_Roxbury, Nov. 12, 1778._
Lieutenant colonel Ethen Allen was at length exchanged; and congress
granted him a brevet commission of colonel, [May 14.] in reward of his
fortitude and zeal in the cause of his country.
General Sullivan being sent to command at Providence, gen. Pigot who was
at Newport, inferred that there was a design of attacking Rhode-Island
whenever an opportunity offered: the latter therefore concluded upon an
expedition that might delay or frustrate the event. Lieutenant col.
Campbell, with about 500 British and Hessians was sent off in the night
of the 24th, passed up the river, and landed from the ships, tenders,
and boats before day, between Warren and Poppasquash-point. At day-light
[May 25.] they marched in two bodies, one for Warren, and the other for
the head of Kickemut-river, where they destroyed about seventy
flat-bottomed boats, and set fire to one of the state gallies, which was
extinguished without doing much injury. They burnt also a quantity of
pitch, tar, plank, &c.—They then fired the meeting-house at Warren, and
several dwelling houses; and retreated toward Bristol, where their ships
and boats had fallen down to receive them. In Bristol they burnt two and
twenty houses, and through mistake, the church instead of the
meeting-house. The destruction of houses and places of worship, was
afterward attributed chiefly to the licentiousness of the soldiers, who
treated both friends and foes with cruelty, plundering houses and
robbing women of their shoe-buckles, gold rings and handkerchiefs. They
carried off with them a state galley. A few days after, a party of 150
men were sent from Newport, to burn the saw-mills and contiguous houses
at Tiverton. They fired an old mill and old house near the place of
landing; and then proceeded for the town, to execute the business they
were sent upon; but the bridge leading to it being defended by five and
twenty men, they could not cross, though they attempted it repeatedly.
The advancing season will close these small excursions, by bringing
forward more capital operations; and for the counteracting of which the
Americans must depend much upon supplies from France.——This reminds me,
that on the 28th, a French 50 gun ship, with 350 men, a brig and a
schooner, bringing arms and dry goods, arrived in James River, Virginia,
from Rochford. Congress the next day, to commemorate the agreeable event
which has taken place between France and the United States, resolved
that a new continental frigate, built in the Massachusetts, and lately
launched, should be called the _Alliance_. Within three weeks after, the
command of her was bestowed upon captain Peter Landais.
In the beginning of June the Trident arrived in the Delaware, with the
earl of Carlisle, Mr. Eden and governor Johnstone, three of the
commissioners for restoring peace between Great-Britain and America. On
the 9th Sir Henry Clinton informed gen. Washington of their being at
Philadelphia, and requested a passport for doctor Ferguson, their
secretary, with a letter from them to congress. The general declined
granting a passport, which was unanimously approved by congress. The
refusal made it necessary to forward the letter, with the acts, a copy
of their commission and other papers, by the common intercourse. They
were received by an express from Washington on the 13th, and the letter
was read till some offensive language against his most Christian majesty
offered, on which the further reading of it was suspended till the 16th,
when the reading of that and the other papers was finished. They were
referred to a committee, who drew up a letter to be sent by the
president, in answer to the letter and papers from the commissioners,
which was unanimously agreed to by the delegates on the 17th, and was as
follows—“I have received the letter from your excellencies on the 9th
instant, with the enclosures, and laid them before congress. Nothing but
an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human blood, could
have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so
disrespectful to his most Christian majesty, the good and great ally of
these states, or to consider propositions so derogatory to the honor of
an independent nation. The acts of the British parliament, the
commission from your sovereign, and your letter, suppose the people of
these states to be subjects to the crown of Great-Britain, and are
founded on the idea of dependence, which is utterly inadmissible. I am
further directed to inform your excellencies that congress are inclined
to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war
originated, and the savage manner in which it hath been conducted. They
will therefore be ready to enter upon the consideration of a treaty of
peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting,
when the king of Great-Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition
for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an
explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these states, or the
withdrawing his fleets and armies.—I have the honor to be, your
excellencies most obedient and humble servant.” Before this letter could
be received by the commissioners, a movement took place at Philadelphia,
which must have completely frustrated all negociation, had the same been
even in a train answering to the wishes of the British agents, for it
indicated an apprehension of great danger to the royal forces should
they continue in the city.”
Mr. Eden brought with him secret orders for the speedy evacuation of
Philadelphia; they were so secret as not to be made known either to
himself or governor Johnstone. Whether the earl of Carlisle met with the
like treatment, is not yet ascertained. It has been publicly asserted,
that the orders were dated exactly three weeks before the commissioners
sailed from England, which carries the date back to the last of March.
On their delivery, Sir Henry Clinton immediately applied himself to the
putting of them into execution. By the eighteenth every thing being
ready, the British army evacuated the city, at three o’clock in the
morning. They proceeded to Gloucester-Point, three miles down the river,
and before ten the whole had passed in safety across the Delaware, into
New Jersey. At ten they began their march to Haddonfield, which they
reached the same day. Your curiosity may make you desirous of knowing in
what condition the British left Philadelphia. An American son of
liberty, who visited it in the beginning of July, wrote to his
friend—“The whole north side of the city, before you enter, is a
promiscuous scene of ruin. Upon getting into the city, I was surprised
to find it had suffered so little. I question whether it would have
fared better, had our own troops been in possession of it, that is, as
to the buildings.” The necessary preparations for its evacuation, could
not be concealed from general Washington; when the appearance of their
intending to march through Jersey became serious, he detached general
Maxwell’s brigade, in conjunction with the militia of that state, to
impede the progress of the royal troops, so as to give the American army
time to come up with them, and to take advantage of any favorable
circumstances that might offer. Some time before, gen. Lee having been
exchanged, had joined the army at Valley-forge. The evening preceding
the evacuation, the principles of the operations proper to be adopted,
were taken up and fully discussed by his excellency and the general
officers, when it appeared to be the common sentiment, that it would be
highly criminal to hazard a general action with the enemy at present, as
by it they might lose every advantage which a three years war, combined
with many fortunate circumstances, had given to America. The next day
his excellency, after observing, “near 11,000 men would be able to march
off the ground in a condition for service,” proposed in writing, a set
of queries to the several general officers, in order to learn the
particular opinion of each, as to “what is to be done?” which was to be
returned on paper. The answers were in common the same with the
prevailing sentiment of the council on the preceding day. Gen. Mifflin
was not of the number consulted. He would have gloried in being present
to have taken an active part upon this occasion; but by some secret
manœuvres was thrown at a distance. He desired and obtained leave of
congress, on the 4th of May, to join the army, and repaired to
Valley-forge. Some of the general officers were disgusted at the thought
of his returning to his command now the campaign was opening, to share
in the honors it might yield, when he had not shared with them in the
peculiar distresses of their winter-quarters. When their sentiments came
to be known to certain members of congress, measures were taken to
produce and perfect the following motion on June 11th, “That gen.
