THE DISSOLUTION OF NEW GRANADA.
1815--1817.
The second fall of the Republic of Venezuela was coincident in point of
time with the fall of constitutional government in the mother country,
and the absolute King of Spain and of the Indies, after subjugating his
vassals in the Peninsula, turned his attention to subduing by force of
arms his insurgent colonists beyond the seas.
Up to that time, with the exception of New Granada and Venezuela, none
of the colonies of Spanish America had declared themselves independent,
or had adopted the republican form of government. They made war on those
who upheld the Royal standard, but they were governed by rulers of their
own choosing in the name of the captive King. Thus, naturally, Venezuela
and New Granada were the first of these colonies to receive attention.
In the year 1813 these two colonies had been united by the Spanish
authorities under one nominal government, Marshal Montalvo being
appointed Viceroy. The Peninsular troops had made but a poor show in the
war in Venezuela; the two restorations had been achieved by native
troops under the command of Monteverde, Boves, and Morales, who looked
with contempt upon the Spanish generals as they condemned their
excesses, and who refused all obedience to the colonial authorities.
Thus Montalvo looked upon the preponderance of the native element as a
source of danger, and as a dishonour to the cause of royalty, and had
applied to the Home Government for reinforcements. New Granada was now
to be the theatre of war, and thither went Bolívar, either to take part
in it or to seek help for another reconquest of Venezuela.
He presented himself to the Congress assembled at Tunja. Camilo Torres,
the President, thanked him for his distinguished services, saying that
Venezuela was not lost so long as Bolívar lived. He was at once put in
command of a corps of 1,800 men, of which Urdaneta’s column formed a
part, and was sent to reduce Cundinamarca, which still held aloof from
the Federal Government. In view of the danger which now threatened the
Republic, Congress had appointed a Supreme Junta, whose authority was
recognised by all the provinces except Cartagena and Cundinamarca. Santa
Fé de Bogotá was the arsenal of the Republic, the subjugation of
Cundinamarca was therefore necessary.
Bolívar prosecuted his campaign with his usual activity. At his approach
all the towns of Cundinamarca declared in favour of Congress; Bogotá,
the capital, where Alvarez, who had been left in command by his nephew,
Nariño, when he marched for the South, had entrenched himself, alone
offered any resistance. Bolívar laid siege to the city, and by a series
of vigorous assaults shut up the garrison in the principal square, and
cut off their supply of water. Alvarez was forced to capitulate.
Congress then changed the seat of government to Bogotá; the Republic had
at last possession of its own capital, and the Government was greatly
strengthened. Bolívar was named Captain-General of the Confederation,
his title of Liberator was recognised, and another was bestowed upon
him, that of “Illustrious Pacificator.” Of course Bolívar made a speech
on this occasion, and prophesied that the Army of New Granada would
break the chains of all the oppressed peoples of South America.
The new plan of Bolívar was to advance by the coast to Coro. Government
gave him three battalions of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, in all
2,000 men, with orders to seek supplies of arms and ammunition at
Cartagena. Colonel Castillo, who was Governor of this Province, prompted
by his old jealousy of Bolívar, and listening to the counsels of Mariño
and Montillo, who had taken refuge at Cartagena, refused these supplies.
Bolívar established his head-quarters at the beautiful city of Mompox
and remained inactive, passing his time in feasts and parades, and in
intrigues against the local government, till his money was spent and he
had lost half his troops by sickness and desertion.
Then, with only one gun, he laid siege to Cartagena, the strongest
fortress in South America, till a powerful Spanish expedition landed on
the coast and brought him to his senses. On the 8th May, 1815, he handed
over the relics of his army to Castillo, and took leave of his men in a
sentimental address, in which he expressed his sorrow at not being able
to share in the triumphs which awaited them. He then withdrew to
Jamaica, but ere he went fired a parting shot, declaring:--
“Cartagena prefers her own destruction to the duty of obedience to the
Federal Government.”
