BOOK IV.

DIPLOMACY. 1813-1829.

"9th May, Sunday.--At 3 P.M. sailed from New Castle on board the ship

Neptune, of 300 tons, Captain Lloyd Jones. We are in all 34 persons on

board, viz., Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard, ministers of the

United States; George M. Dallas, George B. Milligan, John P. Todd, and

James Gallatin, their secretaries; Henry Smothers, Peter Brown, and

George Shorter, their black servants; Mr. Pflug, a Russian, and his

black boy, Peter; Captain Jones, his two mates Tomlinson and Fisher, and

William C. Nicholson, midshipman; Dr. Layton, a black steward, a white

and a black cook, a boatswain, eleven able and three ordinary seamen.

Rodney and Collector McLane accompanied us with the revenue cutter, in

which they returned in the evening. Anchored at night near Bombay Hook.

"11th May, Tuesday.--Bore down for a British frigate. Fell to the

leeward. She, being at anchor, sent her boat on board with a lieutenant

and compliments from the captain to me, and that he would be glad to see

me on board. This was perhaps intended as civility, but was of course

declined, and we sent Dallas and Milligan on board with our compliments.

Captain Jones went at the same time to show to the captain of the

frigate Admiral Warren's passport, which the captain endorsed. His name

is Braynton; the frigate's, Spartan, a 36.... The Spartan is the only

armed English vessel here. At 3 P.M. sailed to sea, and in the evening

took our departure from Cape Henlopen.

"The incidents of voyage to Gottenburg but few....

"20th June, Sunday.--At 8 o'clock A.M. anchored in the quarantine

ground.... At 7 in the evening the officer returned from Gottenburg with

permission to land.... We immediately jumped in the boat and went ashore

on the quarantine island, and scampered amongst the rocks, pulling wild

roses and bunches of clover, which grew in small patches of low ground,

none containing more than two acres, all the rest of the island

consisting of barren rocks.... At night we returned on board.

"21st June, Monday.--After breakfast we hired the quarantine and a

fisherman's boat to take us to Gottenburg.... Our boatmen told us that

the current being very rapid down the river Gotha after we should have

passed the castle, and the wind right ahead, we must land at some houses

on the main about four miles by land from Gottenburg, where we could get

carriages to take us to town. This we accordingly did, on as barren and

rocky spot as what we had yet seen, and there we entered the first

Swedish houses. They had inside the appearance of Pennsylvania German

houses, both as to smell, inhabitants, and furniture. A fat, fair, ugly

woman was blowing her nose in her apron. The husband was drinking a dish

of very strong coffee. On the table was a large lump of loaf sugar, the

only kind used even by poor people. Although their dress and appearance

reminded me of the Germans, they are much fairer complexion, and, if

tanned, their hair and eyes still discover it. But they did not to me

appear as healthy-looking as our Americans.... Four wooden open chairs,

not better-looking than carts, some with steel and some with wooden

springs, were soon brought, each drawn by a small but pretty good horse,

harnessed with ropes. The drivers sat at the bottom, and we set off, two

in each.... At the end of four miles we came in sight of the river

Gotha, about three-quarters of a mile wide, and had a view of the suburb

of Martagat and of much shipping along its wharves.... Knowing nobody,

we stopped at the house of a Mr. Dixon, a Scotchman, who had formerly

acted as American consul, and requested him to show us the best inn....

There we were soon joined by Mr. Fosdick, of Boston.... Mr. Lawrence, of

Philadelphia, and Mr. Bowie, of Georgetown, came also to see us and to

hear from America. We had been delighted to see once more population of

any kind, but to meet Americans at such distance from home is a feeling

to be understood only by those who have experienced it. I could have

pressed every one to my bosom as a brother....

"22d June, Tuesday.--We left Gottenburg after breakfast ... and in two

hours reached our ship.... At night, having had two sets of pilots,

though the distance was but twelve miles, we reached the sea....

"24th June, Thursday.--...At dusk anchored in Copenhagen inner roads.

"25th June, Friday.--Landed at 10. Bachalan's hotel....

"1st July, Thursday.--Breakfasted and went on board.... Detained all day

by southeast wind. Field of battle of Nelson, 1801. New fortifications

and defences. Block ships sunk in sixteen feet water. Bombardment in

September, 1807; 400 houses destroyed, 1500 persons killed. This cause

of great increase of army and expense. Batteries everywhere; armed

population. Norway starved and faithful. Frugality of King in personal

expenses. Ministers serve for nothing (nominal salary, 8000 old rigs, or

about 200 Spanish dollars). Existence of kingdom at stake. Conduct of

Russia and England towards it unintelligible. They have thrown it in

France's hands, much against their will. Despotism and no oppression.

Poverty and no discontent. Civility and no servile obsequiousness

amongst people. Decency and sobriety....

"8th July, Thursday.--Fair weather; head-wind. We grow very impatient.

We are opposite to Courland....

"12th July, Monday.--Head-wind.... Entered Gulf of Finland."

* * * * *

Here end Mr. Gallatin's memoranda of his voyage, and here begins the

history of his long diplomatic career. He arrived at St. Petersburg on

the 21st July, and set to work with his colleagues to carry out the

purposes of the mission.

As now completed, the American commission appointed to negotiate for

peace under the mediation of Russia consisted of Mr. Gallatin, Mr. J. Q.

Adams, then our minister at St. Petersburg, and Mr. James A. Bayard. For

the first time Gallatin was now associated in public business with J. Q.

Adams, and by a curious combination of circumstances this association

was destined to last during all the remainder of Mr. Gallatin's public

life. What each of these men thought of the other will be seen in the

course of the story, for neither of them had anything to conceal. Cast

as they were in two absolutely different moulds, it was not in the

nature of things that they should ever stand in such close and

affectionate intimacy as had existed between Mr. Gallatin and the two

Presidents of his own choice, especially since the Virginia triumvirate

was even more remarkable for the private than for the public relations

of its members, and in this respect stands without a parallel in our

history. Although there was little in common between the New England

temperament of Mr. Adams and the Virginia geniality of Mr. Jefferson and

Mr. Madison; although Mr. Adams, as the younger man and at first the

inferior in rank and influence, could under no circumstances stand to

Mr. Gallatin in the same light as his older and more confidential

friends; although the previous history of both seemed little calculated

to inspire confidence or good will in either; there was nevertheless a

curious parallelism in the lives and characters of the two men, which,

notwithstanding every jar, compelled them to move side by side and to

agree in policy and opinion even while persuading themselves that their

aims and methods were radically divergent. Mr. Adams was about six years

the junior. When young Gallatin took his degree at the College of Geneva

in May, 1779, young Adams was arriving with his father at Paris to begin

his education as diplomate and scholar in the centre of all that was

then most cultivated and stimulating in the world. While Gallatin was

wandering with Serre among the Maine woods, Adams was wandering between

Paris and St. Petersburg, picking up his education as he went. Had

Gallatin remained two years longer at Harvard College, he would have met

Adams there. As they grew older they were in opposing ranks as public

men. For Gallatin's early political theories Adams felt little respect,

and for his eminent share in expelling the Federalists from office the

son of the expelled President could hardly have been grateful. A few

years, however, brought them together. As Senator the force of

circumstances compelled Mr. Adams to support the Administration and the

measures of Mr. Jefferson for the same reasons which compelled Mr.

