UTF-8
Note: Images of the original pages are available through
Internet Archive. See
https://archive.org/details/diplomatistsofeu00cape
THE DIPLOMATISTS OF EUROPE.
From the French of
M. CAPEFIGUE.
Edited by
Major-General Monteith,
K.L.S. F.R.S. &c.
London:
G. W. Nickisson,
215 Regent Street.
M.DCCC.XLV.
London:
Printed by George Barclay, 28 Castle Street,
Leicester Square.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
PRINCE METTERNICH 1
M. DE TALLEYRAND 58
COUNT POZZO DI BORGO 109
M. PASQUIER 172
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON 197
THE DUC DE RICHELIEU 223
PRINCE HARDENBERG 252
COUNT NESSELRODE 289
LORD CASTLEREAGH 327
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
The sketches now offered to the reader have most of them been already
published in parts, in magazines and reviews. I have been advised to
collect them into one work, in order to make their tendency and their
spirit better understood.
The end I proposed to myself at the time I wrote them, was to efface
the prejudices which the decrepit schools of the Revolution, and of the
Empire, had cast over the vast intellects who have had the direction
of the government in various countries, or who still continue to guide
the state. This end, I think, was partly gained by the four sketches of
the career of Prince Metternich, Counts Pozzo di Borgo and Nesselrode,
and the Duke of Wellington. I have considered it the more essential to
complete this publication at present, because, for some years past,
people appear only to take pleasure in extolling those who have been
engaged in the work of destruction. The most illustrious public bodies
take pleasure in listening to the praises of those who have ruined
the old state of society, and no man is considered clever, learned,
or virtuous, unless he has been at least half a regicide. As for me I
request a little space for the politicians who create, preserve, or
add to a state,--for the men whose works still endure, and survive all
those who declaimed against them. I would give all the fame of the
Radicals of 1791, of the year III., or the year VIII., for the smallest
portion of the abilities of Cardinal Richelieu.
It was not at random that I selected the names of the statesmen of
whom an account is here to be met with; they each represent an idea--a
system--a policy. Prince Metternich is the creator of the theory of
the balance of power and armed neutrality, which has obtained a very
exalted rank for Austria among European powers; Prince Talleyrand
brought back among us the temperate diplomacy of the Empire, of the
first days of the Restoration, and of the Revolution of 1830; Count
Pozzo di Borgo personifies the persevering tact of European policy and
the Russian system since the year 1814; the chancellor, M. Pasquier,
exhibits the administration of the latter part of the reign of
Napoleon, and he was, also, the moderate minister of the Restoration;
the Duke of Wellington is England under arms, and the active spirit of
the Tories; the Duc de Richelieu is the symbol of probity in affairs,
and of great unrequited services--he is the man who delivered his
country from the dominion of a stranger, and yet with whose name
the present generation is, perhaps, less acquainted than with that
of any orator at the hustings; Prince Hardenberg represents Prussia
at first holding a neutral course, then advancing with her poetical
universities; Count Nesselrode has been Chancellor of Russia for the
last thirty years; and, finally, I have raised to its proper exalted
position the much-belied character of Lord Castlereagh, the faithful
interpreter of the views of the Tory party, the worthy successor of Mr.
Pitt, and who preserved England and added to her power. These sketches,
therefore, by their account of the different ministers, form a vast
history of the cabinets of Europe.
Many new details will be found in these portraits, and my admiration
for intellectual and powerful minds has made me strive to perfect
them. Being quite unconnected with the agitations of the present
times, I have not mentioned in these pages any name mixed up with
the dissensions of the press and the tribune. Some of the politicians
of the present day were, however, the noble friends of the Duc de
Richelieu, and others afforded him the aid of their talents and
sagacity. May they continue their career, without becoming weary and
discouraged in the difficult paths of Conservatism and order! May
they persevere, in spite of the misery of holding office in changeful
times! The heart of Pitt was often deeply pained while arranging
his magnificent work, and England now pronounces him the prince of
statesmen. Toil and trouble are the condition of man, and nothing
strong or durable ever was created, without raising a clamour of
opposition from beings of inferior intellects, violent tempers, and
disappointed ambition.
_June 1843._
NOTE.--The following pages being merely a translation, the Editor
has found it necessary to abstain from any observations on the work
of M. Capefigue, and from offering any remarks upon the sentiments
of this able writer, even where he may materially differ with him.
_June 1845._
PRINCE METTERNICH.
The Austrian government, which is composed of old hereditary states
and conquests of a later date, a sort of chequer-work of provincial
privileges and immunities, may be said to be the creation of a
statesman, who must be placed in a superior rank to all others.
It is not only under the aspect of a long and brilliant diplomatic
career that we must regard the life of Prince Metternich, we must also
look upon him as the head of the executive organisation, which includes
so many various interests, and such a diversity of national characters
and feelings, under the government of one sceptre.
