They are hardy veterans, well disciplined, well armed, well clad, and

well fed. Our finances have assumed a new form, and are every day

becoming more respectable by the total abolition of paper, except that

of the bank, payable in specie at sight. You have doubtless heard of

the late change in the British administration. Sir Guy Carleton has

come out in the place of Sir Henry Clinton, and we have reason to

believe, that the present system is to endeavor by lenient measures,

to seduce us from our alliance with France, and to cajole us out of

that freedom, which they find they cannot force us to relinquish. It

is astonishing to see the contempt with which these attempts are

received. The only effect they have, is to convince us of the

declining strength of the enemy, and to excite a general determination

to push them with vigor before they recover their late blow. I enclose

the last resolution of Congress, organizing this office, that you

may, by seeing my powers, know what attention you are to pay to my

letters, which will consist of two sorts; the one written by me

without consulting Congress, in which, however, I shall always govern

myself by what I suppose to be their sentiments; the other, written

and submitted to their inspection, so that you may have the highest

evidence of its corresponding with their views. When this is the case,

I shall always inform you of it. This letter has been read in

Congress, and of course contains no instructions, which they

disapprove. I shall send you a packet of newspapers with this.

I should have told you, that your salary will in future be paid here.

I shall receive it as your agent, and vest it in bills on Dr Franklin,

and remit them to him, so that you may draw upon him quarterly. I

shall send him one quarter's salary by this conveyance, commencing the

1st of January last, and ending the 1st of April last, and considering

myself as the agent of all our foreign Ministers, I shall follow your

directions relative to the disposition of your appointment, until you

shall think it expedient to name another.

Your most obedient humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 22d, 1782.

Sir,

Your letters, from the 28th of July to October 15th, have been read in

Congress. I have reported an answer,[24] but they have not yet agreed

on it, and I do not care to let this vessel go without a line,

however hastily written, to you. You will receive with this the

newspapers, which contain some information upon a delicate point. The

administration of Britain having been changed, they will endeavor to

represent themselves as popular in America, to induce a belief that we

will, under their auspices, be desirous of returning to our connexion

with them. Be assured, that the change in their administration has

produced none in the sentiments of America; they are immovably fixed

in their determination to support their independence, and not to

violate their alliance with France. The Assembly of Maryland and the

Council of this State have passed resolutions to that effect; it will

be the language of all, as soon as they meet. Congress have refused a

passport to Sir Guy Carleton's Secretary, which was asked in order

that he might be the bearer of a letter to Congress. Neither army has

taken the field, of course I have no military operations to

communicate.

Your salary will in future be paid here, where your agent will vest it

in bills on Dr Franklin, quarterly, upon whom you will draw

accordingly. I shall consider myself as agent for all our foreign

Ministers, and transact the business accordingly for you, unless you

should choose to appoint some other.

I enclose a cypher, which you will use if it arrives safe, till I have

leisure to send you a better.

I am, Sir, your most humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[24] This refers to the preceding letter of May 10th.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 29th, 1782.

Sir,

You will receive herewith a letter of the 10th instant, which having

been submitted to Congress, was returned yesterday to this office,

together with the resolution, which I have the honor to enclose

expressive of their sense of the sentiments contained in the letter,

and of the line of conduct you ought to pursue. Having written to you

lately, I have little to add.

We have not been able to settle a cartel with the British for the

exchange of prisoners, of whom we have a balance in our hands to the

amount of ten thousand. They refuse to pay the great sums, that we

have advanced for their maintenance, which we make a preliminary to an

exchange. It is not improbable, that the Germans will be made free of

the country, sold for three years, to defray this expense, which they

most of them wish, as they express a great inclination to settle here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, June 28th, 1782.

Sir,

Immediately after we had received intelligence here of the important

change in the councils, and in the system of Great Britain, I

consulted my correspondent (the Marquis de Verac) upon the expediency

of disclosing my public character, without further delay to her

Majesty's principal Minister. He gave me his opinion freely and

candidly. For your information, I need only say, that it is the same

in every respect with his former one, which you will find in his

letter to me, of the 12th of September last, and in mine of September

15th to the President of Congress.

I cannot take upon me to say, that his opinion is not well founded. My

private sentiment then was, that that event could not fail to occasion

a correspondent change in her Majesty's system also; but I knew my

means of information were not as good as those of my correspondent,

and that though every one seems to think the mediation of her Majesty,

between Great Britain and Holland, was in effect at an end, yet in

form it was still kept up, so that the reasons against disclosing my

character, mentioned to you in my letter of March 5th, might still be

supposed to have some influence. This determined me to conform to his

advice.

