THE THIRD WAR IN VENEZUELA.
1815--1817.
In none of the colonies of Spanish America was the struggle for
emancipation so stubborn, so heroic, and so tragical, as in Venezuela.
In the North of the Continent she was the nucleus of the revolution,
gave it both its military power and its political basis, and supplied to
it the genius of Bolívar. Twice conquered, she yet arose a third time
against her oppressors.
After the rout of Urica, and the catastrophe of Maturin, the remnants of
the Republican army of the East were dispersed as guerillas along the
banks and about the head-waters of the Orinoco, and on the plains of
Barcelona, while the insurrection was still unquelled on the plains of
Casanare. A fresh signal for a general revolt was given by the island of
Margarita immediately after the departure of Morillo on his expedition
against New Granada. The Royalist governor, Colonel Urreistieta, to
assert his authority, ordered the arrest of Arismendi. Fifteen hundred
of the islanders rose in arms. The governor ordered the troops to give
no quarter to the insurgents, gave them permission to pillage as they
chose, and burned two towns in accordance with instructions received
from General Moxó. The insurgents accepted the challenge of war to the
knife. Arismendi put himself at their head, and took possession of the
northern half of the island, captured by assault the fort at the Villa
del Norte, and put to death the whole of the garrison, who numbered 200
men. Then on the 15th November, 1815, he laid siege to the capital and
shut up the governor in the castle of Santa Rosa. His army numbered
4,300 infantry and 200 cavalry, badly armed, but all resolute men.
On the plains of Casanare the scattered groups of guerillas were
organized by Paez into an army. José Antonio Paez was a native of
Barinas, and was at this time twenty-six years old. He had served
bravely throughout the campaign of the reconquest, but had never
attracted special notice; now he was to show his great talents as a
leader. He was a genuine Creole, of Caucasian race, with some mixture of
native blood; a man of herculean strength, a breaker-in of wild horses,
and an untiring swimmer. Skilful in the use of lance and sword, in
moments of danger he was ever in the front rank, and had great influence
over his men, both by his personal and by his moral qualities. They were
accustomed to call him “Uncle” when addressing him. If any soldier
committed a crime or showed unwillingness to obey orders it was his
custom to challenge him to single combat. Whether the challenge were
accepted or not he was always the victor, either physically or morally.
After the excitement of a battle his nervous system would frequently
give way, and he would fall to the ground, apparently lifeless. His
plans were always carefully thought out and rapidly executed. He at this
time knew neither how to read nor write, and was in no sense a
politician, but was of a kindly, generous nature, and of very superior
intelligence. In times of peace he was easily led, but in times of
danger he led every one. His usual dress was a blouse of blue cloth,
with a cloak thrown over his shoulders; a slouched hat, the front rim
turned up and decorated with the cockade of Venezuela; and the gaiters
of a Llanero. He wore a Toledo sword, and invariably carried a long
lance.
Paez was serving as a simple captain with a small corps of Patriots
which held the town of Guadalito, when news was brought of the approach
of the Spanish governor of Barinas, with 1,100 horse and 300 infantry.
The officer in command proposed to retreat. Paez requested permission
to remain with one squadron to defend the town. Most of the other
officers present approved of the proposition, on which the commander
said angrily,
“Then let Paez command you, and those who choose may follow me to
Casanare.”
Paez, left with 500 men, marched out to meet the enemy, whom he found on
the 16th February, 1816, near to the sources of the Apure. Paez,
advancing alone to reconnoitre the position, had his horse killed under
him by a musket-ball. It was near nightfall; some advised him to wait
for daylight.
“It is as dark for them as it is for us,” said Paez, and shouted to his
men, “Comrades, they have killed my horse. If you will not revenge his
death I will revenge him alone, and will die in the enemy’s ranks.”
The men shouted back that they would go wherever he would lead them. He
formed them in two lines and led them on under a heavy fire. Such was
the fury of the charge that two-thirds of the Royalist cavalry were
driven in confusion from the field. As he led an attack upon their
second line his horse was wounded, and burst the girths of the saddle
with his plunges. The attack was beaten off. Springing on to the first
horse he could catch, Paez rallied his men and again charged at full
speed upon the rest of the Royalist cavalry, and bore them down in the
rush. While the Patriots pursued the broken cavalry the Spanish infantry
retreated through the woods. Four hundred killed and two hundred
prisoners were the trophies of the day. Paez treated his prisoners so
well that they all voluntarily took service with him.
