THE RECONQUEST OF VENEZUELA.
1813.
By the surrender of Miranda Monteverde was left unopposed in Venezuela,
and was made Captain-General, with the title of “Pacificator.” He
commenced his work of pacification by deeds from which the warmest
partisans of Spain now turn away their eyes in horror. He violated the
capitulation by imprisoning so many citizens that the gaols could not
hold them; many died of hunger and suffocation in filthy dungeons. In
the provinces his reign of terror assumed forms still more barbarous;
the whole country seemed given up to hordes of banditti.
Colonel Cervéris, pro-consul of Cumaná, acted with such inhumanity as
even disgusted the hard hearts of his superiors, who replaced him by
Antoñanzas, and the Audiencia complained of his misconduct to the Home
Government. All this was but the prelude to a war of extermination,
which was provoked by the Royalists by murders, by mutilations and by
torture.
The people, cowed in spirit by their sufferings, by their political
calamities, and by the natural catastrophes which had befallen them,
were only too anxious for rest on any terms under the domination of the
colonial system. Clemency would have kept them peaceful, but the reign
of terror drove superstitious fears from their minds, and changed
weakness into strength. They fled from their persecutors into the woods
and mountains; the leaders emigrated. Misery and despair created a
desire for vengeance in the breasts of the most timid.
A handful of exiles gave the signal from a rock in the Antilles, and the
whole of the eastern part of the territory rose in rebellion.
Famous in the history of the New World is the gulf called “Triste,”
discovered by Columbus on his third voyage, when he, without knowing it,
landed for the first time on the Continent of which he was in search. At
its mouth, between the eastern extremity of the Peninsula of Paria and
the island of Trinidad, there lies a smaller island called Chacachacare;
on it the fugitives from Cumaná took refuge. Though only forty-five in
number, they resolved to renew the war and to raise the country against
the Spaniards. A gallant youth of good family, from the island of
Margarita, Santiago Mariño by name, put himself at their head. Manuel
Piar, a handsome mulatto, two brothers, José Francisco and Bernardo
Bermudez, and the engineer Ascue, formed his staff. With no other arms
than six muskets and some pistols, they landed on the coast on the 13th
March, 1813, surprised a guard, captured twenty-three muskets, and
marched resolutely on the fortified town of Güiria. The garrison, who
were all natives, joined them; on the 16th March they had 200 well-armed
men.
With seventy-five men Bernardo Bermudez took the town of Maturin, where
there was a deposit of military stores; his brother fortified Irapa on
the Gulf, and Mariño made this place his head-quarters.
Cervéris had a small flotilla on the Gulf and 400 men, but did not dare
to act on the offensive until, being reinforced by a Basque named
Zuazola with 300 men, he sent him to retake Maturin. Zuazola easily
overcame a small Patriot force which opposed his march, slaughtered them
without mercy, and sent boxes full of human ears to Cumaná as trophies
of his victory. He then tried to induce those of the country people who
had fled to the woods to return to their homes, by giving them
assurances of safety, but all who presented themselves were either
killed or mutilated, men, women and children. Some were flayed alive,
some were tied two and two together by the shoulders and thrown into a
lake.
Colonel Fernandez de la Hoz, governor of Barcelona, having joined
Zuazola, they attacked Maturin with 1,500 men. In the absence of
Bermudez, Piar was in command, and had 500 men with him. By a sudden
attack upon them with his cavalry, he threw the Royalists into such
disorder that they were forced to retreat. In April they again advanced
and were this time completely routed.
Monteverde, who had looked upon the invasion as the escapade of a wild
boy, now became alarmed and marched on Maturin with 2,000 men, but his
troops were thrown into disorder by the heavy fire of cannon and
musketry which was poured upon them from the town, and a charge of
cavalry led by Piar completed the rout. Monteverde escaped with
difficulty, leaving 400 dead upon the field, and lost all his guns and
baggage. Marshal Cajigal, who was now placed in command of the district,
remained strictly on the defensive at Barcelona, while the Patriots
threatened Cumaná.
