000,000
of inhabitants, cannot be described as a Power whose Dominions have
been partitioned. My Lords, it has been said that no limit has been
fixed to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria. Well, I think that was a
very wise step. The moment you limit an occupation you deprive it of
half its virtue. All those opposed to the principles which occupation
was devised to foster and strengthen feel that they have only to hold
their breath and wait a certain time, and the opportunity for their
interference would again present itself. Therefore, I cannot agree
with the objection which is made to the arrangement with regard to the
occupation of Bosnia by Austria on the question of its duration.