The French, to perplex the councils of the British court assembled a
multitude of regiments from all parts of the kingdom, and marched them
down to the sea side, where they formed large encampments opposite to
the shores of Great-Britain.—These manœuvres occasioned the calling out
and embodying of the militia of England upon the rising of parliament.
The militia being joined by the regular forces, camps were formed in
different places: but the nation trusted most to the navy.
My last closed with the account of Admiral _Keppel’s_ having sailed. He
was deservedly in the highest esteem with his own profession, as well as
the public. It was extremely proper therefore that he should be
appointed to command that fleet, to which was committed the defence of
the island, the protection of the homeward bound trade, and the
preservation of the dignity of the British flag in the adjoining seas.
On his arrival at Portsmouth toward the end of March, he found matters
very different from the opinion that had been generally circulated, and
from what he himself had been led to expect. Instead of a strong and
well appointed fleet, he discovered to his astonishment, that there were
only six sail of the line in any degree of condition for immediate
service; even these on his reviewing them, with a seaman’s eye, gave him
no peculiar pleasure. The paucity and condition of both men and ships
was not more alarming, than the deficiency of all kinds of naval stores
was lamentable; but the admiral acted with such prudence and caution, as
to prevent that increase of the public alarm, that a display of these
circumstances must have occasioned. He urged his private applications to
the admiralty, with such assiduity and effect, that a new spirit and
unusual degree of vigor were suddenly seen to prevade the naval
department: and such industry was used, that beside dispatching the
twelve ships for America under Byron, he was enabled to take the seas
with a fleet of twenty sail of the line, at the time already mentioned.
He had scarcely arrived at his station in the Bay of Biscay, when two
French frigates, with two smaller vessels appeared in sight, and were
evidently taking a survey of the fleet. War had not been declared nor
reprisals ordered: but it was necessary to stop these frigates, as well
to obtain intelligence, as to prevent its being conveyed. A general
signal for chasing was made; a ship of the line got at length along side
of the Licorne of 32 guns; on her firing a gun, the Frechman stood to
her and was brought into the fleet. Mean while, the other French
frigate, _La Belle Poule_, of twenty-six heavy twelve pounders, beside
several others of lighter metal, with a schooner of ten guns in company
were closely pursued by the _Arethusa_ frigate of only twenty-eight six
pounders, and the Alert cutter, till ought of sight of the fleet. The
Arethusa getting up with her chase, captain _Marshall_ requested the
French officer, lieutenant _Chedeau de la Clocheterie_ to bring to, and
acquainded him with the order for conducting him to the admiral. A
compliance being refused, the captain fired a shot across the Belle
Poule, which she instantly returned, by pouring her whole broadside into
the Arethusa. A desperate engagement ensued with unusual warmth and
animosity for above two hours, each side vying with the utmost degree of
national emulation to obtain the palm of victory, in this first action
and opening of a new war. The Belle Poule had the superiority not only
in the weight of metal, but to number of men. The Arethusa was so
shattered, that she became almost unmanageable as there was little wind.
The captain was obliged to act with the more caution, as he was upon the
French coast, and close on shore at midnight. The Belle Poule having her
head in with the land, and meeting with no further interruption from the
Arethusa, embraced the opportunity of standing into a small bay. During
the forepart of this action, the engagement was no less warm between the
Alert cutter and French schooner.—Their force was about equal. The
contest was well supported for upward of an hour, when the schooner was
compelled to strike. Next morning an unexpected movement made by the
Licorne, occasioned one of the convoy to fire a shot across her way, as
a signal for keeping her course, when to the astonishment of admiral
Keppel and the whole fleet, she suddenly poured her whole broad-side,
accompanied with a general discharge of musketry, into the America, of
74 guns, at the instant lord Longford, her commander, was standing upon
the gunwale, and talking in terms of the utmost politeness to the French
captain. The frigate instantly struck her colours, as soon as she had
discharged her fire. Only four of the America’s people were wounded.
Notwithstanding the provocation, lord Longford had such command of his
temper as not to return a single shot.—Another French frigate falling in
with the fleet, was detained by the admiral, under the plea of hostility
committed by the Licorne; but several French merchantmen wer suffered to
pass through the fleet unmolested. The capture of the French frigates
afforded the admiral a source of the most critical and alarming
information. He was now within sight of Ushant, when he discovered to
his astonishment, that the French fleet in Brest road and Brest water,
amounted to thirty-two ships of the line, beside ten or twelve frigates,
while his own force consisted only of twenty of the former and three of
the latter. The odds between the two fleets was so vast, that he could
not justify risking an action, which might prove fatal to the kingdom.
But it gave him the greatest uneasiness to find himself obliged to turn
his back on France. The French no sooner determined to take a decided
part with the Americans, than they assiduously applied themselves to the
getting of their navy into the utmost forwardness for actual service;
and had proceeded with such profound secrecy that the strength of it had
not transpired so as to reach the British ministry, who appear to have
been wanting in procuring good and early intelligence; which was a
matter of so much importance in the estimation of the French, that they
used every means for obtaining it. The Brest fleet lay ready for
sailing; and was only detained till the destination of admiral Byron’s
force could be ascertained at Paris.