The island of Margarita lies in the Carribean Sea, off the mouth of the
Gulf of Cariaco, on which the city of Cumaná is situate, and is about
thirty-five miles from the mainland. It is divided by a range of
mountains which run down the centre from east to west; the north and
south coasts are thus completely separate, the only communication
between them being by a narrow defile, easy of defence. Asuncion, the
capital, lies inland on the south side, and is dominated by the fortress
of Santa Rosa, but has a port on the coast, which is defended by the
castle of Pampatar. The north side of the island is known as the
district of Juan Griego, and has a good port on the Carribean Sea, which
is defended by a blockhouse. The possession of Margarita was of great
importance to both parties, not only by reason of its situation, but
also because the inhabitants, being mostly sailors and fishermen, would
be of great assistance in naval operations along the coast.
At that time Colonel Pascual Martinez, a petty tyrant of the Cervéris
type, was governor of Margarita. The Audiencia reproved him for his
conduct, and ordered certain prisoners on the mainland who had been
accused by him, to be set at liberty. Furious at this, he declared that
if any one of these men set foot on the island he would shoot him. Among
the prisoners so set at liberty was a man of mixed race, who from being
a fisherman had risen to be one of the largest proprietors on the
island. This man, Juan Bauptista Arismendi by name, was a sort of
chieftain among his fellows, a rude hero of the people, a man of
vehement passions combined with innate sagacity, and of an adventurous
spirit. On the fall of Miranda he was accused of treason and hid
himself. Governor Martinez seized his wife and children and threatened
to shoot them if they did not disclose his hiding-place. Arismendi gave
himself up, his property was confiscated, his family reduced to poverty,
and he himself was sent as a prisoner to La Guayra. He swore vengeance.
Being released, he returned to the island and was thrown into a dungeon.
The populace rose _en masse_. Martinez shut himself up with a garrison
in the castle of Pampatar, but was forced to surrender; Arismendi was
made governor and kept his vow of vengeance. Martinez and twenty-nine
Spaniards who were with him were shot.
Arismendi immediately opened communications with Mariño, offering to
assist him in any way in his power. Mariño, who was now besieging
Cumaná, asked for a flotilla to blockade the place. Arismendi sent him
three armed schooners and eleven boats under an Italian named Bianchi,
with a supply of arms and ammunition for the Patriot forces. Cumaná was
thus speedily invested both by land and sea.
Cumaná was well fortified and was defended by a garrison of 800 men with
forty guns, under command of Governor Antoñanzas. The Patriots dared not
attempt an assault, but their blockade soon reduced the city to
extremities. Antoñanzas, taking advantage of the careless watch kept by
the Patriot flotilla, shipped a portion of his force on some small
craft, and sailed away, as he said, in search of help, leaving the
fortress in charge of a subordinate officer. This officer, seeing his
position hopeless, entered into arrangements for a capitulation, but
while the negotiation was in progress, spiked his guns, embarked the
remainder of the garrison in such boats as they could lay hold of, and
followed Antoñanzas, who had not succeeded in escaping from the Gulf.
After rejoining him a fresh breeze sprang up, and the fugitives again
set sail in eight small vessels, but were attacked by Bianchi as they
left the Gulf. Only three vessels escaped, on one of which was
Antoñanzas, who soon after died of a wound received in the action.
The city was occupied by the Patriots, and twenty-five prisoners of
distinction were shot, at the instigation of José Bermudez.
Mariño then marched against Cervéris, who retreated, after shooting
Bernardo Bermudez, who was lying in a hospital dangerously wounded.
Piar, with a strong column, occupied Barcelona, which was evacuated on
his approach by Cajigal, who retired to Guayana. When he reached the
Orinoco, a man named José Tomas Boves, who had served under Antoñanzas
and Zuazola, and a Canarian named Morales, asked to be left behind, in
order that they might raise the Llaneros against the Patriots. Cajigal
gave them permission to make the attempt, and also left with them one
hundred men and some supplies. This small force became the nucleus of a
powerful army, which was destined to crush the Republic of Venezuela for
the second time.