Cast your eyes over the provinces which extend from the centre of
Germany into Poland, from the extremity of Gallicia as far as Venice
and Milan, from Zara on the Adriatic to Mantua, the key of Lake Garda
and of the Tyrol, an assemblage of richer countries or more opulent
cities cannot be met with. To Metternich belongs the honour of having
already, for above thirty years, maintained his hold upon these
various nations; he has realised the most difficult system of local
administration and of a central government, great domestic liberty,
with, at the same time, careful surveillance, an active police with
very indulgent toleration, the most extensive credit with the least
oppressive taxation. One might compare the Austrian government to the
father of a family, anxious and rather strict with his children; the
elder ones are tractable, the younger sometimes unruly, over whom he
keeps a tight rein, in order that it may as seldom as possible be
necessary to have recourse to chastisement.[1]
[1] Nothing can exceed the paternal government of Austria to her
hereditary states, or the severity of the police in her Italian
dominions. In Hungary the Austrian power has never been sufficient to
enable her to ameliorate the prominent defects of their still feudal
system. The Italians, Sclavonians, and Hungarians, are still far from
being amalgamated with the Austrians.
Railways and industrial establishments are becoming numerous in
Austria; her navy is increasing on the Adriatic, and is a means of
circulating her flourishing manufactures. Metternich has thus caused
the age of labour to succeed to that of war and conquest. The ancient
constitution of Germany was destroyed at the peace of Presburg, during
the time of the contemptible and fragile assembly of the Confederation
of the Rhine. The house of Austria then renounced the old imperial
crown; but a new existence has opened for it, and, after innumerable
reverses under the Republic and Napoleon, it again reared its head with
a new state of political life and of military power. Since the year
1813, Austria has been constantly called upon to play a great part in
the affairs of Europe, and Metternich has succeeded in giving to her
politics a character of perseverance, or, rather, of immutability, the
result of an idea nobly conceived, and then worked out like a mission
he felt intrusted to accomplish.
The political life of a statesman is bound up in the work he has
undertaken. It is not my habit as a historian to adopt the narrow views
inspired by party-spirit or worn-out declamation: when a minister has
achieved the greatness of an empire, resisted vassalage under Napoleon,
and furnished the most extensive field for the page of history, I will
not, from a weak patriotism, raise my voice against this master-mind.
We may meet with enough men who destroy; we ought to feel respect for
those capable of creating, and then maintaining their work.
Clement Wenceslaus, Count of Metternich-Winneburg-Ochsenhausen, was
born at Coblentz, on the 13th of May, 1773, of a good German family,
whose ancestors have served in former times against the Ottomans. I
also find there were several officers of the name of Metternich in
the company of Lanzknechts, in the time of the Reformation and of the
League. His father, Count Metternich, a man of very moderate abilities,
was greatly in the confidence of Prince Kaunitz, and his name is
mentioned in all the business transacted concerning the Low Countries.
Young Metternich received the names of Clement-Wenceslaus, after the
Prince of Poland and Lithuania, Duke of Saxony, who stood godfather to
him. At the age of fifteen he went to the university of Strasburg, at
that time very celebrated, and the most frequented academy in Europe.
The philosophy of Voltaire, Helvetius, and Rousseau, was then in
the ascendant--that empty sensualism which filled young heads with
effervescing fancies. The university of Strasburg was under the
direction of Koch, the celebrated lecturer upon international law;
and, by a singular chance, another youth, whose name has since been
well known, was also pursuing his studies at the same university; this
was Benjamin Constant de Rebecque. Some degree of friendship sprung up
between the students, and it is curious to observe what a different
career was opened by the caprices of Fortune to the two pupils of
Professor Koch. Count Metternich concluded his philosophical studies
in the year 1790; the rest of his education was completed in Germany.
When he reached the age of twenty he visited England and Holland, and
afterwards went to live at Vienna, where he married Maria Eleonora, of
Kaunitz-Rietberg.
Metternich's first entry into the diplomatic corps was merely as a
secretary at the Congress of Rahstadt,--a singular negotiation, which
had a most tragical termination;[2] he afterwards accompanied Count
Stadion in his missions to Prussia and to St. Petersburg, and was
at the latter court at the time of the alliance between Russia and
Austria, which fell to the ground in consequence of the rapidity of
Napoleon's military investment of Ulm, and the revolt of Bavaria,--an
admirable campaign, which at once placed the French emperor in the rank
of the greatest military commanders.
[2] The French commissioners were attacked on leaving the city and
many killed.--_Editor._
Even at this early period it was the opinion of Metternich that the
triple alliance between Russia, Prussia, and Germany, would not be
too much to restrain the power of Napoleon; and a striking evidence
of the importance of France and of her leader had just been afforded
by the battle of Austerlitz. Count Metternich was called upon to take
a part in all the treaties concluded at this time; and, up to this
period, his opinions appeared to belong to the same school as those
of Count Stadion, who was shortly afterwards appointed minister for
foreign affairs. By him Metternich was proposed as ambassador to the
court of Russia; but, the treaty of Presburg having completely altered
the position of Austria in Europe, Francis II. preferred sending the
young diplomatist to Napoleon; and, on the 15th of August, 1806, the
day of the solemn national anniversary, the ambassador presented his
credentials, and first appeared before the favourite of fortune and
glory.
