THE REORGANIZATION OF VENEZUELA.
1817--1819.
The Home Government, on hearing of the third insurrection on the island
of Margarita, sent a reinforcement of 2,800 men under the command of
General Canterac. Morillo on his way to that island with his 3,000 men
met Canterac at Barcelona, and, embarking his troops in twenty vessels,
sailed with him for Margarita.
Brion had left the island with his flotilla for the Orinoco. Arismendi
was also absent, and General Gomez, who had been left in command, had
but 1,100 infantry badly equipped, 200 cavalry, and some few
artillerymen.
On the 15th July the troops effected a landing under the protection of
the guns of the squadron. Canterac had thought that the mere sight of
his fresh troops would suffice to disperse the insurgents, but his
division suffered a heavy loss ere they could make good their footing on
the island.
Morillo’s first step was to publish a proclamation, in which he offered
pardon to all insurgents who would lay down their arms, but threatened
all who should resist with extermination. Gomez rejected the offer of
pardon and made every preparation for a stubborn resistance,
strengthening the fortified positions, and piling up heaps of stones on
the heights for want of better ammunition.
The castles of Porlamar and Pampatar were evacuated by the Patriots
after a slight resistance, but they spiked the guns and concentrated
their forces in the city of Asuncion. Morillo marched inland to cut them
off from the north of the island, and was met on the 31st July by a body
of 500 Patriots who had entrenched themselves on very broken ground,
covered with brushwood, at a place called Matasiete. It took Morillo
eight hours of hard fighting to drive them from this position, but his
losses were so heavy that he was forced to return the next day to
Pampatar. He then occupied the town of San Juan, which is situate in a
break in the range of hills which divides the island, and so cut off the
communications of the main body of the Patriots with the port of Juan
Griego, where their flotilla was stationed. On the 8th August the fort
which protected the town was taken by assault after a desperate
resistance. The garrison of this fort only consisted originally of 200
men, the survivors of whom fled to a lake near by, and refusing to
surrender were massacred, Morillo killing eighteen of them with his own
hand. The scene of this butchery is known to this day as “The Lake of
the Martyrs.”
Had Morillo persevered there is no doubt that he would have conquered
the whole island, but adverse intelligence recalled him to the mainland.
After losing 1,000 men he re-embarked the rest, and on the 20th August,
1817, established his head-quarters at Caracas.
Morillo now adopted a more humane policy. He published a general
amnesty, abolished the military tribunals, and re-established the
Audiencia and the Civil Courts. The aspect of the war had changed
greatly in his absence. Paez had invaded Barinas, taken the capital of
that province, and had routed a strong Royalist division at San Carlos,
sacking the town and shooting all his European prisoners. But the plains
were now covered with water, so nothing could be done against him.
Bolívar had possession of the line of the Orinoco. Saraza’s guerillas,
strengthened by an infantry corps, protected the right flank of Paez.
Monagas occupied the plains of Barcelona, and the Province of Cumaná was
held by Bermudez. Canterac was sent off to Peru with his sorely
diminished division. The garrison of Caracas and the division of La
Torre held the line of the coast. Aldama, with another division, covered
the line of the Lower Apure and protected San Fernando, and Calzada,
with a light cavalry division, disputed with Paez the possession of the
Province of Barinas. The peninsula of Paria, and the cities of Cumaná
and Barcelona were held by 800 men, and the rest of the Royalist forces
were distributed in various forts along the coast. Neither party had any
plan of operations, both were waiting to see what the other would do.
Bolívar was at this time the one conspicuous figure in America. He
received a despatch from the Director of the United Provinces of La
Plata congratulating him upon his success, and prophesying the speedy
union of their arms in the same cause. Bolívar replied by an address to
the Argentine people:--
“The Republic of Venezuela, though plunged in mourning, offers you
brotherhood. When, covered with laurels, she has crushed the tyrants who
profane her soil, then she will invite your concurrence, that our emblem
be the UNION of South America.”
