THE PASSAGE OF THE ANDES.
1817.
“What spoils my sleep is not the strength of the enemy, but how to pass
those immense mountains,” said San Martin, as from Mendoza he gazed upon
the snow-clad summits of the Andes, which as a mighty barrier separate
the wide plains of the Argentine Pampa from the smiling valleys of
Chili, through twenty-two degrees of latitude, from the desert of
Atacama to Cape Horn.
These mountains at 33° south latitude divide into two parallel ranges,
one running southward along the borders of the Pacific Ocean, the other
forming the grand Cordillera upon which San Martin gazed from Mendoza.
The coast range is a succession of granite hills with rounded summits
and gentle slopes, like to the waves of a petrified sea. The great
Cordillera is in its centre composed of three or four ranges of conical
and sharply-defined peaks which rise one over the other to a height of
21,000 feet above the level of the sea, crowned with perpetual snow. At
its feet lie deep valleys, from which perpendicular precipices rise up
to the clouds, and the mighty condors wheeling in airy circles at that
dizzy height are the only living things to be seen. There are also lakes
fed by torrents of melted snow which, pouring down the mountain sides
into these valleys, find at times no exit, their path being closed by
immense heaps of débris hurled from the lofty summits by the force of
ice and water. These immense groups of mountains are traversed by
rugged defiles, and narrow paths, the result of volcanic action, wind
along the edges of precipices, while below roar the mountain streams
carrying great rocks along with them, tossing them about as though they
were straws. Here nature displays her giant strength as an artificer,
decking herself with no other ornaments than the cactus, mosses, and
thorny plants; everywhere are seen traces of the world in embryo, as it
emerged from chaos in the process of creation.
Between the Cordillera and the coast range stretches a great central
valley, cut across in places by spurs from the higher mountains, which
take an oblique line to the south till they lose themselves in the
ocean, or reappear as solitary islands or as clusters of islands, which
are the summits of mountains springing from the bed of the sea.
The great Cordillera can only be crossed at certain passes. Those which
have connection with our history are: in the centre, those of Uspallata
and Los Patos, in front of Mendoza and San Juan; to the north, those of
La Ramada and Come-Caballos, by which the Argentine province of La Rioja
communicates with Coquimbo and Copiapó; and to the south, that of the
Planchon, which gives access to the valley of Talca, and that of the
Portillo which leads to the plain of Maipó and to the capital of Chile.
These passes, from 9,000 feet to 12,000 feet above the level of the sea,
are covered with snow in winter, and are practicable only in the height
of summer. Until then they had been crossed only by small detachments of
soldiery, or by troops of mules, the paths being in many places so
narrow as only to give room for one mounted man at a time. The passage
of a numerous army with guns and baggage was held to be impossible and
had never been thought of till the feat was accomplished by San Martin.
Food and forage for men, mules, and horses had to be carried with them,
and it was necessary to reach the other side in force sufficient to
overcome a watchful enemy; to concentrate the different columns upon
his weak points; and to make all the preparations secretly, so that the
army might rush like a thunderbolt from the western slopes of the
mountains and do battle in the open plain.
San Martin, by his complex spy system, had deluded the enemy into the
belief that the invasion would come from the passes of the south; his
real intentions he had kept from friends and enemies alike. In
September, 1816, he invited the Pehuenche Indians, who occupied the
eastern slopes of the Andes commanding the entrances to the passes of
the Planchon and Portillo, to a conference at the fort of San Carlos to
the south of Mendoza. With the invitation he sent them many mules laden
with spirits and wine, with sweetmeats, cloth, and glass beads for the
women, horse gear and clothes for the men. In savage pomp they came; the
warriors, followed by their women, rode up to the fort on the day
appointed in full war costume, flourishing their long lances, and
commenced proceedings by a sham fight in the Indian fashion, dashing at
full speed round the fort, from whose walls a gun was fired every five
minutes and was answered by Indian yells. Then the chiefs entered the
fort and were told by San Martin that the Spaniards were foreigners who
intended to rob them of their lands, their cattle, their women, and
children; and that he desired to pass through their country with an
army, to go by the Planchon and Portillo Passes to the country the other
side of the mountains, there to destroy these Spaniards. The Indian
chiefs listened to his request and granted him the permission he
required, after which they, with their warriors, gave themselves up to
an orgy which lasted eight days.
On the sixth day San Martin returned to Mendoza satisfied that the
Indians, with their usual perfidy, would at once inform Marcó of his
project, and took care that their information was confirmed by the
agents of Marcó in Mendoza, who sent him despatches to the same purport,
dictated by San Martin. At the same time San Martin advised the
Government and his friend Guido that he had arranged with the Indians
for supplies of cattle and horses, and for help in his expedition,
without in any case giving a hint of his real intentions.