José Bermudez, with another column, captured several towns on the coast
of the Gulf of Paria, and furious at the death of his brother, killed
every Royalist who fell into his hands.
In eight months all the eastern part of Venezuela was thus reconquered
by the Patriots, who named Mariño Dictator of the Provinces of Cumaná
and Barcelona, and of the island of Margarita, with Piar as his second
in command, at the same time that Bolívar entered Caracas in triumph and
was acclaimed Dictator of the West after one of the most extraordinary
campaigns of the epoch, which in some respects resembles the first
campaign of Buonaparte in Italy.
While Bolívar, after his victory over Correa, was awaiting due
authorization from the Government of New Granada to proceed with his
scheme of reconquest, a young lawyer named Briceño, who had been a
member of the Congress of Caracas, maddened at the excesses of
Monteverde, presented to him a plan he had published in Cartagena, which
he with others had sworn to carry out. His design was to make a general
massacre of “the cursed race of European Spaniards and of the
Canarians.”
Bolívar and Castillo Rada, who shared the command with him, assented to
it with the proviso “those found with arms in their hands.”
Briceño started off on his campaign of murder with one hundred and forty
sworn assassins, and a few days after sent back two heads as a trophy, a
present which excited the horror of the two commanders. Briceño was soon
after defeated and made prisoner by a very superior force, and was shot
at Barinas, which execution was afterwards used by Bolívar as a pretext
for cruel reprisals.
The Government of New Granada adopted the idea of Bolívar; the Republic
of Venezuela should be restored under its auspices, and the federal form
of government should be re-established under the previous authorities.
The invading army was to be a liberating army only, and should take no
part in the internal affairs of the sister republic, which should be
called upon to pay the expenses of the expedition. Bolívar accepted
these conditions, and swore to carry them out faithfully.
His first step was to detach Castillo Rada with 800 men against Correa.
Castillo defeated the Royalist army in a sharply contested action,
and drove it back to Trujillo, but then withdrew his forces and
resigned his command through jealousy of Bolívar, thinking that his
fellow-countrymen would prefer him as a leader to a Venezuelan. But
Torres did not hesitate, he chose Bolívar to command the Granadian
contingent, conferred the rank of brigadier upon him, and ordered him at
once to drive the Royalists out of the Provinces of Mérida and Trujillo,
after which he was to await instructions, which would be conveyed to him
by commissioners from Congress, who would accompany him in all his
future operations as those of the Convention accompanied the armies of
Revolutionary France.
Bolívar had barely 600 men, while he was opposed by 6,000, who were so
posted that wherever he attacked them they were always two to one. The
first invasion of Bolívar along the western slopes of the eastern range
of the Cordillera which crosses the territory of Venezuela, was a series
of flashes of lightning which ended in a thunderbolt. On the 30th May he
took Mérida unopposed. The city raised a battalion of 500 infantry and a
squadron of cavalry to reinforce his army. His vanguard, under Girardot,
then occupied Trujillo, and a strong detachment under D’Eluyar forced
Correa to take refuge in Maracaibo.
The garrison of Trujillo retreated to Carache, a town devoted to the
Royalist cause, but were driven out by Girardot, who shot all the
Spaniards who were taken prisoners, and the town was declared “infamous”
by Bolívar in a proclamation. In fifty days there was not an enemy left
in either province.
From this time Bolívar assumed a new attitude, as the independent
representative of the Republic of Venezuela, and became a sort of
Dictator. In contravention of the express orders of the Government of
New Granada, he on the 15th June fulminated in a proclamation an order
for the extermination of all Royalists, which he established by decree
on the 6th September as a fundamental law of Venezuela. The atrocities
committed by Monteverde and his myrmidons produced their natural
effect.
“Every Spaniard who does not conspire against tyranny in favour of the
just cause, in the most active and efficacious manner, shall be held to
be an enemy, shall be punished as a traitor, and shall be put to death.”