The political system of which Count Metternich was the representative
at Paris was very complicated. Since the first coalition against
France, Austria had suffered the most severe reverses, having been
twice deprived of the Milanese by Buonaparte, general and consul;
then driven back on the banks of the Danube by Moreau, and having a
second time entered the lists, after the alliance with Russia, this new
coalition was dissolved by the battle of Austerlitz, and the Austrian
cabinet was obliged to sign the treaty of Presburg,--a covenant
submitted to through necessity alone, which broke up the old empire of
Germany, and, in some measure, made an end of that of Austria.
It was the politics of this treaty, so fatal to the interests of
the emperor, that Metternich was deputed to represent at Paris. The
Confederation of the Rhine had overturned all the German system of
affairs, which was as ancient as the Golden Bull. Wirtemberg and
Bavaria, instead of being mere electorates, became kingdoms; when
Bavaria received, at the expense of Austria, a territory of more
than 12,000 square miles, a population of above 3,000,000 of souls,
and a revenue of above 17,000,000 florins; and the aggrandisement of
Wirtemberg, also prejudicial to Austria, though, no doubt, in a less
degree, cost her about 150 square miles. Austria also lost the Venetian
states, the Tyrol, the five cities of the Danube, Venetian Dalmatia,
and the mouths of the Cattaro.
The act of the Confederation of the Rhine, which was the work of
Talleyrand, Otto, and Reinhard, tore away the last remains of the old
imperial mantle: and Francis II. was obliged to lay aside this ancient
dignity, which would have been, in time to come, nothing but an empty
title. Napoleon's system was to invade every thing, and a treaty was to
him but an opportunity of launching out into fresh conquests. He had
planted his family in Germany by instituting the kingdom of Westphalia;
and, by means of marriages, he connected himself with Wirtemberg and
Bavaria: all the stipulations in the treaty of Presburg had been
insisted upon with the most inflexible haughtiness.
After these terrible reverses, Metternich considered the best means
of regaining a little influence in Europe was to keep on good terms
with Napoleon, or rather to preserve a strict neutrality, which might
allow Austria to trace out an advantageous line of conduct for herself,
should any decisive circumstance occur, as it could hardly fail to do
sooner or later. The diplomatic system of Metternich was consequently
one of expectation and inquiry; his special mission was, to become
intimately acquainted with the most trifling peculiarities of this new
and singularly constructed court, and to discover the thoughts and even
the caprices of the powerful Emperor of the French.
Fresh successes had just crowned the arms of Napoleon. After some
unfortunate hesitation, Prussia had cast herself headlong into the
Russian alliance; and, after her subsequent defeat at Jena, the peace
of Tilsit had laid the foundation of a temporary truce, for treaties
with Napoleon could only possess that transitory character. Metternich
received orders from his court to endeavour, by means of a respectful
deference, to conciliate the favour of the great sovereign. The
almost magical influence which Napoleon had obtained over the mind
of Alexander at Tilsit had excited great apprehensions at Vienna:
an interview was about to take place at Erfurt, and the probable
consequences that might result from it were a source of serious alarm
to Austria. Metternich was constantly seen at the Tuileries. He was
the representative of a very ancient European court; himself a man
of good birth, and with aristocratic manners, every thing was in his
favour, and he was perfectly successful in his mission. At the court
of Napoleon there existed much formality, a tone of society combining
at once a degree of constraint with the blunt manners of the camp. It
was a mere collection of puerile ceremonies; and a man of good family
enjoyed an incontestable superiority there from the good taste and
ease communicated by education, and the constant habit of society. The
ambassador was then thirty-four years of age, his countenance was noble
and intelligent; he went to all the court entertainments, and attracted
universal attention by the elegance of his equipage and his expensive
habits. Young, brilliant, gifted with a ready wit and an easy flow of
language, with a slightly emphatic manner of speaking, Count Metternich
had the reputation of being a successful gallant, and highly in favour
with the Parisian ladies.
