the French expedition to Russia. The movement, still more national
than military, which repulsed this gigantic undertaking, naturally
took its source from the old Muscovite families, and in the savage
energy against which the Czars, ever since the days of Peter the Great,
have struggled in vain; and Alexander, whose education and principles
rendered him particularly averse to this return of barbarism, felt the
need of a confidential friend, in whose bosom he might confide his
fears of the results to be apprehended from this Muscovite tendency,
which went beyond his own ideas and wishes. Count Nesselrode became one
of these confidential servants, and as early as 1812, although he did
not fill the official situation of _conseiller d'état_, he took the
principal part in the prodigious diplomatic movement then in progress;
he concluded and signed the treaty of the subsidies with England, and
the secret alliance of the two great powers against Napoleon, which
completed his political fortune.
The intimacy between Count Nesselrode and Prince Metternich began in
the course of the negotiations at the congress of Prague. As I have
before observed, it is impossible to institute a comparison between
these diplomatists; Prince Metternich being the creator of a system,
while Nesselrode was merely employed in executing, or perhaps in
moderating an idea, which was not always his own. Count Nesselrode was
not the official plenipotentiary at the congress of Prague, the full
powers being entrusted to M. d'Anstett, a man of considerable ability,
but hardly likely to be very favourably inclined to a peaceable system,
for he was a French _émigré_; however, the impulse and the direction of
the whole business emanated entirely from Alexander, and consequently
from Count Nesselrode, the most faithful and devoted of his
representatives. It was then, as we cannot but feel, of the greatest
importance, to induce Austria to join the coalition of the Allies
against Napoleon, for upon it depended the success of the campaign of
Germany; but Metternich was far from being decided in favour of this
step, and he wished to oblige them to purchase the co-operation of
Austria at a very high price: the negotiations, however, were conducted
with great ability by Count Nesselrode, and at the conclusion of the
congress of Prague the alliance of Austria was well secured to the
coalition. The Russian minister arranged in the name of his sovereign
all the articles of this treaty, which calmed the fears of Austria, by
assigning to her an advantageous frontier in Germany and Italy.
A new element had just manifested itself in the Russian diplomacy,
General Pozzo di Borgo having arrived at head-quarters, after
accomplishing his mission to Bernadotte, crown-prince of Sweden. Count
Pozzo was the friend of the disaffected generals of the Empire; and his
constant thought, and the master-passion of his soul, was his desire
to bring about the ruin of his ancient rival, whom he considered as
the oppressor of Europe. It was necessary for Count Nesselrode, if not
exactly to contend with this influence over the mind of Alexander,
at least not entirety to concur in it; for he, like Metternich, for
a short time considered it might be possible to treat with Napoleon,
and to impose such a degree of restraint upon his military power, as
to prevent him from injuring the German independence, or the security
of the interests and relations of the States. On this head Nesselrode
perfectly agreed in the opinions of Alexander, who, during the campaign
of 1813, was as far from desiring the downfall of Napoleon, as from
wishing to interfere with the form of government in France; there was
then quite enough to do in Germany, the Rhine had not yet been passed,
and the question concerning the deposition of the French Emperor did
not occur until 1814. Count Nesselrode having been present at the
interview at Abo, between the Czar and Bernadotte, it was impossible
he should be ignorant that questions had been raised concerning
certain possible events, among which the chance of another form of
government being established in France was spoken of. Those who have
some knowledge of the state of the case, are well aware that nothing
could be more vague and undecided than all that was settled in this
interview, if we except the close alliance between Russia and Sweden,
and certain decisions concerning their territorial claims. The Emperor
Alexander conversed with Bernadotte about the plan of the campaign, and
the state of the public mind in France, as well as concerning all the
possibilities and chances that might be the consequence of the war; and
Bernadotte in his turn naturally spoke of his grievances, and of the
injuries which, as a Republican general, he had been exposed to from
Napoleon, and for which he retained a strong dislike to him: but there
was no talk of any change, and they entered into no positive agreement
to overturn the sovereign who then reigned in France.