A new system of dates was also adopted by him:--“Third year of
Independence and first of the War to the Death.”
This decree of extermination has found many apologists; with the
exception of some Spaniards no one has condemned it as an act of
personal atrocity. Only two men have utterly censured it. One of them,
an historian of Venezuela named Gonzalez, says:--
“It created thousands of enemies to the Republic in the interior, and
alienated exterior sympathy. It was the fury of a storm, a stain upon
our history.”
The other who condemned it was Bolívar himself, who in his last days
spoke of it as a “delirium.”
This struggle did not assume a ferocious character until the indigenous
races took part in it. The Spanish leaders, Miyares, Ceballos and
Cajigal, always acted with humanity and repressed the excesses of their
subordinates, as also did Cortabarria, the agent of the Regency. Nothing
that the Royalists had yet done could in any way justify this decree as
a measure of retaliation.
At Trujillo Bolívar received orders from the Government of New Granada
to proceed no further. As his ambition was to encircle his brow with the
civic crown as liberator of his native land, to pause was to endanger
the advantage he had already gained. From the east came echoes of the
success achieved by Mariño and his comrades, but he aspired to be the
man who should rescue the ruins of Caracas, the city of his birth, from
the enemy. They might forestall him. On his own responsibility he went
on.
Tiscar, the Spanish general, who occupied Barinas with 1,300 men, had
done nothing to prevent the capture of Mérida and Trujillo, but at last
determined to cut off the retreat of the invaders, and detached Colonel
Marti with 700 men for that purpose. Bolívar at once crossed the
mountains in his front with a strong vanguard, after detaching Rivas and
Urdaneta with 500 men, by a more southerly route, in the same direction.
On the 1st July Rivas found himself confronted by the entire column
under Marti in a very strong position, from which he drove the Royalists
to another stronger still, where he on the next day completely defeated
them after five hours fighting, capturing a gun and 400 prisoners, all
the Spaniards among whom were at once shot.
Tiscar retreated on the approach of Bolívar, who occupied Barinas on the
6th July, taking 13 guns and a large quantity of military stores, while
Tiscar was so actively pursued by Girardot, that his men dispersed, and
he fled to Guayana.
At Barinas, Bolívar raised some new battalions and several squadrons of
cavalry, and separated this increased force into three divisions under
Urdaneta, Girardot, and Rivas, which he dispersed in such a manner as
must have ensured defeat in the face of an active enemy, but his
manœuvres, imprudent as they were, resulted in the most brilliant
success. Rivas, with 600 men, totally defeated 1,000 Royalists under
Colonel Oberto on the 22nd July, and then recrossing the mountains for
the third time in one month, rejoined Bolívar and Girardot.
Bolívar, who had now 1,500 men, marched rapidly against Colonel
Izquierdo, who was encamped on the plain of Taguanes. Izquierdo, who had
only 1,000 men, retreated in close column on Valencia, hotly pursued by
the Patriots. After six hours marching, the Patriot cavalry headed the
column, which was at once charged by the infantry and totally destroyed,
Izquierdo himself falling mortally wounded.
Monteverde on hearing of the fall of Barinas, had gone to Valencia, but
seemed perfectly bewildered by the rapid movements of Bolívar, and did
nothing to assist his scattered divisions. Tardily, he left Valencia
with some infantry and cavalry to support Izquierdo, but was met by the
news of his defeat, and fled to Puerto Cabello, while Bolívar entered
Valencia unopposed, capturing thirty heavy guns and large quantities of
military stores.
The garrison of Caracas, composed of civic guards and volunteers, for
the most part dispersed, and General Fierro, who was in command, made
overtures to Bolívar for a capitulation. Bolívar granted honourable
terms, guaranteeing the lives and properties of the inhabitants, on
condition that all the Province, including the fortress of Puerto
Cabello, was given up. Fierro, without waiting to make a formal
surrender, fled to La Guayra and escaped, but Monteverde refused to
ratify the capitulation.
