responsibility that it would incur if, by any precipitate measures, it
were to break the peace of Europe before the Conference which had
been proposed by the British Government for considering the means
of settling the question between Germany and Denmark, and thereby
maintaining that peace, can be assembled, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed
that he had not forgotten that when Russia had been warned by France,
Great Britain, and Austria of the responsibility which she was
incurring by her conduct towards Poland, Prince Gortsehakoff had
replied, 'that Russia was ready to assume that responsibility before
God and man.' He, for one, did not wish to provoke another answer of
the same sort to be received with the same indifference. (No. 4, 536.)
The drama now becomes deeply interesting. The events are quick. That
is the answer of the French Government; and on the next day Lord
Russell writes to Lord Cowley to propose concert and co-operation with
France to maintain the treaty--that is, to prevent the occupation of
Schleswig. Lord Cowley writes the next day to Lord Russell that the
French Government want to know what 'concert and co-operation' mean.
Lord Russell at last, on January 24, writes to say that concert and
co-operation mean 'if necessary, material assistance to Denmark'. That
must have been about the same time when the Cabinet was sitting to
draw up Her Majesty's speech, assuring Parliament that negotiations
continued to be carried on in the interest of peace. Now, Sir, what
was the answer of the French Government when, at last, England invited
her to go to war to settle the question between Germany and Denmark? I
will read the reply:
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, after recapitulating the substance of my dispatch
of January 24 to your Excellency, explains very clearly the views of
the French Government upon the subject. The Emperor recognizes the
value of the London treaty as tending to preserve the balance of power
and maintain the peace of Europe. But the Government of France, while
paying a just tribute to the purport and objects of the treaty
of 1852, is ready to admit that circumstances may require its
modification. The Emperor has always been disposed to pay great regard
to the feelings and aspirations of nationalities. It is not to be
denied that the national feelings and aspirations of Germany tend to
a closer connexion with the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig. The
Emperor would feel repugnance to any course which should bind him to
oppose in arms the wishes of Germany. It may be comparatively easy
for England to carry on a war which can never go beyond the maritime
operations of blockade and capture of ships. Schleswig and England are
far apart from each other. But the soil of Germany touches the soil of
France, and a war between France and Germany would be one of the most
burdensome and one of the most hazardous which the French Empire could
engage. Besides these considerations, the Emperor cannot fail to
recollect that he has been made an object of mistrust and suspicion in
Europe on account of his supposed projects of aggrandizement on the
Rhine. A war commenced on the frontiers of Germany would not fail to
give strength to these unfounded and unwarrantable imputations. For
these reasons, the Government of the Emperor will not take at present
any engagement on the subject of Denmark. If, hereafter, the balance
of power should be seriously threatened, the Emperor may be inclined
to take new measures in the interest of France and of Europe. But for
the present the Emperor reserves to his Government entire liberty.
(No. 4, 620.)
Well, Sir, I should think that, after the reception of that dispatch,
though it might have been very hard to convince the Foreign Secretary
of the fact, any other person might easily have suspected that the
just influence of England was lowered in another quarter of Europe.
Sir, I have now brought events to the period when Parliament met,
trespassing, I fear, too much on the indulgence of the House; but
honourable members will remember that, in order to give this narrative
to-day, it was necessary for me to peruse 1,500 printed folio pages,
and I trust I have done no more than advert to those passages to which
it was requisite to direct attention in order that the House might
form a complete and candid opinion of the case. I will not dwell,
or only for the slightest possible time, on what occurred upon the
meeting of Parliament. Sir, when we met there were no papers; and I
remember that when I asked for papers there was not, I will frankly
say, on both sides of the House, a sufficient sense of the very great
importance of the occasion, and of the singular circumstance that the
papers were not presented to us. It turned out afterwards from what
fell from the Secretary of State in another place, that it was never
intended that the papers should be presented at the meeting of
Parliament. The noble lord at the head of the Government treated the
inquiry for papers in a jaunty way, and said, 'Oh! you shall have
papers, and I wish you joy of them.' That was the tone of the First
Minister in reference to the most important diplomatic correspondence
ever laid before Parliament since the rupture of the Treaty of Amiens:
but we are all now aware of the importance of these transactions. It
was weeks--months almost--before we became masters of the case, but
during the interval the most disastrous circumstances occurred,
showing the increased peril and danger of Denmark, and the successes
of the invaders of her territory. We all remember their entrance into
Jutland. We all remember the inquiries which were made on the subject,
and the assurances which were given. But it was impossible for the
House to pronounce any opinion, because the papers were not before it,
and the moment we had the papers, a Conference was announced.
