CHACABUCO.
1817.
From San Felipe, San Martin sent off a trusty spy to Santiago with
instructions to bring him back, on the third day, information of the
movements of the enemy. He then set himself to work to prepare for
battle, mounting his artillery and concentrating the different
divisions. On the 10th February all the army was united on the open
plain at the foot of the slope of Chacabuco.
On the 10th and 11th the engineers, protected by skirmishers,
reconnoitred the roads and passes leading across the Sierra. On the 11th
the spy returned, bringing answers to San Martin from his agents in the
capital, and copies of the secret orders of Marcó. The spy had visited
the barracks of the Royalist troops, and had counted those on the march
for Chacabuco. San Martin then summoned a council of war.
The Sierra of Chacabuco rises to a height of 4,300 feet above the level
of the sea. About three miles before reaching the summit, the main road
from Santa Rosa to Santiago divides into two paths. That to the left,
which is the shortest but also the steeper of the two, is still only a
bridle-path; the other is now the main road, but was at that time little
known. Both lead to the plain of Chacabuco, but the points at which they
descend from the heights are nearly two miles distant one from the
other. The left-hand path first reaches the lower ground near the head
of a valley about three miles long, down which it winds until it joins
the other path at the farmhouse of Chacabuco, which stands at the head
of the plain.
From the summit of the Sierra the whole country is seen spreading out as
a beautiful panorama. The plain at the foot, extending southwards some
seven miles in the direction of Santiago, is shut in by the hills of
Colina, through which there is a path. Behind lie the great masses of
the Cordillera, to the west the spur runs on till it joins the coast
range, as yet unseen.
San Martin informed his officers that he had determined to advance
without waiting for the rest of his artillery, and to fight the decisive
battle before the enemy had time to concentrate his forces. The army was
to march in two columns by the diverging paths, which columns should
debouch simultaneously upon the plain beyond, and attack the Royalist
position in front and on the flank. The column of the right was put
under command of Soler, and consisted of 2,100 men, with seven light
guns. That of the left, under command of O’Higgins, consisted of 1,500
men, with two guns. The latter was to engage the attention of the enemy
in front, without attacking the position, while Soler marched upon his
left flank and rear, when a general advance would decide the day.
Atero, after the skirmish in the valley of Putaendo, had retreated to
Chacabuco, and Marcó hurriedly sent reinforcements, offering the
soldiery a reward of twenty dollars for each one of the enemy killed,
and twelve for each prisoner; but, at the same time, he secretly sent
off his baggage to Valparaiso, and not until the 10th did he appoint a
commander for the army assembling at Chacabuco. He then selected Colonel
Maroto of the Talavera regiment, who reached the headquarters at the
farmhouse on the evening of the 11th. Maroto found under his orders
1,500 infantry, 500 cavalry, and five guns, a force far inferior in
numbers to that of the invaders, and depressed in spirit, but they were
the flower of the Spanish army. All that he had time to do that evening
was to strengthen an outpost which was stationed on the summit in a
position which commanded the eastern pass, purposing to occupy the
heights with his entire force on the following day.
At two in the morning of the 12th February, under a bright moon, the
Argentine army commenced their advance, the infantry leaving their
knapsacks behind them. Flanking parties from Soler’s division were the
first to meet the enemy, but had barely time to exchange a few shots
when the position was attacked by O’Higgins, who drove this advanced
guard before him over the summit. The Royalists retreated in good order
upon the main body, which had advanced three miles up the valley at dawn
of day.
Maroto, believing that the whole force of the Patriots was in pursuit of
his vanguard by the main road, withdrew his army across the valley,
which was intersected by a muddy stream, and took up a strong position
on the opposite slope, placing two of his guns so as to command the
mouth of the pass, and extending his line to a hill on his extreme left,
where he established a strong force of infantry, with the cavalry in the
rear.
Zapiola, with three squadrons of the grenadiers, harassed the retreat of
the Royalist vanguard, but could make no impression upon it, the ground
being unfavourable for cavalry, but he succeeded in preventing the enemy
from occupying two hills at the mouth of the pass, where they might have
seriously hindered the advance of O’Higgins; and advanced into the
valley till forced to retire by the fire of the two guns in position in
front.
At 11 A.M. O’Higgins debouched from the pass, and drew up his infantry
in line on the open ground under fire of the enemy. For an hour he
contented himself with returning their fire and beating off their
skirmishers, till, as he afterwards said himself, his blood was boiling
to be at them. In his excitement he forgot the positive orders of San
Martin to wait for Soler before attacking the enemy, and gave the word
to charge. His men advanced with alacrity, but were soon entangled in
the muddy stream, which they in vain attempted to cross under the fire
of the enemy, and finally retreated in disorder to the mouth of the
pass.
San Martin, sitting on his war-horse, saw from the heights above the
repulse of his lieutenant. At once he sent off his aide-de-camp Condarco
to hasten the march of Soler. This is the incident in his life which is
commemorated in the equestrian statue which now graces the Plaza San
Martin in Buenos Ayres.
