and ill-humour, which had marked their origin. The slightest proposal
called forth anger, the most trifling insinuation gave offence.
Metternich retained the character of mediator, which had been
recognised by the other powers; he resisted all idea of overturning the
French government, and, when General Moreau arrived on the Continent,
the first words the Austrian minister said to M. Maret were, "Austria
has nothing to do with this intrigue; she will never approve of the
proceedings of General Moreau." At last, the ultimatum of the allied
powers, communicated by Metternich, was as follows. The dissolution of
the duchy of Warsaw, which was to be divided between Russia, Prussia,
and Austria (Dantzic was given to Prussia); the cities of Lubech and
Hamburg were to be reinstated in their independence, the kingdom of
Prussia was to be remodelled, and one frontier was to extend to the
Elbe; all the Illyrian provinces, including Trieste, were to be ceded
to Austria, and a reciprocal guarantee was to be given, that the
condition of the sovereignties, both small and great, should not be
subject to alteration, except by common consent, but should continue
such as they might be settled by the peace. The Emperor of the French
at first refused to accede to these terms, which were afterwards
modified, and at last received a reluctant and tardy assent; for
Austria was then entering with all her strength into the coalition.
I have consulted upon the events of this period the two men who played
the principal parts in the diplomatic transactions of the war, Count
Pozzo di Borgo and Prince Metternich. I asked them, "Was there really
a sincere desire for peace at Prague?" They both answered in the
affirmative. Pozzo di Borgo, in his hatred for Napoleon, described
to me the anxiety he felt at witnessing the hesitation of Austria;
and Metternich justified himself to Europe for the indecision of his
conduct by his desire to bring his diplomatic mediation to a happy
issue, for the interests of Napoleon, Austria, and the general peace.
A notification from the court of Vienna announced to Count Nesselrode
and Prince Hardenberg, that, for the future, Austria, as a member of
the coalition, would locate 200,000 men, in large bodies, behind the
mountains of Bohemia. The joy of the Allies was not to be expressed;
one should have heard Count Pozzo di Borgo recount the magical effect
produced by this letter of Metternich; it arrived in the middle of
the night at a barn, in which were reposing the Emperor Alexander,
the King of Prussia, Count Nesselrode, Prince Hardenberg, and all the
staff of the allied troops. They arose and embraced each other, as if
the salvation of Europe were achieved, and Napoleon tumbled from his
throne. The manifesto of Austria, which was the work of Metternich,
appeared ten days later. In spite, however, of this rupture,
Caulaincourt remained at Prague, and the chancellor of state still
assured him he was ready to proceed with the negotiation if France
would agree to the independence of the Germanic Confederation and of
Switzerland, and to the reconstruction of the dominions of Prussia on
a scale of greater importance. Napoleon, still unwilling to give in,
applied to Count Bubna, in the persuasion that he would be able to
exercise a favourable influence over his father-in-law, the emperor; at
last, on the 14th of August, he gave his consent to the proposals of
the Austrian cabinet, and his answer was despatched to Prague; but it
was too late. Metternich declared the impossibility of entering into a
separate treaty, and said it would be necessary to refer simultaneously
to the three courts whose political interests were henceforth
inseparable.
Still Napoleon did not abandon all hope of drawing Austria over to his
interests, and he proposed entering into a negotiation, even after the
commencement of hostilities, when the Austrian army was actually in
motion. 200,000 Austrians came forth from the mountains of Bohemia, and
turned the flank of the French army. Then the general rising in Germany
took place; a transitory lustre was conferred by the admirable battle
of Dresden, but Leipsic witnessed the last expiring gleam of the French
glory. By the end of 1813, the line of the Elbe was lost, and even that
of the Rhine was compromised. All Germany was in arms, and the whole of
Europe had assumed a threatening posture.