Gallatin to support those measures which, abstractly considered, were

entirely inconsistent with his past history and his early convictions.

In 1813 there was no very decided opinion to divide them. They worked

cordially together at St. Petersburg and at Ghent. During nearly twelve

years they continued to work together in the management of our foreign

relations. The irruption of President Jackson and his political

following threw them both out of public life; and when Mr. Adams

returned to it as member of Congress, Mr. Gallatin remained in

retirement. Both were then non-partisan; both held very strong

convictions in regard to the duties and the short-comings of the day;

both died near the same time, the last relics of the early statesmanship

of the republic.

So far as his colleagues in the mission to St. Petersburg were

concerned, although Mr. Adams had been and Mr. Bayard still was a

moderate Federalist, Gallatin found no difficulties in the way of

harmonious action; but almost from the first moment it became evident

that the negotiation itself was destined never to take place. The

English government, though somewhat embarrassed by Russia's offer to

mediate, and yet more by the quick action of President Madison in

sending commissioners under that offer, was clear in its determination

not to allow Russia or any other nation to interpose in what it chose to

consider a domestic quarrel. The questions involved were questions of

neutral rights, and on that ground the position of the Baltic powers had

never been satisfactory to England; accordingly, England had met the

invitation of Russia, if not with a positive refusal, certainly with

decided coldness. Instead of finding everything prepared for

negotiation, Mr. Gallatin found on his arrival that not a single step

had yet been taken by England beyond the communication of a note which

discouraged any arbitration whatever. Unfortunately, too, there were

complications beneath the surface; complications with which the American

commissioners were not familiar, and which no agency of theirs could

remove. The Emperor was not at St. Petersburg; he was with his army,

fighting Napoleon. He had left Count Romanzoff behind him at St.

Petersburg, and was accompanied by Count Nesselrode. Count Romanzoff had

nominal charge of foreign affairs; he held strong opinions on the

subject of neutral and commercial rights; he was regarded as not

peculiarly friendly to England; and he was the author or instigator of

the Emperor's offer of mediation. On him alone in the imperial court

could the American commissioners rely. On the other hand, every

immediate interest dictated to the Emperor the policy of close

friendship with England. This policy was apparently represented by Count

Nesselrode, and Count Nesselrode now had every advantage in impressing

it upon the Emperor. The British government before the arrival of the

American commissioners would have preferred that Alexander should

quietly abandon his scheme of mediation and that all discussion of the

subject should be dropped. The object of Romanzoff was to press the

mediation in order to secure in the United States a balance against the

overpowering dominion of England on the ocean.

The sudden arrival of the American commissioners was an event which no

one expected or wished. Upon Count Romanzoff, already tottering, it

brought a new strain, which appears to have been more than he could

meet; yet, although his influence was nearly at an end, he still caused

no little irritation to the British government before his fall, and the

arrival of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard added greatly to this

embarrassment. Lord Castlereagh was obliged to abandon the attempt to

smother the Emperor's mediation, and to take a more decided tone.

Nothing could well be more unpleasant than the position of Mr. Gallatin

and his colleagues at St. Petersburg. To see plainly that they were not

wanted was in itself mortifying, but to feel that they were gravely

embarrassing their only real friend was painful. Yet it was impossible

to get away; Count Romanzoff was not disposed to retreat from the ground

he had taken; without waiting to be pressed,--indeed, immediately on

hearing of the arrival of the commissioners at Gottenburg,--he wrote to

the Emperor suggesting a renewal of the offer of mediation to England.

He did all in his power to make the envoys comfortable in their

unpleasant situation, and he set himself to study their case with the

aid of a masterly little memoir which Mr. Gallatin prepared at his

request.

On the 10th of August the Emperor's reply was communicated to the

envoys, and it authorized Romanzoff not only to renew the offer of

mediation, but to send it direct to London without further advice from

headquarters. On the 24th, the Count summoned Mr. Gallatin and his two

colleagues to listen to the reading of his despatches, by which the

offer was to be renewed; and at Mr. Gallatin's suggestion two slight

alterations were made in the draft.

The envoys had already waited more than a month at St. Petersburg, and

the summer was gone without the accomplishment of a single object. Mr.

Gallatin ought soon to be on his way home, if he had any idea of

resuming his post at the Treasury, but to escape was now out of the

question, while any effective action was even more hopeless. The envoys

discussed the subject from every point of view, but their means were

slender enough and the power of England was omnipotent about them. For

their purposes it was essential to open some private communication with

the Emperor Alexander at headquarters; General Moreau offered himself

for this service, and Mr. Gallatin wrote to him at considerable length

on the subject.[119] To ascertain directly the views and intentions of

the British government was more important, and here Mr. Gallatin was

even more fortunate. On his arrival at Gottenburg he had written to his

old acquaintance Alexander Baring, announcing his progress towards St.

Petersburg, and in this letter he had invited communication of

intelligence connected with the mission. Mr. Baring replied on the 22d

July, and his letter reached St. Petersburg about the middle of August;

it was written with the knowledge and advice of Lord Castlereagh, and

showed in every line the embarrassment caused by the Russian offer of

mediation. In order to withdraw questions of blockade, contraband, and

right of search from the mediation of a Baltic power, the British

government was driven to assume the position that this was "a sort of

family quarrel, where foreign interference can only do harm and irritate

at any time, but more especially in the present state of Europe, when

attempts would be made to make a tool of America in a manner which I am

sure neither you nor your colleagues would sanction. These, I have good

reason to know, are pretty nearly the sentiments of government here on

the question of place of negotiation and foreign mediation, and, before

this reaches you, you will have been informed that this mediation has

been refused, with expressions of our desire to treat separately and

directly here, or, if more agreeable to you, at Gottenburg."

This was clumsy enough on the part of the British ministry, whose

parental interest in protecting the innocence of America from contact

with the sinfulness of Russia was not calculated to effect its avowed

object, and still less to please the Emperor and his continental allies,

who were here plainly charged with intending to make a tool of the

United States; but at this time English diplomacy cultivated very few of

the arts and none at all of the graces; there is hardly an important

state paper in the whole correspondence between England and America from

1806 to 1815, which, if addressed to the United States government

to-day, would not lead to blows. The letter of Mr. Baring, kindly meant

and highly useful as it was, had all the characteristics of the English

Foreign Office, and in the hands of an indiscreet man would have done

more harm than good; Mr. Gallatin's temper, however, was not irritable;

he did not even show the letter itself to Count Romanzoff, and he

answered Mr. Baring without a trace of sarcasm or irony. His reply is,

indeed, a model of dignified and persuasive address, brief,

straightforward, and comprehensive,[120] and the passage in which he

refers to his own sacrifice throws some light on the nature of his

private feelings: "I would not have given up my political existence and

separated myself from my family unless I had believed an arrangement

practicable and that I might be of some utility in effecting it."

The situation was now more than ever perplexing. On the one hand, not

only Mr. Baring but the British government maintained that the mediation

had been refused and that direct negotiation had been offered in its

place; on the other hand, Count Romanzoff denied that the mediation had

been refused, and in a manner obliged the three envoys to wait the

result of another application. As a matter of fact, England had made as

yet no offer of direct negotiation; had this offer been made when it was

said to have been determined upon, in June, and then transmitted to

America, the situation would have been simple; but, as matters now

stood, the American envoys were fully justified in thinking that the

British government had no other purpose than to mislead them, and their

impatience naturally increased.

