of the Hundred Days. Matters were in a strangely complicated state
at the Congress of Vienna, and Napoleon, looking at the affairs of
Europe under one point of view only, had formed a fair judgment of the
condition of the allied powers with regard to each other, without,
however, comprehending that his presence on the Continent would unite
them all in a terrible coalition. The very name of Buonaparte filled
the old European sovereignties with so much alarm, that they recovered
themselves with the utmost haste, in order to take measures for the
general safety.
They owed to the activity of Talleyrand and Metternich the official
declaration of the Congress of Vienna, which placed Buonaparte at
the ban of Europe, simultaneously roused against the common enemy.
The mystic spirit of Alexander entered willingly into the idea of a
Christian alliance and a European crusade, and Metternich, after the
system he had adopted ever since the rupture in 1813, could not depart
from the military agreement entered into at Chaumont. Napoleon was
declared at the ban of the empire by a revived custom of the ancient
assemblies of the German Diet.
The pretended agreement between Napoleon, Austria, and England, at
the time of his landing in the Gulf of Juan, was a romance invented
afterwards by the imperialist party. Napoleon, who was well informed
concerning the diplomatic state of things, might imagine a separation
of interests among the cabinets a probable thing, but beyond this
there was nothing. One of his first steps was to endeavour to place
himself in communication with Metternich, and we again find Fouché in
correspondence with the chief of the Austrian cabinet: they had never
lost sight of each other since their memorable conference in 1809,
and their acquaintance was renewed in 1813, when Fouché was appointed
Governor-General of Illyria. I have reason to believe, that they had
even then spoken to each other in confidence concerning the decline of
power of _that man_, as the disaffected called Napoleon, and of the
possibility of a regency under Maria Louisa; in 1813 the subject they
would select for their conversation would probably be the abdication
of the Emperor, which was one of the favourite ideas of the senatorial
party. At the same time Napoleon wrote to Maria Louisa, he despatched,
by means of some secret agents, confidential letters from intimate
friends of the minister, and even from a princess of the imperial
blood, between whom and Prince Metternich a tender feeling had existed:
and finally, in order to sow dissension throughout the whole of
Europe, he transmitted to the Emperor Alexander a copy of the treaty
of the triple alliance, concluded against Russia in the month of March
1815, and signed by Lord Castlereagh, Talleyrand, and Metternich: his
primary object was to break the powerful union among the sovereigns.
At this period, the Austrian armies had marched into Italy against
Murat and the Neapolitans, and General Bianchi had obtained the most
brilliant victories over the wavering and ill-organised troops of
Joachim. Metternich caused all the fortresses of the kingdom of Naples
and the Roman States to be garrisoned by Austrian troops; for he had
decided, in concert with the French legation, upon the re-establishment
of the House of Bourbon at Naples as completing the scheme of the
government of Europe.
While Fouché was negotiating with Metternich a plan for substituting
the regency under Maria Louisa to the empire, organised as it had
been during the hundred days, French agents were contriving means
of carrying off the child who had been saluted in his cradle with
the title of King of Rome. A great deal of mystification went on in
all this; there was even one of these gentlemen, otherwise, too, a
man in good society, who received a large sum of money, but who had
in reality no other object than that of joining M. de Talleyrand at
Vienna. Napoleon had promised that his wife and son would be present
at the Champ de Mai, but Metternich's police baffled the intentions
of the French agents, and, with the politeness which characterises
all his actions, the minister conducted the daughter of the emperor
and the Duke de Reichstadt to the palace of Schönbrunn, under an
escort of the most trustworthy servants of the house of Austria. It
was one of the most delicate circumstances that occurred during the
life of Metternich, a man, too, always remarkable for his attention
to propriety; for Maria Louisa did not at that time feel the cold
indifference for Napoleon which she afterwards exhibited, and she was
a party to the project formed for carrying her off, by some attendants
who had remained with her, but who now all received an order to quit
Schönbrunn.
The Austrian armies proceeded from Italy across the Alps, and took a
part in the melancholy invasion of the south of France; they afterwards
occupied Provence and Languedoc as far as Auvergne, their head-quarters
being at Lyons and Dijon. On the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna,
after the second fall of Napoleon, Metternich repaired to Paris, to be
present at the conferences which were to precede the treaty of November
1815. Prussia and England had been victorious at Waterloo, and their
interest had proportionally increased. In the negotiations of Paris,
the two cabinets of Berlin and Vienna acted in concert to represent the
interests of Germany, which were very hostile to the French nation.
The German population had been greatly irritated during the gigantic
efforts that Europe had made against Napoleon; the secondary princes
on the banks of the Rhine demanded Alsace and a portion of Lorraine,
marked upon a map drawn in 1815 (which now lies before me), under
the name of Germania, as the representation of Germany. There was a
terrible reaction in that country against France, one of those refluxes
of the people and the national feeling by which various periods of our
history have been distinguished.