If Bolívar with his usual activity, had marched on Puerto Cabello, he
must have captured it, as the fortifications were dismantled. Instead of
this, he vaingloriously marched to receive the ovation which awaited him
in Caracas, and gave Monteverde twenty days in which to prepare for
defence.
In this campaign, Bolívar showed that though he had had no military
education, he possessed the talents of a great revolutionary leader, and
the inspiration of genius. At one step he gained a place among the
celebrated captains of his time; he drew out his plans quickly and
executed them with daring resolution, while he lost no time in securing
the fruits of his victories. With 600 men, in ninety days, he had fought
six battles, defeated and dispersed 4,500 men, captured fifty guns and
three deposits of war material, had re-conquered the whole of western
Venezuela from the Cordillera to the sea, and had restored the Republic.
Never with such small means was so much accomplished, over so vast an
extent of country, in so short a time.
Bolívar entered Caracas in triumph on the 6th August; the bells rang,
the cannon roared, and the people shouted in applause of their
liberator; his path was strewed with flowers, blessings were showered
upon his head. Beautiful girls, belonging to the principal families of
the city, dressed in white and wearing the national colours, led his
horse by the bridle and crowned him with laurels. The prison doors were
opened and the captive Patriots set free, and he did not sully his
triumph by one act of vengeance, in spite of his terrible decree of
extermination which had been ruthlessly carried out on every field of
battle.
Two days later he announced the re-establishment of the Republic, but he
did not restore the federal system, to which he was opposed on
principle, and which was not consistent with the public safety. He
proclaimed himself Dictator with the title of “Liberator,” and in this
he showed both foresight and patriotism; the restoration of the old
system would have certainly entailed anarchy and defeat.
There were thus two Dictators in Venezuela, Mariño in the East, Bolívar
in the West. Mariño sent commissioners to Bolívar to treat concerning
the form of government which should be adopted. Bolívar hesitated, he
saw the necessity of establishing a firm central authority, and
meanwhile Mariño, who had by this time a powerful army, did nothing
against the common enemy.
On the 25th August Bolívar laid siege to Puerto Cabello. His Granadian
troops stormed the outer defences and drove the garrison into the
castle. Then batteries were erected on the coast, which beat off three
Spanish brigs of war whose fire had raked the lines of the besiegers. On
the night of the 31st an assault was made, but the only result of it was
that Zuazola, who commanded an outwork, was made prisoner. Bolívar
offered to exchange him for one of his own officers who had been
captured. Monteverde refused, whereupon Zuazola was hanged on a gallows
in front of the walls.
The Royalists were defeated, but they were not conquered; they soon
recovered from their stupor, and reports of reactionary movements came
from all sides. Then on the 6th September the Dictator fulminated
another decree, his last thunderbolt in this war to the death, which
produced one of the most dreadful hecatombs of which history bears
record. He declared that all Americans who should even be suspected of
being Royalists were traitors to their country. This extreme and
ill-advised measure greatly contributed to the defeat of Bolívar in the
campaign now commencing. Such is the logic of Destiny!
On the 16th September the frigate _Venganza_ arrived at Puerto Cabello
from Spain, accompanied by an armed schooner and six transports, with
the Granada regiment, 1,200 strong, under command of Colonel Salomón.
Bolívar raised the siege and retired to Valencia.
Monteverde, encouraged by the retreat of the Patriots and by the
reinforcement he had received, took the field on the 26th September with
1,600 men. But he had no fixed plan and committed the grave mistake of
dividing his force. He himself took up a position on the road to
Valencia at a place called Las Trincheras, and detached 500 men by
another road to the heights of Barbula. Bolívar remained quiet for four
days, unable to divine his intentions, and then sent Girardot and
D’Eluyar with the Granadian troops against the enemy at Barbula, while a
column under Urdaneta went in support. On the 30th September the
Royalists were driven from this strong position, but Girardot fell, shot
through the head in the moment of victory. His troops, in revenge, asked
permission to attack the main body at Las Trincheras by themselves.