A shot which recoiled upon himself, for he also had preferred his own
destruction to obedience, and had inoculated the Granadian Republic with
a new germ of dissolution.
In Jamaica he published a memorial in his own defence, which rather
strengthens the case against him. Soon after that, under the signature
of “A South American,” he published another memorial upon the Revolution
in South America, and upon the future organization of the new republics,
which is a refutation of the chimerical plan of a Continental monocracy
which he attempted to establish later on. In this memorial he advocated
the absolute independence of each separate colony, “but New Granada
shall unite with Venezuela, and this nation shall be called Columbia.” A
prophetic vision!
The reinforcements applied for by Montalvo reached Cumaná early in
April. One ship-of-the-line, three frigates, and twenty-one smaller
ships of war came in convoy of a fleet of sixty transports, carrying
10,600 men and a siege train. This was the greatest effort which had as
yet been made by the mother country to crush the insurrection in South
America, and it was the last. The troops were selected from regiments
which had fought against the armies of Napoleon, and had been educated
in the school of Wellington. They were under the command of Marshal
Morillo, the best of all the Spanish generals of that time. Originally a
sergeant of marines, he had won his way by distinguished valour to his
present high position. He had seen hard service among the Spanish
guerillas, and had learned the art of war in the Anglo-Spanish armies.
He was no great military genius, but he had respectable talents and was
a good fighter. He was popular among the soldiery, but was a strict
disciplinarian, and tenacious in his enterprises. He was cruel by
system, not from inclination, but was also of a suspicious and
passionate temperament. He knew nothing of the country he was sent to
pacify, and his instructions gave him no information of any value, being
drawn up in complete ignorance of the actual state of South America, and
were instinct with contempt for the Creole inhabitants, a contempt in
which he also shared.
This expedition was originally intended for the River Plate, but on the
fall of Monte Video its destination was changed. At the same time, as
Panamá was considered to be the key to the continent, another expedition
of 2,500 men was sent, under command of General Miyares, to Vera Cruz
for the purpose of securing the Isthmus.
Morillo was instructed to overrun the mainland from Guayana to Darien,
first of all reducing the island of Margarita. He was then to take
Cartagena, subdue New Granada, and to re-establish order in Venezuela.
All this was thought so easy that he was further instructed to send his
spare troops to Peru and Mexico. Vast as was this plan, Morillo
accomplished it in the time given him for the purpose. In the course of
the year 1815 all the insurgent colonies of Spain were reduced to
submission, with the exception of the Provinces of the River Plate.
The rest of the instructions were drawn up in terms of benevolence
towards the Americans. The atrocities committed under the Royal flag
were severely censured, and the troops who had taken part in them were
directed to be withdrawn from the theatre of action, but ample power was
given to Morillo to deviate from these instructions when he thought it
necessary, and he had also permission to suppress the tribunals of
justice. Thus everything was left to his discretion.
The first man with whom Morillo spoke in the New World was Morales, who
was now master of the east of Venezuela, and had fitted out a flotilla
for an attack upon the island of Margarita. Early in April the
expedition was sighted from the coast of Cumaná; Morales sailed out to
meet it with three brigs, manned by a division of infantry, to place
himself at the orders of the general. Camba, the historian, who was
present, says that his European soldiers gazed in astonishment upon the
decks of these three small vessels as they sailed through the Spanish
fleet. They were crowded with dark-skinned men wearing round straw hats,
a waistcloth, with a cartridge-box buckled over it, and, in general, no
other raiment. If these were the victors what must the vanquished be
like! An unfortunate first impression to receive, which gave them a
false idea of the work before them. “Venezuela and Caracas were lost
after the arrival of first-class troops, who were well commanded.”
In accordance with his instructions, Morillo went on to the island of
Margarita with all his army, reinforced by three thousand of Morales’
troops, shipped on the flotilla. The Patriot cruisers had captured one
of the vessels of the convoy, so that the strength of the expedition was
known. Bermudez proposed to resist to the last extremity, but finding no
support fled to Cartagena. Arismendi gave himself up, and was kindly
received by Morillo, who seated him at his own table, apparently
forgetting his massacre of eight hundred Spaniards. On the 9th April,
1815, the island was occupied without resistance. Morillo issued a
proclamation offering an amnesty to all insurgents who would give
themselves up, and kept his word; but fifteen men who gave themselves up
to Morales were slaughtered.