As steps towards constitutional government by the installation of a
Congress Bolívar established a High Court of Justice, and on the 30th
October presided at the opening of a Council of State to which he
entrusted the management of civil affairs in his absence, hoping to
strengthen his authority by “the first of all forces, public opinion.”
Bolívar then ascended the Orinoco with 1,500 well equipped troops, and
crossed to the left bank, at about a hundred miles from Angostura. His
intention was to join Saraza, who had 2,500 men, and with his aid to
crush Morillo and retake Caracas. At the same time he wrote to Paez to
co-operate in the scheme by advancing from Barinas. But on the 2nd
December Saraza allowed himself to be surprised and completely routed by
La Torre at Hogaza. The Patriots suffered a loss of 1,200 killed with
three guns and all their flags, while the Royalists had only 200 killed
and wounded, among the latter being La Torre himself.
Bolívar was forced to recross the Orinoco and return to Angostura. Then
with some reinforcements he again ascended the river to join Paez, who,
on the advance of Morillo and La Torre had prudently retired to
Calabozo. The two commanders having united their forces marched with
2,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry on San Fernando.
On reaching the river Apure, Bolívar looked in vain for the boats which
Paez had promised to provide, while on the opposite side were a number
of canoes under guard of a Royalist gunboat and three armed flecheras.
Bolívar was dressed in a green spencer with red facings and three rows
of buttons; on his head was a dragoon’s helmet, which had been sent him
as a sample; he wore Llanero gaiters, and carried in his hand a short
lance with a black pennon adorned with a skull and cross bones, under
which might be read the inscription “Liberty or Death.”
“Where are your boats?” asked Bolívar of Paez.
“There they are,” said Paez, pointing to the enemy’s boats.
“How shall we take them?”
“With cavalry,” answered Paez.
“And where are these horse marines?” asked Bolívar.
Paez turned to his guard of honour, and picking out fifty men under
Colonel Aramendi, he put himself at their head, shouting:--
“Into the water, boys! Follow your Uncle!”
Then putting spurs to his horse he plunged into the river, followed by
his men lance in hand, and yelling to frighten off the alligators which
swarmed around them.
The armed boats opened fire upon them, but without effect; the terrified
crews jumped overboard, and fourteen boats were captured.
“If I had not seen it, I never would have believed it possible!” said
Bolívar.
Bolívar simply established a blockade of San Fernando, and marched
without loss of time against Morillo, who had assembled 1,600 infantry
and 300 horsemen near to Calabozo. His movements were so rapid that
Morillo was taken by surprise on the morning of the 10th February, 1818,
and was himself involved in the rout of his cavalry, and borne from the
field by the fugitives. One company of light infantry covered the
retreat, and perished to the last man. Morillo shut himself up in
Calabozo, which was defended by four redoubts, while Bolívar withdrew to
rest his men.
Morillo, without cavalry and without supplies, saw that resistance was
hopeless; he buried his guns, and on the night of the 14th February
marched off towards Sombrero on the river Guarico, taking his sick and
wounded with him. At midday, on the 15th, he was overtaken by Bolívar
with his cavalry. The horsemen could make no impression on the solid
columns of the Spanish infantry, but they delayed their march and so
gave time for the Patriot infantry to come up. During the night which
followed Morillo continued his retreat, and the next day reached the
wooded country about Sombrero. Here he took up a strong position on the
river Guarico, where he repulsed several attacks of the Patriot
infantry, and after nightfall, by a forced march, reached the valleys of
Aragua.
Bolívar, still with Caracas on the brain, retired to Calabozo, where he
had a stormy conference with Paez. The Llanero chieftain insisted that
to attempt an offensive campaign while the fortress of San Fernando was
still held by the Royalists was to lose the command of the plains.