Nevertheless, what organisation, exterior or interior, did they intend
to establish, to form a general constitution in Germany? How could they
restore to the Emperor Francis the influence in that country which he
formerly possessed, but of which he had been deprived by Napoleon?
Germany had arisen with the double cry of liberty and unity on her
lips. Unity! how was it to be established among principalities of
which the power and the population varied so greatly, and who still
maintained the feudal principle in the midst of civilised Europe? And
liberty! it was an indefinite expression; how could it be applied
to so many different systems of government, and to so many various
localities whose interests were so distinct from each other? The scheme
of the Confederation of the Rhine had been formed by Napoleon solely
with a view of increasing the importance of all the petty states, and
of inducing them to enter into a coalition hostile to Austria and
Prussia. Now circumstances were altered; Austria and Prussia were
the great predominant powers, whose business it was to establish
their own influence, and govern the whole confederation by means of a
protectorate, more or less clearly defined; Prussia assuming the power
in the northern provinces, Austria to the south. It was necessary,
when the fatherland should be threatened, that its mixed population
should be capable of being called forth to serve indifferently in the
armies of Prussia and Austria. The unity of the German states was thus
opposed as a barrier against Russia and France, and served equally as a
protection against both those nations.
Metternich, when he gave up the old imperial mantle in the name of
the emperor, obtained for him a more real advantage as president of
the diet; a number of votes were awarded to Austria and Prussia, in
proportion to the importance of their position; and either by means of
their command of the army of the confederation, or by their influence
in the diet, these two countries held undisputed sway over the
deliberations and the employment of the troops. No doubt, many little
acts of injustice were committed, and some caprice was exhibited in
the repartition of the states and of the contingents. Sovereignties
were sometimes aggrandised because they were protected by the Emperor
Alexander, and, sometimes, even by Metternich; but where are the
human operations over which perfect justice presides? Since they were
desirous of unity, this sacrifice of some to the cause of all was the
natural consequence of it; and should it now be asked, what is to be
the result of this confederation, I reply, that Austria has reason to
fear lest Prussia should assume a constantly increasing importance in
Germany. The destiny of Austria henceforth is elsewhere, her future
lies in the south; Prussia is too singularly situated not to strive to
agglomerate her dominions; she will undoubtedly do so, either in point
of fact, by means of conquest, or morally, by the influence she will
exercise. It is towards the shores of the Adriatic that Austria will
find herself indemnified for the diminution of her influence in central
Germany.
The cry of liberty had been raised in Germany when it roused itself
against Napoleon; and the secret societies of Schill and Stein still
had representatives in old Blucher and General Gniesenau. What did the
government propose doing for the liberty they demanded? Constitutions
had been promised, and representative states were granted to some
principalities, but, the victory being once obtained, there was
hesitation about proceeding any farther.
Now that experience has made us perfectly acquainted with the spirit of
revolutions, it is easy to understand how, in the rapid alteration of
political situations, the promises of to-day are violated to-morrow.
It is in vain to imagine that these periods of transition, when the
people struggle for crochets of sovereignty, can bear a comparison with
seasons when the proceedings of the government are calm and regular;
after victory the popular excitement shews itself unreasonable, and
wants to insist upon promises the government is no longer able to
perform.
In 1813, during the period of battles and revolutions, many things
had been promised to Germany; but was it possible to perform them in
1815 and 1816? Suppose that in Germany, that country of excitement
and mystical spirit, the utopias of the secret societies had been
realised,--a political existence given to the universities, and a
turbulent representation to all the states,--that they had granted them
the liberty of the press and an organised democracy,--would Germany
ever have reached the high degree of prosperity and public tranquillity
she now enjoys? We must take customs as they exist, and minds with
the habits they have formed; we must not give a people institutions
which would be a torment to their existence without increasing their
well-being. I do not say that the governments of Austria and Prussia
acted rightly in not fulfilling their promises--I merely say, that
time alone can shew whether this conduct proceeded from prudence, or
from a calculating spirit of selfishness. The events of 1814 and 1815
had considerably increased the possessions of Austria in Italy, and,
as this was really a country obtained by conquests, it was natural
and necessary that an armed surveillance should be established in the
Lombardo-Venetian territory, as well as a police capable of controlling
the provinces united to the Austrian empire. The utmost ability will
be required to slacken successively the springs of this police, in
proportion as the victors may be more firmly established in their
foreign possessions. To have granted free constitutions to the people
would have been an imprudent generosity, for this conquest, like those
of Napoleon, could only be maintained by military occupation, which it
was desirable to render as little oppressive as circumstances would
permit. The Italians, a hot and enthusiastic people, had driven out the
French in the day of their calamity; the Austrians should endeavour to
avoid a similar misfortune, and keep carefully upon their guard.
