CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE SECOND FALL OF VENEZUELA.

1814.

A Dictatorship was a necessity of the time, but the powers of a Dictator

to be efficient must be united in one person. Bolívar shared his power

with Mariño, the alleged rights of both rested upon force only. To put

an end to this anomaly Bolívar determined upon an appeal to public

opinion. It was impossible to summon a Congress, he therefore convened

an Assembly composed of the civil corporations and of the heads of

families of the city of Caracas.

Now was disclosed another phase of his complex character; never in any

public man were seen greater contradictions between word and deed. A

prey to insatiable ambition he was eager for uncontrolled power, but

repudiated it in theory. In South America he was the inventor of the

system of resignations, which has had great vogue since his time. He had

supreme power in his hands, and resigned it, protesting that he would

never again accept it, but took it back on conditions imposed by

himself. Throughout his career, he ever invoked the high authority of

Congresses as the representatives of public opinion; sometimes he gave

way to them, more frequently he imposed his will upon them; but he

always sought their sanction for his acts, and so compelled them to

share responsibility with him.

To the Assembly he now convened at Caracas, to which by a convenient

fiction he attributed representative authority, he gave an account of

his administration, and into its hands he abdicated the power he had

bestowed upon himself, only to receive it back again intact. He made

three speeches; in the first he abdicated the Dictatorship, and

pronounced a warm eulogium upon his own deeds; in the second, he gave a

biographical sketch of his own life, and showed from it that it was

impossible for him to continue in the exercise of unlimited power; in

the third, he again accepted the Dictatorship, which was bestowed upon

him without conditions by the acclamations of the Assembly.

His next step was to endeavour to secure the co-operation of Mariño, by

recognising his authority in the eastern provinces, and in January,

1814, a treaty was signed between them. But it was too late now, their

union merely prolonged the struggle.

Yañez was advancing with 1,000 men by the eastern slopes of the

Cordillera. Urdaneta crossed the range, and on the 2nd February met him

with 700 men at Ospino. Yañez led a charge of the Llanero horse upon the

Patriot infantry, but was killed, and his troops dispersed. His body was

cut into fragments, which were sent as trophies to the scenes of his

atrocities. Calzada, who took the command, in revenge burned the town of

Ospino and then retreated.

Campo Elias was detached with 1,500 men against Boves and his hordes of

Llanero horse. He marched to the town of Cura, where it was arranged

that he should be joined by Mariño, but Mariño never came. Boves

detached Rosete with 1,200 men to Ocumare, a town lying to the west of

Caracas, which was feebly defended, and the inhabitants, men, women, and

children, were all butchered; even those who had taken refuge in the

church found there no safety.

On the 3rd February Campo Elias and Boves met at La Puerta. The Patriots

were crushed by overwhelming numbers, and all the infantry perished, but

Boves was badly wounded. Campo Elias, with the remains of his force,

retreated to the narrow pass of Cabrera in front of Valencia, where he

threw up entrenchments.

Morales, who now took command of the Royalists, advanced with 1,000

horse and 300 infantry by the valley of Aragua to Victoria, which city

he attacked on the 10th February. Here Rivas was in command of the

Patriots, but had hard work to hold the position against the superior

numbers of the Royalists, till Campo Elias suddenly appeared at the head

of 220 horse, and Morales was beaten off with the loss of all his

artillery, and retired to Cura.

Rivas then marched with 800 men upon the town of Charavaye, then

occupied by the column under Rosete, and cut the Royalists to pieces,

giving no quarter. He then re-took Ocumare, and finding the streets

strewn with dead bodies, swore an oath of vengeance, in which oath he

was joined by Arismendi, who held the command at Caracas in his absence.

This vow was most fearfully fulfilled.

Arismendi finding the prisons of La Guayra full of Spaniards, wrote to

Bolívar who was at Valencia, asking instructions, and stating that their

presence was a danger to the capital. The answer was an order for the

immediate execution of all of them, except such as had taken out letters

of naturalization.

“The Secretary of the Liberator is a fool,” said Arismendi, “he has put

with the _exception_ instead of _including_.”