Bolívar let Paez depart with his division, but marched himself with
1,000 raw infantry and 1,200 horse for the valleys of Aragua, where he
greatly increased his force by recruits. At Victoria he established a
reserve under Urdaneta, and detached his cavalry and 200 infantry to
occupy the pass at Cabrera. Morillo, who had concentrated his forces at
Valencia, surprised Saraza at Cabrera, routed Monagas at Maracay on the
road to Caracas, and advanced upon Victoria. Bolívar was compelled to
make a hasty retreat.
He halted at La Puerta, for him a most ominous position, and was there
attacked on the morning of the 16th March by the Royalist vanguard under
Morales. He succeeded in repulsing this attack, but Morillo, in person,
led up the main body, and though himself wounded, very quickly drove the
Patriots from the field, with the loss of 400 killed and 600 wounded.
Bolívar lost in this battle even his private papers, and seemed to have
lost his head also. He exposed himself in the most reckless manner
wherever the fight was hottest, seeming to court death as some expiation
of the errors he had committed. Fortunately for him, on the 6th March
Paez had captured San Fernando, with twenty guns, eighteen armed
vessels, and seventy-three flecheras, and now came to his assistance; as
did also Cedeño with his guerillas.
La Torre, who had taken command of the Royalists, found another army in
front of him when he advanced to Calabozo. He retreated to the heights
of Ortiz on the river Poga, which command the entrance to the valleys.
Here he was attacked by Bolívar and Paez with 800 infantry and 2,000
horse. The strength of his position enabled him to repulse several
assaults, after which he prudently retreated to Cura, and later on to
San Carlos.
Bolívar then detached Paez against San Carlos, and marched with the bulk
of his force further to the West, always aiming at Caracas. Paez was met
at Cojedes by La Torre with a very superior force. Carried away by his
impetuosity, he charged at the head of one squadron, and bore down all
before him, but found on his return to the field that his army had
disappeared. Overwhelmed by numbers the infantry had been cut to pieces,
the cavalry had fled. Paez returned to San Fernando with less than half
the force with which he had commenced the campaign.
Still worse fortune befell Bolívar. He abandoned the plains and advanced
into a country swarming with detached parties of Royalists. He, with his
staff, were attacked at night as they slept in hammocks in a wood. He
threw off his green spencer and brass helmet and escaped on foot, but
wandered about all alone till next day, when he fell in with his
dispersed troops, flying from their encampment where they had been
surprised, and ultimately rejoined Paez at San Fernando.
Bolívar, downcast and sick but not disheartened, immediately set to work
to raise fresh troops, and sent Cedeño with 1,300 men to re-occupy the
plains of Calabozo. Cedeño was cut to pieces by Morales, who then
advanced towards the Apure, but was there totally routed by Paez on the
28th May, 1818. Then came on the rainy season, and both parties were
forced to remain in quarters. The Patriot army no longer existed, all
the infantry had disappeared, the arms were ruined and the ammunition
was exhausted. The Liberator had lost both his credit as a general and
his civil authority. All threw upon him the blame for the ill-success of
the Patriot arms, and time, which has enhanced his glory, confirms in
this instance the judgment of his contemporaries. But there was yet the
nucleus of an army on the Apure, and Guayana was still secure.
The position of the Royalists was not much better. Morillo had 12,000
men scattered about in detachments, but he had neither money, arms, nor
supplies. As he himself reported to the Viceroy of Peru:--
“Twelve pitched battles, in which the best officers and troops of the
enemy have fallen, have not lowered their pride or lessened the vigour
of their attacks upon us.”
The Spanish squadron lay idle at Puerto Cabello, while Argentine and
Venezuelan privateers scoured the Carribean Sea with the ports of
Margarita as their head-quarters.
In the East the Patriot arms had been equally unfortunate. Mariño,
recalled by his partisans and supported by Gomez, Governor of Margarita,
had again established himself at Cumaná and openly renounced all
allegiance to the Liberator. Bermudez, who remained faithful, was routed
and driven across the Orinoco with the loss of his artillery. Monagas
was isolated on the plains of Barcelona.
Bolívar returned to Angostura, leaving Paez in command of the Army of
the Apure, and with indomitable energy set to work to create a new army.