Austria had hardly joined the coalition before difficulties arose
in this vast body, agitated by so many different interests. Some
jealous feelings had already been entertained concerning the title
of generalissimo of the armies, which had been conferred upon Prince
Schwartzenberg, and other questions were subsequently started as to the
object of the campaign. As long as the French occupied Germany, the
most pressing anxiety was to get rid of this heavy yoke. Having once
reached the Rhine, there was no confederation, no imminent danger; the
soil was covered with the wrecks of Napoleon's empire, and Germany had
recovered her ancient independence. The sole remaining possessions of
the French in that country were some fortresses, which, after a siege
of longer or shorter duration, must revert to their ancient sovereign.
The house of Austria had ceased to be afraid of France, but had begun
to entertain some apprehensions with regard to Russia. The Russians had
been taught the road towards the south of Europe, and they were likely
to remember it.
In the opinion of Metternich, France, with a certain degree of power
and a definite extent of territory, was necessary to the balance
of power in Europe; and he took care this should be mentioned in
the manifesto published by the allied armies on the Rhine. This
manifesto, of which the idea belonged to Metternich, was executed by
Gentz. Austria, being now free from danger in Germany, could, without
risk, lend assistance to the threatened empire of France. The family
connexion with Napoleon was not yet broken; his moral influence, it is
true, was greatly weakened; but his powerful mind was in its pristine
vigour, and he was still capable of making some daring attempt. These
long-sighted views were clearly displayed in the conversation between
Metternich and M. de St. Aignan. Austria, already embarrassed by her
position with regard to France and Russia, would gladly have withdrawn
from a war which no longer closely affected her own interests; but a
principle, fatal to Napoleon, had been admitted,--the allied powers
were no longer at liberty to enter into a treaty the one without
the other. When Lord Castlereagh arrived on the Continent, he gave
additional solidity to this tendency to unite in a common cause; and
the implacable enemy of Napoleon, Count Pozzo di Borgo, had been
despatched to London to request the presence of the prime minister of
England on the Continent. They were desirous of rendering the alliance
incapable of future alteration, for the first successes beyond the
Rhine had naturally given birth to two separate questions: one relating
to territory in the new settlement of the boundaries in Europe; the
other, a moral question, as to the form of government which should be
established in France in case the allied armies should take possession
of Paris. The interests of England and Austria were differently
affected from those of Russia and Prussia by the arrangements that
might be entered into.
In the first place, what would they do with the most important
conquests? Russia was in possession of Poland, Prussia of Saxony, and
Austria of a great portion of Italy. Should the Emperor Alexander
attempt to set up a sort of kingdom in Poland, the interests of
Austria would suffer. Again, could Prussia be permitted to enlarge her
dominions by the addition of Saxony? All these questions were already
subjects of debate in the diplomatic body, which, to all outward
appearance, was still perfectly united; the most unlimited confidence
in each other was expressed by all parties, but, in reality, interest
and selfishness were the prevailing feelings. Lord Castlereagh shewed
great ability at this juncture by constituting himself the general bond
of union of the coalition.
With regard to the questions connected with the government of France,
it was hardly possible to suppose Austria would agree to a project of
a change of dynasty, when an archduchess held the reins of government
as regent. The Emperor Alexander had entered into a private contract
with Bernadotte, whose feelings against Napoleon were very bitter.
Alexander would agree to any form of government that might be proposed,
but in the conference at Abo all possibilities had been discussed, even
one which might place Bernadotte at the head of affairs in France.
England, though well inclined towards the Bourbons, did not make their
restoration so indispensable a condition as to render debates upon
matters of more personal interest subordinate to it. Lord Castlereagh
had explained this to the exiled princes; they had not yet been
permitted to land upon the Continent, and the Comte d'Artois did not
arrive at Dole until January, 1814.