He then galloped down the slope and joined O’Higgins. As he reached the
lower ground, he noticed an extraordinary movement in the ranks of the
enemy, and then descried the head of Soler’s column advancing rapidly on
his flank.
O’Higgins again advanced, while the grenadiers under Zapiola charged the
centre of the enemy, and sabred his artillerymen at their guns. The
position was carried by the bayonet, and the Royalist infantry formed
square on their centre. Colonel Alvarado, with the vanguard of the right
wing, at the same time captured the hill on the left flank of the
Royalists, while Necochea and Escalada charged the cavalry in the rear.
The victors then fell simultaneously upon the square, which was speedily
broken. Some of the fugitives made for the farmhouse in their rear, but
found their retreat cut off by Soler, and were forced to surrender at
discretion; others tried to escape by the valley, and there fell under
the sabres of the grenadiers.
The Royalists lost in this action 500 killed, 600 prisoners, all their
artillery, a standard, and two flags; while the loss of the Patriots was
12 killed and 120 wounded. But the moral effects of the victory were
still greater; the disaster of Chacabuco spread panic among the
adherents of the Royal cause all over Chile. Only three men were
undismayed--Barañao, Ordoñez, and Sanchez.
Barañao, on the march with his hussars to join the army, was met at the
entrance to the plain of Chacabuco by news of the disaster. He
countermarched to Santiago, and offered Marcó to take up an infantry
soldier behind each of his horsemen, and to fall upon the Patriot camp
by night; but Marcó thought of nothing but his own safety, and fled to
Valparaiso, leaving the capital in the hands of the populace.
On the 13th the Patriot army was in full march upon Santiago, Necochea,
with his squadron of grenadiers, being sent in advance to maintain order
in the city; where the next day the army entered amid the enthusiastic
plaudits of the inhabitants. As a Chilian historian says:
“San Martin, occupied in carrying out his vast plans, cared little for
these futile manifestations. He thought only of the resources for
carrying on the work which he had gained by the victory.”
On the 15th he issued a proclamation convoking an assembly of notables,
who should name three electors for each of the provinces of Santiago,
Concepcion, and Coquimbo, in order that they might appoint a chief for
the State.
The Assembly, to the number of one hundred, met under the presidency of
Don Francisco Ruiz Tagle, the provisional Governor, and declared that--
“They were unanimous in naming Don José de San Martin as Governor of
Chile with full powers.”
San Martin refused to accept the appointment, and summoned another
Assembly, to the number of two hundred and ten, which by acclamation
named General O’Higgins Supreme Director of the State, which was what
San Martin desired. The new Director appointed Don Miguel Zañartu his
Minister of the Interior, and Lieutenant-Colonel Zenteno, San Martin’s
secretary, Minister of War and Marine; and then issued a proclamation
to the people and addressed a note to the foreign Powers.
When Marcó left the capital, his troops at once dispersed. Some of them,
with Maroto at their head, reached Valparaiso, and at once embarked. The
rest were made prisoners, among them Marcó himself, who had not even
energy sufficient for a rapid flight. San Martin received the late
Governor-General with great affability.
“Give me that white hand,” said he, with bluff sarcasm; and, leading him
to an inner room, he conversed privately with him for two hours, and
then dismissed him.
San Bruno, who had murdered prisoners in the public jail, was also taken
prisoner, and, being sent at once for trial, was quickly sentenced, and
shot in the great square, which was an act of simple justice.
News of the victory of Chacabuco was received in Buenos Ayres on the
24th February. All day shouts of triumph echoed through the streets,
while cannon roared from the fort and from the ships of the squadron
anchored in the roadstead. The captured flags were hung out from the
balconies of the Cabildo, grouped round a portrait of the victorious
general. Medals were decreed to the soldiers who had fought under him,
and to himself a special badge of honour, while his daughter, Maria
Mercedes, received a life-pension of 600 dollars per annum, which her
father devoted to her education.
Government also sent San Martin his commission as Brigadier-General, the
highest military grade in the Argentine service. He, in accordance with
his previously expressed determination, declined the honour, but asked
for further supplies of men, arms, and money, to carry on the campaign,
and appointed himself General-in-Chief of the united Argentine and
Chilian armies.
After arranging with the Chilian authorities for the formation of a
naval squadron, and establishing in Santiago a Supreme Council of the
Lautaro Lodge, half Chilians and half Argentines, he announced his
intention of returning to Buenos Ayres to concert measures with
Government for the prosecution of the war.
The Cabildo of Santiago offered him ten thousand ounces of gold for the
expenses of his journey, which he declined to accept for himself, but
devoted it to the establishment of a public library in that city.
One month after the battle he passed by the scene of his late victory,
and saw there a mound of earth, under which lay the dead of the 12th
February of the Patriot army, most of them negroes from Cuyo, liberated
slaves. This mound was the first landmark of the War of Emancipation.