The first success and the first disaster of the expedition came
together. The ship-of-the-line _San Pedro_, the most powerful vessel of
the squadron, caught fire and was a total loss, the military chest and a
great quantity of warlike stores being burned with her.
The generous behaviour of Morillo at Margarita procured him a favourable
reception at Caracas, where he arrived on the 11th May, but his first
act was to levy a forced loan to replace the treasure lost on the _San
Pedro_. He then proceeded to confiscate the properties of all who had
taken part in the Revolution, and of those who were absent or who were
suspected, the amount so taken being estimated at fifteen millions of
dollars. General Moxó, a man of cruel and rapacious character, was made
Governor of Venezuela; the Audiencia and all the civil tribunals were
suppressed, and were replaced by councils of war. A military despotism
was established.
Morillo had now 16,000 men under his command, including the native
troops. He sent a battalion of light infantry to Puerto Rico, a division
of 1,700 men to Peru, 3,000 men were told off as the garrison of
Venezuela, and Calzada’s division, in Barinas, was reinforced by
European troops. Then with 5,000 Europeans and 3,500 native troops under
Morales, embarked in fifty-six ships, he sailed on the 12th July for the
leeward coast to commence operations against New Granada.
The employment of native troops was in accordance with his instructions,
but the measure produced discontent in his ranks. These troops were
despised by the Spaniards, and had no wish to leave their native
country. More than a thousand of the Llaneros deserted rather than
embark. The way in which they were treated aroused in them the native
instinct for independence, of which they soon became the most doughty
champions.
Morillo landed at Santa Marta, intent upon the capture of Cartagena. The
garrison was weak, was short of arms and of provisions, and was cut off
from help either by sea or by land, but was nevertheless resolute to
resist to the last extremity. The ground was cleared for three leagues
round, outlying posts were called in, a flotilla was armed for the
defence of the bay, sixty guns were added to the eighty-four already
mounted on the batteries, martial law was proclaimed, and all men
capable of bearing arms were compelled to serve. The garrison was thus
increased to 3,600 men, of whom 1,300 were regular troops. The command
was at first given to Castillo, but he was soon after replaced by
Bermudez, and Montilla was named Major-General.
Cartagena was then the strongest fortress in America. It was captured by
the French in 1697, but when the English, under Admiral Vernon, attacked
it in the year 1741 they were beaten off, although they had 9,000
soldiers in addition to a powerful fleet. It was built upon a promontory
running into the sea, and is so separated from the mainland by marshes
that it may be considered an island--a sort of military Venice. The city
proper is situate to the north-west of this promontory, and to the west
of it lies a suburb called Getzemani, which communicates with the city
by a fortified bridge thrown across a deep canal, and is closed at each
end by a stockade. Getzemani is also joined to the mainland by another
bridge of similar construction. The fortress, the city, and the suburb,
were all enclosed on the land side by high walls and bastions. To the
east, beyond the swamps, and about half a mile from the walls, stood a
castle on a hill, called San Lázaro, whose fire swept all the city, but
was itself under the fire of a fortified hill, called La Popa, which
commanded all the approaches. The most accessible part of the city was
the bay, which runs from north to south, and is nearly a mile in length.
This bay is shut in from the Gulf of Mexico by two islands, which leave
only two practicable entrances--the Boca Grande, by which Admiral Vernon
penetrated, and which was afterwards closed by orders from Spain, and
the Boca Chica, which was defended by two castles on the island and by
batteries on the coast. The flotilla consisted of a corvette, seven
schooners, and some gunboats, aided in shallow water by a sort of armed
rafts called “bongos.”
Morillo detached Morales, with his division, across the Magdalena, to
blockade the city by land while he blockaded it by sea, his idea being
to starve out the garrison.