It is particularly in this point of view that the history of the
Congress of Chatillon is deserving of a serious study. At this meeting
there was still an evident desire on the part of Austria to conclude
a treaty on the basis of the balance of power in Europe; but, from
the very commencement, Metternich must have discovered that the
position of Austria was no longer the same as at the beginning of the
campaign. All moral influence had now passed over to the side of the
Emperor Alexander, who had become the arbiter of the destinies of the
coalition; Prussia and Austria only appeared in the light of useful
auxiliaries, the principal influence and popularity rested with the
czar; he alone was talked of, and the negotiations were especially
addressed to his cabinet. The military treaty of Chaumont, which fixed
the number of troops to be furnished by the coalition, was dictated by
Lord Castlereagh, who was afraid of a dissolution of the alliance. It
was then declared that the allied powers would never sheathe the sword
till they had reduced France within the limits it occupied in 1792;
and, for this purpose, each cabinet promised a contingent of 150,000
men under arms, England agreeing to furnish a subsidy.[5]
[5] The sum of 5,000,000_l._ sterling was to be furnished for the year
1814, to be increased if necessary.--_Editor._
From this period Metternich found himself in a very delicate position.
As the events of the war gradually brought the allies nearer to
Paris, the Emperor of Austria could not with any degree of propriety
take a part in military operations whose object was the capture of
a metropolis governed by the archduchess. Metternich, who was in
correspondence with Maria Louisa, could no longer control the course of
events, and, perhaps, this princess, weary of seeing herself surrounded
by so much littleness of mind, avidity, and folly, as were exhibited
by the relations and supporters of Napoleon, when the regency was at
Blois, might not have been sorry to get rid of her fictitious dignity.
The Emperor Francis II. remained at Dijon, while the bold advance of
Schwartzenberg laid Paris at the mercy of the allies.
A reproach has constantly been cast upon Metternich for his conduct
upon this occasion; how, it is said, could he sanction a proceeding
which rent the imperial crown from the brow of Maria Louisa? I
believe, at this time, all idea of the continuance of the empire had
been abandoned, its time had passed away: there are seasons when the
force of public opinion carries every thing before it, and now there
was a sort of weariness of mind, people were tired of Napoleon and
his military system, the string drawn too tight had snapped asunder.
A retrospect must be taken of that time, and it will explain the
resolution of the allies. It would have been difficult to maintain
even the regency of the empress, and at the same time carry out the
military engagements entered into at Chaumont. In France all were tired
of the war, a general rising had taken place in Europe, nor would
Napoleon have submitted to the degradation of a kingdom bounded by
narrower limits than the Rhine. No doubt the regency would have been
the most complete triumph of the Austrian system, but what would have
become of Napoleon under the regency? would he have resigned himself to
so humiliating a situation? would he not have been stifled in the small
kingdom of France? The proceedings in Paris were quite independent of
Metternich, who was not even present at them. The Emperor Alexander
had acquired so overwhelming an influence in the senate with the
patriots of 1789, that no cabinet, even of the first order, would have
contended with it. The archduchess had been conducted from Blois to her
father, Francis II., without any discussion taking place concerning the
regency or the empire. Talleyrand had said, "The restoration of the
Bourbons is a principle; every thing else is an intrigue:" and this
expression put an end to all negotiations that had not the return of
Louis XVIII. for their object. The diplomatic corps were occupied with
the Treaty of Paris, which produced the re-establishment of order, the
general peace, the restoration of the Bourbons, and the settlement of
the boundaries of the French territory, which had been the principal
object and most important result of the campaign. But this was not
all; the immense empire of Napoleon was in ruins, and how should these
important fragments with which the world was overspread be divided?
Might Francis II. resume the old imperial crown, which he had resigned
at the treaty of Presburg? In spite of the strong predilection then
entertained for ancient customs, Metternich felt that the crown of
Charlemagne would be merely an empty title unsupported by any real
influence, and it would have been a cause of offence to Prussia, whose
jealousy would have been roused by the existence of a German empire in
close contiguity with her own kingdom, which embraced nearly a third of
the population of Germany. With the strong instinct which forms part
of his character, Metternich felt that, for the future, Austria, while
retaining a great general influence over Germany, had better strive
to become a southern sovereignty, having Gallicia at one extremity,
and Dalmatia at the other, and including the Lombardo-Venetian
territories, under the ancient and magnificent iron crown. He carried
this idea into the Congress of Vienna, when the new constitution of the
European sovereignties was to be established on a general basis, and
he took care to bring it forward again upon every occasion in which
the diplomatic system of Austria was displayed. This alone affords an
explanation of the extreme and constant solicitude evinced for the
possession of the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, and the constant tendency,
both by means of conquest and commerce, towards the shores of the
Adriatic.