During the campaign of 1814, there was as much activity in the
negotiations as even in the military operations; and when the Allies
had once passed the Rhine it was considered necessary diplomacy
should follow all the phases of the war, so as to be ready to reply
to the proposals that might be made by the Emperor of the French,
and also to resolve all the difficulties they might encounter. The
arrival of Lord Castlereagh on the Continent greatly facilitated the
transactions regarding the subsidies and the equipment of the troops;
and the treaty of Chaumont was signed by Count Nesselrode, as well as
by the plenipotentiaries of the other allied powers. The ascendancy
acquired by England just then was so great, that she may almost be
said to have alone given the impulse and direction to all the acts of
the cabinet; it must, however, be acknowledged, that as she furnished
the sinews of war, it was very natural she should fix positively the
use to which they were to be applied. Count Nesselrode arranged with
Lord Castlereagh the method of issuing the pay of the troops, and the
diplomatic result of the campaign.
The sad events of the war brought the Allies to Paris; and the moment
was decisive for that portion of the senate which, under the direction
of Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and Jaucourt, wished for the fall of Napoleon.
A provisional government was established, after the occupation of the
capital. There could be no hesitation in the choice of alliances, for
the support of Alexander was indispensably necessary to accomplish the
ruin of the imperial system, whose hour was come! For this purpose,
however, it was essential to obtain the concurrence of Nesselrode,
the minister who had signed all the diplomatic acts concluded in the
last three years; and even had they considered him as a mere secretary
(Alexander being accustomed to act very much for himself), they would
naturally have been desirous of engaging him in the interests of the
provisional government.
As soon as Alexander entered the French territory, the disaffected
placed themselves in communication with his cabinet. I have already
mentioned the mission of M. de Vitrolles, who, with a view to the
restoration, had informed the Czar of the state of the public mind; and
Count Nesselrode had hardly arrived in Paris before he was surrounded
and assailed by a thousand conflicting intrigues and negotiations
of all sorts, for the purpose of inducing his cabinet to decide in
favour of the Bourbons. It was the general bent of the period, as the
revolutionary principle had been that of a former era. The first steps
taken by the Russian minister were full of caution; he wanted to feel
his way and judge of the public feeling, and it was also necessary to
induce Prince Schwartzenberg, who commanded the active army, to make an
open demonstration in favour of the Bourbons; yet, at the same time,
they were not quite certain what was the ultimate decision of Austria,
and, more especially, of Prince Metternich. All the papers written
about this time by Count Nesselrode bear evidence of this complicated
situation; he, however, spoke in plain terms in an official letter
addressed to M. Pasquier, that he might set at liberty some people
arrested on account of _the good cause_, and this _good cause_ was the
restoration of Louis XVIII.
It was evident from this expression of opinions favourable to
legitimate sovereignty, that the decision had been made before it was
officially announced. Never, perhaps, at any time had more activity
been displayed than at this period; Nesselrode must remember it as
the most brilliant and busy part of his life. His _salon_ never was
empty; at one time Caulaincourt, with full powers from the Emperor,
solicited peace; at another, the marshals of the empire stipulated
for the rights of the army, and a special treaty for Napoleon; then,
again, Talleyrand, D'Alberg, and De Jaucourt, came to press the Russian
minister to put an end to all uncertainty by pronouncing the downfall
of Buonaparte; and, finally, the royalists devoted to the Bourbons,
such as Sosthènes de la Rochefoucauld, and De Vitrolles, endeavoured to
obtain the triumph of the ancient dynasty.
After these various negotiations, the declaration of the Emperor
Alexander, announcing to France that they would not treat with
Napoleon, was agreed to in the cabinet. This remarkable declaration was
drawn up by Pozzo di Borgo; it was printed by means of a hand-press at
the hôtel of Prince Talleyrand, in the Rue St. Florentin, and thousands
of copies were thrown from the balconies. It was a great party stroke
for the house of Bourbon, for from that time its cause was secure. It
has been reported that the resolution of Count Nesselrode was decided
by immense diplomatic presents; but one should generally regard with
distrust the various stories that are current after political events
have been accomplished: there is less corruption than people imagine
in public business. At the same time it is very probable that some
gratitude would be manifested after so important an act; secret
presents almost invariably accompany the signature of stipulations in
all diplomatic transactions--it is an old custom, and, no doubt, the
value of these presents was increased in consequence of the immense
importance of the service rendered; but this is all that historical
impartiality can say on the subject.