The ambassador had recourse to the pleasing species of politics which
reaches the secrets of the cabinet--through the heart. His fascinating
manners had gained him the good-will of Napoleon, who took pleasure
in distinguishing him in the crowd of foreign ministers, and liked to
converse with him, though with an occasional observation that he was
very young to be the representative of one of the oldest courts of
Europe. "At the battle of Austerlitz you were scarcely older than I am
now!" was one day the reply of the ambassador. The Emperor was never
hasty in his language to Metternich, for he considered him as the means
by which an idea of the French system could be conveyed into Austria;
and more than once the subject of their debate was the question of the
balance of power in Europe, which assumed in the mind of Napoleon such
gigantic proportions. Metternich's scheme was to represent the alliance
between France and Austria as indispensable; and he spoke of the treaty
of 1736, concluded under the influence of the Duc de Choiseul, as the
basis of all political grandeur in Europe. The conference of Erfurt
was, however, a source of constant uneasiness to him, and Napoleon had
just departed for the meeting which was to reconcile the two empires
of the North and the South. Promises had been exchanged between the
emperors, and in these plans the sacrifice of Austria was determined
upon. They were not ignorant of this at Vienna: had, then, all the
efforts of Metternich in Paris been in vain? The Spanish war had just
broken out, and another sovereign had been hurled from his throne.
Was not this a fresh warning to the House of Austria? The alarms it
inspired were confessed at the court of London, and England fed their
fears in order to induce them to take a vigorous part in the war;
for which purpose a report was circulated of a projected change of
succession in the Austrian dynasty, favoured by Napoleon.
The peace of Presburg, by placing every where in the Germanic
Confederation French principles, and almost French administration,
had excited strong dissatisfaction, and the general detestation had
been increased by large military contributions, and numerous vexatious
oppressions indulged in by the generals and their subordinates. In
every direction burst forth the anti-Gallic spirit in favour of the
liberty of Germany, especially among the nobility and the secret
associations, which had become formidable as early as 1808. The
liberal impulse against Napoleon had been awakened in Europe, and it
was not one of the least influential causes of his downfall. England
encouraged these views; subsidies were promised to a government deeply
involved in debt; the resistance of the Peninsula was pointed out to
Austria, and the difficulties thereby opposed to the military power of
Napoleon, especially after the capitulation of Baylen. Why should they
not take advantage of this opportunity to burst through the conditions
imposed by the treaty of Presburg? England engaged to subsidise the
Austrian army, if, uniting their efforts to the common cause, they
would seize that moment for declaring against France; and she also
promised a simultaneous diversion in Holland and Spain. These warlike
propositions soon found friends among the German nobility, and Count
Stadion entered completely into the English views. The levies were
immense, for the fate of the empire was at stake.
At this period the business of the young ambassador was to mask by
flattering promises the military preparations that were making in
Austria. His papers were full of protestations of confidence: and how
could he act otherwise? Is it not the duty of a diplomatist to soften
the course of events, and to moderate the first bursts of anger and
vengeance of one nation against another? Austria did not wish to engage
in war until Napoleon should be completely absorbed in his Spanish
expedition. But as soon as the Emperor and the Old Guard had left
Paris, to raise the puppet throne of Joseph at Madrid, she no longer
dissembled her warlike preparations; hostilities were commenced against
Bavaria, the close ally of Napoleon, and the Austrian standard was
unfurled at Ulm. Napoleon, informed of this unexpected movement, made
but one step back to Paris. Metternich was still there.
The ambassador was now placed in a very delicate position, for the
Austrian war had really been a surprise. Napoleon thought himself the
dupe of Metternich, and he commanded Fouché, the Minister of Police,
to cause him to be seized, and marched from one military station to
another, until he reached the frontier. The order was harsh, brutal,
and contrary to all diplomatic usages. Is not an ambassador bound to
obey the instructions of his government, and to serve its interests?
and is it not his duty to conceal every thing that may injure his
court? Fouché, with his usual regard to his own interest, and who
considered what the future might bring forth, executed the orders of
Napoleon with delicacy and politeness. He went to the ambassador's
house, told him the occasion of his visit, and expressed the most
lively regret for it. A degree of dissatisfaction had already begun
to arise in the mind of this minister, who looked forward to the
time when the insatiable ambition of Napoleon must have a limit, and
he and Metternich expressed to each other, in mutual confidence,
their feelings on the miseries of war and the rapacious spirit of
Napoleon; and Fouché, whose disposition was generally communicative and
incautious, went so far as to give utterance to most singular opinions
concerning the probable downfall, or even death, of his master. In
order as far as possible to soften the rigorous orders he had received,
a single captain of gendarmerie, chosen by Marshal Moncey, accompanied
the travelling-carriage of the ambassador to the frontier. Prince
Metternich takes pleasure in relating the curious occurrences of this
journey, which, like that of the aide-de-camp Czernicheff in 1812, was
not devoid of peril.
Then the earth was shaken! The Austrian army, under the Archduke
Charles, fought valiantly for the defence of their country and
their sovereign, and the battle of Essling menaced the fortunes of
Napoleon. The disastrous event of this day was never fully published in
France; but elsewhere it was perfectly known. Preussisch-Eylau, the
capitulation of Baylen, and the battle of Essling on the Danube, appear
to me to be the three culminating points, which first taught the world
that the armies of Napoleon were no longer invincible: these battles
had a great moral influence upon the affairs of Europe, and Wagram was
necessary to restore the powerful effect of the Emperor's name; the
field of battle on this occasion was doubtful, but nothing could be
more decisive than the result; great discouragement was manifested in
the councils of Vienna, and the party in favour of peace carried the
day.