One word with respect to the Conference. I never was of opinion that
the Conference would arrive at any advantageous result. I could not
persuade myself, after reading the papers, that, whatever might be the
cause, any one seriously wished for a settlement, except, of course,
Her Majesty's Ministers, and they had a reason for it. The Conference
lasted six weeks. It wasted six weeks. It lasted as long as a
carnival, and, like a carnival, it was an affair of masks and
mystification. Our Ministers went to it as men in distressed
circumstances go to a place of amusement--to while away the time, with
a consciousness of impending failure. However, the summary of
the Conference is this, that Her Majesty's Government made two
considerable proposals. They proposed, first, the dismemberment of
Denmark. So much for its integrity. They proposed, in the second
place, that the remainder of Denmark should be placed under the joint
guarantee of the Great Powers. They would have created another Turkey
in Europe, in the same geographical relation, the scene of the
same rival intrigues, and the same fertile source of constant
misconceptions and wars. So much for the independence of Denmark.
These two propositions having been made, the one disastrous to
the integrity and the other to the independence of Denmark, the
Conference, even with these sacrifices offered, was a barren failure.
And I now wish to ask--after having, I hope, with some clearness and
in a manner tolerably comprehensive, placed the case before honourable
members--what is their opinion of the management of these affairs by
Her Majesty's Government? I showed you that the beginning of this
interference was a treaty by which England entered into obligations as
regards Denmark not different from those of France. I have shown you,
on the evidence of the Secretary of State, that the present position
of France with respect to Denmark is one quite magnanimous, free from
all difficulties and disgrace. I have shown you, I think, what every
man indeed feels, that the position of England under this treaty, on
the contrary, is most embarrassing, surrounded with difficulties, and
full of humiliation. I have stated my opinion that the difference
between the position of England and that of France arose from the
mis-management of our affairs. That appeared to me to be the natural
inference and logical deduction. I have given you a narrative of the
manner in which our affairs have been conducted, and now I ask you
what is your opinion? Do you see in the management of those affairs
that capacity, and especially that kind of capacity that is adequate
to the occasion? Do you find in it that sagacity, prudence, that
dexterity, that quickness of perception, and those conciliatory moods
which we are always taught to believe necessary in the transaction
of our foreign affairs? Is there to be seen that knowledge of human
nature, and especially that peculiar kind of science, most necessary
in these affairs--an acquaintance with the character of foreign
countries and of the chief actors in the scene?
Sir, for my part I find all these qualities wanting; and in
consequence of the want of these qualities, I see that three results
have accrued. The first is that the avowed policy of Her Majesty's
Government has failed. The second is, that our just influence in the
councils of Europe has been lowered. Thirdly, in consequence of our
just influence in the councils of Europe being lowered, the securities
for peace are diminished. These are three results which have followed
in consequence of the want of the qualities to which I have alluded,
and in consequence of the management of these affairs by the
Government. Sir, I need not, I think, trouble the House with
demonstrating that the Government have failed in their avowed policy
of upholding the independence and integrity of Denmark. The first
result may be thrown aside. I come therefore to the second. By
the just influence of England in the councils of Europe I mean an
influence contra-distinguished from that which is obtained by
intrigue and secret understanding; I mean an influence that results
from the conviction of foreign Powers that our resources are great and
that our policy is moderate and steadfast. Since the settlement that
followed the great revolutionary war, England, who obtained at
that time--as she deserved to do, for she bore the brunt of the
struggle--who obtained at that time all the fair objects of her
ambition, has on the whole followed a Conservative foreign policy. I
do not mean by Conservative foreign policy a foreign policy that would
disapprove--still less oppose--the natural development of nations. I
mean a foreign policy interested in the tranquillity and prosperity of
the world, the normal condition of which is peace, and which does not
ally itself with the revolutionary party of Europe. Other countries
have their political systems and public objects, as England had,
though they may not have attained them. She is not to look upon them
with unreasonable jealousy. The position of England in the councils of
Europe is essentially that of a moderating and mediatorial Power.
Her interest and her policy are, when changes are inevitable and
necessary, to assist so that these changes, if possible, may be
accomplished without war, or, if war occurs, that its duration and
asperity may be lessened. This is what I mean by the just influence
of England in the councils of Europe. It appears to me that just
influence of England in the councils of Europe has been lowered.
Within twelve months we have been twice repulsed at St. Petersburg.
Twice have we supplicated in vain at Paris. We have menaced Austria,
and Austria has allowed our menaces to pass her like an idle wind. We
have threatened Prussia, and Prussia has defied us. Our objurgations
have rattled over the head of the German Diet, and the German Diet has
treated them with contempt.