This season of 1814 was very brilliant for Count Nesselrode; there was
nothing at Paris but _fêtes_ and flowers. The moderation of Russia had
swayed all the resolutions and softened the conditions of victory, and
the Emperor Alexander enjoyed a great reputation as the symbol of peace
and the expression of magnanimity in the midst of triumph. England
and Austria were quite cast into the shade, nobody was spoken of but
Alexander, and this celebrity was reflected upon Count Nesselrode in so
great a degree as to occasion a feeling of jealousy in Metternich, who
had hardly any thing to do with the transactions at Paris in 1814. The
Austrian minister awaited his turn at the congress of Vienna. The first
occupation of our capital was the _apogée_ of the moral omnipotence of
Russia in the affairs of southern Europe.
Here it is necessary I should mention all the difficulties of
Nesselrode's situation. Nothing could be more changeable and more prone
to sudden impressions than the mind of Alexander, who passed from one
enthusiastic fancy to another with inconceivable rapidity; when he
had taken up one idea it was difficult to put it out of his head; and
if you followed in the same track, some time afterwards he would meet
with some other fancy, which he adopted with equal warmth. We may,
therefore, imagine how difficult was the part of a secretary of state
desirous of giving some consistency to these projects, of classing them
in a certain order, and of producing any result from them all. From the
close of 1813, Alexander had been deeply imbued with the mysticism of
Madame Krüdner, and he mingled with his manifestoes on the principles
of Europe, and his theories of peace and war, a species of ascetic
worship and enthusiastic superstition very difficult to translate or
apply to the real business of life, and of which the ultimate object
was not always understood by powers like England and Austria.
At the congress of Vienna they had to treat of serious affairs, and
it was necessary to give a positive meaning to the vague conceptions
of Alexander, and translate theories into treaties. Poland was
occupied by a Russian army, and the diplomatists of the old Muscovite
school, in hopes this occupation would become permanent, pressed the
annexation of Poland to Russia, without a constitution or any free
state privileges. Alexander, who was desirous of wearing the crown of
Poland, was entirely opposed to these demands, and wanted to collect
the ruins of that kingdom into one system of political organisation;
and Count Nesselrode faithfully executed this idea of his sovereign at
the congress of Vienna. The question of Poland was his sole anxiety, as
the integrality of Saxony and the restoration of the House of Bourbon
at Naples was the exclusive thought of Prince Talleyrand.
At the congress of Vienna Nesselrode formed an intimacy with Prince
Hardenberg. Russia had supported the pretensions of Prussia, the
States had been bound to each other by means of political and family
arrangements, and, for the future, Prussia was destined to act as
the advanced guard of Russia, in her projects of influence over the
south of Europe. Russia was too busy with her own affairs to observe
the sort of underhand alliance forming between England, France, and
Austria, against Alexander's design of instituting a kingdom in Poland,
dependent on a viceroyalty of the czars. Nesselrode had to contend at
once with Metternich and Hardenberg, who were both afraid of seeing the
portion of Poland that had accrued to them at the time of the first
partition escape from their grasp; Austria fearing for Gallicia, and
Prussia for the districts beyond the Vistula. The other opposition the
Russian minister had to overcome was, as I have before observed, that
of the old Muscovite families, who murmured at seeing the organisation
of Poland with an independent constitution and a degree of national
liberty. Great difficulty existed in this quarter, although Nesselrode
had not entered as warmly into this project as his sovereign had done,
but had taken a middle course, in order to avoid a misfortune with
which he had at one time appeared threatened.