Bolívar acceded to their request but supported them with 1,000 of his
own troops. Monteverde was driven out of the entrenchments he had thrown
up, with heavy loss, on the 3rd October. He himself being wounded
returned to Puerto Cabello, leaving Salomón in command till he should
recover, and the Patriots under D’Eluyar again laid siege to this
fortress.
Bolívar, eager for fresh ovations, decreed sumptuous funeral honours to
the memory of Girardot, to whose valour both New Granada and Venezuela
owed their greatest victories. The citizens wore mourning for a month;
his heart was taken out and carried to Caracas to be deposited in the
Cathedral, his body was sent to Antioquia, his native province, and his
pay was secured to his posterity. Bolívar himself accompanied the
funeral procession to Caracas.
On the 14th October, the day of the obsequies, twenty of the civic
functionaries of the capital assembled and decreed that Bolívar should
be appointed Captain-General of the armies of Venezuela with the title
of “Liberator,” which he had already bestowed upon himself, and that the
inscription “Bolívar, Liberator of Venezuela” should be inscribed over
the gateways of all the public offices. Posterity has confirmed this
title to him, but its acceptance at that time, when the reaction was
gaining ground every day, was a symptom of inordinate personal vanity.
In return for this compliment Bolívar instituted the military order of
“The Liberators”; a star with seven rays, symbolical of the seven
provinces of the Republic, given as a decoration to those who should
merit it by deeds of arms, and which carried with it certain privileges.
This order was more democratic than those instituted by O’Higgins and
San Martin in Chile and Peru, as it was for lifetime only, and was less
aristocratic than the order of Cincinnatus created by Washington.
The time which Bolívar wasted in theatrical displays the Royalists made
good use of for their own purposes. Boves was a Spaniard by birth, whose
real name was Rodriguez. In his youth he was condemned to eight years
penal servitude at Puerto Cabello for piracy, but was released chiefly
through the intervention of a man whose name he then adopted in
gratitude. He joined the revolution when it first broke out, but being
looked upon as disaffected he was thrown into prison at Calabozo till
that town was retaken by Antoñanzas, when he joined the Royalists and
took part in the butchery at San Juan de los Morros. Morales, his
companion and second in command, had served as a volunteer with the
Royalists at Barcelona, and was made a sub-lieutenant of artillery by
Monteverde. These two men were both endowed with the warlike instinct,
were both distinguished by indefatigable activity and by an iron will;
they were just the sort of men to act as leaders of semi-barbarous
troops. But Boves, with all his ignorance and brutality, had something
of moral elevation about him: he fought for a cause, not for rapine.
Morales took an actual pleasure in cruel deeds, and was of insatiable
rapacity. These two men were the first to discover the latent strength
of the people, which the revolution later on assimilated to itself. Up
to this time the revolutionary movement had been confined to the cities
and towns; Bolívar with all his perspicacity never suspected that the
main strength of the country lay on the plains around them.
When these two men were left on the north bank of the Orinoco by Cajigal
they adopted Bolívar’s plan of rousing the country by proclamations.
They called the Llaneros to arms, offering them bloodshed and booty in
the cause of the King, with pain of death to all who disregarded the
summons. Each man presented himself on horseback with a lance; in each
district a squadron was formed which took its name. Boves taught them
the secret of victory, which was to have no fear of death, to go
straight on and never look behind. In a very short time they had 2,500
men embodied, an army of horsemen such as had never yet been seen in
America.
Colonel José Yañez, a Canarian, was a man of the same stamp as Boves and
Morales, but of greater military skill. After the dispersion of the
column by Tiscar, he had retreated to San Fernando on the Apure River,
and with some help from Guayana, had there organized an infantry corps
of 500 men, which he named the “Numancia” battalion. He also raised two
regiments of Llanero cavalry, each 500 strong. With this force he
invaded Barinas in September, before the waters had retired from the
plains.