Marcó, harassed by the alarming news sent him by his supposed spies in
Mendoza, and annoyed by the guerillas under Martin Rodriguez, who
infested the country between the Maule and the Maipó, and sacked
villages even in the vicinity of the capital itself, adopted most
ill-conceived and contradictory measures. He fortified the ports and
organised a flotilla to act against an imaginary naval force, which his
spies in Cuyo informed him had already left Buenos Ayres. He cut
trenches in the pass of Uspallata; made a map of the southern provinces,
and a survey of the mouths of the passes in that district; strengthened
the guards at all the passes; after concentrating his troops, scattered
them again all over the country; and followed the example of San Martin
by holding a great conference with the Indians of Arauco.
The policy of San Martin was successful; the Captain-General of Chile
attempted to defend the whole of his frontier and had no idea where the
real attack was to come from. One only of his many councillors advised
him to concentrate the army on the capital, and there make ready for
whatever might happen. Instead of that, he increased the general
discontent by arbitrary exactions, till all classes of the people longed
for the appearance of San Martin and made ready to help him as best they
could. Small parties of troops were on several occasions attacked and
routed by armed bands of the peasantry, and the bandit Neyra made
himself famous by similar exploits.
In the encampment at Mendoza matters were far different; there
methodical activity and automatic obedience blended with intelligent
enthusiasm; there one far-seeing will reigned supreme. There everything
was known that Marcó either thought or did, each man worked diligently
at his appointed task, and all trusted blindly in their chief. The
forges blazed day and night, the arsenal turned out cartridges by the
hundred thousand. Fray Beltran made special carriages for the artillery,
adapted to the mountain passes, the guns themselves were to be carried
on the backs of mules; slings were prepared for carrying them over
dangerous places, and sleds of raw hide in which they might be hauled up
by men when the gradients were too steep for the mules.
The General-in-Chief, silent and reserved, thought for all, inspected
everything, and provided for every contingency. Large provision was made
of _charquicán_, a food much in vogue among the muleteers, composed of
beef dried in the sun, roasted, and ground to powder, then mixed with
fat and Chile pepper and pounded into small compass. A soldier could
carry enough of this in his knapsack to last him eight days. Mixed up
with hot water and maize meal ready roasted, it formed a soup at once
nutritious and appetising. San Luis alone furnished 2,000 arrobas, and
the total provision amounted to 3,500 arrobas (87,200 lbs.). The
soldiers made for themselves closed sandals of raw hide called
_tamangos_, which were lined with fragments of old clothes collected for
that purpose from all the province. Water-bottles were made from the
horns of the animals slaughtered in the encampment, and slings were made
for them out of the rough edges of the cloth from which their uniforms
were made. The sabres of the cavalry were carefully sharpened, but they
had only three trumpets till Government sent them two more. Thirty
thousand horseshoes were prepared, which was a great innovation, as the
Argentines were not accustomed to shoe their horses; without them the
hoofs of the cavalry horses would have been worn down in the transit
over the stony passes. Four cables, each 170 feet long, and two anchors
formed a portable bridge. Cuyo alone furnished 13,000 mules, but the
promises of Government to replenish the exhausted treasury were not
fulfilled. A rebellion had broken out in Cordoba which taxed the
resources of Pueyrredon to the utmost to repress; but he aided San
Martin in every way he possibly could, with clothes, saddles, tents, and
arms, and wrote him:--“Don’t ask me for anything more unless you wish to
hear that I have hung myself to a beam in the fort.” And also: “You may
well say that among us there has never been seen an army so well fitted
out; but neither has there been seen a Director who had equal confidence
in a general, and, it must be added, never a general who so well merited
that confidence as yourself. After all, my mind would be easier if you
had another thousand good soldiers with you.”
Everything was ready. The army consisted of 3,000 infantry in four
battalions, led by Alvarado, Cramer, Conde and Las Heras; five squadrons
of the mounted grenadiers, 700 sabres, led by Zapiola, Melian, Ramallo,
Escalada, and Necochea; and 250 artillery, with ten 6-pounders, two
howitzers, and nine 4-pounder mountain guns, under command of La Plaza.
Twelve hundred mounted militia from Cuyo accompanied the army, besides
muleteers and artisans.
The army was arranged in three divisions, each entirely independent of
the others. The vanguard under Soler, and the reserve under O’Higgins,
marched by the pass of Los Patos. Las Heras with the artillery marched
by that of Uspallata, which was the only one practicable for guns and
ammunition. All the food necessary for fifteen days they took with them,
also 600 bullocks for slaughter, and a special supply of onions and
garlic, very necessary at high levels both for man and beast.