Under such circumstances, Mr. Gallatin lingered helplessly in St.

Petersburg, idle and anxious, while the world seemed convulsed with

agony. He wrote a long letter to General Moreau on the 2d September,

ignorant that, while he wrote, Moreau was drawing his last breath. With

what patience he could command, he amused himself with such resources as

St. Petersburg offered. No answer had yet been received from England,

when, on the 19th October, letters arrived from the United States,

announcing that his nomination as envoy to Russia had been rejected by

the Senate, and that consequently he was no longer a member of the

mission.

Curiously enough, only one week had elapsed since Mr. Gallatin had been

officially recognized as envoy by Count Romanzoff; the difficulty of

communicating with the Emperor had caused delays in every detail, so

that all Mr. Gallatin's share in the transactions under the mediation

was, with the exception of this single week, unofficial. The news of his

rejection by the Senate was probably not unexpected, but, like

everything else in this unlucky mission, it came in just such a way as

to increase complications; no official information of the fact and no

instructions were received, nor did these reach Mr. Gallatin until the

end of March in the following year, and yet without such official

advices it was difficult to get away from St. Petersburg, and Count

Romanzoff was strongly of the opinion that he could not go.

Nevertheless, there were some advantages in the situation. The Senate

had at least restored to Mr. Gallatin his liberty of action; he was no

longer dependent on his colleagues; if not envoy, he was still Secretary

of the Treasury, strong in his relations with the President, master of

all the threads of the negotiation, and it depended only upon himself to

say what measures he should take. Little consideration was needed to

show that he could do no good by returning to America. His enemies were

there in possession of the field, and his failure in diplomacy would

strengthen their hands; his only chance of baffling them was by rescuing

the negotiation, and this he set himself to accomplish. Somewhat to the

disgust of Mr. Adams, he proceeded, delicately but decidedly, to mark

out his own course. Mr. Baring had urged the mission to go to England to

treat directly of peace. Mr. Gallatin did, in October, send his

secretary, George M. Dallas, to London to make a channel of

communication between Lord Castlereagh, Count Lieven, the Russian

Ambassador, and Mr. Baring on one side, and himself and Mr. Madison on

the other. The news of Mr. Gallatin's rejection by the Senate arrived

precisely as young Dallas was starting for London. Thither Gallatin

meditated following him, and as for the responsibility thus assumed, he

bluntly told Mr. Adams "that _he_ was no longer a member of the mission;

he was a private gentleman, and might go home by the way of England or

any other way, as he pleased; that as to the approbation of the

government, he should not trouble himself about it; he would not disobey

their orders, but if he was right he should not much regard whether they

liked it or not. Mr. Baring's letter did indeed speak of the decision of

the British government upon the point of impressment in the clearest and

strongest terms, but he believed the point might still be presented to

them in a manner which would induce them to judge of it otherwise. This,

he thought, would be the utility of their going to England. For his

purpose was to convince the British ministers that unless they should

yield on the article of impressment, there was no possibility of

treating at all."[121]

Another scheme of Mr. Gallatin's was to go directly to the Emperor

Alexander's headquarters and attempt to stimulate his action; but to

effect this object a strong friend was needed, and since Moreau's death

there was no individual about the Emperor on whose aid reliance could be

put.

The anomalous attitude and independent action of Mr. Gallatin naturally

annoyed his colleagues and might easily have made a coolness, but he had

the tact to follow his own path without giving offence. Meanwhile the

curious diplomatic mystification which had perplexed the American envoys

all summer, and of which the Emperor was the innocent cause, began to

approach an end. As early as July 14, Lord Castlereagh had instructed

Lord Cathcart, in the most positive language, to make the Emperor

understand that England could not consent to even the _appearance_ of

foreign intervention in the American dispute,[122] and this final

decision seems to have been communicated to the Emperor on the 1st

September, at Töplitz, when Alexander had already authorized Romanzoff

to renew the offer of mediation; when Romanzoff had indeed already

written his despatches to that effect and forwarded them to the Emperor

for approval. On the arrival of these despatches at headquarters,

Alexander wrote back on September 8, approving the draft for a new offer

of mediation notwithstanding the fact that Lord Cathcart, only a week

before, had officially announced that under no circumstances could

England admit of mediation, but that she meant to negotiate directly.

The second proposal to mediate was, therefore, forwarded by Romanzoff to

Count Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, and the Count must have

informally notified Lord Castlereagh of its contents, for it seems to

have been on the strength of information contained in this despatch that

the British note to Mr. Monroe, dated November 4, and offering to

negotiate directly, was founded; but Count Lieven never officially

communicated the proposal itself to Lord Castlereagh; by the usual

diplomatic jugglery this second offer was quietly suppressed at the

British minister's hint, and Count Lieven only wrote back that Lord

Castlereagh had transmitted directly to the Emperor in person a memoir

containing his reasons for declining mediation. The Emperor forgot to

communicate this memoir to Romanzoff, and when the latter received

Lieven's letter early in November he could only communicate it without

explanation to the Americans. This was done on November 3, and by this

time another British minister, Lord Walpole, had arrived in St.

Petersburg, who irritated the Americans still farther by talking openly

and bitterly of Count Romanzoff's intrigues. No one knew how to explain

the riddle. Even Lord Cathcart, who was with the Emperor, wrote to Lord

Castlereagh on the 12th December: "I think Nesselrode knows nothing of

the cause of the delay of communicating with the American mission; that

it was an intrigue of the Chancellor's, if it is one; and that during

the operations of war the Emperor has lost the clue to it, so that

something has been unanswered. If it is not cleared up, I will write

another note and send a copy to Walpole."[123] Romanzoff himself was

deeply mortified, and this evidence of the Emperor's neglect seems to

have been the cause of his retirement from office. He now announced to

the Americans that he should remain Chancellor a short time longer

solely to close the affair of this mission.

All the parties to this imbroglio, confused and irritated by the veil of

mystery which surrounded it, suspected intrigue and treachery in their

opponents. The Americans naturally believed that England was to blame,

and, although this was not the case, there was some reason in the

suspicion, for Lord Castlereagh, straightforward and honest in his

treatment of Russia, was very slow in dealing with America, and, instead

of writing on July 14 to the United States government, he had waited

until Count Lieven again jogged his elbow by bringing to his knowledge

Count Romanzoff's second offer of mediation. This was the entire

advantage gained for America by Russia, and the whole result

accomplished by Mr. Gallatin's voyage. On the 4th November, Lord

Castlereagh forwarded to America the offer of direct negotiation which

he had announced in his instructions to Lord Cathcart of the 14th July.

Not until Mr. Baring wrote to Mr. Gallatin on the 14th December did

these facts become certainly known to the Americans, and even then Mr.

Baring was mistaken in regard to the dates furnished him from the

Foreign Office.

[Sidenote: 1814.]

All hope of success from the mediation had long vanished; the winter

had set in; Gallatin was not even a member of the commission; yet he

still lingered at St. Petersburg, partly in deference to Count

Romanzoff's wish, partly in the hope of receiving the long-expected

communication from the Emperor which was to close the mission, partly in

expectation of receiving more decisive news from England or of getting

instructions from America, partly in order to have the company of Mr.