The heavy rains of the season and frequent tempests made the work of the
siege very arduous to the Royalists, filling their hospitals with sick.
On the 25th October the city was bombarded, with no other effect than to
kill a few women and children. Several assaults were made upon various
outworks, which were repulsed, but in November the larger island was
captured by Morales. Two batteries were placed upon it and upon the
adjacent shore, the fire from which swept the bay and prevented fishing,
thus destroying one great resource of the city, where hunger soon proved
more formidable than shot and shell. Fevers broke out, rats and hides
were eaten by the starving garrison, sentinels were found dead at their
posts when parties were sent to relieve them, but no one talked of
surrender. At last it was determined to drive from the city two thousand
useless mouths, old men, women, and children. It was a procession of
spectres; only one-third of them reached the advanced posts of the
besiegers, the rest sank down and perished on the way. The survivors
were kindly received by the Spaniards, but Morillo wrote to the Patriot
leaders that if they did not surrender in three days he would drive the
fugitives back into the city. On that day, the 4th December, three
hundred persons died of hunger in the streets; it was impossible to hold
out longer, but still they would not surrender.
On the night of the 5th the guns on the hill of La Popa, and on the
castle of San Lazaro, were spiked. At dawn on the day following, a
remnant of two thousand men embarked on the flotilla, crossed the bay
under the fire of the Royalist batteries, took on board the garrisons of
the batteries at the Boca Chica, and on the 7th put to sea in a storm
which dispersed the blockading squadron.
Morillo entered the city on the 6th December, and found it a hospital of
dying men, and a cemetery of dead bodies, which lay all about the
streets; the very air was poison. The siege had lasted one hundred and
eight days. It was calculated that six thousand had died in the city of
hunger and disease, besides those who were killed in the various
attacks. The loss of the besiegers was nearly three thousand five
hundred men.
The victory was stained by an act of barbarism. Morales, who had
occupied the batteries at the Boca Chica, on their evacuation by the
Patriots, offered an amnesty to all fugitives who would present
themselves. Four hundred old men, women, and children, and some
fishermen who had hidden in the brushwood covering the island, presented
themselves. The throats of every one of them were cut on the seashore by
his orders. Morillo was more humane, but Castillo, who had hidden
himself, was put to death by his command, and his body was exposed on a
gibbet. The same fate was meted out to six of the principal citizens,
among them being Garcia Toledo, who had headed the revolution in 1810.
At the same time the Inquisition was re-established.
Calzada, advancing from Barinas to aid in the subjugation of New
Granada, attempted first to clear the plains of Casanare of the Patriot
light horse, but being beaten by them on the 1st October, he crossed the
Cordillera with 1,800 infantry and 500 cavalry, routed various detached
parties of Patriots who came in his way, and totally defeated their main
body at Balaga on the 25th November. He then occupied Pamplona, where he
found the streets strewn with the corpses of Spaniards, who had been
barbarously murdered by the Patriots when they evacuated that city.
Congress now again made Torres President, with dictatorial powers, and
appointed Torices Vice-President. Torres raised an army of 2,500
recruits, with which he forced Calzada, who was advancing on the
capital, to retreat to Ocaña. But Calzada, after receiving some
reinforcements, turned upon him and completely routed him on the 22nd
February. The three Provinces of Pamplona, Socorro, and Antioquia were
then occupied by the Royalists, and the capital lay defenceless. Torres
resigned, and a physician named Madrid was appointed in his place. He
called for volunteers; only six men offered themselves.
Cundinamarca, which had been forced into the Union, had remained
disaffected, and now became openly Royalist. The rest of the country was
worn out, and was only eager for peace. Congress authorised Madrid to
negotiate with Morillo, and dissolved itself. The new President retired
to the South with the remnant of the army, and joined the division of
Popayán under Mejia, who then marched against a Royalist force under
Sámano, which was advancing from Quito, and was totally defeated.