[June 27.] On the return of the British fleet to Portsmouth, the
admiral’s conduct was branded with the most opprobrious terms, and
ascribed to the most disgraceful motives, and his general character
treated with the most indecent scurrility in those publications which he
considered as under the immediate direction of the ministers. He bore
all with wonderful temper; made no complaints; pressed forward the
preparations for his return to sea, without noise or parade; and
submitted to all the unmerited reproach thrown upon him, without being
provoked to a justification, which, by the narration of the fact, must
have criminated the first lord of the admiralty. The seasonable arrival
of the two first of the British West-India fleets, and of the Levant
trade, brought in a supply of seamen at the most critical period in
which they could have been wanted. By this mean, and the exertions every
where used by the admiralty, Keppel was enabled to put again to sea, on
the ninth of July, with 24 ships of the line, and was joined on the way
by six more; he had also an addition of one frigate and two fire ships.
Mean while the French king made use of the engagement with the Belle
Poule and the taking of the other frigates, as the ostensible ground for
issuing out orders for a reprisal on British ships, and the ordinance
signed the 28th of March, was immediately published. Similar measures
were pursued in Great-Britain, when the account of these transactions
was received. Thus nothing of war was wanting between the two nations,
excepting the formality of the declaration.
The force and destination of admiral Byron being at length made certain
to the French ministry, orders were sent to the Brest fleet to proceed
to sea. They instantly weighed anchor, and sailed the day preceding the
departure of the British fleet from Portsmouth. They amounted to 32
ships of the line, and a cloud of frigates, and were divided into three
squadrons, the whole under the command of the count d’Orvilliers, who
was assisted in his own particular division, by admiral the count de
Guichen. The second was commanded by the count Duchaffault, assisted by
monsieur de Rochechovart; and the third by the duke of Chartres, a
prince of the blood, seconded by admiral the count de Grasse. The duke
was sent on board by the court to animate the fleet, and to intimate the
greatness of the objects proposed, and how much reliance was placed on
the courage and exertions of the officers and seamen. The British fleet
was also thrown into three divisions, the van being commanded by Sir
Robert Harland, and the rear by Sir Hugh Palliser. The commander in
chief, with the centre division, was assisted by the voluntary services
of admiral Campbell, a brave and experienced officer, who from ancient
friendship and a long participation of danger and service, condescended
to act as first captain in Keppel’s own ship, the Victory. The two
fleets came in sight of each other on the 23d, in the afternoon. From
the movements of the French admiral, it was inferred that he had no
knowledge of the increase of Keppel’s strength; but considered his fleet
as being in number the same as when on its station before Brest. He
appeared disposed to bring on an immediate action; but when the fleets
approached so near as to discover each other’s force, he apparently
relinquished that determination, and continued afterward to evade, with
great caution and knowledge in his profession, all those endeavours
which were used on the other side to bring on an engagement. Through a
fresh gale and a change of wind in the night, the French gained the
weather gage, by which they had the advantage either of bringing it on,
or of totally avoiding it. But two of their line of battle ships fell
considerably to the leeward, and were so effectually cut off from the
rest of the fleet, that they were never able to rejoin it during the
remainder of the cruise. This put the hostile fleets on an equality in
point of number, with respect to line of battle ships. The British fleet
continued constantly to beat up against the wind in pursuit of the
French, who declined coming to a general engagement, as they daily
expected a strong reinforcement, and hoped to intercept the commercial
fleets, that, while making for the British ports, would have to pass
through the track in which their numerous frigates were stationed.
Admiral Keppel penetrated their motives, and labored to bring them to
action; and as the preserving of a regular line of battle with any hope
of it was evidently impracticable, the signal for chasing to windward
was kept constantly flying. [July 27.] Some sudden shifts of wind,
together with an unexpected and unintentional effect produced by an
evolution on the French side, being all improved by the most masterly
efforts on the other, brought the two fleet so close that they could not
part without an action. But the French endeavored to avade its
consequences as much as possible; and by suddenly putting about on the
contrary tack, altered the course of the ships in each fleet, so that
they could engage only as they passed, instead of lying side to side,
and thereby making an effectual impression.
The French began, by firing at a great distance on the headmost of Sir
Robert Harland’s division as the ships led up, but not a shot was
returned till they were near the enemy. The example was followed, or a
similar conduct pursued by the fleet in general, as fast as each ship
could close up with the French; and notwithstanding their having been
necessarily extended by the chase, they were all soon in battle. As the
fleets passed each other very close on the opposite tacks, the cannonade
was heavy, and the effect considerable. The action lasted about three
hours. As the French in their usual way, directed their fire principally
against the rigging, several of the British ships suffered considerably
in their masts, yards and sails. The British fire which was principally
levelled at the hulls of the enemy, was not deficient in its effect of
another kind, the destruction of the seamen. The action being over for
the present, admiral Keppel hauled down the signal for battle, till the
ships could recover their stations, or get near enough to support each
other on the renewal of the action. To call them together for that
purpose, he immediately made the signal to form the line of battle
a-head, which was considered as commanding the most prompt obedience.