Here begins the melodrama which has been cast around the person of
Prince Metternich, with the picture of the cruel prisons and Piombi of
Venice. I appeal to the Christian sincerity and good faith of Silvio
Pellico, whether there be one word of real truth in his book, _Le
mie Prigioni_. Does he call to mind the terrible Piombi of Venice,
which, in his case, consisted of a room on the fourth floor in the
ducal palace, commanding a most extensive view over the Great Canal,
and for which Lord Byron would have paid some hundreds of sequins?
He was deprived of his liberty, it is true; and this is, no doubt, a
deplorable misfortune: but had he engaged in a conspiracy?--had he
attempted to overturn the established government? He avows that he had
done so, and in attempts of this kind a man sets his liberty and
"Life upon a cast,
And he must stand the hazard of the die."
The Austrian cabinet, no doubt, takes ample precautionary measures, but
there is no cruelty or oppression in its system; and whoever has had an
opportunity of conversing with Prince Metternich ought to ask himself,
whether it is possible a man of so calm and reasonable an intellect
should be guilty of an act of barbarity without even a motive for his
conduct?
The strict repressive measures upon which the system of Prince
Metternich in Germany and Italy is founded occasioned a movement of
reaction; for liberty, that master passion of the mind, does not
allow itself to be crushed without making some despairing efforts.
Far from the secret societies having been dissolved in Germany, they
were regularly organised in the universities among the students,
and the heated state of their minds was encouraged by the influence
of poetry and the political writings, which called upon the courage
and patriotism of all those who possessed noble hearts to lend their
assistance to the German unity. This unity, so loudly appealed to
by the young generation, was in reality only a sort of federative
republic, in which all the states, while enjoying their individual
freedom, were to be united by the practice of virtue, and would thus
tend to the general happiness of mankind. The old German sovereignties
were obliged to curb these associations, which burst forth in the
assassination of Kotzebue.
Metternich had just been travelling in Italy when the universities
distinguished themselves by this sanguinary crime. He was loaded
with the benefits of his sovereign; he now bore the title of prince,
and stars of almost all the orders of knighthood in Europe glittered
on his breast. The state of fermentation which existed in Germany
had not escaped his statesmanlike penetration, and it was solely at
his suggestion that a congress took place at Carlsbad, where severe
and distrustful measures were adopted against the organisation of
the public schools in Germany. The conduct of the universities, the
repression of seditious writings, the establishment of a political
police,--nothing was neglected in this regular crusade, undertaken by
the government against the revolutionary feelings by which the heated
imaginations were then inflamed. After great disturbances have taken
place in a state, the sole anxiety of the government is to check any
disposition to disorder, and they are excited to do so by public
opinion, and by the middle classes, who entertain a dread of fresh
revolutions, and with good reason.
In the year of the Congress of Carlsbad, the Propaganda menaced the
kingdoms of Europe with a fresh revolution. Let us observe accurately
their situation in 1820. Towards the south there was the insurrection
of Spain and the Cortes, and the proclamation of a government more
liberal than even that of England; at Naples, almost by a magical echo,
the constitution was also proclaimed; from Naples the cry of liberty
was heard in Piémont, and the king was deprived of his throne. In Paris
the disturbances were so great that the government was exposed every
evening to a change in its political system. This year of 1820 might be
considered as the first edition of the stupendous event of July, which
took place ten years later with all the fracas of an insurrection.
Austria was particularly endangered by these revolutions, for the
extremities of the kingdom of Naples and Piémont came in close contact
with her Italian possessions. The people had declared themselves; the
sovereigns then became aware of the danger, and roused themselves for
their defence; congresses were held at Troppau and at Laybach, and
Metternich, without hesitation, urged the adoption of powerful measures
to quell the revolutionary spirit now manifested; he was so deeply
convinced of their indispensable necessity, that he opposed every kind
of delay, and only required the moral support of Prussia and Russia,
declaring at once that an Austrian army was about to march into Italy
and occupy Naples and Piémont. The Emperor Alexander, whose mind was
full of the dread of secret societies and plots in Europe, lent his
support to Metternich. There was but one single instance of opposition
with regard to Piémont, and it is known from whence proceeded these
objections. To such a degree has history been disfigured! It proceeded
from the dignity of Louis XVIII., and the despatches of the Duc de
Richelieu and M. Pasquier. The revolutionary spirit was breaking out in
the streets of Paris in 1820, and the restored sovereign declared to
Metternich, that if the Austrian army entered Piémont their occupation
could not be of long continuance, as France could not allow of the
Austrians upon the Alps.