Again, Sir, during the last few months there is scarcely a form of
diplomatic interference which has not been suggested or adopted by
the English Government--except a Congress. Conferences at Vienna,
at Paris, at London, all have been proposed; protocols, joint
declarations, sole mediation, joint mediation, identic notes, sole
notes, united notes--everything has been tried. Couriers from the
Queen have been scouring Europe with the exuberant fertility of
abortive projects. After the termination of the most important
Conference, held in the capital of the Queen, over which the chief
Minister of Her Majesty's foreign relations presided, and which was
attended with all the pomp and ceremony requisite for so great an
occasion, we find that its sittings have been perfectly barren; and
the chief Ministers of the Cabinet closed the proceedings by quitting
the scene of their exertions and appearing in the two Houses of
Parliament to tell the country that they have no allies, and that, as
they have no allies, they can do nothing. Pardon me, I must not omit
to do justice to the exulting boast of the Secretary of State, who, in
the midst of discomfiture, finds solace in the sympathy and politeness
of the neutral Powers. I do not grudge Lord Russell the sighs of
Russia or the smiles of France; but I regret that, with characteristic
discretion, he should have quitted the battle of the Conference only
to take his seat in the House of Lords to denounce the perfidy of
Prussia, and to mourn over Austrian fickleness. There wanted but one
touch to complete the picture, and it was supplied by the noble lord,
the First Minister.
Sir, I listened with astonishment--I listened with astonishment as the
noble lord condemned the vices of his victim, and inveighed at the
last moment against the obstinacy of unhappy Denmark. Denmark would
not submit to arbitration. But on what conditions did the German
Powers accept it? And what security had Denmark? That if in the
Conference she could not obtain an assurance that the neutral Powers
would support her by force on the line of the Schlei--what security, I
say, had she that any other line would be maintained--an unknown line
by an unknown arbiter? Sir, it does appear to me impossible to deny,
under these circumstances, that the just influence of England in
the councils of Europe is lowered. And now, I ask, what are the
consequences of the just influence of England in the councils of
Europe being lowered? The consequences are--to use a familiar phrase
in the dispatches--'most serious', because in exact proportion as that
influence is lowered the securities for peace are diminished. I lay
this down as a great principle, which cannot be controverted, in the
management of our foreign affairs. If England is resolved upon a
particular policy, war is not probable. If there is, under these
circumstances, a cordial alliance between England and France, war
is most difficult; but if there is a thorough understanding between
England, France, and Russia, war is impossible.
These were the happy conditions under which Her Majesty's Ministers
entered office, and which they enjoyed when they began to move in the
question of Denmark. Two years ago, and even less, there was a cordial
understanding between England, France, and Russia upon this question
or any question which might arise between Germany and Denmark. What
cards to play! What advantages in the management of affairs! It
seemed, indeed, that they might reasonably look forward to a future
which would justify the confidence of Parliament; when they might
point with pride to what they had accomplished, and appeal to public
opinion to support them. But what has happened? They have alienated
Russia, they have estranged France, and then they call Parliament
together to declare war against Germany. Why, such a thing never
happened before in the history of this country. Nay, more, I do not
think it can ever happen again. It is one of those portentous results
which occur now and then to humiliate and depress the pride of
nations, and to lower our confidence in human intellect. Well, Sir,
as the difficulties increase, as the obstacles are multiplied, as
the consequences of the perpetual errors and constant mistakes are
gradually becoming more apparent, you always find Her Majesty's
Government nearer war. As in private life we know it is the weak who
are always violent, so it is with Her Majesty's Ministers. As long
as they are confident in their allies, as long as they possess the
cordial sympathy of the Great Powers, they speak with moderation, they
counsel with dignity; but, like all incompetent men, when they are in
extreme difficulty, they can see but one resource, and that is force.
When affairs cannot be arranged in peace you see them turning first
to St. Petersburg--that was a bold dispatch which was sent to St.
Petersburg in January last, to ask Russia to declare war against
Germany--and twice to Paris, entreating that violence may be used to
extricate them from the consequences of their own mistakes. It is only
by giving Government credit, as I have been doing throughout, for
the complete sincerity of their expressions and conduct, that their
behaviour is explicable. Assume that their policy was a war policy,
and it is quite intelligible. Whenever difficulties arise, their
resolution is instantly to have recourse to violence. Every word they
utter, every dispatch they write, seems always to look to a scene of
collision. What is the state of Europe at this moment? What is the
state of Europe produced by this management of our affairs? I know not
what other honourable gentlemen may think, but it appears to me most
serious. I find the great German Powers openly avowing that it is not
in their capacity to fulfil their engagements. I find Europe impotent
to vindicate public law because all the great alliances are broken
down; and I find a proud and generous nation like England shrinking
with the reserve of magnanimity from the responsibility of commencing
war, yet sensitively smarting under the impression that her honour is
stained--stained by pledges which ought not to have been given, and
expectations which I maintain ought never to have been held out by
wise and competent statesmen.