Washington be directed to order an enquiry to be made into the conduct
of major-general Mifflin, late quarter-master-general, and the other
officers who acted under him in that department; and if it shall appear
that the extraordinary deficiencies thereof, and the consequent
distresses of the army were chargeable to the misconduct of the
quarter-master-general, or any of the said officers, that a
court-martial be held on the delinquents.” When this enquiry was ordered
to be made, he was with the army, and in a fair way of obtaining a just
proportion of his countrymen’s confidence. He clearly saw the meaning of
the stroke; but the order made it necessary for him to obtain leave of
absence for some weeks, to collect materials for his justification.
When intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton’s having evacuated Philadelphia
and marched to Haddonfield, reached the American head-quarters, the next
measure to be taken by gen. Washington, was apparent. Gen. Greene, by
his conduct and industry as quarter-master-general, had effected such a
happy change in the line of his department, as enabled his excellency
with great facility to move with the whole army and baggage from
Valley-forge in pursuit of the enemy. The troops proceeded to and
crossed the Delaware at Corriel’s ferry; when a select corps of 600 men
were immediately detached under col. Morgan, to reinforce gen. Maxwell.
The slow advance of Sir Henry, led his excellency to suspect that he had
a design of bringing on a general action, could he draw the Americans
into the lower country. This consideration, and a desire of refreshing
the troops after the fatigues they had endured from rainy and excessive
hot weather, determined the American general to halt about five miles
from Princeton. While there he stated to the general officers [June 24.]
the following facts—“the enemy’s force is between 9 and 10,000 rank and
file—the American army on the ground is 10,684 rank and file, beside the
advanced brigade under general Maxwell, of about 1200, and about 1200
militia,” on which he proposed the question, “Will it be advisable to
hazard a general action?” The answer was—“Not advisable, but a
detachment of 1500 to be immediately sent to act as occasion may serve,
on the enemy’s left flank and rear, in conjunction with the other
continental troops and militia already hanging about them, and the main
body to preserve a relative position, to act as circumstances may
require.——Lee, Stirling, Greene, Fayette, Steuben, Poor, Paterson,
Woodward, Scott, Portail, Knox.” The detachment was immediately made
under general Scott. The same day Sir Henry concluding that gen.
Washington, who had alway hitherto avoided a general action, would not
now give into it against every dictate of policy, and that the American
views were directed against his baggage, in which part he was indeed
vulnerable, determined to take the right hand road leading to
Sandy-Hook, instead of making for the Rariton, where he suspected
general Gates with the northern army might join that under general
Washington. Gates arrived at Fishkill about the middle of May, to take
the command in that quarter. The troops under him were so few, that he
could not answer for the defence of that pass through the highlands,
with which he was entrusted; and was persuaded that if the enemy made a
sudden and determined push to carry it, the militia would not come in
time to save it. On the 17th of June draughts arrived, and militia were
hourly expected; after mentioning this in a letter to congress, he
exclaims—“Thank heaven for the precious time the enemy have so foolishly
lost!” He had no idea of marching for the Rariton; but his cavalry, and
a considerable body of infantry, was at this period so posted, as to
give the alarm of an attack upon New-York: and he proposed moving the
main body of his army to White-Plains, and taking a strong camp in that
neighbourhood, to keep up the alarm: which was highly approved of by
gen. Washington, and procured his thanks. On the 25th his excellency
moved his army to Kingston. Upon receiving intelligence that Sir Henry
was prosecuting his route towards Monmouth court-house, he dispatched
1000 select men under brigadier gen. Wayne, and sent the Marquis de la
Fayette to take the command of the whole advanced corps, with orders to
seize the first fair opportunity of attacking the enemy’s rear. Gen. Lee
declined the command, as he was against attacking, on which it was
offered to the marquis, who accepted it with pleasure. In the evening of
the same day, the whole army marched from Kingston, intending to
preserve a proper distance for supporting the advanced corps, and
arrived at Cranberry early the next morning. The intense heat of the
weather, and a storm coming on, made it impossible to resume the march
that day without great injury to the troops. The advanced corps, being
in consequence hereof too remote from the main body, and too far upon
the right to be supported, the marquis had orders sent him to file off
by his left toward English-town, which he executed early in the morning
of the 27th. Sir Henry being sensible of the approach of the American
army, changed the disposition of his troops, and placed in the rear what
were deemed the best, consisting of all the grenadiers, light-infantry
and chasseurs of the line; at the same time gen. Knyphausen was
requested to take the baggage of the whole army under the charge of his
division, which made the first column. Under the head of baggage was
comprised, not only all the wheel carriages of every department, but
also the bat-horses—a train which, as the country admitted but of one
rout for carriages, extended near twelve miles. The alteration made by
Sir Henry laid gen. Washington under the necessity of increasing the
number of the advanced corps. His excellency embraced this opportunity
of gratifying gen. Lee, with the consent of the marquis. Lee observed
that his having declined the command of the advanced corps had lessened
him in the opinion of officers and soldiers, wished to be appointed
afresh. Washington would not consent to remove the marquis; but a
reinforcement being wanted, he detached Lee with two brigades to join
the marquis at English-town, and of course to take upon him the command
of the whole. The main body marched the same day, and encamped within
three miles of that place. Morgans corps was left hovering on Sir
Henry’s right flank, and the Jersey militia, amounting to about 700,
under gen. Dickinson, on his left. The royal army was strongly encamped
in the neighbourhood of Monmouth court-house, where they halted till the
morning of the 28th. When once arrived at the heights of Middletown,
about twelve miles in advance, there would have been no possibility of
attempting any thing against them with a prospect of success, the
American general therefore determined to attack their rear the moment
they moved from their present ground, and communicated his intention to
Lee, who was ordered to make the necessary disposition, and to keep his
troops in readiness for the shortest notice. The like was done with
respect to the troops under his own immediate command.