Boves opened his campaign by surprising a column of 1,000 men which had
been sent against him, near Calabozo, on the 20th September. The cavalry
passed over to him, the infantry he routed. He murdered all his
prisoners, and then took and sacked the small town of Cura.
Now there appeared upon the scene another singular character, of the
iron temperament of Boves, with all his ferocity and courage, who raised
a barrier to his impetuous onslaught. Nothing was known of him except
that he was a Spaniard who had come to America very young, and had
married an American wife. When Bolívar opened his campaign of
emancipation, this man had headed the rising at Mérida; then, leaving
wife and children, he raised a battalion and devoted himself body and
soul to the cause of independence. Throughout the campaign he
distinguished himself by his indomitable valour and by his cruelty to
prisoners, to whom he gave no quarter. The cause of his hatred to his
fellow countrymen is unknown. He was accustomed to say:--
“When the Spaniards are all killed then I will cut my own throat, so
that there shall not be one left.”
The name of this man was Vicente Campo Elias. At Las Trincheras he was
raised to the rank of lieutenant-colonel for conspicuous bravery. This
was the man to send against Boves.
He marched from Valencia with 1,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry. Boves
with 2,500 horse, and Morales with 500 infantry, waited for him at a
place called Mosquitero, at the entrance to the plains. On the 14th
October the armies met. Boves charged the left wing of the Patriots with
his usual impetuosity, and carried all before him, but Campo Elias,
caring nothing for this, rushed upon the main body of the Royalists, and
routed them completely in fifteen minutes. Morales escaped badly
wounded, but nearly the whole of his infantry were butchered, and the
Llanero horse were cut to pieces. Boves and Morales fled with twenty men
beyond the Apure, and the state of the plains rendered pursuit
impossible.
Campo Elias contented himself by retaking the town of Calabozo, and
killing every man in the place for having given assistance to Boves.
Unarmed Venezuelans were butchered by Venezuelan troops at Calabozo in
the name of Liberty on the same day on which Bolívar was greeted in
Caracas as the Liberator. This cruel deed decided the Llaneros. Seeing
that there was no mercy for them, they abandoned their homes and looked
to Boves for their revenge. The decree of extermination began to bear
fruit.
Ceballos, who commanded at Coro, on hearing that reinforcements had
reached Puerto Cabello, drew up a plan for the concerted action of the
scattered bands of Royalists. With such men as he could collect, he
sallied forth, and after routing two detachments of Patriots took
Barquisimeto, where he was attacked by Bolívar and Urdaneta. Bolívar
captured the town with a handful of horse, but his main body was totally
routed by the Spanish infantry led by Ceballos, who, after his victory,
crossed the Cordillera, and at Araure, in the valley of Caracas,
effected a junction with the column under Yañez. Salomón, instead of
joining him, marched with 1,000 men to the heights of Vigirima, to the
west of the city of Caracas, and there entrenched himself.
Bolívar was then at Valencia with the Granadian contingent. He collected
what other troops he could; Rivas brought up the garrison of Caracas,
with a battalion of 500 students from the University. After two days’
fighting, Salomón was on the 25th October driven back to Puerto Cabello
with the loss of four guns. Bolívar then turned his attention to
Ceballos, and by drawing 1,500 men from the force under Campo Elias, he
had by the 1st December collected a force of 3,000 men. Ceballos had
3,500 men and ten guns, posted in a strong position on the slopes of the
mountains, at the town of Araure. Here Bolívar attacked him on the 4th
December. One Patriot battalion advancing incautiously was cut to
pieces, but Bolívar, nothing daunted, brought up the rest of his
troops, and ordered a charge with the bayonet, which was his favourite
manœuvre. He was no tactician; he hurled his men in masses upon the
enemy, and trusted to their valour. Yañez attempted to take the
attacking column on the flank with his cavalry, but was himself taken in
flank by the Patriot cavalry, and utterly routed. Ceballos, after a
stubborn resistance, was completely defeated, losing 500 killed, 400
prisoners, and all his guns. He fled to Guayana, 800 of his infantry
escaped in the same direction, and Yañez fled to the Apure with 200 men.