Then with a refinement of cruelty, he set the prisoners to work to erect

a great funeral pile on which their bodies should be burned. When the

pile was ready the massacre commenced, the prisoners were brought in

groups from the dungeons; to the sound of the trumpet the soldiers fell

upon them with bayonet, axe, and poniard, and cast their quivering

bodies into the flames. Very little powder was burned on the eight days

during which the slaughter lasted. Eight hundred and sixty-six victims

perished, among them being many who had saved the lives of Patriots at

the risk of their own.

These horrible massacres were the natural fruit of Bolívar’s decree of

extermination. They utterly failed to accomplish their purpose, that of

stamping out the spirit of reaction, and only served as a pretext for

the perpetration of equally brutal atrocities by the Royalists.

Bolívar, who had only 1,500 infantry and 600 cavalry, could not advance

into the open country against Boves, who had at least four times that

number of resolute horsemen, but the capital was safe against an assault

by such troops. He fortified Valencia and armed a flotilla on the lake,

strengthened the pass at Cabrera, occupied Victoria, and threw up

field-works at San Mateo, where he established his head-quarters, while

he waited for Mariño. The position was well chosen; on the heights which

surrounded it stood a country-house which was his own property, to the

east of which lay one of the most valuable of his patrimonial estates.

But in place of Mariño, Boves, whose wound was by this time healed,

appeared in his front on the 25th February, at the head of 2,000 light

infantry and 5,000 horse.

Morales was completely routed in an attack on his right flank, and Boves

himself was repulsed in an attack on the centre, but captured some

outworks on the right. Bolívar sent a reinforcement under Villapol and

Campo Elias. Both these leaders were killed, but the son of the former,

Captain Villapol, restored the day, drove the Royalists from the

positions they had captured, and though badly wounded, held his ground

till nightfall. Boves, who was again severely wounded, was carried off

the field by his men, and Morales resumed the command.

In this desperate fighting the Royalists had exhausted their ammunition,

and were for fifteen days compelled to remain inactive, till on the 11th

March Morales again attacked the entrenchments, but was again repulsed.

On the 17th Boves again took command, and was on the 20th beaten off in

a third attack.

The Patriot magazine was established in the country-house to the rear

of the position. On the 25th March Boves detached a column of infantry

to make its way by the heights beyond the Patriot lines, to capture this

magazine, while he himself led a general attack in front. The magazine

was in charge of a young officer, a native of New Granada, named

Ricaurte, who had only fifteen men with him. When this young officer saw

the infantry column rushing down upon him from the heights, he knew that

it was hopeless to attempt to defend the house. He sent off his men, and

remaining alone he waited till the enemy burst in upon him with shouts

of triumph, when he fired the magazine, and he himself and the greater

part of the Royalist column were blown into the air together.

When Bolívar saw the flight of the small garrison, he thought that all

was lost. He dismounted from his horse and ran into the ranks, calling

to his soldiers that he would die with them, but the Royalists were so

terrified by the sudden destruction of their column of infantry, that

they desisted from the attack and withdrew, leaving 800 dead and wounded

behind them.

While attacking the lines of San Mateo, Boves had detached a strong

column under Rosete to make an attempt upon the capital. Rivas was ill

in bed, and 800 of the youth of the city sallied out under Arismendi to

meet the enemy on the open plain, but were cut to pieces on the 11th

March. Bolívar sent 300 picked troops under Colonel Montilla to the

assistance of the garrison. With this reinforcement Rivas managed to

organize a column of 900 men, and leading them out in person, lying on a

stretcher, he totally defeated Rosete on the 20th March at Ocumare, and

the capital was saved.

Cajigal, the new Captain-General, had established his head-quarters at

Coro, and had formed a column of 1,000 men from the remnants of various

shattered battalions. These troops he placed under command of Ceballos,

who drove Urdaneta before him out of Barquisimeto. Urdaneta then

endeavoured to hold San Carlos, but was driven thence by Calzada, and

took refuge in Valencia, where the war material of the Patriots was

stored. Here he received orders from Bolívar to resist to the last

extremity, and to send 200 men to aid D’Eluyar in the siege of Puerto

Cabello. Urdaneta obeyed orders, but was left with only 280 muskets to

make head as he could against the united forces of Ceballos and Calzada,

who now attacked Valencia with 3,000 men. The Royalists had no

artillery, but by dint of numbers they drove the Patriots from the

outworks, and cut off the supply of water from the garrison. Urdaneta

called a council of his officers, when it was agreed that if the inner

line of defence was forced, the garrison should retire to the artillery

barracks and blow the place up. The example of Ricaurte had enflamed

their hearts.