At the Congress of Vienna, Metternich exercised a prodigious influence.
The Emperor Francis had made a great family sacrifice, by abandoning
the cause of Maria Louisa, and, in honour of this conduct, Europe fixed
the assemblage of the sovereigns at Vienna. In the midst of balls,
elegant amusements, and entertainments, Europe was to be remodelled
on a different basis; the long conferences, which were to decide
the fate of nations, were intermingled with flowers and pleasure.
Prince Metternich, then in his forty-first year, saw the object of
his anxieties and wishes fully accomplished; Vienna afforded the most
brilliant spectacle; the sovereigns were assembled there, accompanied
by a myriad of persons of princely rank, with their families, their
courts, and their numerous suites. Love intrigues contended with
the more serious business of this Congress, which had become the
rendezvous of all the most distinguished characters in Europe. In the
evening people assembled at the Royal Theatre, or in the brilliantly
illuminated saloons, where, at the gaming-table, Blucher was employed
in completing the ruin of his affairs, which he had begun in Paris.
Prince Metternich had the direction of the diplomatic party, while the
empress, wife of Francis II., received the august strangers with the
grace and dignity she was so well known to possess. The splendours
of the Congress of Vienna left a strong impression upon the minds of
the diplomatic characters who were present at it; they are associated
in their memory with the fresh and pleasing recollection of the
days of their youth, and, when you converse upon the subject with
those whom death has spared, they speak in enthusiastic terms of the
chivalric entertainments, the fancy balls of the empress, and the
_galanteries_ of the sovereigns. What brilliant parties were those of
Lady Castlereagh, a female diplomatist, as active as the English prime
minister in all negotiations relating to the management of the world!
In walking through the streets of Vienna, it was no uncommon sight to
meet the three sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, shaking
hands, and giving each other marks of mutual confidence, and yet the
most serious dissensions already prevailed in the Congress concerning
the territorial arrangement of Europe. The quadruple alliance, as it
had been settled in the treaty of Chaumont, was nothing but a military
convention, intended to overturn the power of Napoleon; more a kind of
plan of battle, or strategic stipulation, than a regular and political
negotiation. After the fall of Napoleon, the allied powers resumed
their natural interests. Thus, on the question of German supremacy,
Prussia would naturally be inclined to side with Russia, and draw off
from Austria; England, to oppose Russia in every thing relating to
the sovereignty of Poland, which the Czar had already appropriated to
himself; and France, though so terribly shaken by the late invasion,
must endeavour to regain some degree of credit in Europe, by keeping
on good terms with England and Austria. I must say, to the honour of
the eldest branch of the Bourbons, that it always exhibited the most
perfect dignity in its foreign relations, and perhaps the critical
situation of our internal affairs was only produced by a fatal reaction
of foreign dissatisfaction upon ourselves. From the first assembling
of the Congress, private conferences had taken place between Lord
Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand, to take into consideration
the conditions of a treaty which might afford a counterpoise to the
immense ascendancy Russia had obtained during the invasion of France
and the events of 1814. By this treaty, which was signed in the month
of March 1815, subsidies were agreed upon in the event of certain
occurrences, and an engagement was entered into, that a fixed number
of troops should always be in readiness for the _casus belli_, should
Russia and Prussia attempt to disturb the equilibrium established among
the European powers, and, according to a despatch of M. de Talleyrand,
France was to maintain a half war establishment.