However, I could not think of resting totally inactive in this state

of things; though I thought it not prudent to make any official

communications, yet it could not be amiss to endeavor at this time to

turn, if possible, the thoughts of those in government upon our

affairs, and to refute certain assertions of our enemies, which had

remained without contradiction here, and by this means to prepare the

way for the former. It might at least serve to sound the sentiments of

the Ministers. With these views I have thrown the few following

reflections upon paper, three translations of which into French, have,

I am assured, been placed in the very hands I wished to place them,

and that they have not been unacceptable.

_Reflections._

"When Great Britain engaged in a war with her late Colonies, either to

obtain allies, or to prevent new enemies rising up against her, she

was desirous to have it believed that she was contending in the common

cause of all the maritime powers of Europe. Spain she endeavored to

alarm by suggesting, that the revolt in America would be a fatal

example to all her Colonies in the new world, and if it had not such

an effect upon them, they would at least be liable to be conquered one

after another, by their new neighboring empire, so that in one way or

the other Spain would lose her American Colonies, if the independence

of the United States should be established. To Holland she held up the

danger her peculiar commerce, and her navigation would be exposed to,

from the enterprising spirit of the Americans, who would not fail to

become soon her rivals throughout all Europe. To the nations about the

Baltic she alleged, that the free commerce of America would be highly

prejudicial to their commerce, _because many of the commodities of

America, being of the same nature with theirs, they would everywhere

in the markets of Europe come into concurrence with them_. She has

been more particular with regard to Russia, and asserted, that this

empire can derive no possible benefit from a free and direct commerce

with America, and that with or without this commerce, Russia will be

in the same circumstances, _because Great Britain who now takes off,

will continue to take off, all the superfluous productions, and

manufactures of Russia_.

"The conduct of Spain, and of Holland, is the best comment upon the

declarations of the British, which respect those nations. I shall

confine myself, therefore, to those which respect the nations about

the Baltic, and particularly Russia. A few short reflections upon

these reasonings, or rather assertions, may perhaps show the mere

fallacy of them.

"Let it be admitted, that Great Britain will in fact continue to take

off all the superfluous productions and manufactures of Russia. Does

it follow from hence, that Russia can have no interest in a free and

direct commerce with America? Will it make no difference to the

interests of Russia whether she disposes of her commodities to Great

Britain alone, or to Great Britain and America at the same time? Will

not the concurrence of America in her ports give an additional

advantage to Russia? Will it not enhance the price of her commodities?

Will it not increase the demand for them? And will not this increased

demand be the means also of increasing the quantity of her productions

and manufactures? If these things do not follow, all the reasonings of

the best writers upon the principles of commerce, showing the great

benefits every nation derives from the concurrence of purchasers of

her commodities, are false and delusive. Besides, how is Russia paid

for her productions and manufactures? Is it not by exchange in a very

great proportion for foreign commodities? Are not many of these

foreign commodities of the peculiar production or manufacture of

America, such as rice, indigo, sugar, coffee, cocoa, pimento,

cochineal, and all sorts of dyeing woods? Does it make no difference

to the interest of Russia, whether she receives those articles

directly from the countries, which produce them, or in circuitous

voyages through Great Britain, and consequently from a third hand?

Does not this course draw along with it double freight, double

insurance, double commissions, and are not all the other charges

attending a voyage (to say nothing of additional duties,) ordinarily

doubled by means of this circuitous course? Will not the price of such

American commodities be increased by these means when they arrive in

Russia, at the most moderate computation, at the rate of twentyfive

per cent? Will not Russia, therefore, necessarily lose at that same

rate, upon all her commodities sold to Great Britain in exchange for

such American commodities? And will not this contribute in a great

measure to keep the course of exchange against her? And will she not

lose also the advantages she would infallibly derive from the

concurrence of the Americans in her ports? Is it not worthy of

consideration, whether this extra price of materials, necessary for

the manufactures of Russia, will not render them so much dearer to

foreign nations, and whether this circumstance will not expose her to

the danger of being rivalled in those very commodities in other

countries? In one word, is it not of the last importance to a nation

to draw all such foreign commodities as she wants from the first hand,

or from their proper source? What credit, then, is to be given to the

assertion of the British, viz. that this empire can derive no benefit

from a free and direct commerce with America and that, without this

commerce, Russia will be in the same circumstances.

"Further, if it is true, that many of the productions of America are

of the same nature with those of Russia, and that a concurrence of

those articles on the part of America, in the markets of Europe, would

be prejudicial to the commerce of Russia, does it follow from hence,

that it would not be the interest of Russia to have a free and direct

commerce with America? Let us take one article by way of example;

hemp, which is the foundation of the principal commerce of Russia.