But all these divers interests were confounded by the astounding news
of Napoleon's landing in the Gulf of Juan. The Emperor Alexander, whose
mind was more than ever impressed with the mystic and liberal ideas of
the German school, did not hesitate a moment in lending his powerful
aid to the coalition. Madame Krüdner had persuaded him that the _white
angel_, Peace, was to overcome the _black angel_, which presided over
battles, and that the part of mediator and preserver of the human race
was intended for him. The immense armies of Russia, therefore, marched
against the _black angel_ (Buonaparte). I will not enter into the
military details of the Waterloo campaign; suffice it to remind the
reader that the Russians, who had afforded such decisive support during
the invasion of 1813 and 1814, upon this occasion only arrived with the
third division after the struggle was over, which explains the reason
why the influence of England and Prussia was paramount in France during
the transactions of 1815.
I have elsewhere given an account of these negotiations;[48] the
Emperor Alexander constituted himself the protector of the French
interests, being led to do so as much by the natural generosity of his
disposition as by a certain degree of national rivalry, which already
began to appear between Russia and England. Nesselrode's influence
over the mind of the Emperor was quite as powerful as that of Pozzo
di Borgo, and we must acknowledge that they rendered us the most
essential service, by preserving us from a partition of our territory,
and a pecuniary indemnity beyond the power of France to discharge.
Still the treaty of Paris stands in evidence, that we were obliged to
submit to very painful sacrifices and heavy humiliations.
[48] _Vide_ articles "Pozzo di Borgo" and "Richelieu."
Just at this time the influence of Nesselrode was endangered by a rival
in Alexander's favour; I allude to Count Capo d'Istria.
Capo d'Istria was born in the Ionian islands, in the midst of the Greek
population, which have so often been encouraged by Russia to strive
for their liberty, ever since the time of Catherine II. He was the
friend of Ipsilanti and of all the ardent generation who fought for
the independence of their country. At a very early age he had been
employed in secret and mysterious negotiations. However the cabinet
of St. Petersburg might be situated with regard to the Porte--let
the relations of the two countries be what they might, Russia, for
the last century, had never ceased to favour secretly the efforts of
Greece to shake off the Ottoman yoke. Alas! had she not had frequent
cause for self-reproach on this subject? More than once she had
instigated the Greeks to revolt, and then, when all their efforts had
proved ineffectual, she had not dared to defend them openly in the
face of Europe; for she was closely watched by England and Austria,
who denounced to the Divan the slightest action of the unfortunate
Hellenists--even the groans of an oppressed people were not allowed
to pass in silence. When, therefore, Capo d'Istria was admitted to
the confidence of the Emperor, the cause of the Greeks enjoyed the
advantage of a constant advocate, and a warm, faithful representative.
His credit dated from the negotiations in Switzerland in 1815, whose
result was a new act of mediation under the threefold influence of
Austria, Russia, and Prussia. Capo d'Istria was afterwards appointed to
divide with Nesselrode the ministry for foreign affairs.
It was, as I have before observed, a complete rivalry, for Count
Nesselrode had entirely adopted the ideas of the European school.
Since the year 1812, he had followed the political system opposed
to the military principle of the French revolution, now pursued in
concert by all the cabinets of Europe, whose ruling desire, from the
year 1816, had been the repression of the liberal movement engendered
by the resistance of the people to the conquests of Napoleon.
Nesselrode perfectly agreed with Metternich on this point, and the
Emperor Alexander's partiality for the liberal and Hellenic school
of Capo d'Istria was a source of sorrow and vexation to them both.
The difficulties they had to encounter were of a complicated nature,
for religious feelings were mingled with political ideas--there
was strong sympathy between the two churches of Moscow and Athens,
and the patriarchs were in constant communion with each other. It
was impossible openly to attack Alexander on this point; all that
Nesselrode could do in opposition to Capo d'Istria, was to spread the
alarm in every direction concerning the fearful progress made by the
spirit of insurrection.