[June 28.] General Knyphausen moved at day-break: Sir Henry, that he
might not press upon him, did not follow till near eight o’clock, with
the other division, composed of the 3d, 4th, and 5th brigades of
British, two battalions of British grenadiers, the Hessian grenadiers, a
battalion of light-infantry, the guards, and the 16th regiment of
light-dragoons, a body of troops not easily to be equalled.
About one o’clock in the morning, gen. Lee received a letter from gen.
Washington, and in pursuance of the directions it contained, wrote to
gen. Dickinson to select some hundreds of his best men, and detach them
as nigh to the British rear as he could. These troops were to act as a
corps of observation, and to forward the earliest intelligence
respecting the enemy. He also ordered col. Morgan to advance with the
men under his command so near as to attack them on their first movement:
but it was left to him how to act, only he was to take care and not
expose his troops, in that manner as to disable him from acting in
conjunction with Lee, should there be a necessity for it. Orders were
likewise sent to Grayson, as the commanding officer of the two brigades
(of Scot and Varnum) consisting of about 600 men, to get them instantly
in readiness to march. By daylight they entered English-town; but it was
not till between five and six that they marched from thence toward
Monmouth court-house, having been detained for want of guides. Nearly at
the same time, Lee gave orders to the several detachments and Maxwell’s
brigade, to prepare for marching immediately, leaving their packs behind
under proper guard: they followed the two just mentioned brigades about
seven o’clock. About five Dickinson sent an express to general
Washington, informing that the front of the enemy had began their march.
His excellency instantly put the army in motion, and sent orders to Lee
to move on and attack them, unless there should be _very powerful
reasons to the contrary_;[87] and acquainted him that he was marching to
support him, and for doing it with the greater expedition and
convenience, should make the men disencumber themselves of their packs
and blankets. The exceptive clause in the orders rendered them
discretionary; they manifested the earnest desire of the commander in
chief, that an important blow might be struck which the enemy should
feel; but Lee could not consider them as requiring him to risk a general
engagement, in direct repugnency to the spirit of those councils of war
that had been repeatedly held upon the subject. While Lee was advancing
with his column, he sent forward an aid to order Grayson to push on as
fast as possible and attack the enemy. Before the aid overtook him, he
had passed Freehold meeting-house with the two brigades. The aid
delivered Lee’s orders: but gave it as his opinion, that Grayson had
better not move on, for that he had been informed that the main body of
the enemy was near Monmouth court-house and was thought to be marching
to attack them, of which circumstance he supposed Lee was ignorant. The
aid on his return fell in with Dickinson, who gave him the same
information, and charged him with a message to Lee. Lee conformed to it
on its delivery, and gave orders for posting two militia regiments upon
a hill for the securing of a particular road, and then pushed forward
over a morass or ravine, by the bridge or sauseway, to a height where
Dickinson was with a few militia. During his stay on this height,
intelligence of the most extraordinary nature was continually brought
him. Some asserted, that the enemy had moved off with precipitation, and
that it was only a covering party which remained; others averred, that
the main force was still on the ground, and filing off in columns to the
right and left—one while the enemy’s troops were turning the flanks of
the American’s—at another, pushing in front. These opposite reports
occasioned Varnum’s brigade, and part of Scott’s, and col. Durgee’s
brigade of Lee’s column, to pass and repass the bridge over the morass
several times, as it was universally agreed to be by no means
warrantable to risk an action, with a ravine in the rear, over which
there was only one good passage. While these marchings and
counter-marchings took place, the marquis de la Fayette arrived at the
head of the main body of Lee’s troops; when the general having
reconnoitred a wood, into which it had been reported a battalion or two
of the enemy had thrown themselves, and being satisfied that it was
groundless, determined to march on, and ascertain with his own eyes, the
number, order and disposition of the enemy, and then to conduct himself
accordingly. His whole command amounted to about 4000 men, exclusive of
Morgan’s corps and the Jersey militia; and consisted of gen. Scott’s
detachment, gen. Wayne’s, gen. Maxwell’s brigade, gen. Varnum’s, general
Scott’s and col. Jackson’s regiment. When they had nearly passed through
the woods, with which the country abounds, and were arrived at a point
facing the court-house, and on the edge of a plain about three miles in
length and one in breadth, they were formed, but within the skirt of the
wood, that the enemy might not discover them. Here they remained while
generals Lee and Wayne, and a few others, went out upon the right and
rode forward to reconnoitre. From the observations Lee made, and the
intelligence he obtained, he concluded that the forces he saw, were no
other than the enemy’s covering party, and entertained hopes of an
interval between them and the main body, sufficient to afford him the
opportunity of cutting them off. That he might perfect this business,
Wayne was appointed to command 700 men, to whom were attached two pieces
of artillery. Wayne was to attack the covering party in the rear
faintly, so as to halt them, but not with vigor lest that should
occasion their retreating with celerity to the main body, or drawing
from it so powerful a reinforcement as to defeat the principal
design.—Mean time Lee was to endeavor, by a short road leading to the
left, to gain the front of the party. While marching on this road, one
of gen. Washington’s suite came up to procure intelligence. Lee, with a
fixed firm tone of voice and countenance which suggested confidence of
success, desired him to infrom his excellency, that the enemy did not
appear well to understand the roads; that the route he was on cut off
two miles; that the rear of the enemy was composed of 1500 or 2000; that
he expected to fall in with them, and had great certainty of cutting
them off; and that general Wayne and col. Butler were amusing them with
a few loose shot while he was performing the route. Wayne’s command was
advanced to the right and drawn up. The enemy appeared just in the edge
of the wood upon an eminence with their light-dragoons. A few of the
American light-horsemen were advanced upon the right, at a very
considerable distance. One of Lee’s aids-de-camp observed the queen’s
light-dragoons parading as though they meant to charge these American
light-horsemen, who had no officer of eminence to head them: he
therefore rode up and advised them to let the British dragoons come as
near as could be done with safety, and then to retreat off to where gen.
