liberal principles and those of absolute dominion; and that is, that
Capo d'Istria had always been the faithful interpreter of an idea of
independence for Greece, consequently, when liberal opinions were in
the ascendant, he was not likely to continue in favour. The great
misfortune of the Greeks at this moment, and what retarded their
emancipation, was the circumstance of their insurrection taking
place at the same time as the revolt in Piémont and the proclamation
of the constitution of the Cortes; rendering it difficult always
to discriminate exactly between an unruly military movement which
terrified the regular governments, and the noble spectacle of Greece,
with a spirit worthy of her forefathers, raising the holy symbol of
her religion on her banners, stained and torn in many a former heroic
struggle. Capo d'Istria's affection for Greece led to the loss of the
Emperor's favour; and he, the protector of the Hellenists, was stabbed
to the heart by a Greek,[49] affording a melancholy proof of the
ingratitude of revolutions.
[49] Count Capo d'Istria was murdered in September, 1831, by the
brother and son of a Mainote he had imprisoned.--_Ed._
Then took place the intimate fusion of the Russian and Austrian system
of politics, occasioning the absolute triumph of Metternich; and this
situation was continued at the congress of Verona under Nesselrode,
from that time forth sole minister of Russia, and chief of the
_chancellerie_ under Alexander. At the congress of Verona he held the
pen, and all the resolutions regarding Spain were taken in concert;
the diplomatic notes were drawn up by the two ministers together;
Metternich wrote to the Austrian minister at Madrid, while Nesselrode,
recalling the Russian ambassador, fulminated a sentence of proscription
against the Cortes. It was no longer the liberal and generous Alexander
they had to deal with, but an imperious prince, who, through his
ministers, laid down the law in a sovereign and dogmatic manner. When
M. de Villèle craftily objected for a short time to engage in an
expensive and hazardous campaign, Nesselrode, without the slightest
hesitation, wrote to him, in the name of the Emperor, that Russia was
determined to venture every thing in order to repress the spirit of
revolt in the Peninsula. The impulse was so powerful it was no longer
possible to resist it.
The close of Alexander's life was greatly harassed by these feelings;
the sacred cause of the Greeks weighed upon his mind as a subject
of remorse, and the sorrow it occasioned him was imprinted on his
countenance, which now bore the appearance of ill health. Yet what
was to be done? The panic of impending revolutions had seized upon
his mind, and delivered him over to a thousand terrors, for his dread
of the spirit of the secret societies was extreme. Liberalism filled
him with alarm, he viewed it as a spectre threatening him with the
seditions that might arise in his empire, and he did not comprehend
that the most effectual means of employing the national effervescence
of the Russians would have been to march them against Turkey for the
deliverance of Greece. The causes of the unexpected death of Alexander
have formed the subject of much inquiry; perhaps this acute sorrow was
not entirely unconnected with it: he was a man of a deeply religious
mind, with a mild disposition and a tender and impressionable heart;
thus he felt deeply for the sufferings of Greece. Every stroke of a
yataghan which caused the head of a woman or child to roll in the dust,
among the ruins of Athens or Lacedæmon, made his heart bleed.
Soon after Alexander had been gathered to his fathers, a commotion, at
once political and military, took place in Russia. In southern Europe
people are not sufficiently acquainted with the character of the noble
family of the Czar: there was a degree of enthusiasm in the filial
affection entertained by the Emperor Alexander for his aged mother, and
the deepest respect existed in the hearts of Constantine and Nicholas
for their elder brother Alexander. His death took them all by surprise,
and upon his tomb burst forth the military movement prepared by the
secret societies, and by a generation of young officers, dreaming of
the old Sclavonian independence.