Metternich was the principal author of this secret treaty, because,
after things had been replaced in their original state by the
restoration of Louis XVIII., he began to be afraid of Russia and
her immense weight: the question of Poland was the pretext. France
manifested particular anxiety for the re-establishment of the King of
Saxony, whose territory Prussia was desirous to absorb; while England,
on the other hand, but little inclined to favour Russia, considered
it indispensably necessary that Prussia should possess very extensive
territorial strength, that she might serve as a constant barrier
against northern invasion. It was necessary Metternich should combat
this opinion for the sake of Saxony, and he did so in a series of
papers opposed to those of Prince Hardenberg and Baron Humboldt. On
the Polish question he perfectly agreed with England: at the bottom
of Alexander's good-will towards the Poles, there lurked an idea of
political aggrandisement; for, by making a kingdom of Poland, he well
knew that the portion of that country that had accrued to Austria, as
well as what had fallen to the share of Prussia, would sooner or later
all unite under one sceptre. On no account would Alexander resign his
paramount influence[6] over Warsaw. Things reached such a pitch, that
Metternich issued orders that the Austrian armies should be maintained
upon a war establishment, while Russia kept her troops in readiness,
and appealed to the Poles to stand by their country. Whilst Metternich
warmly opposed the establishment of Russian Poland as a kingdom under
any circumstances, England was desirous it should be placed on so firm
a foundation, as to serve as an obstacle to the encroachments of the
Russian cabinet.
[6] Suzeraineté.
Serious events already obliged Metternich to turn his attention towards
Italy, and here we must look back upon events of a rather earlier
date. As far back as the month of February 1813, England had taken
advantage of some dissatisfaction entertained by Murat, and still
more by Caroline, Napoleon's own sister, to hasten the downfall of
the French empire. All the good people of Buonaparte's family appear
to have taken their royalty in good earnest, and to have fancied they
possessed some consequence of their own, and might remain kings and
queens independent of the great emperor. England, clever at taking
advantage of these little absurdities, reminded Murat of the example
of Bernadotte, and suggested the possibility of his becoming king of
all Italy. While Napoleon was abusing his brother-in-law in his haughty
and violent letters, reminding him that "the lion was not dead," the
English cabinet soothed with the most flattering hopes the imagination
of Murat, who had but a poor head for politics, and every thing was
brought into play that could flatter the vanity of the most theatrical
soldier of the imperial era.
At the close of the year 1813, Murat was already in the occupation of
the Roman States, making an appeal to the patriots, for it was the
custom of Europe at that time to march forward invoking the liberty of
the people. To detach him from a bad cause, Metternich had particularly
recourse to a gentle and tender influence, a pleasing reminiscence
of his embassy in Paris, and he guaranteed to Murat the peaceable
possession of the kingdom of Naples. After the re-establishment of
the Bourbons in France gave rise to the strongest uneasiness in his
astonished mind, King Joachim deputed the Duke of Serra Capriola to the
Congress of Vienna, pleading his treaties with Austria and England;
but his envoy was not admitted to the assembly, for a negotiation
was on foot to replace the old dynasty of Sicily upon the throne,
a negotiation conducted by Prince Talleyrand. Louis XVIII. had
recommended the interests of his family to the Congress of Vienna, and
M. de Talleyrand was to receive from the Neapolitan branch of the
Bourbons a rich equivalent for his sadly compromised principality of
Benevento. Austria was a little unmindful of her promises, and defended
her engagements with Murat but very feebly; indeed, the general bent
towards the restoration of the former order of things was so strong,
that he who had usurped the crown of Naples was actually declared
guilty of treason. In the English House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh
read a private correspondence, carried on with Napoleon at the very
moment when Murat was negotiating with the Alliance, which afforded
evidence of a double policy having been pursued. Having become uneasy
concerning the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna, he made vast
military preparations, in concert with the patriots and the secret
societies, with the intention of assuming the great crown of Italy.
Metternich caused the Austrian armies to assemble _en masse_ in the
Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, where they awaited under arms the coming
events.
The storm soon burst.