Wayne was, and let him receive them. The British horse pursued till they
came near the general, when receiving a fire from col. Butler’s
regiment, posted on the skirt of a wood, they wheeled and galloped off
in great haste to their own body; as they were retiring, the two pieces
of artillery fired a few shot at them. Wayne then advanced, and
encouraged his men to follow on, and charge the enemy with bayonets. The
aid rode back to Lee, who immediately sent him forward to Wayne, with
orders that he should only feign an attack, and not push on too
precipitately, as that would subvert his plan and disappoint his
intentions. Lieut. col. Oswald, who commanded the artillery, supposed
that the enemy were retreating, and so passed the morass in front, over
a causeway, into a grain field, and began to cannonade. This happened
after ten o’clock.—About the same time a part of Lee’s troops issued out
of a wood on the left of, and about a mile below the court-house, in
small columns, and in an oblique direction with respect to the royal
forces, rather toward their right, and within cannon shot.—These were
drawn up ready to face the Americans, with their right near a wood, and
their left on open ground, covered by their cavalry, and forming an
obtuse angle with the court-house. The cavalry filed off to the left, as
if with design to attempt something on the right of Lee’s troops, which
occasioned an order to the marquis de la Fayette to wheel his column by
his right, and to gain and attack the enemy’s left flank. Lee having
also ordered to the right the three regiments in Wayne’s detachment,
Wesson’s, Stewart’s and Livingston’s, rode toward Oswald’s artillery and
reconnoitred the enemy, who appeared in full view, marching back again
toward the court-house, and in greater numbers than was expected, so
that Lee said, he believed he was mistaken in their strength.
Let us now advert to the manœuvres of Sir Henry Clinton. Soon after he
had begun with his column to follow gen. Knyphausen, reconnoitring
parties of the Jersey militia appeared on his left flank. The queen’s
rangers fell in with, and dispersed some detachments among the woods in
the same quarter. His rear-guard having descended from the heights above
Freehold into the plain, some American columns appeared likewise
descending into it, and began the cannonade on his rear, which was
returned by a superior fire. At this instant intelligence was brought to
Sir Henry, that the enemy were discovered marching in force on both his
flanks. He conjectured that the object of the Americans was the baggage,
which at that juncture was engaged in defiles that continued for miles.
He conceived that the only means of parrying the apprehended blow, was
by facing about, attacking the corps which harrassed his rear, and
pressing it so hard as to oblige the detachments to return from his
flanks to its assistance. Thinking that the measure might possibly draw
on a general action, he sent for a brigade of British, and the 17th
light dragoons from Knyphausen’s division, and at the same time gave
directions that on their arrival they should take a position for
covering his right flank. He then made a disposition, and advanced in a
direction toward the right of the Americans.
This happened while Lee was reconnoitring. The American column to the
left of him, under gen. Scott, quitted the wood, crossed a morass, and
formed in the plain field, about a hundred yards in front of Maxwell,
who expected an opportunity to form his brigade by Scott’s moving to the
right, as there was a vacancy between the latter and the troops with
Lee. These were at that moment moving to the right, and every step they
gained came nearer to the royal forces, who were also pushing to the
right of the Americans. Lee’s discernment led him immediately to send
off one of his aids with orders to Scott, whom he supposed to be in the
wood on the other side of the morass, to halt his column in the wood,
and continue there till further orders; that there might be no possible
misconception, another aid was speedily dispatched with similar orders.
Before these could be delivered, Scott had mistaken the movements on his
right for a retreat; and apprehended danger to his own column in case of
its remaining where he was, notwithstanding his detachment and Maxwell’s
brigade, with the other troops to the left, made full two-thirds of
Lee’s whole command, and though the enemy appeared to bend their course
from the left to the right of the Americans. Under such apprehension,
Scott re-crossed the morass, re-entered the wood, and retreated; Maxwell
and the others did the like of course. When the first aid reached that
part of the wood to which he had been directed, and found that Scott had
marched off the ground, he rode back; while returning he met the second
aid, and acquainted him with what had taken place; upon their coming to
Lee, and communicating their information, the general discovered much
surprise, and expressed his disapprobation of Scott’s conduct in strong
terms; but immediately upon the intelligence, directed a light-horse
officer to carry orders to the marquis de la Fayette to return to the
court-house. A general retreat now commenced on the right, till the
troops reached Freehold and a neighboring wood. When these were quitted,
the British pursued as far as the village, where they halted. Mean while
the Americans marched on and passed the next morass in front of Carr’s
house, about half a mile from the village. The retreats and advances
which took place were attended with cannonadings on each side. The halt
of the British, on account of the intense heat of the weather, and their
having suffered severely from fatigue, admitted of the Americans halting
also for a considerable space, which heat and fatigue had rendered
equally necessary for them. But upon the advance of the British from
Freehold, and Lee’s discerning that the position he at first meant to
occupy with the design of receiving the enemy and baffling their attack,
was not suitable; the whole of his command, Scott, Maxwell, and the
others having now joined the corps which before formed the right, were
ordered to retreat from the neighbourhood of Carr’s house toward a wood
and eminence behind the morass they had crossed in the morning, which
had been pointed out to him as a desirable and proper spot. Before they
had wholly left the ground about Carr’s house, the British cavalry made
a sudden and rapid charge upon some parties of the American horse, who
were in the rear reconnoitring. It was expected they would have
attempted a charge on the whole rear, but they did not venture upon it.
Soon after Lee with his columns issued out of the woods below the
court-house into the plain, gen. Washington was advancing with the main
body of the army between English-town and Freehold meeting. Expecting
from the information brought him, than the van of Lee’s command and the
rear of the British would ere long engage, he ordered the right wing
under gen. Greene to go to the right to prevent the enemy’s turning his
right flank: and then prepared to follow with the left wing directly in
Lee’s rear to support him. While this disposition was making, he
learned, to his great surprise, from a countryman, that the continental
troops were retreating. Though the account was confirmed by two or three
persons whom he met on the road, after moving a few paces forward, yet
he appeared to discredit it, having not heard any firing except a few
cannon a considerable time before. He rode on, and between Freehold
meeting and the morass, which he had just crossed, met the retreating
troops marching toward the same, as Lee meant that they should re-pass
it and then occupy the ground behind it, where he proposed making a
stand against the enemy. Washington was exceedingly alarmed at finding
the advanced corps falling back upon the main body, without the least
notice given him. He desired one of the retreating colonels to march his
men over the morass, halt them on the eminence, and refresh them. Seeing
Lee at the head of the next column, he rode up to him with a degree of
astonishment and indignation, and proposed certain questions that
implied censure. Lee felt it, and answered with warmth and unsuitable
language. Hard and irritating words passed between them for a short
space, when Washington rode on toward the rear of the retreating troops.