Victory had then decided between France and Austria, proving the star
of Napoleon to be utterly irresistible. The two parties which divided
the court of Vienna now became more marked, the opinion in favour of
peace, represented by Count Bubna, prevailed in the Emperor's council,
and Count Stadion, who had hitherto had the direction of affairs
under the influence of the English system, was obliged to retire from
the cabinet. The ministry for foreign affairs having thus become
vacant, Francis II. thought to conciliate France by the appointment
of Metternich, who had displayed great abilities during his embassy
to that country. The count, having been reconciled with Napoleon,
had since then carefully maintained a middle course between peace
and war, and he had also begun to adopt in politics the attitude of
armed neutrality, which, ever since 1813, has been the characteristic
of Austrian policy. This was a period of deep humiliation for the
old imperial crown. The _Moniteur_ had announced that _the House
of Lorraine had ceased to reign_; the Austrian monarchy had been
vanquished in the struggle, its armies had experienced terrible
reverses; but there still remained to the Emperor Francis the devoted
affection of his people, and the indignation they felt at the prospect
of French domination.
Count Metternich was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Napoleon,
together with Count Bubna, and interviews took place for the purpose
of treating of peace. The victor was excessively irritated at the
vigorous conduct of Austria, and never were conferences attended with
more violence or more fiery disputes; so that Metternich was obliged
to apply all the powers of his mind towards inspiring the haughty
conqueror with more moderate sentiments. If Napoleon bore in mind his
silent and skilful conduct in 1809, he knew, that by favouring his
elevation at the court of the Emperor of Austria, he should secure to
himself an ally and a representative of his system. These motives,
joined to dark hints of assassination, and to the uneasiness caused
by the religious brotherhoods among the people, which were already
beginning to stir for independence, all contributed to hasten the
conclusion of the treaty of Vienna. Is it necessary to remind the
reader that the French every where made use of their victories with the
inflexible right of the conqueror?
On the occasion of this treaty, Count Metternich received the title of
Chancellor of the State, with the direction of foreign affairs,--an
office of immense responsibility under existing circumstances. The
population was exhausted by the war; the treasury without resources,
having been completely drained by the contributions levied by the
French; and the monarchy was deprived of all influence in Germany, the
treaty of Vienna having robbed it of the last remains of importance
towards the south; so that, as I have elsewhere[3] remarked, beside
her was the Confederation of the Rhine, that is to say, Napoleon; in
front the Helvetic Confederation, again Napoleon; to the south the
kingdom of Italy, still Napoleon. There remained but a choice of two
plans to Austria, either again to try the chance of war, or to appease
the Emperor of the French by the most profound submission to all his
wishes. Such was the idea of Metternich, when he suggested the marriage
of the archduchess, when, as it was said by the implacable Lady
Castlereagh, it was necessary to deliver up a daughter of the house of
Austria to satisfy the Minotaur.
[3] See "Europe during the Consulate and the Empire of Napoleon."
If the French emperor were to choose a wife among the grand-duchesses
of the house of Romanoff, the plan proposed at Erfurt would be quickly
accomplished, that is to say, the formation of two great empires,
around which there would be a number of small intermediate kingdoms, in
some degree dependent upon them; and, to avoid this peril, Metternich
hastened the marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa: by this
means the house of Austria would secure a real protector in the
French emperor, and the suit of a brilliant adventurer, at the feet
of the daughter of a royal line, might be advantageous to the future
prospects of the German crown. It is allowable in politics to calculate
to what extent human passions may affect the course of affairs, and
therefore the new chancellor of the state, when negotiating the union
of the archduchess with Napoleon, looked forward, by means of a family
arrangement, to recovering the position of which Austria had been
deprived by the fortune of war. The marriage of the archduchess was
arranged and concluded entirely by Metternich.
Still, however, he carefully pursued the course towards which there
appeared at that time to be a general bent in Europe. In the beginning
of the year 1811, certain symptoms appeared to indicate to the court
of Vienna that a rupture was about to take place between France and
Russia, and these suspicions were changed ere long into certainty:
M. Otto, the French ambassador at Vienna, opened his mind completely
to Metternich, and, acting on the principle of the late alliance, he
proposed they should form a kind of league of offence and defence in
the war Napoleon was about to commence against Russia. The French
emperor only required a detached corps of 40,000 Austrian auxiliaries
as an active force, who were to attack the eastern extremity of
Gallicia, at the same time that the French army should proceed to the
Vistula. This treaty farther stipulated that the Austrian possessions
in Poland should remain untouched, and certain territorial cessions in
favour of Austria were agreed upon, in the event of the war against
Russia proving successful; thus Metternich began to reap the advantages
of the French alliance.