Bayard on his journey. Not until the 25th January, 1814, did they leave

St. Petersburg, and still without a word from the Emperor.

They travelled with all the slowness inevitable in the movements of

those times from St. Petersburg to Amsterdam. There they arrived on the

evening of the 4th March, and there they remained during four weeks. The

situation of affairs did not grow better. The complete destruction of

France was practically accomplished, and America was now left to oppose

alone the whole power of England, which would infallibly be directed

against her. On reaching Amsterdam Mr. Gallatin learned that Lord

Castlereagh's offer of direct negotiation had been promptly met on the

part of Mr. Madison by the appointment of a new commission, of which Mr.

Gallatin himself was not one, for the reason that at the time these

nominations were made he was supposed to be on his way home to resume

his post at the Treasury. When the mistake was discovered, and after it

had become evident that the Treasury must no longer be left vacant, the

President, on the 8th February, nominated Mr. Gallatin as a member of

the new commission, and at the same time appointed Mr. G. W. Campbell

Secretary of the Treasury. By this accident Mr. Gallatin, instead of

standing first in the commission, was made its last member, and all his

colleagues, Mr. Adams, Mr. Bayard, Henry Clay, and Jonathan Russell,

took precedence of him.

These proceedings had no effect in changing Mr. Gallatin's movements:

whether first or last in the commission, or whether omitted from it

entirely, he continued to superintend all the diplomatic operations

connected with the proposed peace. Towards the end of March he received

from Mr. Baring the necessary permission to visit England, and

immediately afterwards he crossed the channel with Mr. Bayard and

established himself in London. Almost at the same moment Mr. Clay and

Mr. Russell arrived at Gottenburg, and brought with them Mr. Gallatin's

appointment as fifth commissioner. A considerable time necessarily

elapsed before all the five envoys could be brought together, and during

this interval Mr. Gallatin was quietly employed in smoothing the path of

negotiation.

With the British government itself he held no direct communication on

the difficult points involved in the future settlement, and if he still

hoped to persuade that government to make concessions on the subject of

impressment, his hope was altogether disappointed; neither Mr. Baring

nor Lord Castlereagh himself would at that moment have dared to suggest

the smallest concession on that point in the face of the excited popular

feeling of England. Mr. Gallatin appears to have refrained from every

attempt to negotiate on his own account, and to have contented himself

with removing such obstacles and with setting in motion such influences

as it was in his power to affect or control.

The first object he had at heart was the removal of the place of

negotiation. Their instructions, not as yet known to Mr. Gallatin,

authorized the envoys to treat, and assumed Gottenburg as the place,

rejecting the British proposition to treat at London. Mr. Gallatin would

have preferred London, because he believed, and with justice, that his

chances were better with Lord Castlereagh than with any mere agent of

the Foreign Office; but this point was one of pride as well as fear

among Americans; to London they would not go, and accordingly Mr.

Gallatin contented himself with changing the place of negotiation to

Ghent. The following letter explains his motives for this movement.

GALLATIN TO HENRY CLAY.

LONDON, 22d April, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--We have just heard of your arrival, but have received no

letters, and I am yet ignorant whether I am one of the new commission to

treat of peace. My arrangements must depend on that circumstance, and I

wait with impatience for the official account which you must have

brought. For that reason Mr. Bayard addresses you and Mr. Russell in his

own name, but I coincide fully with him in the opinion that the

negotiations should by all means be opened here, or at least in Holland,

if this is not rendered impracticable from the nature of the commission.

If this has unfortunately been limited to treating of peace at

Gottenburg, there is no remedy; but if the commission admits of a change

of place, I would feel no hesitation in removing them at least to any

other neutral place, whatever may be the language of the instructions.

For their spirit would be fully answered by treating in any other

friendly country as well as if at Gottenburg. On that point I feel great

anxiety, because, on account of the late great changes in Europe, and of

the increased difficulties thence arising in making any treaty, I do

believe that it would be utterly impossible to succeed in that corner,

removed from every friendly interference in our favor on the part of the

European powers, and compelled to act with men clothed with limited

authorities, and who might at all times plead a want of instructions.

You are sufficiently aware of the total change in our affairs produced

by the late revolution and by the restoration of universal peace in the

European world, from which we are alone excluded. A well-organized and

large army is at once liberated from any European employment, and ready,

together with a superabundant naval force, to act immediately against

us. How ill prepared we are to meet it in a proper manner no one knows

better than yourself; but, above all, our own divisions and the hostile

attitude of the Eastern States give room to apprehend that a continuance

of the war might prove vitally fatal to the United States.

I understand that the ministers, with whom we have not had any direct

intercourse, still profess to be disposed to make an equitable peace.

But the hope, not of ultimate conquest, but of a dissolution of the

Union, the convenient pretence which the American war will afford to

preserve large military establishments, and, above all, the force of

popular feeling, may all unite in inducing the Cabinet in throwing

impediments in the way of peace. They will not certainly be disposed to

make concessions, nor probably displeased at a failure of negotiations.

That the war is popular, and that national pride, inflated by the last

unexpected success, cannot be satisfied without what they call the

chastisement of America, cannot be doubted. The mass of the people here

know nothing of American politics but through the medium of Federal

speeches and newspapers faithfully transcribed in their own journals.

They do not even suspect that we have any just cause of complaint, and

consider us altogether as the aggressors and as allies of Bonaparte. In

those opinions it is understood that the ministers do not participate,

but it will really require an effort on their part to act contrary to

public opinion, and they must, even if perfectly sincere, use great

caution and run some risk of popularity. A direct, or at least a very

near, intercourse with them is therefore highly important, as I have no

doubt that they would go further themselves than they would be willing

to intrust any other person. To this must be added that Lord Castlereagh

is, according to the best information I have been able to collect, the

best disposed man in the Cabinet, and that coming from France, and

having had intercourse with the Emperor Alexander, it is not improbable

that those dispositions may have been increased by the personal

expression of the Emperor's wishes in favor of peace with America.

Whatever advantages may be derived from that circumstance and from the

Emperor's arrival here would be altogether lost at Gottenburg....

HENRY CLAY TO GALLATIN.

GOTTENBURG, 2d May, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--I am rejoiced at finding you in Europe. We had great fears

that you would have left it before our arrival and proceeded to America.

Your rejection last summer in the Senate was very generally condemned by

the people, and produced a reaction highly favorable to you. The total

uncertainty in which the government was left as to your movements (for

on the 1st February, when I left Washington, not one syllable had been

received from either yourself or Mr. Bayard), and the increased and

complicated concerns of the Treasury, produced a state of things highly

embarrassing to the President; so much so that he could no longer

resist the pressure to fill the Treasury. After this measure was

determined on, it became more than ever desirable that the public should

have the benefit of your services here. Had it not been confidently

believed when the new commission was formed that you were on your way to

America and would be there shortly, you would have been originally

comprehended in it.

I have not time to say what I want to communicate on American affairs.