In this _wrestling_, to use the old expression of M. Bignon, the
cabinets had the advantage over the people. Naples was overcome in
a few marches, and Piémont was occupied by the Austrian troops. The
repressive impulse being once given, a combined system was every where
manifested with the design of suspending political liberty. War was
declared by the cabinets against all forms of government which owed
their birth to military excitement or to an exclusively revolutionary
spirit. Metternich was present at the Congress of Verona, a meeting
which appears to me to have been the final expression of the will of
Europe regarding the spirit of insurrection. France was charged with
the suppression of the Spanish Cortes, as Metternich had executed by
force of arms the will of the allied powers against Naples and Piémont.
Here the cabinets were again successful, the revolution was completely
suppressed, as far as regarded its power of action, and only kept a
place in the disordered imagination.
All these acts of government, and all the proclamations which followed
the assembly of the Congress, were the especial work of Prince
Metternich. The Chancellor of Austria possesses a remarkable flow of
language, a pure taste, and a noble manner of expressing his ideas,
even in a diplomatic despatch, where the sense is almost always hidden
under technical, and, it may be added, heavy modes of speech. To him
is owing the style distinguished by the elevation of ideas, which
always appeals to posterity and to the justice of future times, from
the opinion formed by contemporary passions. He even allows himself
to be carried on too far by his anxiety to express his meaning, and
by the literary ornament he is desirous of conferring upon the most
trifling despatch that leaves his cabinet; he takes the principal part
in their composition, he writes in French with extreme elegance and
precision, and he reads all the newspapers regularly, even to the part
which contains merely literary and theatrical critiques. Those who saw
him in 1825, when the unfortunate illness of his wife obliged him to
visit Paris, were surprised to find him possessed of the most exquisite
literary taste. He was acquainted with all our good authors, and shewed
remarkable sagacity in the judgment he formed of the writers of our own
times. One could hardly imagine how a politician, whose life had been
spent in affairs of so much importance, could have found time to study
the most trifling productions of literature.
Affairs were now settled in Europe. The governments began to emerge a
little from the undecided political condition proclaimed by the Holy
Alliance. From the beginning of the year 1827, Metternich had felt some
uneasiness concerning the proceedings of Russia with regard to the
Ottoman Porte, which was likely to be productive of extreme danger to
the Austrian influence. If the Russian projects were realised, Austria
would see herself deprived of her ascendancy over the Porte, which was
nearly as old as that of France. At this time Metternich caused the
French ministry to be sounded, but he was hardly listened to, for the
most decided negotiations were in progress between the three cabinets
of Russia, London, and Paris, on the Greek question; and here it
is well to explain the refusal of Metternich to interfere with the
transactions which led to the treaty of July 1827.
Since the year 1824, the cause of the Greeks had assumed a degree of
consistency and a European character. Every era has its policy of
sentiments, and people were now infatuated with a classic fanaticism
for the Greeks. No doubt there was something glorious in the heroism
which strove to burst the chain of the barbarians; but the enthusiastic
declarations of Russia, her strong and pressing despatches in favour
of the Greeks, were, in their main object, less the expression of a
religious sympathy than the proceedings of a skilful policy, which
sought to abase the Ottoman Porte, in order subsequently to reduce it
into a state of vassalage. Russia, therefore, applied to Charles X.,
by speaking of the cross which had brought salvation to the world. In
England it roused into action the Greek committee, and it was under
the influence of these philanthropic prepossessions that the treaty of
July 1827, and the battle of Navarino, which was the consequence of
it, led to serious uneasiness on the part of Metternich. This minister
instantly divined the full consequences of this shortsighted policy.
The battle of Navarino, by crippling the power of the Porte, killed
it, in a political sense, for the advantage of Russia: it was the
prelude to the campaign of 1828 to the Balkan. Russia had succeeded in
getting M. de la Ferronays placed at the head of foreign affairs in
France: he was an honest man, but rather Russian in his inclinations
and habits; consequently, Metternich could not draw France into a
scheme of confederation and armed league against Russia. He was more
fortunate in England with the Duke of Wellington, who acknowledged the
mistake into which Mr. Canning had fallen, and pronounced the battle
of Navarino _an untoward event_. England had thus returned to a perfect
understanding of which were her real interests.
People may ask, why did not Metternich at this time decide upon war?
how came it that he did not at once take part with the Ottoman Porte?
It was in consequence of the fixed system of the Austrian chancellor;
he has gained every thing through peace. The conquests of Austria are
owing to her pacific principles--to the species of armed neutrality
which is always ready at the proper moment to obtain some advantage.
A war would have compromised its general position in Europe. Being on
good terms with England, and in concert with that nation, the Austrian
cabinet stayed the victory; it was gaining something during the Russian
expedition of 1829, but it was not enough.