The campaign of 1812 began. The Austrian corps of 30,000 auxiliaries
was posted on the Vistula, and, if not required to take an active part
in the operations, it still was a check upon the Russian army, which
already threatened the flanks of Napoleon's troops. Metternich watched
with extreme anxiety the movements of the invading army in Russia; its
disastrous retreat was an appalling and unlooked-for catastrophe, and
Prince Schwartzenberg went to oppose the Russian troops.
A new train of ideas, a new series of negotiations were now to be
entertained. The retreat from Moscow had been so calamitous, that it
had not spared to the French enough troops to protect the line of the
Oder, far less to retain possession of that of the Vistula. If Prussia
and Austria had been faithful to their alliance with Napoleon, they
ought immediately to have combined their forces, and opposed all their
strength to the Russians, who were already making incursions on every
side. The situation of the two courts was very difficult, for the
whole German nation was so unanimous in their dislike to the French,
that it would have been impossible for the cabinets of Berlin and
Vienna to take any steps in their favour, without placing themselves
in direct opposition to the people they governed; and, besides, after
the deep humiliation they had both endured at the hands of Napoleon,
was it not natural they should seek some motive, or, if the expression
be preferred, some pretext, for delivering themselves from a state
of subjection so fatal to them? Prussia, who was foremost, had no
hesitation in abandoning an alliance that was so dishonourable to her.
Metternich did not immediately follow her contagious example, but, a
cessation of hostilities having taken place between the Russian and
Austrian armies, the eyes of France fell upon the cabinet of Vienna,
as the mediatorial power which was to prepare a peace, on a foundation
in better keeping with the general equilibrium of Europe. In his
conferences with M. Otto, the imperial chancellor gave him clearly
to understand, that the Austrian government would not depart from
the principles of the French alliance, but that the nature of their
situation had been altered by the late military events, and, as the
frontier of Austria might become the theatre of war, the cabinet of
Vienna would naturally assume a more decided attitude, in order to
bring to a conclusion a struggle which would for the future so closely
affect the empire.
The mission of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Bubna, at Paris, was
conducted in the same spirit. Without giving up the alliance, the
Austrian government signified that it could no longer rest upon the
same basis, in fact, that they must take a more decided part in
the approaching military crisis. Metternich's object in this new
negotiation was to lay the foundation for a general peace. Such a
resolution was by no means disinterested on his part, for, in the new
settlement of the boundaries of the different states of Europe which
must ensue, Austria would obtain an accession of territory, as a
consequence of the position in which the course of events had placed
her. The English party was gaining ground at Vienna, and Lord Walpole
had arrived with offers of subsidies and augmentation of territory;
in proportion, also, as the French army met with fresh reverses, the
popular feeling of Germany assumed a more decided character; still
Metternich persisted in his mediatorial system, from the conviction
that it would be for the real advantage of his country.
These negotiations continued all through the winter of 1812-13. In
the meanwhile, M. Otto had been replaced by Count Louis de Narbonne,
the representative of the family alliance. He had been appointed by
Napoleon, in the hope that his presence would remind Austria that an
archduchess sat upon the throne of France; and, by the decree of the
senate and the emperor, this same archduchess had just been officially
proclaimed regent during the absence of Napoleon: the government being
placed in her hands was a fresh guarantee to Austria of the personal
feelings of the emperor's son-in-law. In politics alliances are
formed upon positive interests, and Napoleon had too greatly abused
his victories; the decree had gone forth, the empire, which extended
from Hamburg to Venice--the protectorate, which pressed heavily upon
Germany, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland--the diplomatic
oppression which burdened Sweden and Denmark--all must have an end:
after action, a reaction must be expected.
During this time considerable levies took place in every part of the
Austrian territory, for it was determined the army should be made up to
its full complement of 300,000 men. Metternich justified these warlike
preparations by the natural position in which Austria was placed:
when the belligerents came so closely in contact with the territory
of a neuter party, it appeared quite natural that the neuter should
take precautions to preserve its own independence. The position which
Metternich had given to Austria had made her a predominant power, with
the right of insisting upon real advantages, by way of indemnity; this
was an admirable change of circumstances, which left Austria at liberty
to come to a definitive decision.
