THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTH OF CHILE.
1817.
After the victory of Chacabuco, San Martin made three mistakes, two of
mere detail, but one of importance, which had an evil influence upon his
later operations. The campaign which ought to have finished immediately
was thus prolonged, and he was compelled to fight four more battles to
accomplish the reconquest of Chile, retarding by three years the
prosecution of his great enterprise.
On the 12th February he remained encamped on the field of battle instead
of pursuing the enemy at least to the end of the plain of Chacabuco. The
following day, instead of marching upon the capital he ought to have
pursued the fugitives to Valparaiso. By this mistake 1,600 veteran
troops escaped to Peru, to act against him later on. But his great
mistake consisted in his neglect to secure the fruits of his victory by
an immediate campaign in the South. The military strength of Chile lay
in the South--the people were warlike, the royal cause had there many
partisans, and the country was full of strong military positions, in
especial the fortress of Valdivia, backed by the islands of Chiloe, a
sea-port by which reinforcements from Peru could be poured into the
country. Looking far ahead, the victor of Chacabuco overlooked that
which was close at hand.
Ordoñez was an officer of great talent, who up to that time had had no
opportunity of distinguishing himself. He and San Martin had fought side
by side against Napoleon. At the close of the war he was a colonel, and
with this rank he came to America in 1815 as Governor of Concepcion. He
was there still and now came forward as the most doughty opponent of his
old comrade. He had no regular troops with him; but ably seconded by
Sanchez, he summoned the militia, collected the soldiery dispersed to
the north of the Maule, garrisoned the frontier of Arauco, fortified the
Peninsula of Talcahuano, aided by the royal squadron, made large
provision of supplies, and scoured the country from the Bio-Bio to the
Maule with his light troops. For two months he was unmolested, and had
time to organize a division of 1,000 men, and to receive a reinforcement
from Lima of 1,600 regulars.
Freyre, after his success at Talca, had contented himself with
intercepting communications, and his force was weakened by Rodriguez,
who marched his guerillas to the North, while his instructions from San
Martin to collect horses and cattle for the main army were neglected. At
the same time several smaller parties of the Patriots were cut up by the
Royalists.
San Martin did not totally neglect the South. On the 18th February a
column of 1,000 men under Las Heras, left Santiago, and on the 4th March
crossed the Maule and joined Freyre at Diguillin, but he marched so
slowly that the enemy had plenty of time to prepare for him. O’Higgins,
who was left in supreme command by San Martin, was greatly irritated at
this delay, and in April marched himself to his assistance, with 800
men. But his progress was just as slow as that of Las Heras, who in the
meantime, after calling a council of his officers to attest the
meagreness of his equipment for such an expedition, marched resolutely
on Concepcion, encamping on the 4th April at a farmhouse near to that
city.
Ordoñez, who had been watching his movements, fell upon him at night
with 700 light troops, but was beaten off with the loss of two guns; and
the next day Las Heras occupied Concepcion.
Concepcion lies on the northern bank of the Bio-Bio, at the head of the
peninsula of Talcahuano, and about five miles distant from the fortified
town of the same name. Las Heras was thus in a critical position; he
dare not retreat, and his force was insufficient to attack Ordoñez in
his entrenchments. He built a small fort on the Gavilán Hill, to the
south-west of Concepcion, and waited for O’Higgins. On the 1st May four
Spanish vessels anchored in the Bay of Talcahuano, bringing the 1,600
fugitives from Chacabuco, who had been sent back from Peru to reinforce
the garrison, and Ordoñez thought himself strong enough to resume the
offensive. On the night of the 4th he sallied out with 700 men and four
guns to attack the left flank of the position held by Las Heras, while
Colonel Morgado, with 400 men and two guns attacked on the right, and a
small force in boats rowed up the Bio-Bio to menace the city from the
river. The action commenced at daybreak and was hotly contested for
three hours, until Freyre, who commanded on the right of the position,
having routed Morgado and captured his two guns, came to the assistance
of Las Heras, and Ordoñez was compelled to retreat, hotly pursued by the
grenadiers under Medina, who captured one of his guns. The flotilla was
beaten off by two companies of the 7th Regiment, which arrived during
the action. The loss of the Royalists in this smart affair was 192
killed and 80 prisoners. The Patriots had 6 killed and 62 wounded.