Admiral Palliser was at this moment in his proper station; but quitted
it and passing Keppel to leeward on the contrary tack, while the latter
was advancing to the enemy, never came into the line during the rest of
the day. Palliser being totally out of the line, other ships for
a-stern, and 5 disabled in their rigging, at a great distance to
leeward, the British admiral, about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, could
not collect above twelve ships to renew the engagement. The French
observing the exposed situation of the British ships which had fallen to
leeward to repair their damages, edged away with an evident intention of
cutting them off from the rest of the fleet. Adm. Keppel instantly
discerned their design and the danger of the ships, and suddenly wore
and stood athwart the van of the enemy, in a diagonal line, for their
protection. He also dispatched orders to Sir Robert Harland to form his
division at a distance astern of the Victory, to cover the rear and keep
the enemy in check, till Palliser should, in obedience to the signal,
come with his division into his proper station. The protection of the
disabled ships being accomplished, and the French continuing to form
their line, ranging up to leeward parallel to the centre division, it
became the admiral’s immediate object to form his as speedily as
possible, in order to bear down upon them and renew the battle. Seeing
Palliser still to windward, he sent capt. Windsor of the Fox frigate
with express orders to him to bear down into his wake; and to tell him,
that he only waited for him and his division to renew the attack. This
order not producing the desired effect, the admiral threw out the signal
for all ships to come into their stations; and again at seven o’clock,
being wearied out with fruitless expectation, he made the signal for
each particular ship of Palliser’s division to come into her station in
the line; but before they had complied with this signal, night put an
end to all further operations.—From a motive of delicacy, no signal was
particularly thrown out to the Formidable, Sir Hugh Palliser’s own ship.
The French could have renewed the action during every hour of the
afternoon, with apparent advantages, which from the situation of affairs
could not possibly have escaped their observation. Their conduct the
following night indicated their indisposition to a renewal of it. Three
of their best sailing vessels were stationed at proper distances with
lights to divert the attention of the British fleet, and to induce a
belief that their whole line still kept its position. During this
deception the rest of the fleet withdrew in the most silent manner,
without lights or other signals than the throwing up of some rockets;
and made the best of their way to Brest, where they arrived the next
evening. By day-light the French fleet had got at such a distance, that
the British admiral concluded, he had not the smallest prospect of
coming up with them, and that neither a general nor partial pursuit
could answer any beneficial purpose. He therefore left only a proper
force to protect the homeward bound trade, and then made the best of his
way to Plymouth, as being the nearest port, in order to put the fleet
into a proper condition to return in quest of the enemy.
It was observed on the day of action with equal surprise and regret, and
by some of the bravest and most experienced British officers, that the
French worked and manœuvred their ships, with a degree of seaman-like
address and dexterity, which they never before perceived. The event of
the day, and the consequent escape of the French fleet were to admiral
Keppel intolerably grievous. By his consummate skill, and the most
incessant industry, he had gained after four days pursuit of the enemy,
one of the fairest opportunities of doing the most signal service to his
country, in the most critical exigency, and of raising his own name to
the summit of naval renown. He hoped to have made the 27th of July, “a
proud day to Great-Britain.” All these mighty advantages and glorious
rewards were unaccountably ravished from him, when they appeared within
his grasp. In Plymouth, the failure of a complete victory was attributed
to Sir Hugh Palliser; whose non-compliance with the admiral’s signals
has been ascribed by many to the disabled condition of some of the ships
in his division.
The admiral, with wonderful temper, and no less prudence, accommodated
his conduct to the necessity of his situation, and made the public
security and interest the only objects of his direction. He advanced no
charge against Palliser. His public letter was short, general, and
barren of information. It stated facts so far as it went, threw no blame
upon any body, and commended the bravery of the officers in general, and
of Sir Robert Harland and Sir Hugh Palliser in particular. But this
approbation is to be applied only to the particular circumstances and
immediate time of the action: the subsequent transactions of the
afternoon, were in general thrown into the shade; and the causes that
prevented a renewal of the engagement left in such obscurity, as has
drawn no small share of censure upon Keppel himself.
The French fleet returned to Brest considerably damaged in their hulls,
but glorying in an action, wherein they had engaged an equal number of
British ships without the loss of a single vessel, as though they had
gained a victory. It will be some time before they are fully repaired,
through a scarcity of the necessary means.
The Americans have many friends in Holland, who will be ready to assist
them when an opportunity offers; but not a-la-mode de Paris. They have
not the same inducements with the French to venture on a war with
Britain, in favor of the independence of your United States. Dutch
policy will keep them from it, that they may enjoy the sweets of a
neutrality while others are fighting. They may supply you with a loan;
but they will not draw the sword in your behalf. Nothing will bring them
to this unless Britain should add to their long catalogue of political
errors, that of compelling them to it.