Peace, necessary to our country before the astonishing events which have

recently occurred on this side of the Atlantic, events with which the

imagination can scarcely keep pace, will doubtless be now more than ever

demanded. I think, however, you attach more consequence than belongs to

the indications in the Eastern States. I have no doubt that a game of

swaggering and gasconade has been played off there, without any serious

intention to push matters to extremity. After a great deal of blustering

about raising 20,000 men and declaring the freedom of the port of

Boston, a meeting of the malcontents there determined it inexpedient to

take any such measure during the last session of the Legislature. The

truth is, they want men, they want money, the principal actors want

courage. Yet I would not despise these appearances. If the British

government should determine to land a considerable force in the Eastern

States, avowing friendship to them and an intention only to war with the

Southern States, or with the Administration, certainly very serious

consequences might ensue, though I believe they would fall far short of

conquest or dissolution....

* * * * *

On the point of removing the place of negotiation from Gottenburg to

Ghent Mr. Gallatin was successful, and perhaps it was on the whole

fortunate that he was disappointed in his wish to negotiate at London,

for the delays consequent on the distance of Ghent were an element in

the success of the negotiation.

Another point which Mr. Gallatin pertinaciously labored to gain was the

active aid of the Emperor Alexander. What Romanzoff had been unable to

effect, and what Moreau had died too soon to accomplish, Mr. Gallatin

was bent upon doing by other means. Fortunately, his former ally,

William H. Crawford, had been taken by Mr. Madison from the Senate and

sent as minister to Napoleon, after whose fall he remained in Paris,

waiting for new credentials and for recognition from Louis XVIII. As a

diplomate, Mr. Crawford was not altogether successful; his temper and

manners were little suited to the very delicate situation in which he

was placed; nevertheless he was a person on whose aid Mr. Gallatin could

thoroughly rely, and the assistance of La Fayette and Humboldt went far

to supply his deficiencies. Mr. Gallatin, therefore, enrolled him also

in the service, and wrote at some length, giving him a sketch of the

situation in much the same language used in the letter to Mr. Clay of

the next day, but with a different conclusion.

GALLATIN TO W. H. CRAWFORD.

LONDON, 21 April, 1814.

The only external check to those dispositions [of enmity in England] can

be found in the friendly interposition of the Emperor Alexander, not as

a mediator, but as a common friend, pressing on this government the

propriety of an accommodation and expressing his strong wishes for a

general restoration of peace to the civilized world. I do not know

whether your situation affords you means of approaching him, and can

only state my opinion of the great importance that an early opportunity

should be taken by you or any other person you may think fitted for the

object, to call his attention to the situation in which we are left, and

to the great weight which his opinion in favor of peace on liberal

conditions, strongly expressed to this government, must necessarily have

at this time. Of his friendly disposition for the United States there is

no doubt; but we may be forgotten; and it is necessary that he should be

apprised of the hostile spirit which prevails here, and which, if not

balanced by some other cause, may even carry ministers beyond their own

wishes and views. It should also be stated that our government having

accepted one year ago the Emperor's mediation, and not having supposed

that, considering the political connection between him and Great

Britain, she could reject that offer, no other provision was made on our

part to obtain peace until our government was apprised, in January

last, of the rejection of the mediation by England. Thus was a delay of

a year produced, and the opening of our negotiations unfortunately

prevented till after England is at peace with the rest of the world, a

circumstance which, although it does not give us a positive right to

claim the Emperor's interference, affords sufficient ground to present

the subject to his consideration. I entreat you to lose no time in

taking such steps as may be in your power in that respect, and to write

to me whatever you may think important for the success of the mission

should be known to us....

* * * * *

On the 13th May, Mr. Crawford replied that he had attempted to carry out

Mr. Gallatin's wishes, and had received a polite rebuff from Count

Nesselrode and no notice whatever from the Emperor. He added: "After I

had failed in obtaining access to the Emperor of Russia and to his

minister, I requested General La Fayette to endeavor, through Colonel La

Harpe, to have the proper representations made to Nesselrode or to the

Emperor. Every effort to effect this object has been abortive. It seems

as if there had been a settled determination to prevent the approach of

every person who is suspected of an attachment to the United States. The

general has, however, come in contact several times with Baron Humboldt,

the Prussian minister, who has imbibed already the British

misrepresentations."

La Fayette soon succeeded, however, in breaking down these barriers

which English influence had raised about the Emperor. On the 25th May he

wrote: "Mr. Crawford is better qualified than I am to give you all the

information from this quarter which relates to American concerns. The

confidence with which he honors my zeal has enabled me to discuss the

matter with some influencing characters among the allied generals and

diplomates. Two of the latter act a great part in the present

negotiations. I found them well acquainted with British arguments and

impressed with British prejudices which convinced me that care had been

taken to influence their opinion. An opportunity has been seeked, which

I am bound not to name, for putting directly under the eyes of Emperor

Alexander a note of Mr. Crawford. You may depend it has been faithfully

delivered, with proper comments, along with a letter, the copy of which

Mr. Crawford has desired me to enclose. I expect this evening to meet

the Emperor of Russia at a friend's house, and shall try to obtain some

conversation on the subject."

On the 26th May, General La Fayette wrote the following letter to Mr.

Crawford, who enclosed it on the 28th in a despatch to Mr. Gallatin.

LA FAYETTE TO W. H. CRAWFORD.

26th May, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR,--I passed the last evening in company with the Emperor

Alexander, who, however prepossessed in his favor, has surpassed my

expectations. He really is a great, good, sensible, noble-minded man,

and a sincere friend to the cause of liberty. We have long conversed

upon American affairs. It began with his telling me that he had read

with much pleasure and interest what I had sent him. I found ideas had

been suggested that had excited a fear that the people of the United

States had not properly improved their internal situation. My answer was

an observation upon the necessity of parties in a commonwealth, and the

assertion that they were the happiest and freest people upon earth. The

transactions with France and England were explained in the way that,

although the United States had to complain of both, the British outrages

came nearer home, particularly in the affair of impressments. He spoke

of the actual preparation and the hostile dispositions of England. I of

course insisted on the rejection of his mediation, the confidence

reposed in him by the United States who hastened to send commissioners

chosen from both parties, which he very kindly acknowledged. He said he

had twice attempted to bring on a peace. "Do, sir," said I, "make a

third attempt; it must succeed; ne vous arrêtez pas en si beau chemin.

All the objects of a war at an end, and the re-establishment of their

old limits can the less be opposed as the Americans have gained more

than they have lost. A protraction of the war would betray intentions

quite perverse and hostile to the cause of humanity. Your personal

influence must carry the point. I am sure your majesty will exert it."

"Well," says he, "I promise you I will. My journey to London affords

opportunities, and I will do the best I can." I told him I had received

a letter from Mr. Gallatin, now in London, and we spoke of him, Mr.

Adams, Mr. Bayard, and the two new commissioners. I had also other

occasions to speak of America; one afforded me by the Swedish Marshal

Stadinck, who mentioned my first going over to that country; another by

a well-intentioned observation of Mme. de Staël that she had received a

letter from my friend Mr. Jefferson, of whom he spoke with great regard.

This led to observations relative to the United States and the spirit of

monopoly in England extending even to liberty itself. The Emperor said

they had been more liberal in Sicily than I supposed them. I did not

deny it, but expressed my fears of their protecting Ferdinand against

the cortes. His sentiments on the Spanish affairs were noble and

patriotic. The slave-trade became a topic upon which he spoke with

philanthropic warmth. Its abolition will be an article in the general

peace.

You see, my dear sir, I had fully the opportunity we were wishing for.