Baron Weissemberg then started for London, under the official pretext
of bringing about a general peace, but in reality for the purpose of
sounding the English cabinet upon the advantages likely to be offered
to Austria, in the way of subsidies and accession of territory, in
case she should declare openly in favour of the coalition, and should
be willing to furnish so considerable a force as 450,000 men. Now all
this occurred in the month of March 1813, and the armaments of Austria
received a fresh augmentation, when the thunders of the artillery
were heard at Lutzen and Bautzen; 200,000 men were already located
in Bohemia: against whom could these immense bodies of troops be
intended to act? At this juncture, Metternich again appeared in his
mediatorial capacity, to prepare the armistice of Plesswitz, afterwards
definitively settled at Nieumarch: Austria constantly declared that,
as the conflicting armies occupied four hundred leagues of her
frontiers, it was impossible she should any longer refrain from taking
an active part in the struggle, if the belligerent powers would not
agree to terms of reconciliation. A step was thus taken, from a state
of alliance with Napoleon, towards a condition of armed neutrality,
and how could so powerful a country as Austria long continue in this
situation? In the heated state of the public mind in Germany, how was
it possible to calculate the exact point where the mediation would stop
for the _casus belli_?
It was the interest of Russia and Prussia to keep on good terms with a
court capable of drawing up a body of excellent troops 200,000 strong.
After some bitter and ill-advised observations, Napoleon also accepted
the mediation; it was a sort of break in the military operations, an
expression of the weariness felt by an army now worn out with battles.
We may see how great a part Metternich had created for Austria in these
negotiations, for, on former occasions, the plenipotentiaries could
treat the Austrian interests as a separate concern, while in her new
position Vienna became the indispensable intermediate agent in any
treaty that might be contemplated. The question was, Did Austria offer
her mediation in good faith, with a sincere wish for peace? or was it
merely as a lure, to enable her to render her military establishment
more complete? This becomes an important question for history.
It must be remembered that, after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen,
the desire for peace was universal, even in France, and in the tent
of Napoleon, in the military night-watch, as well as on the morning
of battle; the troops still fought, but it was no longer with the
willingness, the enthusiasm of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena.
Napoleon submitted to the powerful voice of public opinion, but could
his iron disposition bend to circumstances? Until that time as general
and consul, and afterwards as emperor, he had been accustomed to say to
the vanquished states, "These are my conditions, you have no choice
but to accept them; and, if there are any alleviating circumstances, it
is to my clemency alone that you will owe them." In 1813, the tables
were turned: cabinets now appeared with powers quite equal to that of
France, animated, too, with the ardour of battle, and burning with the
desire of repairing their former humiliation, and reconquering their
independence. The allied powers had signed the armistice of Nieumarch,
one great inducement being the opportunity gained for carrying on a
secret negotiation with the crown prince of Sweden, and also for the
sake of persuading Austria to join the league. I think their anxiety
for peace was less than their wish to gain the time necessary to
complete their vast military arrangements, by detaching Austria from
her part of mediator, and inducing her to join them in the war against
the common enemy; pious Germany, having gained her feet, now wanted
to make an end of her oppressor. Now, would Metternich continue to
preserve this neutral position? would not the Austrian government be
inclined for a change of system?
Let us not forget how Austria was at that time situated. Had she not
a right to obtain, by diplomatic means, all the advantages offered
by her present position? We know the heavy losses she had sustained
in Italy; the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Illyrian provinces, had
been successively torn from her: and was it not natural she should
take advantage of her armed mediation, a favourable position in which
Metternich had contrived to place her? Had she derived the expected
advantages from the general peace, she would not have joined the
coalition against Napoleon; failing in that, she must endeavour to
recover by force of arms all she had been deprived of during the war.
It was for the purpose of justifying this delicate situation that
Metternich first introduced the elegant system of high and noble
diplomatic language, a style of which Baron Gentz has since been the
most distinguished organ--Gentz, whose life has been so busy, and so
full of disappointments, who, in his old age, came to utter soft love
speeches at the feet of Miss Fanny Elssler.
Metternich unfolds in his papers his ideas upon the balance of power in
Europe, which tended to diminish the prodigious influence of Napoleon,
to the benefit of the allied states. I am not aware of any thing
written in a more remarkable style than these despatches; they are,
perhaps, rather loose in their details, but all the expressions are so
carefully guarded, that they never compromised either the cabinet or
the writer.
After signing the armistice of Nieumarch, Napoleon had fixed his
head-quarters at Dresden. Successive despatches, from the French
cabinet, requested the Emperor Francis II. to affix his signature to
the preliminaries of a treaty of peace; at last, Metternich, bearing
an autograph letter from his sovereign, in answer to the overtures
that had been made to him, repaired to Dresden, commissioned to find
out what might be the definitive intentions of Napoleon with regard
to peace. The conference lasted nearly half a day; the emperor,
in his military dress, strode hastily up and down the room, with
flashing eyes, and sharp, hurried gestures: he took up his hat, then
laid it down again, and threw himself into a large easy chair, while
the perspiration started on his brow; he was evidently disturbed
in mind, for he burst forth, in no measured terms, to Metternich:
"Your government," said he, "wants to take advantage of my perplexed
situation; and the question with you is, whether you can exact so
much from me without fighting, or whether you must decide in ranging
yourselves among my enemies? Well, let us see! Let us negotiate--I am
perfectly willing. What do you want?"