Sir, this is anarchy. It therefore appears to me obvious that Her
Majesty's Government have failed in their avowed policy of maintaining
the independence and integrity of Denmark. It appears to me undeniable
that the just influence of England is lowered in the councils of
Europe. It appears to me too painfully clear that to lower our
influence is to diminish the securities of peace. And what defence
have we? If ever a criticism is made on his ambiguous conduct the
noble lord asks me, 'What is your policy?' My answer might be my
policy is the honour of England and the peace of Europe, and the
noble lord has betrayed both. I can understand a Minister coming
to Parliament when there is a question of domestic interest of the
highest character for consideration, such as the emancipation of
the Catholics, the principles on which our commercial code is to
be established, or our representative system founded. I can quite
understand--although I should deem it a very weak step--a Minister
saying, 'Such questions are open questions, and we leave it to
Parliament to decide what is to be our policy.' Parliament is in
possession of all the information on such subjects that is necessary
or can be obtained. Parliament is as competent to come to a judgement
upon the emancipation of any part of our subjects who are not
in possession of the privileges to which they are entitled; the
principles on which a commercial code is to be established or a
representative system founded are as well known to them as to any
body of men in the world; but it is quite a new doctrine to appeal to
Parliament to initiate a foreign policy. To initiate a foreign policy
is the prerogative of the Crown, exercised under the responsibility of
constitutional Ministers. It is devised, initiated, and carried out in
secrecy, and justly and wisely so. What do we know as to what may be
going on in Downing Street at this moment? We know not what dispatches
may have been written, or what proposals may have been made to any
foreign Power. For aught I know, the noble lord this morning may have
made another proposition which might light up a general European war.
It is for Parliament to inquire, to criticize, to support, or condemn
in questions of foreign policy; but it is not for Parliament to
initiate a foreign policy in absolute ignorance of the state of
affairs. That would be to ask a man to set his house on fire. I will
go further. He is not a wise, I am sure he is not a patriotic, man
who, at a crisis like the present, would accept office on conditions.
What conditions could be made when we are in ignorance of our real
state? Any conditions we could offer in a vote of the House of Commons
carried upon a particular point might be found extremely unwise when
we were placed in possession of the real position of the country. No,
Sir, we must not allow Her Majesty's Government to escape from their
responsibility. That is at the bottom of all their demands when they
ask, 'What is your policy?' The very first night we met--on February
4--we had the same question. Parliament was called together by a
Ministry in distress to give them a policy. But Parliament maintained
a dignified and discreet reserve: and you now find in what a position
the Ministry are placed to-night.
Sir, it is not for any man in this House, on whatever side he sits, to
indicate the policy of this country in our foreign relations--it is
the duty of no one but the responsible Ministers of the Crown. The
most we can do is to tell the noble lord what is not our policy. We
will not threaten and then refuse to act. We will not lure on our
allies with expectations we do not fulfil. And, Sir, if it ever be the
lot of myself or any public men with whom I have the honour to act
to carry on important negotiations on behalf of this country, as the
noble lord and his colleagues have done, I trust that we at least
shall not carry them on in such a manner that it will be our duty to
come to Parliament to announce to the country that we have no allies,
and then declare that England can never act alone. Sir, those are
words which ought never to have escaped the lips of a British
Minister. They are sentiments which ought never to have occurred even
to his heart. I repudiate, I reject them. I remember there was a time
when England, with not a tithe of her present resources, inspired by a
patriotic cause, triumphantly encountered a world in arms. And, Sir, I
believe now, if the occasion were fitting, if her independence or her
honour were assailed, or her empire in danger, I believe that England
would rise in the magnificence of her might, and struggle triumphantly
for those objects for which men live and nations flourish. But I, for
one, will never consent to go to war to extricate Ministers from the
consequences of their own mistakes. It is in this spirit that I have
drawn up this Address to the Crown. I have drawn it up in the spirit
in which the Royal Speech was delivered at the commencement of the
session. I am ready to vindicate the honour of the country whenever
it is necessary, but I have drawn up this Address in the interest of
peace. Sir, I beg leave to move the resolution of which I have given
notice.
BENJAMIN DISRAELI EARL OF BEACONSFIELD JULY 18, 1878 BERLIN TREATY
My Lords, in laying on the Table of your Lordships' House, as I am
about to do, the Protocols of the Congress of Berlin, I have thought I
should only be doing my duty to your Lordships' House, to Parliament
generally, and to the country, if I made some remarks on the policy
which was supported by the Representatives of Her Majesty at the
Congress, and which is embodied in the Treaty of Berlin and in the
Convention which was placed on your Lordships' Table during my
absence.