He raised recruits in the Missions of Coroni, re-organized the divisions
of Saraza and Monagas, while Bermudez recruited his forces in Guayana.
Brion brought him 5,000 muskets and a large supply of military stores
from the West India Islands. He also effected a reconciliation with
Mariño and made him general of the Army of Cumaná. The Army of the
Apure, at the instigation of Colonel Wilson, an Englishman who had
joined it with a contingent of volunteers, proclaimed Paez
general-in-chief. This appointment was confirmed by the Llaneros, who
adored him, but Paez, taking no notice of this, assisted the Liberator
in every way he could.
Bolívar then sent General Santander, with 1,200 muskets and a group of
officers, to raise a new army in the Province of Casanare, from the
parties of Patriots scattered on the plains, with orders to threaten the
frontier of New Granada, which step had very important results.
Santander was a native of New Granada, he had served through all the
campaigns of the revolution, and was a well-educated man of great
intelligence.
Bolívar also issued a prophetic proclamation to the people of New
Granada:--
“The day of America has come. No human power can stay the course of
Nature guided by Providence. Before the sun has again run his annual
course altars to Liberty will arise throughout your land.”
Bolívar’s next step was to re-ascend the Orinoco with twenty vessels and
some infantry to reinforce the Army of the Apure. He had a friendly
interview with Paez, and leaving him in command, returned to Angostura
to attend to the claims of civil government.
The country was not satisfied with the arbitrary government of one man,
and demanded some sort of popular representation. Bolívar calmly
reviewed the situation and acquiesced. He re-organized the Council of
State, which had fallen to pieces in his absence, and charged it with
the convention of a Constituent Congress. An electoral scheme was drawn
up on the basis of joining Venezuela and New Granada in one Republic,
and on the 22nd October, 1818, Bolívar published this plan in a
proclamation, in which as usual he renounced all claim to the supreme
power, but contradicted himself by saying:--“The first day of peace will
be the last of my authority.”
The world was beginning now to turn its eyes to the great movement in
Spanish America. The figure of Bolívar stood forth prominently. San
Martin had fought and won the Battle of Maipó, and was preparing for the
conquest of Peru. O’Higgins wrote from Chile to Bolívar, recognising him
as a champion in the cause of America:--
“The cause which Chile defends is the same in which Buenos Ayres, New
Granada, Mexico, and Venezuela are engaged; it is that of the whole
Continent of America.”
Spain solicited the intervention of the European Powers to bring about a
reconciliation. Bolívar replied by a solemn declaration:--
“That the Republic of Venezuela, by right Divine and human, is
emancipated from the Spanish nation; that she neither had solicited nor
would admit, the mediation of the Great Powers; that she would only
treat with Spain as with an equal; and that the people of Venezuela, in
defence of their sovereign rights, were resolved to bury themselves
under its ruins, if Spain, Europe, and all the world were to unite to
keep them under Spanish domination.”
On the 15th February, 1819, the second Congress of Venezuela was
solemnly installed at Angostura. Into its hands the Dictator resigned
his absolute power, and in a speech disclosed for the first time his
plan of constitutional organization, the union of Venezuela and New
Granada in one nation. He spoke in favour of democratic government, and
against the system of federation, as organically weak. At the same time
he showed that no Democracy had ever had the stability of Monarchies and
Aristocracies, and held up the constitution of England as a model, at
once Republican and Conservative. He proposed an hereditary Senate as
the base of the constitutional edifice. In regard to the executive, the
idea of a life President, which he had learned from his master, Simon
Rodriguez, was in his head, but he dared not as yet propose it, it would
not have met with any support:--
“The executive power in a Republic must be strong, for all conspire
against it. In a Monarchy the power should rest in the legislature, for
all conspire in favour of the monarch.”
On the 10th February, 1819, Congress unanimously elected him President,
and from that day he always respected the liberty and opinions of that
body; although he still remained _de facto_ Dictator, he appealed to
them in every emergency. When he abandoned Congress he fell.