As early as the close of 1815, the Emperor Alexander had conceived
the project of the Holy Alliance--an idea resulting from the mystic
and religious fancies of Madame Krüdner, but involving at bottom very
positive resistance to the spirit of revolt; for the Holy Alliance
was nothing more than a contract of mutual support, a sort of bond
entered into by all the crowned heads against the revolutionary
movement in Europe. Metternich and Nesselrode were certainly not the
men for ideal transactions--there had been too much reality and
matter of fact in their lives; still they saw the cabinets adopt these
measures with satisfaction, as they both entertained hopes of bringing
over the Emperor to their way of thinking; and, indeed, the general
course of events at that time appeared to favour the common idea of
Metternich and Nesselrode, for the secret societies in Germany had
been greatly developed, and kept Prussia and Austria in a state of
perpetual anxiety. They sent repeated despatches to St. Petersburg,
and Nesselrode secretly supported the ideas of the alarmed cabinets.
Thus the liberal plans advocated by Capo d'Istria met with secret
opposition, and more than once the Emperor Alexander remained undecided
among the various tendencies which disputed among themselves his mind,
his power, and his affections.
Events, however, were progressing in a manner likely to weaken the
credit of Capo d'Istria, and augment that of Nesselrode. The Polish
senate had been the especial creation of Alexander, it was the work
of his own hands; and this senate, by an ill-advised resistance, had
just deeply offended the will of the sovereign--a circumstance which
might have been considered as a legal act, in a long-established
government, was construed into an armed and criminal revolt; and the
Czar suddenly issued harsh and firm resolutions regarding Poland. The
strong repressive measures advocated by Nesselrode and Metternich thus
regained their place among the ideas of the European system; from the
same cause the influence of Capo d'Istria visibly lost ground with
the Emperor, and with his influence declined the idea of a Christian
insurrection in Greece.
Capo d'Istria, as I before observed, was favourably disposed towards
his countrymen the Greeks, who, by a spontaneous movement, had shaken
off the yoke of the Porte; and he urged Alexander immediately to
interfere, by causing a Russian army to appear on the Pruth and an
imperial fleet in the Mediterranean. The revolt of the Greeks was
observed with great anxiety by Metternich; the house of Austria,
being considered as the protectress of the Divan, made every possible
effort to avoid a conflict calculated to injure the Ottoman influence,
which was necessary to the balance of power in Europe: consequently,
it was the object of Austria to persuade Alexander that the real
spirit evinced by Greece was that of revolution, where Capo d'Istria
saw nothing but a religious question; and in this opinion Nesselrode
perfectly concurred. He considered that the actual state of Europe
would not admit of the emancipation of a people, for rebellion was
every where forming against the crowned heads, and Greece was merely
employed as a pretext.
The moment was well chosen to infuse these alarms into the mind of the
Emperor, the bent of the German universities having just manifested
itself by the assassination of Kotzebue; Piémont had taken up arms,
Naples was in a state of insurrection, and Spain had proclaimed the
Cortes. Metternich, in concert with Nesselrode, then returned to the
idea of congresses, those great fusions of the sovereignties, according
to the course that had been settled by the Holy Alliance.
The diplomatic school had rather a predilection for this assembling
of Europe--those meetings in which all the statesmen of the various
countries met on friendly terms to discuss the affairs of the
Continent. The same passion for congresses was to be observed in
Talleyrand, Metternich, Hardenberg, and Nesselrode; it was a habit they
had formed, a desire of appearing and playing an important part on the
diplomatic stage. The Emperor Alexander was also fond of these great
_réunions_ because he was consulted as an arbiter, the princes of
Europe trusting both to his experience and to his magnanimity.
Nesselrode accompanied the Emperor to Troppau and Laybach; those who
studied the character and deportment of both observed that their minds
appeared to be undecided: there was a kind of uncertain hesitation
between the liberal ideas they had lately entertained and the strongly
repressive tendency advocated by Austria. Metternich made use of all
his talents and influence to convince the Emperor of the dangers by
which all the European sovereignties were threatened, if they did not
decide upon one of those great military demonstrations which, by their
overwhelming force, at once made an end of rebellion; when, just at the
most critical moment, intelligence was brought to the Russian minister
of a mutiny that had taken place in one of the regiments of guards at
St. Petersburg. This news quickly determined the Emperor's opinion;
Nesselrode received orders to enter with the utmost vigour into the
plans proposed by Austria, and the downfall of Capo d'Istria appeared
impending.