That within some parts of the extensive territories of the United

States, both the soil and climate may be adapted to the cultivation of

hemp of the best quality, cannot reasonably be doubted. Is it not then

of the highest importance to Russia, to turn the thoughts of the

Americans from the cultivation of this plant, or in other words, to

make it their interests not to cultivate it? That Russia can do this;

by means which may be pointed out, and in the use of which both

nations may promote their general interests, is certain. But will the

exclusion of the Americans from a free and direct commerce have this

effect? Will the sending them to Great Britain, or to any other

country in Europe than Russia, for the commodities of Russia, but

especially for her hemp, have a tendency to that effect? Will not the

Russian hemp, in consequence of such measures, be burthened with all

the charges abovementioned when it comes to the hands of the

Americans, that is to say, with the extraordinary charge of twentyfive

per cent? And will not this twentyfive per cent in fact operate in the

nature of a bounty to that amount, to encourage the cultivation of

American hemp?

"Besides if America should find a combination to exclude her from the

benefit of a free and direct commerce with Russia, is it not natural

to suppose she would endeavor to relieve herself from the effects of

such an inequitable system, by vigorously adopting proper measures for

that purpose? And could she not do it? Might she not begin by

profiting of the errors of such an exclusive system, to the

encouragement that system would give to the cultivation of her hemp,

could she not superadd a duly upon all Russian hemp, which should be

imported into America? The effects of such a policy on the one part

and on the other, cannot possibly escape the penetration of those

whose business it is maturely to consider these things. But may it not

be asked, if the mischiefs pointed out above should in fact take

place, are there any benefits which Russia could derive from such a

system, which would more than counterbalance them? And what are these

benefits? What, for instance, could compensate Russia for the damage

she would sustain by losing the supply of hemp for the great American

market, a market which will be rapidly increasing, while that of Great

Britain, to say the least, has come to a full stand? Would not two

other important supplies be in danger of sharing the same fate, viz,

sailcloth and cordage? All these three articles have hitherto been

imported in great quantities into America; sailcloth for the use of

all their navigation, and there is scarce any kind of Russian

manufactures, which they have not imported, and which they do not

want. Finally, it is certain, that if America had continued under the

dominion of Great Britain, that very concurrence in the markets of

Europe, which the British pretend will be a consequence of the

independence of America, would have taken place, especially in the

articles of pitch, tar, turpentine, iron, ship timber, masts, spars,

bowsprits, and in general of all naval stores.

"Every one knows that Great Britain drew great quantities of all these

commodities from the northern nations. It is not less certain, that

she drew some of all of them from her late Colonies. But these

commodities are so bulky, and of so little intrinsic value, that it

was utterly impossible for the Americans to transport them across the

Atlantic so cheap as the nations of Europe, which wanted them, and

Great Britain in particular, could import them from the northern

nations. This kind of commerce, therefore, would long since have

utterly failed, and been left free for those nations, if, to prevent

this, Great Britain had not adopted the policy of granting large

bounties upon all those commodities, iron alone excepted, when

imported into Great Britain from America. It was her interest to do

this, because at the same time, that she was thereby encouraging the

commerce of her Colonies, she was rendering a great benefit to her own

manufactures, in which she paid the Americans for those commodities,

so that her bounties turned to the account of both parts of the Empire

at once. Besides, they made her less dependent upon any foreign

nations for those commodities, and she was too well acquainted with

her commercial and political interests ever to lose sight of that

object. She could not grant a bounty upon iron without injuring her

own mines; she therefore adopted the method of exempting the iron of

America from duties, which she imposed upon all the iron imported from

any foreign country, and these duties being considerable, they had a

like effect upon American iron, as the bounties had upon the other

commodities. This system was calculated gradually to destroy the

commerce of the northern nations with Great Britain.

"Now is it not certain, take away the dependence of America upon the

empire of Great Britain, and you take away at the same time the

interest of Great Britain, to give the preference to those American

commodities? She will then procure them where she can procure them

cheapest, that is from the northern nations. When the British

bounties therefore cease, the commerce of America with Europe in those

articles will cease with them. And thus those nations will nowhere be

troubled with the dangerous concurrence in the markets of Europe on

the part of America, which has been so much talked of by the British,

and may have influenced the political systems of those powers. During

the time America was dependent upon the British empire, she has always

imported great quantities of iron and steel from Sweden through Great

Britain. She will certainly continue to import those articles when she

can obtain them so much cheaper by a direct commerce with Sweden or

Russia. Is it not then clear, that the independence of the United

States, in whatever view it is properly considered, will turn to the

benefit of all Europe, Great Britain alone excepted; that the nations

about the Baltic, Russia above all, if they adopt in season a wise

policy towards America, have everything to hope and nothing to fear

from the commerce of that country?"