Boves for some time made no further attempt on the lines of San Mateo,

and the dispirited Llaneros began to desert, but the situation of

Bolívar was desperate. His only chance lay in the speedy arrival of

Mariño, who was at last advancing by forced marches from the East, and

was sweeping the plains in the rear of the Royalists. Then Boves after

one more desperate assault upon the lines, which was repulsed, retreated

to La Puerta, to stop the advance of Mariño from the plains. But Mariño

succeeded in turning this position and established himself at the Boca

Chica. Here he was attacked by Boves on the 31st March, but forced him

to retreat with a loss of 500 killed, and occupied the city of Victoria.

Ceballos then, fearing an attack on his rear by the united forces of

Bolívar and Mariño, raised the siege of Valencia and retired to San

Carlos, to await reinforcements which Boves was collecting on the

plains. Here he was attacked by Mariño on the 17th April. Mariño was so

destitute of military capacity that the troops under his immediate

command dispersed at the first volley, but Urdaneta rallied the infantry

and retired to Valencia.

Cajigal then brought up a strong reinforcement and took command of the

Royalists. Bolívar, after being joined by Rivas with 800 men from

Caracas, advanced against him. After some manœuvring the armies met

on the plain of Carabobo, and Bolívar won a complete victory. The

Royalists lost 300 killed and all their guns and flags, while the

Patriots had only 12 killed and 40 wounded.

Bolívar was victorious over the Spanish generals, but the strength of

the people was against him. The indefatigable Boves had received large

supplies of arms and ammunition from Guayana, and again rushed upon him

from the plains with about 7,000 men, of whom more than 2,000 were

infantry. Bolívar, instead of massing his troops to make head against

this new danger, detached Mariño against Boves with only 2,300 men,

while he sent Urdaneta with 700 men off westward, and another division

of 1,100 in pursuit of Cajigal and Ceballos. But this latter corps

joined Mariño, who then in complete ignorance of the superior strength

of the Royalist leader, determined to wait for Boves at La Puerta, in a

most unfavourable position. Bolívar joined him too late to remedy the

evil. The Patriots were overwhelmed by a desperate charge of the Llanero

horse on the 14th June, and were slaughtered without mercy; at least

1,200 were left dead upon the field; Boves himself reported that 2,800

were killed.

Bolívar fled to Caracas, but instead of making some attempt to reunite

his shattered forces, maintained the siege of Puerto Cabello and

instructed the garrison of Valencia to hold out to the last extremity. A

small detachment of 250 men defending the pass of Cabrera was

overwhelmed, every man was killed, and Valencia was forced to capitulate

to Boves, who, in spite of his oath to spare the lives of the garrison,

butchered them all, and many of the inhabitants of the town also.

D’Eluyar being isolated, spiked his guns and embarked his troops on the

flotilla. Urdaneta was left alone in the West; Bolívar evacuated Caracas

and withdrew to the East, carrying with him all the jewels and specie he

could find in the churches, and embarrassed by the multitude of

fugitives who fled with him. He reached Aragua with 2,000 men and at

once commenced to throw up entrenchments. Mariño sent him 1,000 men

under Bermudez from Cumaná, and some supplies of war material.

On the 18th August, the position at Aragua was attacked by Morales with

a horde of 8,000 negroes, mulattos, and Indians. The Patriots defended

themselves with the resolution of despair, but after two hours fighting,

in which entire battalions had perished, Bolívar retreated with a part

of his force on Barcelona. Bermudez still held the position for two

hours longer, and then fled to Maturin with the remnant of his cavalry.

The butchery which followed was frightful, more than 3,000 were killed

in cold blood, even the townsfolk who sought refuge in the church had

their throats cut in the sacred edifice. The loss of the Royalists was

nearly 2,000 in killed and wounded.

Bolívar, Mariño, Rivas, Piar and D’Eluyar met at Cumaná, and resolved to

concentrate the resistance at Güiria, a position easily defended, while

the flotilla kept open their communications by sea. Bolívar had shipped

the treasure brought by him from Caracas on board of these vessels.