Morillo left a strong garrison at Cartagena and divided the rest of his
diminished force into four light columns for the complete subjugation of
the country. Bogotá fell without a shot being fired, but while he was at
Ocaña with the reserve, news reached him that Venezuela was again in
commotion, that a fresh insurrection had broken out in the island of
Margarita, and that the emigrants, headed by Bolívar, were preparing an
expedition to rekindle the flames of revolution on the mainland.
Seriously alarmed, he sent Morales with a division back to Venezuela to
secure his base of operations.
Morillo now, for the first time, appreciated the magnitude of the
enterprise he had undertaken, and, with rare perspicuity, foresaw its
fatal termination. He wrote to the Home Government that, in spite of his
success, he could not without reinforcements bring the Llaneros into
subjection, and that it was necessary to establish a military
government, and so crush rebellion by the use of the same means which
had been employed at the time of the conquest. He then published an
amnesty to all officers of the revolutionary armies, from captain
downwards, who would lay down their arms, but he put to death all
superior officers who fell into his hands, quartering their bodies and
exposing their heads in cages.
General La Torre, who commanded at Bogotá, published a similar amnesty
to civil officials, for which step he was severely censured by Morillo,
and in May, 1816, the prisons of the capital were full.
Morillo then went there himself, avoiding a public reception and
entering the city by night. La Torre and Calzada were again censured for
receiving presents from rebels; the first was, as a punishment, sent off
to the plains, and the second to Cúcuta. The amnesty was then annulled,
and severe decrees were published against all who should either write or
speak on forbidden subjects.
On the 30th May, which was the birthday of the King, the women of the
city presented themselves, imploring mercy for their fathers, sons, and
husbands. Morillo received them roughly and sent them off with insults.
The prisons being insufficient to accommodate the multitude of
prisoners, some were confined in the convents. He searched the city
archives for pretexts to increase their number, and a military tribunal
was established to try them.
Villavicencio, Montufar, Lozano, Camilo Torres, and Torices were
executed, being shot in the back as traitors, and their bodies were hung
on gibbets. Baraya and Mejia shared the same fate. Caldas, the
philosopher, whose scientific labours had won him world-wide fame, was
sentenced to death, and when Morillo was entreated to spare the life of
so illustrious a man, he answered savagely:--
“Spain has no need of sages.”
One hundred and twenty-five victims perished on the scaffold, of whom a
fifth part were graduates of the University. The properties of all
victims were confiscated; their families were reduced to misery; the
entire male population was classified as convicts, and gangs of them
were forced to work on the public roads. Truly the system adopted by the
Spaniards at the conquest was now re-established in America in the cause
of Spanish absolutism, and for a King who was spoken of by his own
mother as “tiger heart and mule head.”
Bloodshed and absolute power clouded the mental faculties of Morillo; he
dreamed of destroying the Argentine Republic, and of then returning in
triumph to Mexico to repeat there the cruelties of Cortes, but the
course of events in Venezuela soon opened his eyes. He left a garrison
of 3,800 men at Bogotá, Venezuelans and Pastusos, and with 4,000 Spanish
troops crossed the Cordillera in November, 1816, taking some prisoners
with him to shoot on the frontier line. This march convinced him, for
the second time, of his impotence to prosecute his enterprise; by his
own confession, he could neither pass the rivers nor procure supplies
without the help of the Llaneros who went with him.
General Sámano remained in command at Bogotá. His first act was to erect
a gallows in the great square, in front of the windows of his palace,
and to set up four execution-posts (banquillos) on the public promenade.
One of his first victims was a beautiful young woman, convicted of
sending information to the Patriot guerillas on the plains of Casanare.
She was shot in the back, with seven men implicated in the same affair.
She died encouraging her companions to meet their fate like men, and
prophesying that her death would soon be revenged. Under the name of La
Pola her memory is still preserved in the songs of her native land.
Morillo, finding Sámano so apt a pupil in his school of terrorism, made
him Viceroy in place of Montalvo, whose more humane nature shrank from
the perpetration of such cruelties.