As these reflections were not in my hand writing, or signed, or

delivered by me, so there was no danger of exposing Congress or myself

in this business. Though no great doubt could be entertained from what

hand they came, yet they might have been disavowed by me if it should

be thought advisable. I pretend not to have suggested any new matter

upon the subject, or to have urged the whole that might have been said

upon it. Brevity was a thing indispensably necessary. They are perhaps

more adapted to the local state of affairs, than anything the

Ministers here may have seen. On the whole, I have no reason to repent

of the measure. Although it should not be attended with any immediate

good effects, yet I flatter myself it may not be wholly fruitless.

I have prepared a second part, which enforces the first, enters more

into political matter, and is chiefly designed as an answer to certain

ostensible objections, which I understand have been made against her

Imperial Majesty's forming at present any political connexion with the

United States, but have made no use of it yet, because since the

delivery of the first, accounts of the advantages gained by the

British fleet over the French in the West Indies, have arrived here,

and seem a little to have changed the face of affairs in this quarter;

though it seems to me whoever reflects upon that unfortunate action,

cannot really suppose the relative force of the two nations

essentially altered by it. The British it is true may have thereby

saved the most valuable of their possessions in those parts, for this

year at least, the loss of which would have reduced them nearly to

despair, and compelled them to solicit a universal peace upon such

terms as they know it is to be obtained. In this view it has its

serious consequences.

I would very willingly comply with your request, and make my letters

more numerous and more minute, but the want of a safe conveyance from

hence, (having no other than the post, and not having any cypher from

your office) obliges me to remain totally silent upon some matters,

and to use so much caution in others, that I fear none of them will

afford you much satisfaction, or can be of any real service. I have

not been honored with any letter from you since that of the 22d of

October last, the duplicate of which has never come to hand. When you

write me, please to send your letters to the care of Mr Adams. I pray

you to acquaint Congress, that I shall not fail to exert my small

abilities to the utmost, and to improve every favorable opportunity

to promote the end of my mission. I should be happy if I could give

them any reasonable assurances, that my success was at hand.

I am, with much respect and esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, August 30th, 1782.

Sir,

I cannot suffer the post of this day to depart without acknowledging

the receipt of the quadruplicate of the 2d of last March, and another

of the 22d of May. They were received last evening. Neither the

original of the first, nor either of the other copies has reached me,

so that I have been a long time without any intelligence about affairs

in our country from you. The reason you assigned for this surprised

me. I thought it had been next to impossible, that my letters written

from hence, in August, September and October last, should not have

reached you long before that time. The only channel through which you

can write me with the least security, is Holland. If your letters are

sent to the care of Mr Adams, they will come on under every possible

caution; but no letter should be sent addressed immediately to me. In

such a case, there is no doubt but they would all be opened at the

office here. I send all my own letters under cover to friends in

Holland, which, though it doubles the postage, is a caution which

ought not to be dispensed with.

Your letter has eased me of much anxiety, particularly that paragraph

of it, which begins with the word "_you_" and ends with

"_acknowledged_," as it has cleared up the point of most importance,

and upon which I wanted more explicit directions than are contained

in my instructions. Though this letter has been so long on its way,

yet it has arrived in good season to answer every purpose of it. I

have hitherto been governed by sentiments exactly conformable to those

you have expressed in the clause which begins with "_all_" and ends

with "_insecure_." But my anxiety arose from an apprehension, that the

expectations of Congress might possibly have been different, for want

of some local information, which I have never ventured to communicate.

I have reason to believe, that at this time, the illustrious Sovereign

of this empire, and her principal Ministers are fully convinced, that

the affairs of the United States have acquired a consistency, which

renders their independence perfectly secure, particularly that they

are not distracted by internal divisions, that Congress are everywhere

highly respected, freely obeyed, and firmly supported; that the

governments of the several States harmonise with them and with each

other, in all great political points, and in their turn are equally

respected, obeyed, and supported by their respective citizens. On

these points there is no danger of our suffering from the

misrepresentations of our enemies. If I have been able to collect any

part of the sentiments of this Court, it is that the independence of

the United States is established beyond all question, and that its

political measures, so far as they may take our country into view,

will be formed upon that supposition. Indeed, they have long since

been formed on that ground.

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 08 · 第 25 / 36 段