Congress established a life Senate in place of the hereditary Senate
proposed by Bolívar, and adopted a centralized form of government; fixed
the presidential term at four years, the President being eligible for
re-election once but not oftener; and arranged the other public offices
on the republican system. This constitution had yet to be submitted to
the vote of the people; this was at present impossible, and it never was
actually adopted, the framework alone being established.
By decree, unlimited powers were granted to the President in all
provinces which were the theatre of war, and it was also decreed that
the Vice-President should have no authority over the armies. This was in
fact the creation of a military dictatorship.
Bolívar delegated his power to Don Francisco Antonio Zea, with the title
of Vice-President. Zea being a native of New Granada, this appointment
formed a link between the sister colonies. Bolívar then took the field,
followed by a battalion of 500 English, under command of Colonel Elsom,
which had been raised in England in the preceding year.
Often have we made mention of European officers and men in the Patriot
armies, more especially of Englishmen. Venezuela, spite of the virile
strength of her men, and of their heroic efforts during eight years of
struggle against the disciplined armies of Spain, was the only Republic
of South America to seek the help of foreign volunteers, and which had
in her pay entire corps of foreign soldiers commanded by their own
officers. Bolívar was something of a cosmopolitan, and had none of the
prejudices of his fellow-countrymen against foreigners. More a soldier
by instinct than by education, he knew that results are only to be
obtained by method and discipline. He saw how San Martin, with an army
well organized and well led, had triumphed over the best of the Spanish
troops, and understood that he himself needed a more solid nucleus for
his armies than the light horsemen of the plains, and a better
disciplined infantry, to ensure success. Taught by his late disasters,
which were the result both of his own imprudence and of the lack of
cohesion in his troops, he was convinced that without a properly
disciplined army any advantage he might gain would be ephemeral, and
that if he did eventually triumph, he would stand as a conqueror over
ruins. Learning these lessons, he grew from a mere warrior to be a great
captain; without the science and mathematical precision of San Martin,
but with greater boldness and with a heavier crop of laurels.
In 1815 endeavours had been made to raise an auxiliary corps of Irish,
but it was only in 1817 that a system of enlisting volunteers was
instituted in England, through the agency of Don Luis Lopez Mendez, who
was at that time the representative of Venezuela in London. Without this
assistance and efficient co-operation, Bolívar averred that he would
have accomplished nothing in the famous campaign of 1819, for which he
was now preparing.
The soldiers received a bounty of $80 on enlisting, were paid two
shillings a day and rations, and were to receive at the conclusion of
the war $500 and an allotment of land.
In the year 1817, various English and German officers made contracts
with Mendez to take to Venezuela organized corps of artillery, lancers,
hussars, and rifles. The first expedition to leave England consisted of
120 hussars and lancers, under Colonel Hippisley. Their brilliant
uniforms gave them more the appearance of a theatrical troupe than a
body of soldiers going on active service; nevertheless they became the
basis of a corps of regular cavalry.
Colonel Wilson and Colonel Skeenen organized another corps of cavalry,
but Skeenen with 300 men suffered shipwreck on the coast of France.
Campbell took out the nucleus of a battalion of riflemen, which
afterwards did good service in Columbia; and a subaltern named Gilmour,
with the title of Colonel, and with 90 men, formed the basis of a
brigade of artillery.
Such enlistments were contrary to law in England, but in 1818 and in
1819 the number of volunteers increased considerably. General English,
who had gone through the Peninsular War with Wellington, contracted for
a division of 1,200 English, which about this time reached the Island of
Margarita, and subsequently became the celebrated Carabobo battalion.
The 500 men under Colonel Elsom, who accompanied Bolívar to the Apure,
were at first called the “British Legion,” but were afterwards named the
“Albion” battalion. Colonel Elsom had also brought out 300 Germans under
Colonel Uzlar, who had been enlisted at Brussels, which corps was landed
at Margarita.