Bianchi, who was still in command, determined to seize it. Bolívar and

Mariño hearing of his intention, embarked with him as he sailed for the

island of Margarita. He gave two vessels up to them with all the jewels

and two-thirds of the specie, retaining the rest as payment for the

prizes he had made, upon which the two Dictators returned to the

mainland.

On the 3rd September they landed at Carúpano, where they found that they

had been proscribed as traitors who had deserted their comrades, while

Rivas and Piar had taken the command. Piar had the intention of treating

Bolívar as he had treated Miranda, but Rivas set him at liberty and

arrested Mariño. At this juncture Bianchi returned, and by threats saved

them both. Bolívar gave up the treasure to Rivas and retired to Curaçoa,

leaving behind him an address to the people in which he disdainfully

left his justification to the future:--

“I swear to you that this title (Liberator), which your gratitude

bestowed upon me when I broke your chains, shall not be in vain. I swear

to you that Liberator or dead, I shall ever merit the honour you have

done me; no human power can turn me from my course.”

When he had gone, Rivas took the supreme command, but the genius of

Bolívar was wanting. On the 26th August Cumaná pronounced for the

Royalists. Bermudez, entrenched at Maturin, was attacked by Morales with

a greatly superior force, but sallying out, utterly routed him, killing

2,000 of his men. He was then joined by Rivas; between them they

assembled nearly 5,000 men. Piar, disregarding the orders of Rivas to

join him, marched on Cumaná, which he retook and collected 2,000 men,

but was then attacked by Boves and totally defeated.

Boves then retook Cumaná, and put every man to death who fell into his

hands. It is said that more than a thousand victims perished in this

massacre. Cumaná was left a desert. Boves was then joined by Morales,

who had reorganized his army, and together they marched on Maturin at

the head of 7,000 men. The Patriots sallied out to meet them under the

command of Rivas and Bermudez.

With very inferior numbers they met the Royalist army at Urica to the

west of Maturin, on the 5th December. Boves drew up his men in two lines

and awaited their onslaught. An impetuous charge of the Patriot cavalry

broke the right wing of the Royalists, and Boves, ever foremost in a

_melée_, was killed by a lance thrust. Morales, with the left and the

reserve, restored the combat and gained a complete victory. No quarter

was given and the last army of the Republic was destroyed.

Morales was by acclamation named General-in-Chief of the “Windward

Army,” which was the name which had been given to this Royalist force by

its late commander, and lost no time in marching upon Maturin, which

city was well fortified and had a good supply of artillery, but the

garrison, only 600 in number, was but poorly armed. After an obstinate

defence which caused severe losses to the Royalist army, this last

bulwark of the Patriots was captured on the 11th December. Bermudez

escaped with 200 men, but Rivas flying alone, was overtaken and killed,

and his head, covered with the Phrygian cap of Liberty, was exposed in

an iron cage on the road from Caracas to La Guayra. According to

contemporary writers more than 3,000 victims were slaughtered by Morales

after his victory. The peace of the tomb reigned in Venezuela.

Three popular leaders still kept up the flames of insurrection at the

head waters of the Orinoco and its tributaries: Zaraza, Monagas, and

Cedeño, who afterwards became celebrated as Guerilleros. In the West all

was quiet after the rout of La Puerta. The column under Urdaneta, so

imprudently detached by Bolívar after Carabobo, was cut off when Boves

occupied Valencia. Urdaneta retreated with 1,000 men, and being hotly

pressed by Calzada, crossed the frontier into New Granada. He then

detached 200 infantry and some cavalry officers to defend the Province

of Casanare. This small detachment became the nucleus of the famous Army

of the Apure, which changed the destinies of Venezuela, by leading the

people to embrace the cause of the revolution. Among these cavalry

officers was one named JOSE ANTONIO PAEZ, a man till then unknown, who

was soon to become the Achilles of Venezuela, and was to eclipse by his

deeds the fabulous prowess of the heroes of Homer.

There now only remained one spot of Venezuelan territory over which

still floated the flag of the Republic, the island of Margarita, where

Arismendi and Bermudez with some few followers had found asylum.

The Emancipation of South America · 第 39 / 50 章