If it has not been well improved, the fault is mine. But I think some

good has been done. And upon the promise of a man so candid and generous

I have full dependence. If you think proper to communicate these details

to Mr. Gallatin, be pleased to have them copied. He spoke very well of

him, and seemed satisfied with the confidence of the United States and

the choice of their representatives to him. By his last accounts Mr.

Adams was at St. Petersburg. The particulars of this conversation ought

not, of course, to be published; but you will probably think it useful

to communicate to the commissioners.

* * * * *

The obstinate determination of England to isolate the United States and

cut off all means of co-operation between her and the Baltic powers

became more and more evident as the season advanced, and stimulated

Gallatin's efforts. On the 2d June he wrote to Mr. Monroe from London:

"I have remained here waiting for the answers of our colleagues at

Gottenburg, and will depart as soon as I know that they and the British

commissioners are on their way to the appointed place. The definitive

treaty of European peace being signed and ratified, Lord Castlereagh is

expected here this day, and the Emperor of Russia in the beginning of

next week. I enclose copy of an extract of a letter of Mr. Crawford to

me. I may add that I have ascertained that the exclusion of all

discussions respecting maritime questions and of any interference in the

American contest was one of the conditions proposed at the Châtillon

conferences, and I have reason to believe that, with respect to the

first point, a positive, and in the other at least a tacit, agreement

have taken place in the late and final European negotiations at Paris."

Doubtless one of Mr. Gallatin's objects in remaining so long in London

was to have a personal interview with the Emperor. La Fayette wrote to

him from Paris on the 3d of June, recounting briefly the incidents of

his own interview with the Emperor at the house of Mme. de Staël, and

urging Mr. Gallatin to see him: "You may begin the conversation with

thanking him for the intention to do so [to serve us] to the best of his

power, which he very positively expressed to me. Our friend Humboldt,

who has already spoken to him on the subject, would be happy to receive

your directions for anything in his power. I hasten to scribble this

letter to be forwarded by him."

The Emperor Alexander came to London, and Mr. Gallatin had his interview

on the 17th or 18th June. Of this interview Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, in his

History of the War of 1812, has given a somewhat dramatic account,

derived perhaps from Mr. Levett Harris, who had been secretary to the

mission at St. Petersburg, and who, being now in London, accompanied Mr.

Gallatin to the audience. Mr. Ingersoll has in that work so seldom

succeeded in stating facts with correctness, that to quote him is

usually to mislead. All Mr. Gallatin ever recorded on the subject of the

interview is contained in his despatch of June 20 to Mr. Monroe: "Mr.

Harris and myself had on the 17th an audience from the Emperor of

Russia. His friendly dispositions for the United States are unimpaired;

he earnestly wishes that peace may be made between them and England; but

he does not give or seem to entertain any hope that he can on that

subject be of any service. I could not ascertain whether he had touched

the subject since he had been here; only he said, 'I have made

two--three attempts.' If three, the third must have been now. He added,

'England will not admit a third party to interfere in her disputes with

you. This is on account of your former relations to her (the colonial

state), which is not yet forgotten.' He also expressed his opinion that,

with respect to conditions of peace, the difficulty would be with

England and not with us. On the whole, this conversation afforded no

reason to alter the opinions expressed in my letter of 13th inst.[124] I

yesterday, with his permission, sent him a note, ... which contains

nothing new to you, and which will not probably produce any

effect."[125]

To these facts Mr. Ingersoll adds some details. According to him, the

interview took place on the 18th, the day when the city of London gave

its great banquet to the allied sovereigns at Guildhall. The time

appointed by the Emperor for his audience was the hour before he left

his residence in Leicesterfields to attend the entertainment; and Mr.

Gallatin and Mr. Harris drove in "a mean and solitary hackney-coach,

with a permit," through the shouting crowd, unknown and unnoticed,

except by an occasional jeer and a hail as "old Blucher" from the

throng. The Emperor's words are not given, but the substance was that

Mr. Gallatin and his associates should take a high tone and outbrag the

British.

The reader may safely assume that the Emperor said nothing of the kind,

for Alexander was not a man to indulge in impertinence. He earnestly

wished for peace, and he saw how small a chance there was of obtaining

it. He doubtless spoke to Mr. Gallatin with perfect sincerity of his

wishes and his acts; he may have hinted that America would gain little

by showing too great eagerness for peace, but he would certainly have

said nothing which, if repeated, could possibly have offended England.

Indeed, he had gone to the extreme verge of civility in giving any

audience at all to an American agent while he was himself the guest of

the country with which America was then at war.

The result of all Mr. Gallatin's efforts in this direction was,

therefore, apparently a complete failure. The power of England was

supreme in Europe, and whatever irritation the continental sovereigns

may have felt under the extravagant maritime pretensions of Great

Britain, not one of them ventured to lisp a word of remonstrance. Yet it

is by no means certain that Mr. Gallatin was so unsuccessful as he

seemed. The fate of the negotiation at Ghent hung on Lord Castlereagh's

nod, and among the many influences which affected Lord Castlereagh's

mind, a desire to preserve his friendly relations with Russia was one of

the most powerful. The moment came when the British ministry had to

decide the question whether to let the treaty fail or to abate British

pretensions, and it can hardly be doubted that the repeated

remonstrances of Russia had some share of influence in causing England

to recoil from a persistent policy of war. At the crisis of the

negotiation, on the 27th September, Lord Liverpool wrote to Lord

Castlereagh, who was then at Vienna, advising him of the capture of

Washington and the state of affairs at Ghent, and adding: "The Americans

have assumed hitherto a tone in the negotiation very different from what

their situation appears to warrant. In the exercise of your discretion

as to how much you may think proper to disclose of what has been passing

to the sovereigns and ministers whom you will meet at Vienna, I have no

doubt you will see the importance of adverting to this circumstance, and

of doing justice to the moderation with which we are disposed to act

towards America. I fear the Emperor of Russia is half an American, and

it would be very desirable to do away any prejudice which may exist in

his mind or in that of Count Nesselrode on this subject."[126]

While Mr. Gallatin was engaged in arranging the preliminaries of

negotiation and in bringing to bear on the British ministry such

pressure as he was able to command, he did not neglect to act the part

of diplomatic agent for the instruction of his own government. The time

was long gone by when Mr. Gallatin and his party had declaimed against

the diplomatic service. Mr. Madison had now sent abroad nearly every man

in America whose pretensions to civil distinction were considerable.

There were six full ministers between London, Holland, and Paris, and

among them were included two Senators, the Speaker of the House, and the

Secretary of the Treasury. The position of Mr. Gallatin in London was

particularly delicate, since he was in a manner bound not to betray the

confidence which Lord Castlereagh had placed in him by permitting his

residence in England; but he knew little more of military movements than

was known to all the world, and within these limits he might without

impropriety correspond with his government. Thus his well-known despatch

of June 13 was written.[127] In this letter he gave a sketch of the

whole field of diplomatic and military affairs. Beginning with the

announcement that England was fitting out an armament which, besides

providing for Canada, would enable her to land at least 15,000 to 20,000

men on the Atlantic coast; that the capture of Washington and New York

would most gratify them, and the occupation of Norfolk, Baltimore, &c.,

might be expected; this letter continued:

"Whatever may be the object and duration of the war, America must rely

on her resources alone. From Europe no assistance can for some time be

expected. British pride begins, indeed, to produce its usual effect.