Was the accession of the Emperor Nicholas likely to make any
alteration in Nesselrode's position? One powerful reason which
operated against any diminution of the minister's influence was the
respectful admiration of Nicholas for the policy and the opinions of
his deceased brother, and being also inexperienced in business, he
considered it indispensable to surround himself with the men who had
been acquainted with the politics of Russia ever since the great epoch
of 1814. These men of traditions are essential to governments; they
preserve the history of all the precedents in the cabinets; they know
what has been the conduct of Europe during a long series of years,
what are the springs by which she has been actuated, and the acts she
has been called upon to concert; comprising information of the most
essential utility for the comprehension of treaties and the conduct of
negotiations: besides this, it was impossible to deny that Nesselrode
was possessed of very great ability in unravelling events, and had
always shewn an enlightened, though passive obedience, to the wishes of
his sovereign. The Emperor Nicholas, then, being desirous of continuing
the policy of his brother, to whom could he better address himself than
to the man who had had the direction of affairs during the last fifteen
years? Nesselrode also enjoyed the esteem of the Empress-Mother; and
what power that remarkable woman had exercised over political affairs!
She alone always manifested a sovereign contempt for Napoleon--she
alone swayed the mind of her son Alexander, even after Erfurt; and,
according to the patriarchal fashion, all her children appeared, to a
certain degree, to do homage to her for the crown, as if they owed the
supreme power to her from whom they had derived their existence.
Nevertheless, Nesselrode soon found it necessary to modify his
opinions. Ideas had advanced since the death of Alexander, and it was
impossible to restrain the Russian spirit, which had decided in the
most energetic manner in favour of Greece; it therefore required
military food, and a war was indispensable. The influence of Metternich
over the cabinet of St. Petersburg daily lost ground from this moment,
and Nesselrode began to draw off from Germany, and become more
essentially Russian in his principles and ideas; he also began to take
a decided turn in favour of the Greeks. Nor in this conduct ought he to
be reproached with inconstancy, for the times and circumstances were
no longer the same, the monarchical principle having triumphed every
where, in Piémont as well as at Madrid and at Naples, while Poland
appeared entirely subject to her viceroy Constantine. Under these
circumstances it was less difficult to discern the holy and heroic
principle of the Greek revolution, and to rekindle the ardent hope of
an independence, acquired by means of so many pious sacrifices. From
this new tendency of affairs, Nesselrode found himself the antagonist
of Metternich, with whom he had hitherto been agreed; but the Russian
interest now prevailed over the Austrian spirit.
The friendship between France and Russia dates from the year 1815, and
was increased at the congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, under the influence
of the Duc de Richelieu; but at that period, as we learn from the
despatches of Count Nesselrode, France was too much overwhelmed by
the fatal consequences of the two invasions to take an active part
in affairs, or afford a support that would make her alliance worth
seeking by the various cabinets of Europe: but from the year 1819
France exhibited such a developement of vital powers and military
energy, that Russia hastened to include her in her diplomatic means.
The inclinations of the French cabinet turned in this direction, under
the Duc de Richelieu and M. Dessolles; and they continued thus until
the more English administrations of Polignac, of Montmorency, and of
Villèle. The ministry of M. de la Ferronays again was favourable to
the Russian alliance; and the ties that now bound France to Russia
were not merely those of gratitude for the services rendered at the
restoration, but the well-grounded conviction that the Russian alliance
could on no occasion injure our interests, but might, on the contrary,
on many occasions augment our diplomatic influence and our territorial
boundaries. The collection of the despatches of Nesselrode and Pozzo di
Borgo during this interval, and all the diplomatic papers that exist
in the Foreign Office, attest the good-will of the cabinet of St.
Petersburg, and the offers made secretly by it to obtain the alliance
and concurrence of France on the Eastern question.
Another cause which made this friendship so greatly desired, was the
rivalry that had already become apparent between Russia and England.