As flankers to the main army, a detachment of militia and Chilian
emigrants left San Juan under Cabot, by the pass of La Ramada, marching
upon Coquimbo, and another left Rioja by the pass of Vinchina, marching
on Copiapó and Huasco. To the south another detachment, composed of
mounted infantry, grenadiers, and Chilians, marched under the Chilian
Captain Freyre, by the Planchon pass, in support of the Chilian
guerillas, and were aided by a party of thirty dragoons under Captain
Lemos, who went by the Portillo Pass.
Both the main body and the detachments had orders to debouch on Chilian
territory from the 6th to the 8th February, 1817. Each general of
division was given by San Martin himself a pen-and-ink plan of the route
he was to follow, with notes and written instructions. San Martin
himself went by the pass of Los Patos, but had arranged a system of
flag-signals by which Las Heras could communicate with him across the
intervening valleys.
His last instructions from Government were:--
“The consolidation of the independence of America from the Kings of
Spain and their successors, and the glory of the United Provinces of the
South, are the only motives of this campaign. This you will make public
in your proclamations, by your agents in the cities, and by all possible
means. The army must be impressed with this principle, and shall have no
thought of pillage, oppression, or of conquest, or that there is any
idea of holding the country of those we help.”
He was also authorized to raise a national army in Chile, which should
remain under his orders even when a new Government was established; was
prohibited from capitulating with the enemy under any circumstances; and
was charged to avoid any interference in party questions among the
Chilians. He was also authorized, after the re-establishment of the
municipality of Santiago, to preside over the free election of a
provisional president. He was instructed to use his influence to
postpone the election of a Congress until Chile was entirely free from
the enemy, and to persuade the Chilians to send deputies to the Congress
of the United Provinces, in order to establish a perpetual alliance
between the two countries.
As the leading files of the army entered the passes, San Martin, on the
24th January, 1817, wrote to Godoy Cruz:--
“This afternoon I leave to join the army. God grant me success in this
great enterprise.”
The plan of the campaign, as drawn up by San Martin on the 15th June,
1816, was to cross the Cordillera by the passes of Uspallata and Los
Patos, to re-unite his forces in the plain beyond, there to beat the
principal force of the enemy and to seize the capital.
The principal spur from the main range which cuts the central valley of
Chile is that which springs from the great peak of Aconcagua. From this
spur a smaller one branches off, which is called the Sierra of
Chacabuco, and runs parallel to the main spur, enclosing between them
the parallel valleys of Putaendo and Aconcagua, watered by two streams
bearing the same names, which ultimately unite to form the river
Aconcagua, which empties itself in the ocean beyond the coast range of
hills. The road by Uspallata passes to the south of the great peak and
through the valley of Aconcagua to the frontier town of Santa Rosa. The
road by Los Patos is much longer, and, passing to the north of
Aconcagua, leads by the valley of Putaendo to the narrow pass of
Achupallas, which lies to the west of Santa Rosa. Thus any force
stationed at this point would be placed between two fires by the
convergence of the two divisions, and if it retreated to the Sierra of
Chacabuco which lay to the south, would leave the plain of Chacabuco
available for the concentration of the army. Chacabuco was thus the
strategic point upon the occupation of which depended the issue of the
whole campaign.
Meantime Cabot had left San Juan on the 12th January, and on the 8th
February issued from the northern passes. The whole province of Coquimbo
rose in arms to welcome him. Captain Ceballos, detached by him, routed a
Royalist force of a hundred men on the plains of Salala, capturing two
small guns and forty prisoners. By the 12th Cabot was master of the
entire province. On the same day Davila, with the detachment from Rioja,
took the city of Copiapó. The whole of the north of Chile was in the
power of the invaders.
On that same 12th February Freyre, at the other extreme of the line of
operations, occupied the city of Talca, after a skirmish on the plains,
cutting all communication between the capital and the south. He
represented himself to be the vanguard of the main army, and was joined
at once by the Chilian guerillas and by Neyra.
It was only on the eve of departure that San Martin explained his plan
in its entirety to his generals. On the 18th January Las Heras marched
with a flying column by Uspallata, with instructions to entrench himself
at Chacabuco, but to retreat if attacked by superior forces. Two days in
his rear marched Beltran with the artillery. The main body marched on
the 19th by Los Patos; the vanguard was commanded by Soler, and one
day’s march in his rear came the reserve under O’Higgins. Groups of
pioneers preceded the columns, clearing the way for them. Soler had
instructions to debouch on the 8th February into the valley of Putaendo,
to seize the bridge which crosses the river Aconcagua in front of the
town of San Felipe, to occupy that position, thence to open
communications with Las Heras, and, if possible, to attack the enemy in
the rear at Santa Rosa.