This brilliant affair attracted the attention of the Llaneros, who were
weary of the brutal rule of Boves and Morales, and won them over to the
cause of independence.
Paez became at once the first general of cavalry in America. He was the
bond of union between the Llaneros and the Patriots. He was proclaimed
the chieftain of the plains, and from the recruits who poured in to join
his standard he organized the famous Army of the Apure. On taking
command he told his men that he would do his best to merit the
confidence they had placed in him, but exhorted them above all to put
faith in Divine Providence. In September, 1816, he invaded the Province
of Barinas.
While the Army of the Apure was thus gathering itself together, the
parties of guerillas, scattered along the banks of the Upper Orinoco,
and on the eastern plains, also collected, forming divisions of as many
as 1,500 men, under Monagas, Saraza and Cedeño. The Governor of Guayana
sent a strong column against Cedeño, which was completely routed by him
on the 8th March, 1816. A second expedition of 1,500 men, sent in boats
up the Orinoco, had no better fortune, and was forced to retire to
Angostura, the capital of Guayana.
While Bolívar, in exile at Kingston, Jamaica, was turning over in his
mind many plans for renewing the War of Independence, he had a narrow
escape from assassination. A slave of his who had followed his fortunes
went one night into his room when all was dark, and seeing a man asleep
in his hammock, gave him two stabs with a poniard, killing him on the
spot. The dead man was found to be a poor emigrant named Amestoy, who,
knowing that Bolívar would not sleep at home that night, occupied his
room. The slave was caught, and confessed that it was his intention to
kill Bolívar, but said not a word about accomplices. He was hung, but it
was generally believed that an emissary of General Moxó had paid him to
do the deed.
From Jamaica Bolívar crossed to the island of Santo Domingo, hearing on
his way of the fall of Cartagena, where, too late, he had been offered
the command. The famous mulatto, Alexander Petión, was at that time
President of Haiti. He was an ardent partisan of the emancipation of
Spanish America, and not only supplied Bolívar with arms for another
expedition, but opened a credit for him for the necessary expenses with
the house of a wealthy English merchant named Robert Sutherland. Bolívar
also met here a Dutch shipbuilder named Luis Brion, who, becoming
deeply interested both in him and in his designs, placed seven armed
schooners at his orders, with 3,500 muskets, and offered his life and
fortune in the same cause.
Bolívar commenced his preparations early in 1816, at the port of Cayos
de San Luis, which has given its name to this famous expedition. There
the refugees from Cartagena, and many officers from New Granada and
Venezuela had collected. Among them were Piar, Mariño, Bermudez,
Montilla, Soublette, the English Colonel MacGregor, who had served with
Miranda, Doucoudray-Holstein, and Francisco Zea. There was anarchy among
them; many of them refused to recognise the authority of Bolívar. Petión
interposed his influence, and Brion declared that he would entrust his
ships and armament to no one but to the Liberator. He was at length
accepted as leader of the expedition, from which Montilla, who had
challenged Bolívar, and Bermudez, who had led the opposition, were
excluded.
Brion, with the title of Admiral of Venezuela, took command of the
squadron, which sailed from Cayos on the 16th March, 1816. The
expedition consisted of 300 men, whom Bolívar afterwards compared to the
300 Spartans of Leonidas, as he compared his reconquest of Venezuela to
the redemption of Jerusalem by the Crusaders. They reached the island of
Margarita early in May, finding there the Spanish brig _Intrepido_ and
the schooner _Rita_, which Brion boarded and captured, after a desperate
resistance in which three-fourths of their crews were killed. The
expedition then disembarked at the port of Juan Griego, the Royalists
concentrating their forces at Pampatar and Porlamar.
Bolívar and Arismendi then conjointly convened a meeting of the officers
of the Patriot army, and of the principal inhabitants, in the church at
La Villa del Norte, in order to name the supreme ruler of the Republic
they were about to restore. In accordance with his custom, Bolívar
immediately renounced all pretensions to so important a post, which, as
he had already arranged the matter with Arismendi, was merely one way of
securing his own appointment. On the 7th May he was named “Supreme
Chief,” with power to do whatever he might find necessary for the
salvation of the country. Mariño was named second in command.
On the 8th May Bolívar published a proclamation to the people of
Venezuela, announcing that the National Congress would be reinstalled,
and authorising the free towns to elect deputies, who should have the
same sovereign powers as in the former epoch.