The system of the alliances in 1815 had overturned all the ancient
diplomatic ideas, and all private jealousies had given way before the
common object of Europe,--the destruction of Napoleon's power. But one
great fault then committed by England was her inordinate augmentation
of the power of Russia, thus, to a certain degree, creating her future
omnipotence; for it was with the money and subsidies of England that
the cabinet of St. Petersburg acquired the means of influencing for
ever the southern interests. Nesselrode, who had been engaged in
the greater part of the transactions of 1815, was obliged to detach
himself from the traditions of the alliance of 1812, and great ability
is required in order to make these transitions without abruptness;
supple minds possess their influence as well as those of a more decided
character, and ruin follows close upon the attempt to resist too much.
Nesselrode is essentially the man of transitions; he has never assumed
an inflexible attitude in a system or an idea, but has constituted
himself the translator of times and interests: from which cause, as
I have before observed, it sometimes occurred that his opinions as
_chancelier d'état_ to the Emperor Nicholas were opposed to those he
professed when he held the same situation under Alexander. The ideas of
these two princes were not alike, neither were they placed in the same
situations; yet Nesselrode served them both with the same fidelity and
the same intelligence. It is a talent in public affairs to know how to
make one's self the interpreter of another person; there are but a few
of those very superior minds who, being deeply impressed with their own
conceptions, obtain a dominion over times and characters, and even they
frequently fall. But many very distinguished ministers never are able
to attain that point of elevation, and, not daring to make themselves
types, they are content with being impressions. They agree with all
periods, all situations, and all difficulties.
From the accession of the Emperor Nicholas to the revolution of 1830,
the Russian policy was in some measure absorbed by the war with the
Porte. All the ancient theory of the Holy Alliance was abandoned for
less undecided interests, and less fear was entertained concerning
revolutions at the time the most complete revolution took place.
Whatever judgment may be formed of the event of 1830, it must suddenly
have awakened a new train of emotions in the Russian _chancellerie_;
for the popular principle which had caused this violent irruption had
demonstrated as much energy, as did formerly the military power of
Napoleon, against whom all Europe had risen in arms. The old education
of Nesselrode was here destined again to be of service to him; for the
first consequence of the revolt was, though not exactly to _revive_
the treaties of the Holy Alliance, an old parchment which had fallen
to pieces, at least to pave the way for a treaty of mutual guarantee.
All private dissensions were naturally compelled to give way, that
people might hasten to provide against the most pressing danger;
Metternich appeared entirely to resume his former ideas, as if he were
returning to the projects of 1815, and the diplomatic school abandoned
many serious plans for the chances of a crusade against democratic
principles. We are inclined to think Nesselrode did not dislike this
reminiscence of the principles of political repression, being those
which he most perfectly understood, and which he had particularly
dwelt upon during his early years of study and labour: but age had now
supervened; in 1830 Nesselrode was no longer young, and it is not at
the second period of existence people are able to encounter the great
perturbations which shake the world to its centre. In recapitulating
the causes of the maintenance of peace, people have not sufficiently
considered the dread of change that possessed those wearied existences.
Truly, it was not without reason that the Greeks placed in the hands
of the aged the decision concerning peace or war. Let us suppose
Metternich with the impetuosity of youth, and Nesselrode fifteen years
younger, who can tell what might have occurred? Perhaps a violent war
might have broken out, and with it all the chances of disorder.
The insurrection in Poland, however, gave plenty of occupation to
Russia, and the ideas of the Emperor Nicholas on the subject of
repression harmonised perfectly with those of his minister. What
the Russian people desired was the union of Poland to Russia; and
the amalgamation, which had so long been the constant subject of
Nesselrode's thoughts, was, at last, on the point of being finally
accomplished. He never fully entered into the prejudices of the old
Muscovites on this point, but he, nevertheless, was of opinion that
this divided nation, this double and simultaneous government, injured
the political and administrative unity of Russia.
The divers administrations which constitute the vast Russian empire,
and which all tend to one common centre, under the hand of the
Emperor, are, as a whole, very remarkable. Ever since the constituent
assembly established an unity of administration in France, our system
of government has no longer cause to dread that, in a homogeneous
whole, one province or one district will be opposed to another; their
strength has been blended in a manner very convenient to those in
power. But it is far otherwise in Russia: the cabinet of St. Petersburg
has to command thousands of different races--Tartars, Mahometans,
Poles, and Cossacks; each of these people has its laws, its customs,
its power, and its recollections, and it is necessary to maintain
this individuality without detracting from the unity of the system.