Seeds of dissension are not wanting. Russia and England may at the

approaching Congress of Vienna be at variance on important subjects,

particularly as relates to the aggrandizement of Austria. But questions

of maritime rights are not yet attended to, and America is generally

overlooked by the European sovereigns, or viewed with suspicion. Above

all, there is nowhere any navy in existence, and years of peace must

elapse before the means of resisting with effect the sea-power of Great

Britain can be created. In a word, Europe wants peace, and neither will

nor can at this time make war against Great Britain. The friendly

disposition of the Emperor of Russia, and a just view of the subject,

make him sincerely desirous that peace should be restored to the United

States. He may use his endeavors for that purpose; beyond that he will

not go, and in that it is not probable he will succeed. I have also the

most perfect conviction that, under the existing unpropitious

circumstances of the world, America cannot by a continuance of the war

compel Great Britain to yield any of the maritime points in dispute, and

particularly to agree to any satisfactory arrangement on the subject of

impressment; and that the most favorable terms of peace that can be

expected are the _status ante bellum_, and a postponement of the

questions of blockade, impressment, and all other points which in time

of European peace are not particularly injurious; but with firmness and

perseverance those terms, though perhaps unattainable at this moment,

will ultimately be obtained, provided you can stand the shock of this

campaign, and provided the people will remain and show themselves

united." ...

This despatch arrived in Washington only when one part of its advices

had been already verified by the capture and destruction of that city.

Meanwhile the other American commissioners were beginning to assemble at

Ghent, and the British government showed no sign of haste in opening the

negotiation. Mr. Gallatin, on the 9th June, attempted to hurry Lord

Castlereagh's movements by asking when the British commissioners would

be ready. He was told they would start for Ghent on the 1st July, and on

the strength of this information he himself left London on June 21, and,

after a rapid visit to Paris, arrived at Ghent on July 6.

Nearly three months had Mr. Gallatin thus passed in London, and, after

all his efforts, little enough had been attained. His hopes of success

were certainly not brighter than when he left America, more than a year

before; indeed, it was not easy to deny that there had been actual loss

of ground. Mr. Gallatin had undertaken a diplomatic _tour de force_, and

thus far his successes had been far from brilliant; his failures had

been conspicuous. Nevertheless he persisted with endless patience and

with his usual resource. His residence in London could not but be

unpleasant, and perhaps the brightest spot in his whole experience there

was the meeting with his old friend and school-fellow Dumont, the

Genevan, whom he had once half wished to tempt into the Ohio wilderness,

but who had remained in Europe to float on the waves of revolution until

they threw him into the arms of Jeremy Bentham, whose friend and

interpreter he became. Through him Mr. Gallatin became acquainted with

Bentham, but Gallatin had drifted further than his school-mate from the

theorizing tastes of his youth, and he now found quite as much

satisfaction in discussing finance with Alexander Baring as in reforming

mankind with Bentham and Dumont.

From the 6th July till the 6th August the American commissioners waited

the arrival of their British colleagues, and amused themselves as they

best might. This delay was the more irritating to Mr. Gallatin because

his own visit to Paris was said to have been given by Lord Castlereagh

in the House of Commons, on the 20th July, as an excuse for the delay of

the British commissioners. The conduct of the English government

promised ill for the success of the mission, and it was natural that the

Americans should believe they were a second time to be made the victims

of diplomacy. This inference was not necessarily a fair one; the motives

which influenced Lord Castlereagh varied from day to day, and events

proved that he acted more shrewdly in the interests of peace than Mr.

Gallatin imagined. There was more to be hoped from delay than from

haste.

At last the British commissioners arrived: Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn,

and William Adams; none of them very remarkable for genius, and still

less for weight of influence; as compared with the American

commissioners they were unequal to their task. This again, unpromising

as it looked, was not really a misfortune, for the British

commissioners, deficient as they were in ability, polish of manners, and

even in an honest wish for peace, were the mere puppets of their

government, and never ventured to move a hair's-breadth without at once

seeking the approval of Lord Castlereagh or Lord Liverpool. Mr. Gallatin

had nothing to fear from them; singly or together he was as capable of

dealing with them as Benjamin Franklin, under very similar conditions,

had proved himself equal to dealing with their predecessors thirty years

before. Gallatin's great difficulty was the same with which Dr.

Franklin had straggled. The American habit of negotiating by commissions

may have its advantages for government, but it enormously increases the

labor of the agents, for it compels each envoy to expend more effort in

negotiating with his colleagues in the commission than in negotiating

with his opponents. Mr. Gallatin had four associates, none of whom was

easily managed, and two of whom, Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay, acted upon each

other as explosives. To keep the peace between them was no easy matter,

and to keep the peace between them and the Englishmen was a task almost

beyond hope; indeed, Mr. Gallatin's own temper was severely tried in his

conversations with the English envoys, and perhaps a little more

roughness on his part would have been better understood and better

received by them than his patient forbearance. If Gallatin had a fault,

it was that of using the razor when he would have done better with the

axe.

If all the preliminaries were calculated to discourage, the opening of

the negotiation justified something worse than discouragement. Very

unwillingly and with deep mortification the President and his advisers

had submitted to the inevitable and consented to offer terms of peace

which settled no one principle for which they had fought. They had

agreed to what was in fact an armistice; restoration of the _status ante

bellum_; a return to the old condition of things when war was always

imminent and American rights were always trampled upon. Now that Europe

was again at peace, they were willing to leave the theoretical questions

of belligerency undetermined, since it was clear that England preferred

war to concession. To Mr. Clay, who had made the war, and to Mr. Adams,

who fully sympathized with Mr. Clay in his antipathy to the English

domination, these concessions seemed enormous; even to Mr. Gallatin,

always the friend of peace, they seemed to reach the extreme verge of

dignity; but when the English envoys unfolded their demands, the mildest

of the Americans was aghast; it is a matter of surprise that there was

not an outburst of indignation on the spot, and that negotiation did not

end the day it began. In the first interview, which took place on August

8 and was continued the next day, the British commissioners required as

a preliminary basis of discussion and a _sine qua non_ of the treaty

that the United States government should set apart forever for the

Indian tribes the whole North-West Territory, as defined by the treaty

of Greenville in 1795; that is to say, the whole country now represented

by the States of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Illinois, four-fifths of

Indiana, and one-third of Ohio; so that an Indian sovereignty should be

constituted in that region under the guaranty of Great Britain, for the

double purpose of interposing neutral territory between Canada and the

United States and curbing the progress of the latter. Mr. Gallatin

suggested that there were probably one hundred thousand American

citizens settled within that region, and what was to become of them?

"Undoubtedly they must shift for themselves," was the reply.

In comparison with so enormous a pretension the smaller demands of the

British government were of trifling importance, even though they

included a "rectification" of the frontier and a cession of Sackett's

Harbor and Fort Niagara as a guaranty for the British control of the

lakes.[128]

Under such circumstances, the path of the American commissioners was

plain. They had no opportunity to disagree on so simple an issue, and

they wanted no better popular argument for unanimity in support of the

war than this avowed determination to dismember the United States. They

had merely to draft their rejection of the British _sine qua non_.