The expedition, reinforced by four ships from the island, then went on
to Carupano, on the coast of Paria, capturing two armed vessels of the
enemy and the fort, which was abandoned by the garrison. Here Bolívar
established his head-quarters on the 1st June.
Rumour had greatly exaggerated the strength of the force he brought with
him, but Bolívar made small use of the stupor into which the Royalists
were thrown. He detached Piar to Maturin and Mariño to Güiria, but
remained himself at Carupano, issuing pompous bulletins, in which he
renounced his former system of a war of extermination, as a mistake.
Also, in fulfilment of a promise to Petión, he published a decree giving
liberty to all slaves, and called the people to arms, but no one joined
him. He then convened an assembly of the townsfolk, who at his
suggestion decreed the centralization of the powers of government. The
federal system was abolished in Venezuela.
But a month of precious time was thus lost. Twenty days after the
disembarkation, his advanced posts were driven in, and he was besieged
by a division of 1,300 men, while a Spanish squadron threatened his
communications by sea. Mariño sent him a strong reinforcement, but Brion
refused to risk his ships in an unequal fight with the Spanish squadron.
Meantime the guerilla leaders of the East proclaimed him
general-in-chief, and desired his presence.
Rejecting the advice of Piar to occupy Guayana as a base of operations,
he re-embarked his small force, and again landed on the 5th July at
Ocumare, between Caracas and Puerto Cabello. This step can only be
explained by his anxiety to rescue his native city from the Royalists, a
preoccupation which was to cost him the loss of three campaigns. Again
rejecting the advice of his officers, who wished to effect a junction
with the guerillas and so form an army, he detached Soublette with the
bulk of his men to occupy the pass of Cabrera, and a smaller force along
the coast in search of recruits, while he landed a printing press and
issued more bulletins, and Brion went off on a cruise leaving him one
armed brig and two small schooners.
On the same day on which Bolívar landed at Ocumare, Morales reached
Valencia, with the division detached by Morillo after the surrender of
Cartagena. In the face of such a superior force, Soublette was compelled
to retire to a strong position on the heights of Ocumare. Bolívar went
to his assistance with 150 recruits, but the combined force was
completely routed by Morales on the 13th July.
MacGregor was then sent off with a detachment southwards to Choroni,
while Soublette protected the retreat of Bolívar with the artillery to
Ocumare, where he intended to re-embark. While engaged at night in this
operation, he received word that the enemy were entering the town. It
was a false alarm, Soublette still held his ground, but his men were
panic-struck, and Bolívar, without inquiring into the truth of the
report, abandoned his sick and wounded, and fled on board the brig where
his stores of war material were already in safety. He sailed at once and
reached the island of Bonaire on the 16th July. Here he was joined by
Brion, and sailed with him for Choroni, where he learned that Soublette
and MacGregor had marched inland and had taken refuge in the valleys of
Aragua. Returning to Bonaire he there met Bermudez, and with him sailed
off to join Mariño at Güiria.
Soublette and MacGregor had joined forces at Choroni, the latter taking
the command. Two days he waited for news of Bolívar and then marched off
for the plains with 600 infantry and 30 horse. Dispersing a Royalist
detachment which attempted to bar the passage of the hills, he occupied
Victoria and routed another detachment under Rosete. On the 1st August
he was met by a squadron of Saraza’s guerillas, who were in search of
him, and on the 2nd August routed another division of 1,200 Royalists at
Quebrada-Honda. The next day he was joined by Saraza and Monagas with
their divisions of guerillas, and was master of the plains of Barcelona,
while Cedeño held his ground on the Upper Orinoco. So was formed the
army which was afterwards known as “the Army of the Centre,” which, in
conjunction with that of the Apure, decided the destinies of Venezuela.
Of this army MacGregor was recognised as general-in-chief.
At Güiria Bolívar met with but a sorry reception, the troops of Mariño
refused to obey him, and the island of Margarita declined to recognise
his authority. Bermudez charged him with cowardice for deserting his
soldiers when in danger. Amid threats and jeers he was forced to
re-embark and returned to Haití, where he was coldly received by Petión.
The people were incensed against him and had lost all faith in him.