He had not gone many yards before he met his secretary, who told him
that the British army were within fifteen minutes march of that place,
which was the first intelligence he received of their pushing on so
briskly. He remained there till the extreme rear of the retreating
troops got up, when looking about, and judging the ground to be an
advantageous spot for giving the enemy the first check, he ordered col.
Stewart’s and lieut. col. Ramsay’s battalions to form, and incline to
their left, that they might be under cover of a corner of woods, and not
be exposed to the enemy’s cannon in front. Lee having been told by one
of his aids, that Washington had taken the command, answered, “Then I
have nothing further to do;” turned his horse and rode after his
excellency in front. Washington on his coming up asked, “Will you
command on this ground or not? If you will, I will return to the main
body and have them formed upon the next height.” Lee replied, “It is
equal to me where I command.” Washington then told him, “I expect you
will take proper measures for checking the enemy.” Lee said, “Your
orders shall be obeyed, and I will not be the first to leave the field.”
Washington then rode to the main army, which was formed with the utmost
expedition on the eminence with the morass in front. Immediately upon
his riding off a warm cannonade commenced between the British and
American artillery on the right of Stewart and Ramsay; between whom and
the advanced troops of the British army a heavy fire began soon after in
the skirt of the woods before mentioned. The British pressed on close,
their light-horse charged upon the right of the Americans, and the
latter were obliged to give way in such haste, that the British horse
and infantry came out of the wood seemingly mixed with them. The action
then commenced between the British and col. Livingston’s regiment
together with Varnum’s brigade, which had been drawn up by Lee’s order,
and lined the fence that stretched across the open field in front of the
bridge over the morass, with the view of covering the retreat of the
artillery and the troops advanced with them. The artillery had timely
retired to the rear of the fence, and from an eminence discharged
several grapes of shot at the British, engaged with Livingston’s and
Varnum’s troops; these were soon broken by a charge of the former and
retired. The artillery were then ordered off. Prior to the commencement
of the last action, Lee sent orders to col. Ogden, who had drawn up in
the wood nearest the bridge, to defend that post to the last extremity,
thereby to cover the retreat of the whole over the bridge. Lee was one
of the last that remained on the field, and brought off the rear of the
retreating troops. Upon his addressing general Washington, after passing
the morass, with—“Sir, here are my troops, how is it your pleasure that
I should dispose of them?” he was ordered to arrange them in the rear of
English-town.
The check the British received, gave time to make a disposition of the
left wing and second line of the main army in the wood and on the
eminence to which Lee had been directed and was retreating. On this were
placed some batteries of cannon by lord Stirling, who commanded the left
wing, which played upon the British with great effect, and seconded by
parties of infantry detached to oppose them, effectually put a stop to
their advance. Gen. Greene, who had early filed off to the right, on
intelligence of the retreat of the advanced corps, marched up, and took
a very advantageous position on the right of Stirling. The British
finding themselves warmly opposed in front, attempted to turn the
American left flank, but were repulsed. They also made a movement to the
American right, with as little success. Greene having advanced a body of
troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground, which not only
disappointed their design, but severely infiladed those in the front of
the left wing. In addition to this, Wayne advanced with a body of
troops, and kept up so severe and well directed a fire, that the British
were soon compelled to give way. They retired and took the position
about Carr’s house, which Lee had before occupied. Here their flanks
were secured by thick woods and morasses, while their front could be
approached only through a narrow pass. Washington however, resolved to
attack them; and for that purpose ordered gen. Poor, with his own and
the Carolina brigade, to move round upon their right, and gen. Woodward
to their left; and the artillery to gall them in front; but they were
prevented getting within reach before dark. They remained upon the
ground which they had been directed to occupy, during the night, with an
intention to begin the attack early the next morning, and the main body
continued lying upon their arms in the field of action, to be in
readiness for supporting them. During the action, Washington animated
his forces by his gallant example; and by exposing his person to every
danger common to the meanest soldier, taught them to hold nothing too
dear for the good of their country. At night he laid down and reposed
himself in his cloak, under a tree, in hope, as may be supposed, of a
general action the ensuing day; for it appears from several
circumstances, that he was all along rather desirous of that event,
notwithstanding the prevailing contrary opinion of the general officers
whom he consulted. In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton’s troops were
employed in removing their wounded; and about twelve o’clock[88] at
night, they marched away in such silence, that though Poor lay extremely
near them, their retreat was effected without his knowledge. They left
behind them four officers and about forty privates, whose wounds were
too dangerous to permit their removal.
The extreme heat of the weather, the distance Sir Henry had gained by
marching in the night, and the fatigue of the Americans, made a pursuit
on the part of gen. Washington impracticable and fruitless. It would
only have been fatal to numbers of the men, several of whom died on the
day of action through the excessive heat; for Farenheit’s thermometer
was at 96 degrees in the Jerseys, and is said to have been 112 at
Philadelphia. It was a deep sandy country through which they marched,
almost destitute of water; but had there been a plenty, many more would
probably have perished by unguarded drinking to allay their thirst; some
were lost in that way. Sir Henry, without having been joined by the
brigade of British and the 17th light dragoons from Knyphausen’s
division, secured by his manœuvres the arrival of the royal army in the
neighborhood of Sandy-Hook on the 30th of June, without the loss of
either the covering party or the baggage; but not without a considerable
diminution of troops; for by a moderate calculation, from the evacuation
of Philadelphia down to that day, about eight hundred deserted, a great
number of whom were hessians. By the returns of the officers who had the
charge of the burying parties, they left 245 non-commissioned and
privates on the field, and four officers. There were also beside these,
several fresh graves and burying holes found near the field, in which
they had put their dead before they had quitted it.[89] Fifty-nine of
their soldiers perished without receiving a wound, in the same manner as
several of the Americans, merely through fatigue and heat. The loss of
lieut. col. Monckton, who was slain, was much lamented by the British.