There is neither one general rule observed in the mode of levying the
taxes, nor even, in a great measure, is there any undeviating rule
for the military conscription. Some pay tribute, others are subject
to contributions of arms and horses; in some places the recruits are
furnished by the nobles, in others they are obtained by means of
_levées en masse_; some people are still subject to feudal government
under the Czar, and others, again, depend on the regular and immediate
authority of the princes. In France the administrative clockwork is so
simple that nothing but a will and a hand for business are required
to set it in motion; nothing can be easier than the situation of a
prefect, or even of a minister for the home department; interests,
rights, and customs, are all sacrificed to the strength of the
government.
All these circumstances lead to the necessity in Russia of a more
careful and more finished education for a statesman; for a young man
who is preparing for a diplomatic situation at St. Petersburg, must not
only be acquainted with French and German, but must also understand
modern Greek and some of the Oriental languages. Nesselrode, in spite
of his long experience, has been obliged to submit to the general rule;
and a considerable portion of his life has been devoted to the study of
living languages. His mind has become a repertory of treaties, he is a
living catalogue of all the transactions of his time. The offices over
which he presides are the most extensive, the most multiplied, and the
most minute that can be imagined; there is a division for the relations
with Persia, another for those with China, and with the little
Mahometan princes, independent of those for the secret correspondence
with the chiefs of the various tribes lately conquered by Russia.
Nesselrode presides over all these affairs of the _chancellerie_ with
an activity nothing can slacken: his extreme facility in the despatch
of business, and his laborious existence in the midst of the European
relations, have naturally confirmed his credit with the Czar; who is
also accustomed to act very much for himself, and only requires a
minister as a sort of memorandum-book he can consult when he pleases,
and as a faithful arm to execute his will. During the last five years
the system of diplomatic aides-de-camp has been revived in full force,
for the Emperor likes those semi-military appointments, which give a
constantly armed attitude to Russia; in fact, it is one of the active
sources of his moral influence.
Nesselrode, it is true, is only the enlightened hand which writes the
will of the Emperor; he is valued as a man of good counsel, which
means, that he listens a great deal, and that he can discover the
secret thoughts of the person that consults him, without himself
having any of those determined plans which clash with the will of the
sovereign.
The junior diplomatic school of Russia regard Nesselrode as a living
archive, something in the way M. d'Hauterive was considered in France;
and it is of great importance that a person who is called to direct the
affairs of his country in the present times should be well acquainted
with its former history--it also adds greatly to the elevation of his
position. The temperate system, adopted by men weary of agitation, is
a great benefit when opposed to the fiery spirits who wish to proceed
with impetuosity in public affairs. The proud and generous disposition
of the Emperor renders it necessary he should have at his side a man
who will not execute his orders till the following day, because time
is thus afforded for reflection, and an order issued to-day might very
possibly be revoked after the lapse of a night; on these occasions
there is a great advantage in a man of a temperate mind.
Nesselrode has, in every respect, the most agreeable _salon_ in St.
Petersburg, and the one where the most conversation goes on. He takes
pleasure in collecting people who hold the most various opinions, in
such a manner as to form a neutral ground, on which every body may
meet; and when a man has reached a venerable age, full of years and of
honours, what more can be desired? our tent must be pitched somewhere.
When for forty years, people have been engaged in the most gigantic
events, like the aged men in Homer, they offer hospitality to the
young, when they recount to them all they have seen, and the judgment
they have formed; they contemplate the present generation with the
feelings experienced by a traveller who, from an elevated tower, looks
down on the cities far below him, and the people incessantly busy, and
thronging to perform the part assigned to them in the weary task of
humanity.
LORD CASTLEREAGH.