Nevertheless, Bolívar was the man not only for the revolution in
Columbia, but for the emancipation of South America. None so well as he
could rise superior to adverse fortune, none had such power as he over
the petty chieftains, none but he could organize the discordant elements
of the revolution into the strength of a warlike nation. Spite of his
ignorance of military tactics and of his puerile vanity, he was the
genius of the revolution in the North of the Continent. The sacred fire
of liberty and of patriotism burned within him and inspired him. As he
himself said, he would yet merit the title of Liberator. History owes to
him this justice as she turns this disgraceful page.
After the departure of Bolívar, Mariño was named general of the army at
Güiria, with Bermudez as his second in command, but his authority did
not extend beyond the peninsula of Paria.
After occupying the plains of Barcelona, MacGregor marched upon the
city. A Royalist force, which, under the command of Colonel Lopez,
occupied the town of Aragua, sallied out to meet him. The action was
hotly contested, but was decided by desperate charges of the Llanero
horse led by Saraza and Monagas, and by a bayonet charge led by
MacGregor in person. The Royalists lost 500 killed, 300 prisoners, and
one gun.
Barcelona was evacuated by the Royalists on the 12th September, after
they had murdered many of the townsfolk and plundered many of the
houses, but MacGregor was now threatened by Morales, who had advanced to
Aragua with 3,000 men. He sent to Arismendi, Mariño, and Piar for
assistance. Piar, who was then besieging Cumaná, came at once with all
his troops and took the command. On the 27th September the two armies
met at the Playon del Juncal, near to Barcelona. MacGregor, supported by
the fire of Piar’s artillery, led a bayonet charge which decided the
day. The Royalists were totally routed, with a loss of 300 killed and
400 prisoners. After this victory MacGregor, worn out with fatigue and
unwilling to brook the domineering ways of Piar, withdrew to Margarita.
Paez, by skilful manœuvres, forced his old opponent, Colonel Lopez,
to retreat to the line of the Apure in October. The town of San Fernando
on this river was the key of the plains; he resolved to seize it, but
had no boats in which to cross the river. The Royalists had a flotilla
of four “flecheras”[18] and seven long-boats, manned by 400 men. An
officer named Peña had committed some fault. Paez ordered him as a
punishment to get himself killed by the enemy. He crossed the river in a
canoe with eight men, at midday, and threw the Royalist camp into
confusion. In the skirmishes which followed, Colonel Lopez was killed
and the Patriots seized seven boats. Paez then crossed the river, and in
December laid siege to San Fernando. There he received news that La
Torre and Morillo were on the march from New Granada to the plains
watered by the Arauca and Apure.
Mariño and Bermudez were engaged in the siege of Cumaná, aided by the
flotilla from Margarita. The Spanish garrison was about to evacuate the
city, when the Royalist force on the island abandoned it and came to
their assistance. The Patriots were forced to raise the siege.
At the close of the year 1816 the Patriot armies had gained many
advantages, but they felt the need of a head to give cohesion to their
efforts. With the army of the centre were many of the partisans of
Bolívar. Backed by Arismendi they induced the army to demand his recall.
Assisted by Petión and by Brion he organized another expedition, sailed
from Haití on the 21st December, and reached Barcelona at the same time
as Arismendi, who brought a strong reinforcement from the island of
Margarita.
But the Army of the Centre was no longer there. Piar had seen from the
beginning that descents on the coasts and incursions on to the plains
would lead to no satisfactory result, that the Orinoco was the true line
of action, and that Guayana was the true base of operations. Bolívar,
without any plan, had hovered round Caracas like a moth round a candle,
and had burned his wings. Even Cedeño, the rude guerilla, had seen more
clearly, as was shown by his success on the Upper Orinoco. Morillo
himself had seen the same thing, and ere leaving New Granada had written
to the Home Government, impressing upon them the importance of
preserving the line of the Orinoco. Piar, after the victory of Juncal,
found himself in command of an army, and at once proceeded to carry out
his idea, thus saving the Patriot cause by forcing Bolívar to give up
his pursuit of a phantom at Caracas. He left a small garrison at
Barcelona, left the guerillas to defend the plains, and marched for
Guayana.
The Royalists had a powerful flotilla on the Orinoco, and had fortified
Angostura, which was the capital of Guayana. Piar cut down trees in the
woods and made small boats, captured two boats from the enemy, and
forced the passage of the Cauca in front of the Royalist camp. The
guerillas, under Cedeño, swam the river on horseback, fighting with the
crews of the Royalist gunboats as they passed, and on reaching the
opposite shore charged upon the encampment, driving out the enemy before
them.