All the troops were mounted on mules, and marched in single file along
the narrow paths, each twenty men being in care of a muleteer, the
length of each day’s march being decided by the facilities for grass and
water at the halting-places. Not only was the road itself by Los Patos
more difficult than that by Uspallata, but on account of the greater
elevation, and of its vicinity to the eternal snow of the higher peaks,
the cold was very much more intense; it freezes hard there every night,
even at midsummer, and the rarefaction of the air caused many of the men
to drop from the ranks.
Marcó had despatched 1,000 men under Colonel Atero to reconnoitre the
pass of Uspallata, and on the 24th January the advanced posts of Las
Heras were attacked by the enemy at Pichueta, on the eastern slope of
the Cordillera. A reinforcement under Major Martinez drove the
Royalists, after two hours’ fighting, across the summit. San Martin, on
hearing of this, at once despatched Major Arcos with 200 men to seize
the pass of Achupallas. On the 4th February Arcos found the guard there
strongly reinforced; he attacked at once, and the day was decided by
Lieutenant Juan Lavalle, of the mounted grenadiers, who here led the
first of those desperate charges of cavalry for which he was afterwards
so renowned.
At three in the morning of the 2nd February Las Heras crossed the summit
of the Cordillera, and on the 4th, at sundown, an advanced post of the
Royalists at Guardia Vieja was attacked by Major Martinez, and carried
at the point of the bayonet; after which Las Heras, in obedience to
express orders from San Martin, retired upon his reserve. On the 5th the
alarm was given in the valleys of Putaendo and Aconcagua by the
fugitives from Guardia Vieja and Achupallas, but Atero, deceived by the
countermarch of Las Heras into the idea that he was in full retreat,
left the pass of Uspallata open, and marched with 700 men to meet the
invaders at Achupallas. Thus, without further trouble, Las Heras
debouched on the 8th on to the plain and occupied Santa Rosa.
Soler, with the escort and two squadrons of grenadiers, had hurried on
to the assistance of the small force at Achupallas, and thence on the
6th descended into the valley of Putaendo with all his cavalry. Necochea
was then detached with 100 men of the escort against the town of San
Felipe. On the morning of the 7th he was met by Atero, and, by feigning
to retreat in the face of such superior numbers, induced the Royalist
leader to follow him up the valley with 300 horsemen, leaving his guns
and infantry in a strong position on high ground behind him. When he had
drawn him well away from his reserve, Necochea suddenly wheeled his men
into line and charged, breaking up the enemy completely, and driving
him back to the shelter of his guns, with a loss of 30 killed and 4
prisoners. Atero, after this repulse, retreated with all speed to San
Felipe, destroying the bridge over the Aconcagua river. The fugitives
reported that the enemy were tall men armed with very long swords, whose
charge no cavalry in Chile could resist. On the 8th the two divisions
encamped in the valley of Putaendo, and were welcomed with enthusiasm by
the inhabitants.
On the 9th the broken bridge was repaired by the sappers, and while the
whole army crossed, a squadron of grenadiers under Melian advanced to
the hill of Chacabuco, and were there met by advanced parties of the
column under Las Heras. Beltran had lost 6,000 mules out of 10,000, and
two-thirds of his horses, but he brought all his guns with him.
Thus the preliminary operations were crowned with success. A strategic
combination of movements over a frontage of 1,300 miles was completed in
every point on the day prefixed by the author of the plan. He had reason
to be proud of the exploit, but neither then or at any later date was he
ever known to boast of it. He had at that time much else to think of,
his cavalry horses were for the most part foundered by the passage of
the rugged defiles, and he had no time to lose if he was to fight a
decisive battle on the 15th as he had promised.
The judgment of posterity is unanimous in respect to the importance of
the passage of the Andes by San Martin, not alone as a great military
feat, but also for the influence it had upon the final result of the
struggle for emancipation. Spanish historians speak of it as the
turning-point of the contest between Spain and her colonies. In German
military schools it is cited as an example of the importance of
discipline in an army, and of the value of foresight and attention to
details on the part of a general.
The passage of the Andes by San Martin was a feat requiring greater
strategy and skill than the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and by
Napoleon; it was unequalled till Bolívar repeated the exploit on the
equator. If compared with the two former, it is seen to be a much
greater achievement than either of them from its effects upon the
destinies of the human race. In place of vengeance, greed, or of
ambition, San Martin was animated by the hope of giving liberty and
independence to a new world. The passage of the Andes by San Martin
resulted in Maipó; the passage of the Andes by Bolívar resulted in
Boyacá; two decisive victories which liberated entire peoples from the
slavery of foreign despotism; the passages of the Alps by Hannibal and
by Napoleon resulted only in the sterile victories of Trebia and of
Marengo.