To this abrupt sally, to this demand so little in accordance with
the usual diplomatic forms, Metternich merely replied, "That Austria
was desirous of establishing an order of things, which, by the wise
distribution of power, should place the preservation of peace under the
protection of an association of independent states; that the object of
the cabinet of Vienna must be to destroy the sole predominancy of the
Emperor Napoleon, by substituting to his colossal influence a balance
of power, which should establish Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on a
footing completely independent of the French empire." As a summary of
these conditions, Austria claimed Illyria, and a more extended frontier
towards Italy; the Pope was to be reinstated in his dominions; Poland
to be subjected to another partition; Spain and Holland were to be
evacuated by the French army; and the Confederation of the Rhine and
the mediation of Switzerland were to be given up by the Emperor, who
was already overwhelmed with ill-fortune.
Thus was to be accomplished the dismemberment of the gigantic work
erected by the toils and victories of Napoleon. Shall I venture
to describe this scene as it has been depicted to me by the sole
eye-witness, Prince Metternich himself? As the Austrian plenipotentiary
unfolded the views of his cabinet, the sallow complexion of Napoleon
gradually assumed a crimson hue; at last he exclaimed, "Metternich, do
you attempt to impose such conditions upon me without drawing a sword?
These demands are most insulting! And it is my father-in-law who agrees
to such a plan! What kind of position does he wish to place me in with
regard to the French people? Ah, Metternich! how much has England
given you to play this part against me?"
To this offensive language, Metternich, retaining his calm and
dignified demeanour, replied not a word; and Napoleon, in the violence
of his gestures, having let fall his hat, the Austrian minister did
not stoop to pick it up, as politeness would have induced him to do
under any other circumstances. There was a silence of half an hour.[4]
Afterwards the conversation was resumed in a cooler and calmer tone;
and, in dismissing Metternich, the Emperor, taking his hand, said to
him, "After all, Illyria is not my last word, and we may be able to
arrange better conditions."
[4] Prince Metternich told me the Emperor had locked the door.
This dialogue is of importance to history, for it decided the fate of
Napoleon.
The Emperor's habits of command made his language hasty and his summons
for an answer abrupt; and, when he addressed himself thus to a person
in an elevated position, it naturally gave great offence. Metternich
retained the strongest resentment for his behaviour--he had been deeply
insulted; and, besides, so experienced a minister could not fail to
discover the secret thoughts of the Emperor, and must have been well
convinced that, with such a character as his, there was but little
reason to hope for the re-establishment of the balance of power in
Europe.
Nevertheless, Austria consented to the conferences at Prague, and, by a
fresh agreement, the suspension of hostilities was prolonged till the
10th of August. Metternich, as the representative of the mediatorial
power, was by right president of the congress, in the same manner as it
had fallen to the Swedish minister at the congresses of Nimeguen and
Ryswick. M. Maret first raised difficulties on the score of etiquette,
because Baron Humboldt and Baron d'Anstett, the representatives of
Russia and Prussia, were only ministers of the second rank, while
M. de Caulaincourt and M. Maret belonged to the first. They next
discussed the order of precedence and little questions of detail; they
considered whether the negotiation should be carried on in writing or
_viva voce_, and the forms of the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick
were called for. The object of each party was to gain time, in order
that hostilities might recommence. At last, Metternich, seeing the
indefinite turn affairs were taking, resolved to join the military
Congress of Trachenberg, where the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte,
was employed in tracing out the vast plan of the campaign of the
allied armies against Napoleon. They decided upon marching straight
upon Paris, without a moment's hesitation, and making an appeal to
the people, dissatisfied with the Emperor. At Trachenberg, Russia and
Prussia received all the propositions of the Austrian minister without
the slightest difficulty; they agreed, whatever might be the personal
pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, that the general command of the
allied troops should be conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg. The
importance of securing the co-operation of the Austrian army was fully
appreciated, and no sacrifice was spared to attach an additional force
of 200,000 men to the coalition.
With a view to avoid this immense co-operation, Napoleon had addressed
himself at once to the Emperor Francis II., recalling to his mind the
alliance of their families. Maria Louisa had gone to Mayence, and
her husband, taking advantage of one or two days which the armistice
still left at his disposal, went to meet her there, to give his last
instructions to the daughter of the Cæsars, and to confirm to her
all the powers of the regency. France then would be governed by an
archduchess, and, according to all dynastic ideas, could Austria fight
against a country ruled by the daughter of her emperor? They were
mistaken; the cabinets no longer stood in awe of Napoleon, and this
was a circumstance which the French plenipotentiaries at Prague had
not understood. M. Maret, in particular, had shewn his insufficiency,
or, at all events, an inferior capacity, unable to bear a comparison
with a statesman of the school and character of Prince Metternich. One
of the greatest misfortunes of the Emperor Napoleon was, that he was
surrounded by a crowd of people constantly at his feet, and dazzled
with his glory: these were clerks, not statesmen.