Piar then marched upon Angostura, but was repulsed in every attempt to
take the city by assault. Desisting for a time, he passed behind the
city to the mission station at Coroní, where supplies were plentiful.
One of his officers cut the throats of twenty-two friars who were given
into his custody, and received no reprimand for his barbarity. In fact
this cruel deed greatly increased the popularity of the Patriots in the
country round about, as these friars were hated by their Indian
neophytes.
At Coroní Piar established a regular administration, which was of great
service to the Patriot cause, as the armies were by it afterwards
regularly supplied with cattle and corn. By these successes Piar
acquired great fame, which for a time eclipsed even that of Bolívar
himself.
All the Patriot leaders had now done something except Bolívar, but when
he assumed the command for the second time he was another man: more
grave and more thoughtful than he had been. But he was not yet a true
soldier; he still took audacity for inspiration, and launched forth on
enterprises without first of all adapting the means to the end desired.
Immediately on landing at Barcelona he issued a proclamation that he was
about to liberate the Province of Caracas, and in twenty hours set forth
on his expedition with a force of 600 men. A Royalist detachment lay in
his way in an entrenched position on the river Unare. Without any
reconnaissance Bolívar rushed at it. Forty horse fell upon his rear,
threw his attacking column into confusion and totally destroyed it.
The Liberator was lost again. He was now in a worse plight than when he
fled from Carúpano. He wrote to Piar and Cedeño to abandon their attempt
on Guayana, and to Paez, Monagas, and Saraza that they should come to
the protection of Barcelona. All this was utter folly, for Morillo, with
4,000 men, already covered the approach to Caracas, and La Torre, with
Calzada, occupied the higher plains. Meantime he fortified himself in
Barcelona, and mustered 600 more recruits. He turned the Franciscan
convent into a regular citadel and sent for Mariño. Mariño, forgetting
his jealousy, marched from Cumaná and joined him with 1,200 men. Bolívar
then left 700 men in Barcelona, and naming Aragua as the point of
concentration for the scattered forces of the Patriots, he went off to
Guayana to persuade Piar to join him in an invasion of Caracas.
On the 7th April, 1817, Barcelona was attacked and taken by the
Royalists, who cut the throats of the whole of the garrison, and in
addition killed 300 old men, women, and sick. Mariño retreated to the
peninsula of Paria and again declared himself independent, while
Bermudez and other leaders got together 500 men and awaited orders from
Bolívar on the plains.
The Liberator, attended by fifteen officers, met Piar near Angostura and
found that he was already in possession of all the open country. The
behaviour of the negro general was noble and patriotic. He showed no
jealousy of his superior, who had come to seize the laurels which he had
won in spite of him, and set to work to show him that Guayana must be
the base of a successful campaign. The veil fell from the eyes of
Bolívar; for the first time he saw before him the true theatre of the
war. Leaving Monagas to hold the plains of Barcelona with his guerillas,
he summoned Bermudez, Arismendi, and Saraza to join him, and the
revolution was saved, thanks to Piar.
The Royalists held the coastline from Coro to Cumaná with the army of
Caracas, 5,000 strong. The divisions of La Torre and Calzada, 4,000
picked troops, with 1,500 Llanero horse, had concentrated at Guadalito
on the Apure, and in January had forced Paez to raise the siege of San
Fernando. Paez sent a small force against them to draw them on. La
Torre, who had no idea of his force, fell into the trap, and advanced
with all his army on to a wide plain covered with dry reeds. Here the
fugitives were joined by the main body, and facing about, charged
furiously upon the Royalist cavalry, dispersed them completely, and then
by repeated charges forced the infantry to form square. Then Paez, with
fifty men whom he had detailed for the purpose, set fire to the reeds
all round them. Fortunately for them they found a marsh, into which they
plunged, with the mud up to their waists, until the fire burned itself
out, when they hurriedly retreated, leaving Paez in possession of the
whole country round.
This famous deed of arms confirmed the authority of Paez over the
Llaneros, and put him into a position to overrun the Province of
Barinas. He concluded his glorious campaign by placing himself
voluntarily at the orders of Bolívar, on condition that he might still
protect the province he had conquered. Morillo, who was well aware of
the importance of the Province of Guayana, detached La Torre with a
strong force to drive out the Patriots, while he marched with 3,000 men
to reduce the island of Margarita.