Upward of a hundred were made prisoners, including the officers and
privates left upon the field. On the part of the Americans,
lieutenant-colonel Bonner and major Dickinson, officers of distinguished
merit, were slain; beside six others of inferior rank, and 61
non-commissioned and privates. The wounded were 24 officers and 136
non-commissioned and privates. The missing amounted to 130, but many of
them, having only dropped through fatigue, soon joined the army. General
Washington commended the zeal and bravery of the officers in general,
but particularized Wayne as deserving special commendation. The behavior
of the troops in general, after recovering from the first surprise,
occasioned by the retreat of the advanced corps, was mentioned as what
could not be surpassed. The public acknowledgments of congress were very
flattering to the army, and particularly so to the general and his
officers. The general having declined all further pursuit, detached only
some light troops to attend the motions of the royal forces, and drew of
the main body of his army to the borders of the North-River.
The general, on his second interview with Lee upon the day of action,
intimated by his reinstating and leaving him in the command of the
advanced corps, that he meant to pass by what had happened without
further notice; but the latter could not brook the expressions used by
the former at their first meeting; and therefore wrote him two
passionate letters, which occasioned his being put under an arrest, and
brought to trial four days after the action, on the following charges,
exhibited against him by his excellency—1st, For disobedience of orders,
in not attacking the enemy on the 28th of June, agreeable to repeated
instructions—2dly, For misbehavior before the enemy on the same day, by
making an _unnecessary, disorderly and shameful retreat_—3dly, For
disrespect to the commander in chief, in two letters, dated the 1st of
July and the 28th of June. The letter dated 1st of July, was so dated
through mistake, being written on the 28th of June. On the 12th of
August, the court-martial, at which lord Stirling presided, found him
guilty upon every charge, and sentenced him to be suspended from any
command in the armies of the United States of North-America, for the
term of twelve months. The terms of the second charge were softened
down, as he was only found guilty of misbehavior before the enemy, by
making an unnecessary, and in some few instances, a disorderly retreat.
Many were displeased with the conduct of the court-martial; and thought
he ought not to have been found guilty, except upon the last charge.
They argued, “It appears from Washington’s own letter, and other
circumstances, that it was submitted to Lee’s judgment whether to
attack, in what manner, and when. There was manifest proof of Lee’s
intending to attack, in hope of cutting off the enemy’s covering party;
but he altered his opinion as to the promising prospect he had of doing
it, on his coming into the plain, reconnoitring the enemy, and
concluding that they were more numerous than before supposed; and upon
finding Scott had quitted the point of wood where he meant to order him
to remain, he judged an immediate retreat necessary. The detachment with
which Lee was, amounted to no more than one-third of his whole command;
Scott’s column, Maxwell’s brigade, and the other troops to his left,
being full two-thirds. When he began to retire, the main body was more
than six miles distant, though advancing. The enemy’s force was rendered
the more formidable by their great superiority in cavalry, which was
thought to be between four and five hundred. The ground being open, was
by no means advantageous to the Americans, as the British cavalry could
have turned their flank. Would then an immediate attack, under these
circumstances, though it might have distressed the enemy’s rear on the
first onset, have been advisable, as it might probably have involved a
general action before the detachment could have received support? Did
not prudence dictate falling back, and taking a new position, rather
than hazarding an action in the plain? If Lee’s judgment determined for
the affirmative, how could he be declared guilty of disobeying orders?”
The circumstances already noted are in favor of the retreat’s being
necessary in the first instance; and when commenced, the prosecution of
it was absolutely necessary till a good position could be taken for
making an effectual stand against the enemy, to which position Lee was
marching when met by Washington. The strenuous efforts of the British
after the main army was drawn up in that position, before they retired
three miles from the scene of action, tend also to justify the
commencement of the retreat. No mention should have been made of its
being in a few instances, unless such instances were really chargeable
to Lee’s misconduct; whereas of these few it is certain, that some were
owing to fatigue and the enormous heat of the weather. The very sentence
of the court-martial is in favor of Lee’s innocence as to the two first
charges; for a year’s suspension from command is in no wise proportioned
to his crimes, if guilty. Several are of opinion that he would not have
been condemned on these two, had it not been for his disrespectful
conduct toward Washington. On the other hand, some have surmised, that
his manœuvres were owing either to treachery or want of courage; but
they who have the opportunity of knowing him most, will be furtherest
from such apprehensions.[90]
No sooner had Sir Henry Clinton with the army evacuted Philadelphia,
than lord Howe prepared to sail with the fleet for New-York. Repeated
calms retarded his passage down the Delaware, so that he could not quit
the river till the evening of June the 28th: however he anchored off
Sandy-Hook the next day, followed by the transports. The succeeding day
Sir Henry arrived, and the artillery, baggage, and part of the troops
were removed from the main, as the weather permitted: the rest of the
army passed, on the 5th of July, over a bridge of boats across a narrow
channel to Sandy-Hook. They were afterward carried up to New-York. On
the 7th, lord Howe received advice that the Toulon squadron was arrived
on the coast of Virginia. Count d’Estaing anchored at night on the 8th
at the entrance of the Delaware, after being 87 days at sea. On that day
the count wrote to congress: on the receipt of his letter, they sent
word to gen. Washington, that it was their desire he would co-operate
with the count, in the execution of such offensive operations as they
should mutually approve. The same day the congress resolved that a
suitable house should be provided for Monsieur Gerard and chose a
committee of five to wait on him upon his arrival, and conduct him to
his lodgings. The next morning d’Estaing weighed and sailed toward the
Hook, and in the evening of the 11th anchored without it. Had not bad
weather and unexpected impediments prevented, the count must have
surprised Howe’s fleet in the Delaware, as the latter would not have had
time to escape after being apprized of his danger.—The destruction of
the fleet must have been the consequence of such surprisal; and that
must have occasioned the inevitable loss of the royal army, which would
have been so enclosed by the French squadron on the one side, and the
American forces on the other, that the Saratoga catastrophe must have
been repeated. This fatal stroke would have been of an amount and
magnitude (with respect to both the marine and land service, and the
consequences hanging upon it) not easily to be conceived. The prevention
of it, by the various hindrances that d’Estaing met with on his voyage,
ought to be considered by Great-Britain as a signally providential
deliverance.