I am about to write the life of a statesman whose character has been
more violently attacked in the annals of England--I might almost say
of Europe--than any other with whom I am acquainted. No one ever had
to endure more outrages and insults, and no one ever displayed more
inflexible firmness, in the course of a most chequered and agitated
life. I shall offend many little prejudices, and hurt many vulgar
opinions; but things of this sort have never prevented me from
proceeding straight to the truths of history, respecting men who have
accomplished a great political career.
On the picturesque Lake Foyle[50] in Ireland, whose shores are studded
with ancient mansions, and whose waters are diversified with fertile
islands, inhabited by little colonies of aged fishermen, a young man of
eccentric manners, but whose appearance denoted a being of a superior
class to those around him, had for two years fixed his residence. His
only habitation was his boat: fishing, hunting, and violent exercises,
filled up his time; and in the evening, surrounded by the fishermen,
he made them relate to him all the old legendary tales of the country,
and, in his turn, instructing the inhabitants of the district, he drew
up laws respecting fishing, and hunting, as if he were the sovereign
of this watery republic. No one could exhibit more intrepidity than did
this singular being. Upon one occasion he set sail in his frail bark,
in the strait that separates Ireland from England; and his shipwreck on
the Isle of Man, where he had alone managed his yacht in a stormy sea,
like one of the Ossianic heroes, was long recorded by the peasantry.
His dreams were of the legends of the lake; and being deeply enamoured
of the daughter of one of the fishermen named Nelly, he sacrificed
every thing to this ardent and romantic passion, wearing simply the
dress of the children of the lake, for he loved and was desirous of
being beloved again. Enthusiastic and passionate in his feelings, he
would endure no contradiction; and an attempt having one day been made
to deprive him of his mistress, he defied his rival to a duel after the
Scandinavian fashion--that is to say with battle-axes--and conducted
himself with a degree of intrepidity that was celebrated all over Great
Britain.
[50] Quære, Coyne?--_Editor._
This young man, whose eccentricity took so poetical a form, for his
youth was like a ballad, was Robert Stewart, afterwards Viscount
Castlereagh and Marquess of Londonderry. His family was not originally
Irish, but came from Scotland. James I., as every one is aware, created
some great fiefs in Ireland, and bestowed them upon some of his most
faithful subjects, in the hope of more closely uniting Ireland to the
British empire. Eight of these fiefs, with a kind of _suzeraineté_,
fell to the share of the Duke of Lennox; and the Stewarts, that noble
name in Scotland, no doubt allied to the royal line, held some of the
lands subject to the Lennox family. It has always been the fate of
Ireland to be under the dominion of strangers to her soil; the yoke of
conquest becomes more heavy after each impatient tumult. Her oppression
arises from her disturbed condition; each unsuccessful revolt produces
additional servitude, and much of her suffering is owing to the crime
of the popular agitators, who are instigated by nothing but their own
insatiable vanity to endeavour to destroy all old and respectable
national feeling.
The Stewarts, however, decided in favour of William III., and of
what is termed in England the glorious Revolution. As possessors of
military fiefs they were naturally inclined to second the accession
of a new dynasty, by whom their usurpation of the conquered country
was likely to be sanctioned. When great alterations have taken place
in the rights and tenure of property, a change of power is required,
and, indeed, is almost indispensable to restore peace and quiet to
the country. The Orangemen, therefore, formed a closely-united party
in Ireland, and exercised military dominion over the people. In vain
did the unfortunate James, in his rapid passage through Ireland, cause
the parliament of Dublin to pronounce a sentence of confiscation, on
account of felony, against the estates of Colonel Stewart, serving
under William of Orange. This confiscation continued in force but
a short time; and William, having gained the victory, lavished his
rewards upon the officer who had so powerfully supported his cause.
William Stewart, thus loaded with wealth by the king of 1688, was one
of the most determined oppressors of Ireland--one of those who ruled
with a rod of iron the country reconquered after the battle of the
Boyne.