This was the first pitched battle won by Bolívar.
After the rout of Barquisimeto, Bolívar had formed the fugitives into a
battalion, which, in punishment of their cowardice, he called the
“Nameless Battalion,” telling them that they should have no flag till
they did something to merit one. This corps greatly distinguished itself
at the battle of Araure. Bolívar now presented it with the flag of the
Numancia battalion, which had been captured in the fight, and renamed it
“The Victor of Araure.”
Salomón had again taken the field with 1,300 men, but on hearing of the
defeat of Araure, he again retired to Coro, harassed on his way by
detached parties of the Patriots, and losing two guns and more than half
his men.
Bolívar then marched to assist D’Eluyar in the siege of Puerto Cabello.
The moment was propitious; the Spanish ships of war had left for the
Havana, and Piar, with the flotilla from Cumaná, had established a
blockade, cutting off the garrison from all supplies. Monteverde had
been dismissed in disgrace from his command; Ceballos, who had been
appointed to succeed him, was a fugitive in Guayana, where also was
Cajigal, who had been appointed by the Home Government Captain-General
of Venezuela, and had as yet done nothing. Still the garrison, which was
only 600 strong, held out.
Meantime the dual dictatorship brought forth its natural fruit. The
victories of the West were sterile without the concurrence of the army
of the East. Mariño refused to combine operations with Bolívar until he
was recognised as the supreme ruler of the territory he possessed. The
Liberator modestly entreated him to march upon the plains, where Boves
and Yañez were recruiting. Far from doing this, though such action was
necessary to his own security, he even recalled his flotilla from Puerto
Cabello, but Piar listened to the appeals of Bolívar, and continued the
blockade. The result was that Bolívar, being unable to attend to the
siege of Puerto Cabello and to the war upon the plains at the same time,
Boves and Yañez were speedily in a position to assume the offensive.
Boves, more especially, with that wonderful energy which hesitated at no
means, however terrible they might be, to the end before him, again took
the field, two months after his defeat by Campo Elias.
On the 1st November he summoned all able-bodied men to join him,
proclaimed war to the knife against the Patriots, decreed that their
goods should be distributed among his troops, and, finally, liberated
all slaves who would enlist under the banners of the King. The Llaneros,
irritated by the massacre of Calabozo, and eager for plunder, flocked in
masses to his standard. From Guayana came 100 infantry and one gun. By
the middle of December he had 3,000 cavalry, the blades of whose lances
were forged from the spikes torn from the railings of windows.
With this horde he descended to the lower plains. On the 14th December
he routed a division of 1,000 men at San Marcos, and occupied Calabozo,
slaughtering without mercy, and enriching his troops with booty. He then
overran the whole plain lying between the windward coast range and the
Gulf of Paria. For further operations he needed infantry, and set to
work to make some. At the same time Yañez, with some help from Guayana,
organized a force of 2,000 men on the Apure, and captured the city of
Barinas, while Cajigal and Ceballos raised another army on the leeward
coast.
Bolívar was reduced to Caracas and the neighbouring valleys, with a
feeble reserve in Valencia, and was constantly harassed by Royalist
guerillas. Urdaneta, who had marched on Coro, was forced to return to
his assistance.
Mariño, with 3,500 men distributed along the coasts of Barcelona and
Cumaná, and in the adjacent valleys, did nothing. All the rest of
Venezuela was occupied by Royalists; the country people were everywhere
in favour of the reaction, and the Patriots were forced to seek refuge
in the cities. The Patriot armies were entirely without guides, no one
would give them any information. Despatches to the various commanders
could only be forwarded from head-quarters under strong escort. At times
only four men out of an escort reached their destination. Public opinion
had returned to the state in which it was left by the earthquake of
1812.
Columbian historians attribute this revulsion of feeling to Bolívar’s
decree of extermination, and to the excesses authorized by him. Bolívar
was to fall as Miranda had fallen before him, but from different causes.
Ever the logic of Destiny!