Lord Howe’s fleet consisted only of six 64 gun ships, three of 50, and
two of 40, with some frigates and sloops. Count d’Estaing had twelve
ships of the line, several of which were of great force and weight of
metal, one carrying 90, another 80, and six 74 guns each; he had beside
present with him three of the four stout large frigates that had
attended him on his voyage. He anchored on the Jersey side, about four
miles without the Hook; and American pilots of the first abilities,
provided for the purpose, went on board the fleet: among them were
persons whose circumstances placed them above the rank of common pilots.
Lord Howe had the advantage of possessing the harbor formed by
Sandy-Hook, the entrance of which is covered by a bar, and from whence
the inlet passes to New-York. As it could no be known whether the French
would not attempt passing in force over the bar, it was necessary that
the British should be prepared to oppose them. On this occasion a spirit
displayed itself not only in the fleet and army, but through every order
and denomination of seamen, that is not often equalled. The crews of the
transports hastened with eagerness to the fleet, that it might be
completely manned; masters and mates solicited employment, and took
their stations at the guns with the common sailors, the light-infantry,
granadiers, and even wounded officers so contended to serve as marines
on board the men of war, that the point of honor was obliged to be
decided by lot. In a word, the patriotism, zeal, bravery and magnanimity
which appeared at this juncture, was a credit even to Great-Britain. It
must however be acknowledged, that the popularity of lord Howe, and the
confidence founded on his abilities, contributed not a little to these
exertions. But the American pilots declaring it impossible to carry the
large ships of d’Estaing’s squadron over the bar into the Hook, on
account of their draught of water, and gen. Washington pressing him to
sail to Newport, he left the Hook after eleven days tarriance, [July
22.] and in a few hours was out of sight. Nothing could be more
providential. While he remained, about twenty sail of vessels bound to
New-York fell into his possession: they were chiefly prizes taken from
the Americans; but had he stayed a few days longer admiral Byron’s fleet
must have fallen a defenceless pray into his hands. That squadron had
met with unusual bad weather and being separated in different storms,
and lingering through a tedious passage, arrived, scattered, broken,
sickly, dismasted, or otherwise damaged, in various degrees of distress,
upon different and remote parts of the American coast. Between the
departure of d’Estaing and the thirtieth of July, the Renown of 50 guns
from the West-Indies, the Raisonable and Centurion of 64 and 50 from
Hallifax, and the Cornwall of 74 guns, all arrived singly at Sandy-Hook.
By his speedy departure a number of provision ships from Cork escaped
also, together with their convoy.—They went up the Delaware within fifty
miles of Philadelphia after lord Howe had quitted the river, not having
obtained any information of what had happened. The British ministry had
neglected countermanding their destination, though orders for the
evacuation of Philadelphia had been sent off so early as to have
admitted of their receiving fresh directions where to have steered,
before sailing. Great rejoicings were made at New-York upon their safe
arrival, especially as provisions were much wanted by both the fleet and
army.
As the bar prevented all attempts on the part of d’Estaing against
Howe’s fleet within the Hook, a plan was concerted for attacking
Rhode-Island; and gen. Sullivan, who commanded at Providence, was
employed in assembling an additional body of New-England militia. Such
was the eagerness of people to cooperate with their new allies, and
their confidence of succeeding and reaping laurels, that some thousands
of volunteers, gentlemen and others from Boston, Salem, Newbury-Port,
Portsmouth, &c. engaged in the service. When d’Estaing was arrived off
point Judith on the 29th, the pilots who were to have facilitated his
entrance into Newport, were wanting, which occasioned a delay. But on
the morning of August the 5th, his operations commenced, when the
British set fire to the Orpheus, Lark, Juno and Cerbarus frigates and
several other vessels at the appearance of two of his fleet standing in
near Prudence island to attack them. The Flora and Falcon were sunk
afterward. The next day the American troops marched from Providence to
Tiverton under the command of general Greene, who had been dispatched by
gen. Washington from the main army to assist in the expedition. His
excellency also sent on the marquis de la Fayette at the head of two
thousand troops, who by a rapid march joined the militia in season. Gen.
Sullivan’s first letter to the count informed him, that he was not ready
to act, and desired that the attack might be suspended. It was agreed
between them that they should land their forces at Portsmouth on the
tenth in the morning. On the eighth the French fleet went up the middle
passage leading into Newport harbour, when the British batteries began a
severe cannonade, which was returned with great warmth.
The royal troops on the island, having been just reinforced with five
battalions, were about 6000 under the command of Sir Robert Pigot, who
took every possible means of defence. The force under general Sullivan
was composed of about 10,000 men. Upon his receiving intelligence early
on the ninth, that the enemy had evacuated their works on the north end
of the island, and retreated within their lines, about three miles from
Newport, regardless of the agreement with d’Estaing, he concluded (as it
appeared to him best) to push over without loss of time. The army was
immediately put in motion; about eight o’clock the right wing, under
gen. Greene, began to cross from Tiverton, and the rest of the Americans
followed in order. The Massachusetts militia were attended by Mr.