When all was over O’Higgins arrived upon the scene, and in his
satisfaction at the victory forgot all his displeasure. He took the
command, and at once commenced operations against Talcahuano. Ordoñez
having command of the sea and the Bio-Bio, had easy communication with
the ports of Arauco, which both furnished supplies and harassed the left
flank of the Patriots. Freyre, with a flying column of 300 men, was
detached to capture these forts. On the 12th May, Captain Cienfuegos,
with sixty men, crossed the Bio-Bio and took the fort of El Nacimiento,
after which two other forts nearer to Concepcion surrendered. The key of
this line was the fortress of Arauco, situate at its western extremity
on the sea-coast. Freyre incorporated the detachment under Cienfuegos,
and on the 26th May encamped on the River Carampague in the vicinity of
this fort. The garrison, to the number of 200 men, sallied out to
dispute the passage of the river. Freyre, with 50 grenadiers and 50
infantry mounted _en croupe_, crossed the river lower down, and fell
upon the Royalists with such impetuosity, while the rest of his force
attacked them in front, that he completely routed them, and the
following day captured the fort, with eleven guns and large stores of
ammunition, having lost eleven men drowned in the passage of the river,
and one man wounded.
A militia captain named Diaz rallied the dispersed soldiery, and adding
to them some 400 Indians, returned to the attack. Cienfuegos, who had
been left in command, met this new foe on the open, but was completely
beaten, and Arauco was reoccupied by the Royalists on the 3rd June, to
be retaken by Freyre on the 17th July. O’Higgins then made a treaty with
the Indians of Arauco, and so secured their neutrality.
Meantime an advanced post had been established in the vicinity of
Talcahuano, and frequent skirmishes took place with the garrison, in
which the Patriots had always the advantage. On the 22nd July the army
advanced within cannon shot of the line of forts which crossed the
peninsula, but was compelled by heavy rain to retire on the 24th.
Ordoñez kept his main force within the line of his entrenchments, but
officers of his raised bodies of guerillas in the rear of the Patriots,
cutting off supplies, while detachments in boats made frequent descents
on the coast line of Arauco, losing many men, but greatly harassing the
Patriots.
Talcahuano was by nature a strong position, but was made stronger still
by art. The garrison consisted of 1,700 men and seventy heavy guns were
mounted on the forts, while a frigate, a brig of war, and five gunboats
in the bay, and a boat with one heavy gun on the western side of the
peninsula, enfiladed the approach from the South. It was called by
O’Higgins the Chilian Gibraltar, and here it was that Ordoñez by
far-seeing prudence, held the united forces of Chile and the United
Provinces in check for three years.
During the winter O’Higgins had strengthened his army with several
battalions of Chilian recruits; in October he had nearly 4,000 men under
his immediate command, and was also joined by two French officers of
distinction. The first, General Brayer, came with a great military
reputation, gained in the wars of the French Republic and under
Napoleon; but his arrogance soon lost him the sympathy and confidence of
his new comrades. The other, Alberto D’Albe, Captain of Engineers, was
also a man of great experience, and being of a more modest character,
rendered great service to the American cause.
Heavy rains paralysed operations until spring was well advanced; but on
the 25th November, O’Higgins again moved forward to some high ground
within cannon shot of the line of entrenchments. The plan of attack was
drawn up by General Brayer. On the extreme left of the Royalist position
was an outwork called the Morro, against this the main attack was to be
directed, while the attention of the enemy was diverted by false attacks
on the rest of the line. O’Higgins and most of his officers were in
favour of an attack upon the other flank; but San Martin being
consulted, gave his opinion in favour of Brayer’s plan, which was
accordingly adopted. A desultory cannonade was maintained for several
days, when a north wind springing up, which prevented the Spanish
men-of-war from aiding in the defence of the line, the columns marched
to the attack in the early morning of the 6th December. The attack on
the Morro was led by Major Beauchef and Captain Videla, with a mixed
force of Chilians and Argentines. Mounting on the shoulders of their men
they scaled the outer wall, and tore down a portion of the stockade
behind, when such a heavy fire was poured upon them that Videla being
killed and Beauchef severely wounded, the column could advance no
farther, till Las Heras brought up the supports, when the position was
carried by the bayonet. At the same time a Spanish gunboat on the
Bio-Bio was captured by some boats led by an Englishman named Manning,
and an unauthorised attack by Conde on the centre was repulsed.
At daybreak Las Heras found to his dismay that the Morro was merely an
advanced work, and that he was still outside of the line of
entrenchments. Colonel Boedo fell in attempting to force his way beyond;
the guns of two forts on the heights, those of the frigate _Venganza_,
and those of some gunboats converged their fire upon the conquered
outwork, causing heavy losses; in spite of which Las Heras maintained
his position till O’Higgins sent him orders to retire, which he did in
good order, after spiking the guns he had captured, and carrying with
him his wounded and prisoners. The loss of the Patriots was 150 killed
and 280 wounded.
This disaster put an end for the time to all offensive operations, and
on the day of the assault another strong reinforcement of Royalist
troops embarked at Callao for Talcahuano.