General MacGregor, of whom we already know something, brought a foreign
legion of 800 men. Besides smaller contingents, General Devereux, who
had initiated the idea, brought an Irish legion, in which a son of the
great Irish Tribune, O’Connell, was an officer.
On hearing of the arrival of General English and others at Margarita,
Bolívar sent Urdaneta there to organize them. Urdaneta found 1,200
English and 300 Germans. These troops were destined for operations on
the coast of Cumaná and Caracas, but were at this time almost in open
mutiny against their officers. They were brought to order by the
exertions of Colonel Montilla, who had become reconciled to Bolívar. He
was the last of Bolívar’s enemies to become reconciled, and from this
time to the end stood faithfully by him. Montilla had served in Spain,
and had travelled much in Europe; he spoke the languages of these
foreigners and understood their customs. He was also energetic and was
possessed of some military skill. These acquirements gave him
considerable influence over the auxiliaries, which he turned to good
account.
On the 30th January, 1819, Morillo paraded 6,500 men, in seven
battalions and sixteen squadrons, all perfectly equipped, and opened the
campaign by advancing on San Fernando. Paez burned that city on his
approach, and retired south of the Arauca with 4,000 men, among whom was
a squadron of English dragoons. The Royalists dragged canoes with them
across the plains, and on the 4th February forced the passage of the
river.
Paez then changed his tactics: he sent his infantry to the rear, and
remained himself facing the enemy, with 1,500 men well mounted. Morillo
saw small parties of the enemy, who hovered on his flanks and rear, but
who fled from him over the vast plain whenever they were attacked. He
detached Morales with 3,000 men to reconnoitre and to drive in cattle.
On the 14th February one of his squadrons was so occupied when Paez
suddenly rushed upon it with 1,200 men, chased the fugitives to the
encampment, charged the reserve, and then retired at full speed. After
nightfall he again appeared in the rear. Morillo wearied out his troops
in ineffectual pursuit, till after nine days of marchings to and fro
upon the immense plain, he retreated to the Apure. He then threw up
fresh entrenchments at San Fernando, and making that place his
head-quarters, detached divisions to occupy Barinas, Calabozo, and
Sombrero. At this juncture Bolívar arrived, and at once assumed the
offensive, but had the worst of it in two small affairs, and prudently
withdrew beyond the Arauco.
Again Morillo advanced. On the 3rd April Paez, with 150 picked horsemen,
swam the river and galloped towards the camp. Eight hundred of the
Royalist cavalry, with two small guns, sallied out to meet him. He
slowly retreated, drawing them on to a place called “Las Queseras del
Medio,” where a battalion of infantry lay in ambush by the river. Then
splitting his men into groups of twenty, he charged the enemy on all
sides, forcing them under the fire of the infantry, and recrossed the
river with two killed and a few wounded, leaving the plain strewn with
the dead of the enemy.[19] Morillo again retreated, and the rains put an
end to further operations.
Bolívar, ever impatient of inactivity, heard at this time that Santander
had raised 1,200 infantry and 600 horse in Casanare, and had driven back
a Royalist army of 2,300 men under Colonel Barreiro, who had marched
against him from New Granada. This gave him an idea; he resolved to
cross the Cordillera and save Venezuela by reconquering New Granada. He
summoned a council of war, and the idea was received with enthusiasm by
his officers. It was decided that Paez, with a part of the army, should
attract the attention of Morillo and of the Army of New Granada upon the
plains of Barinas; that Urdaneta and Montilla should embark the
auxiliaries on the vessels of Brion’s squadron, and should make a
descent on the coasts of Caracas, menacing the rear of the Royalist
army; while he with the rest of the Army of the Apure, and with the
forces of Santander, should cross the Cordillera, and capture the
capital of New Granada.
This was the greatest stroke of strategy that had emanated from the
fertile genius of Bolívar. It changed the whole aspect of affairs, and
had a similar effect to the passage of the Andes by San Martin.