Hancock as their major-general. About two in the afternoon a fleet
consisting of near 25 sail, was discovered standing in for Newport,
which came to off Point Judith for the night. Lord Howe had determined
to attempt the preservation of the island; but notwithstanding all his
exertions, could not reach sight of it till the day after the French
fleet had entered the harbour. Though his own exceeded the other in
point of number, yet it was far inferior with respect to effective force
and weight of metal. He had one ship of 74 guns—seven of 64—five of
50—six from 44 to 32—and twelve smaller vessels including fire ships and
bomb ketches. When he first appeared, the garrison were much elated, but
upon learning that he brought no provision, of which they were nearly
exhausted, they were equally dejected. A sudden change of wind favoring
the count, he stood out to sea with all his squadron, about eight
o’clock the next morning. They were severely cannonaded as they passed
by the batteries, but received no material damage. Howe deeming the
weather gage of too great an advantage to be added to the superior force
of the count, contended for that object with all the skill of an
experienced seaman; while the count was as eager to preserve it. This
contest prevented an engagement on that day; but the wind on the
following still continuing adverse to the design of Howe, he determined
to make the best of present circumstances, and wait the approach of the
count. A strong gale, which increased to a violent tempest, and
continued for near forty-eight hours, put by the engagement. Two of the
French ships were dismasted and others much damaged. The Languedoc, of
90 guns, d’Estaing’s own ship, lost her rudder and all her masts; and
was met in that condition on the evening of the 13th, by the Renown, of
50 guns. Captain Dawson bore down without hoisting colours. The count
ordered captain Caleb Gardner, who was on board as a pilot, to hail him,
that he might know what ship it was. Dawson made no answer, but ran with
a full sail and fair wind till he was under the stern of the Languedoc,
then hoisted English colours, fired in great and small shot, and
musketry, and sailed off. The Languedoc upon that fired two chace guns
after him, when he never attempted to approach her more. The same
evening the Preston, of fifty guns, commodore Hotham, fell in with the
Tonant of eighty guns, with only her main mast standings, and attacked
her with spirit, but night put an end to the engagement. The junction of
six sail of the French squadron, prevented all further attempts upon
their two disabled ships by the Renown and Preston in the morning. On
the 16th the Isis of 50 guns, capt. Raynor, was chased by the Cæsar,
capt. Bouganville, a French 74 gun. Neither had suffered in the tempest.
A close and desperate engagement was maintained on both sides, with the
greatest obstinacy, for an hour and an half, within pistol shot. The
Cæsar at length put before the wind and sailed off, the captain having
lost his arm, the lieutenant his leg, a number of men being killed and
wounded, and the ship considerably damaged. The Isis had suffered so in
her mast and rigging that she could not attempt a pursuit.
The troops under gen. Sullivan now demand our attention. When they had
landed, they possessed themselves of the heights near the north end of
the island. They suffered no less than the ships by the tempest. The
wind blew most violently, attended with a flood of rain through the
whole day of the 12th, and increased so at night that not a marquee or
tent could stand; several of the soldiers perished by the severity of
the storm, many horses died, the greatest part of the ammunition
delivered to the troops was damaged, and the condition of the army was
deplorable. On the 14th, the storm was over, and the weather clear and
fine. The garrison having enjoyed better accommodations, and greater
security than the Americans, Sir Robert Pigot had a fair opportunity of
attacking the latter while dispirited and worn down by the painful
scenes from which they had just immerged. Gen. Greene and some British
officers are of opinion, that a bold and vigorous onset under these
cirsumstances would have been highly proper and successful. But as
nothing of this kind happened the day was spent by the Americans in
drying their clothes, &c. and getting in order for an advance. The next
morning they marched at six o’clock, and took post about two miles from
the British lines. By the 20th they had opened two four gun batteries;
but their approaches were slow. About two o’clock in the afternoon the
French fleet was discovered standing for Newport. At seven gen. Greene
and the marquis de la Fayette went on board the Languedoc, to consult
upon measures proper to be pursued for the success of the expedition in
which they were engaged. They urged d’Estaing to return with his fleet
into Newport harbor. He was apparently inclined to a compliance: but all
the captains and principal officers on board were rather unfriendly to
him. He being a land officer, they thought it an affront to their
understandings, and a piece of injustice done to their merits and
services, to have him appointed to the command over their heads. They
therefore crossed him in every measure, that looked like giving him any
kind of reputation, in order if possible, to bring him into disgrace.
His instructions from the court of France were to go to Boston, if the
fleet met with any misfortune, or if there appeared a superior British
fleet upon the cost. The count had met with a misfortune, the Cæsar
which had steered for Boston was missing, and a superior British fleet
was expected. All the officers insisted upon his following the
instructions, and entered into a formal protest against prosecuting the
expedition any further. About twelve o’clock at night of the 21st,
Greene and the marquis returned, and made a report of what had passed.
The next day letters went on board from generals Sullivan and Hancock;
as also a protest dated—Camp before Newport, Aug. 22, 1778—and signed by
John Sullivan, N. Greene, John Hancock, J. Glover, Ezek. Cornell, Wm.
Whipple, John Tyler, Soloman Lovell, Jon. Fitconel. They protested in a
solemn manner against the count’s taking the fleet to Boston, as
derogatory to the honor of France, contrary to the intention of his most
Christian majesty and the interest of his nation, and destructive in the
highest degree to the welfare of the United States of America, and
highly injurious to the alliance formed between the two nations. One of
the reasons assigned for the protest was, that the army and stores
collected for the reduction of the island would be liable to be lost, by
an opportunity’s being given to the enemy to cut off the communication
with the main, and totally to prevent the retreat of the army. The best
apology that can be made for this protest is, that it was designedly as
a finesse to induce the captains of the French fleet to consent to its
returning into the harbour of Newport. But it had not this effect and
met with a spirited answer from the count, who sailed on the same day
for Boston. Sullivan was so chagrined at the departure of the fleet,
that contrary to all policy, he gave out in general orders on the 24th,
“The generel cannot help lamenting the sudden and unexpected departure
of the French fleet, as he finds it has a tendency to discourage some
who placed great dependence upon the assistance of it, though he can by
no means suppose the army or any part of it endangered by this movement.
He yet hopes the event will prove America able to procure that by her
own arms, which her allies refuse to assist in obtaining.” Two days
after, in new orders, he endeavoured to smooth off the reflection
contained in it, by declaring that he meant not to insinuated that the
departure of the French fleet was owing to a fixed determination not to
assist in the enterprise, and would not wish to give the least colour to
ungenerous and illiberal minds to make such unfair interpretations.
Count d’Estaing, when arrived in Boston port, wrote to congress on the
26th, and in his letter mentioned—the embarrassments of the king’s
squadron as well on account of water as provisions, how his hopes were
deceived with regard to these two articles, which were growing more and
more important—that it was necessary for him to confine all his
attention to the preservation of the squadron, and restoring it to a
condition to act—that he was no longer at liberty to depend on deceitful
expectations of watering and getting provisions. He justified his
repairing to Boston from the situation of his ships, the advices of a
squadron from Europe, the ignorance of what was become of lord Howe’s
fleet, and the advantage that his lordship would have had for attacking
him had he returned into Newport. He also expressed his displeasure at
the protest.