La Torre embarked his force at San Fernando and descended the Apure and
the Orinoco to Angostura, without meeting any resistance, and
manœuvred to draw Piar from the Missions of Coroní, hoping then to
capture them by crossing the river at Angostura. But Piar divined his
intentions, and leaving a reserve of horses on the right bank, he
marched by the left bank to the vicinity of Angostura, then, after
nightfall, leaving his camp-fires burning, he rapidly countermarched to
his former position.
La Torre crossed the river as he had proposed, but was met by Piar at
San Felix on the 11th April, 1817. The Spanish infantry, advancing in
three columns with cavalry on the flanks, were received by volleys of
musketry and showers of arrows. The Patriots, among whom were 1,200
Indians from the Missions, armed with bows and pikes, then charged, and
a furious hand to hand fight ensued, in which the Spaniards were totally
routed. La Torre escaped with seventeen men, but all the rest of his
Spanish troops were killed. Piar spared the lives of all the Creoles
among the Royalists who would join his ranks.
Bolívar, on his return from an expedition to the plains, where he had a
narrow escape from falling in with Morillo, then on the march for
Margarita, found himself at the head of a respectable army. All the
Patriot leaders now recognised his authority except Mariño, who summoned
a Congress at Cariaco, of which Zea and Admiral Brion were members. This
Congress appointed an executive Junta, of which Bolívar was named one,
and gave Mariño the title of general-in-chief.
Morillo soon put an end to this farce; he overran the peninsula of
Paria, sank the Patriot flotilla, and dispersed Mariño’s army, shooting
all prisoners taken. Those who escaped, headed by Urdaneta and Colonel
SUCRE, a name soon to become famous, went to join Bolívar in Guayana,
while Mariño, with a few followers, fled to Maturin.
Until the Patriots had the dominion of the Orinoco their tenure of
Guayana was insecure. Bolívar armed and organized a flotilla of
flecheras, but what was more to the purpose, Brion again came to assist
him with five brigs, some schooners and more flecheras from Margarita.
These vessels were commanded by a mulatto named Diaz.
One part of the Royalist flotilla was engaged in the defence of
Angostura and Guayana Vieja, which still held out; the other guarded the
mouth of the Orinoco under the protection of the forts. Diaz being sent
by Brion to explore the position of this latter detachment, was attacked
by sixteen Royalist flecheras, and lost two of his boats. With three
flecheras which remained to him, he then attacked the Royalists,
recovered his two boats, captured two of theirs, sank five, and
compelled the rest to retreat in confusion. Brion then entered the river
under full sail.
At the approach of Brion, La Torre evacuated Angostura and was soon
afterwards obliged by hunger to abandon Guayana Vieja, the last position
held by the Royalists in Guayana. The remnant of his army, which now
numbered only 600 men, he embarked on 32 vessels and gained the open sea
in safety.
Piar, though he had recognized the authority of Bolívar, was in his
heart disaffected and entered into a conspiracy with Mariño to restrict
his authority by the appointment of a Junta of War; he also gained over
Arismendi to his views. Bolívar prudently quelled this attempt at
sedition by counsels and threats conveyed privately to the conspirators.
Piar, in alarm, asked leave to withdraw from the army on pretext of
illness, and retired to Upata, where he continued his intrigues till
Bolívar wrote a friendly letter to him asking him to desist. He then
fled to Maturin and concerted with Mariño a plan of independent action.
The position of Bolívar was now one of great danger; the troops of the
army of Guayana were for the most part men of colour, Piar was very
popular with them, and was accused of an intention to produce among them
a mutiny of race. Bolívar gave orders to Cedeño to arrest Piar. The
negro chieftain made no resistance, and was brought to Angostura for
trial by a court-martial, under the presidency of Brion. He was
sentenced to death for disobedience, sedition, and desertion.
Bolívar confirmed the sentence and he was shot in the great square of
Angostura on the 16th October, 1817, dying as bravely as he had lived.
If not an act of justice, this execution was warranted by necessity. It
was the only means of preventing a civil war, which would have ended in
the destruction of the army.
Mariño was still in arms at Cumaná with 400 men. Bolívar sent Bermudez
with his corps to arrest him. Bermudez being an old friend of Mariño’s,
procured his banishment. Bolívar was now rid of opposition, but still
his power was far from being well consolidated.