The negotiation with the British commissioners was, however, much more

simple than the negotiation with one another; of the first the

diplomatic notes and protocols give a fair description, but of the last

a far more entertaining account is given in the Diary of John Quincy

Adams. The accident which placed Mr. Gallatin at the foot of the

commission placed Mr. Adams at its head,--a result peculiarly

unfortunate, because, even if the other commissioners had conceded

respect to the age, the services, and the tact of Mr. Gallatin, they had

no idea of showing any such deference to Mr. Adams. From the outset it

was clear that Messrs. Bayard, Clay, and Russell meant to let Mr. Adams

understand that though he might be the nominal mouth-piece he was not

the autocrat of the commission, and their methods of conveying this

information were such as in those days Mr. Clay was celebrated for

successfully using. Mr. Adams had little of Mr. Gallatin's capacity for

pacifying strife; he was by nature as combative as Mr. Clay, and before

the commission separated there were exciting and very amusing scenes of

collision, in one of which Mr. Adams plainly intimated his opinion of

the conduct of his colleagues, and Mr. Clay broke out upon him with:

"You _dare_ not, you _cannot_, you SHALL not insinuate that there has

been a cabal of three members against you."

In this affair Mr. Gallatin's situation was delicate in the highest

degree. All recognized the fact that he was properly head of the

mission; his opinion carried most weight; his pen was most in demand;

his voice was most patiently heard. The tact with which he steered his

way between the shoals that surrounded him is the most remarkable

instance in our history of perfect diplomatic skill; even Dr. Franklin,

in a very similar situation, had not the same success. In no instance

did Mr. Gallatin allow himself to be drawn into the conflicts of his

colleagues, and yet he succeeded in sustaining Mr. Adams in every

essential point without appearing to do so. When the negotiation was

closed, all his four colleagues were united, at least to outward

appearance, in cordiality to him, and Mr. Adams had reason to be, and

seems in fact always to have been, positively grateful. If Mr. Clay felt

differently, as there was afterwards reason to believe, he showed no

such feeling at the time. The story as told in Mr. Adams's Diary proves

clearly enough that this delicate tact of Mr. Gallatin probably saved

the treaty.

The very earliest despatch they had occasion to send showed Mr. Gallatin

the delicacy of his ground. As first member of the commission, Mr. Adams

drafted this despatch and gave his draft for revision to the other

gentlemen, who showed it little mercy; Mr. Bayard used it merely as the

foundation for an entirely new draft of his own, which was substituted

by the commission for that of Mr. Adams. Mr. Bayard's essay, however,

proved to be little more satisfactory than Mr. Adams's, and at last it

was referred to Mr. Gallatin to be put in final shape. This was done,

and the commissioners ended by adopting his work. The next despatch was

drafted at once by him and accepted with little alteration. Henceforth

the duty of drawing up all papers was regularly performed by him. Mr.

Adams's account of the characteristic criticisms of his four colleagues,

as well as of his own peculiarities of thought and expression, is very

amusing, and probably very exact. "On the general view of the subject

[of the note in reply to the British commissioners] we are unanimous,

but, in my exposition of it, one objects to the form and another to the

substance of almost every paragraph. Mr. Gallatin is for striking out

every expression that may be offensive to the feelings of the adverse

party. Mr. Clay is displeased with figurative language, which he thinks

improper for a state paper. Mr. Russell, agreeing in the objections of

the two other gentlemen, will be further for amending the construction

of every sentence; and Mr. Bayard, even when agreeing to say precisely

the same thing, chooses to say it only in his own language."

At this moment, that is to say, from the 10th August to the 8th October,

it was a matter of little consequence what form these personal

annoyances might take, for no doubt was felt by any of the commissioners

that negotiation was at an end. Even Mr. Gallatin abandoned hope. That

the British government was really disposed to make peace seemed to him,

as to his colleagues, too improbable to be worth discussion. On the 20th

August he wrote privately to Mr. Monroe: "The negotiations at this place

will have the result which I have anticipated. In one respect, however,

I had been mistaken. I had supposed whilst in England that the British

ministry, in continuing the war, yielded to the popular sentiment, and

were only desirous of giving some éclat to the termination of

hostilities, and, by predatory attacks, of inflicting gratuitous injury

on the United States. It appears now certain that they have more serious

and dangerous objects in view." After dwelling at some length on the

indications that pointed to New Orleans as the spot where the ultimate

struggle for supremacy was to come, he concluded: "I do not expect that

we can be detained more than two or three weeks longer for the purpose

either of closing the negotiation, of taking every other necessary step

connected with it, and of making all the arrangements for our

departure." To Mr. Dallas he wrote the same day: "Our negotiations may

be considered as at an end. Some official notes may yet pass, but the

nature of the demands of the British, made also as a preliminary _sine

qua non_, to be admitted as a basis before a discussion, is such that

there can be no doubt of a speedy rupture of our conferences, and that

we will have no peace. Great Britain wants war in order to cripple us;

she wants aggrandizement at our expense; she may have ulterior objects:

no resource left but in union and vigorous prosecution of the war. When

her terms are known it appears to me impossible that all America should

not unite in defence of her rights, of her territory, I may say of her

independence. I do not expect to be longer than three weeks in Europe."

Nevertheless, the three weeks passed without bringing the expected

rupture. None of the American envoys knew the reasons of this delay; but

the letters of the British negotiators, since published, explain the

steps in that backward movement which at last brought about an

abandonment of every point the British government had begun by declaring

essential. Mr. Goulburn, who from the first was strongly inclined to

obstruct a settlement and to put forward impossible conditions,[129]

announced to his chief on the 23d August: "We are still without any

answer to the note which we addressed to the American plenipotentiaries

on Friday last. We have, however, met them to-day at dinner at the

intendants, and it is evident from their conversation that they do not

mean to continue the negotiations at present. Mr. Clay, whom I sat next

to at dinner, gave me clearly to understand that they had decided upon a

reference to America for instructions, and that they considered our

propositions equivalent to a demand for the cession of Boston or New

York; and after dinner Mr. Bayard took me aside and requested that I

would permit him to have a little private and confidential conversation.

Upon my expressing my readiness to hear whatever he might like to say to

me, he began a very long speech by saying that the present negotiation

could not end in peace, and that he was desirous of privately stating

(before we separated) what Great Britain did not appear to understand,

viz., that, by proposing terms like those which had been offered, we

were not only ruining all prospects of peace, but were sacrificing the

party of which he was a member to their political adversaries. He went

into a long discussion upon the views and objects of the several parties

in America, the grounds upon which they had hitherto proceeded, and the

effect which a hostile or conciliatory disposition on our part might

have upon them. He inculcated how much it was for our interest to

support the Federalists, and that to make peace was the only method of

supporting them effectually; that we had nothing to fear for Canada if

peace were made, be the terms what they might; that there would have

been no difficulty about allegiance, impressment, &c.; but that our

present demands were what America never could or would accede to. This

was the general tenor of his conversation, to which I did not think it

necessary to make much reply, and which I only mention to you in order

to let you know at the earliest moment that the negotiation is not

likely now to continue.... As I find, upon reading over what I have

written, that I have drily stated what the American plenipotentiaries

said to me, I cannot let it go without adding that it has made not the

least impression upon me or upon my colleagues, to whom I have reported

it."

If the notes and conversation of the American commissioners made no

impression on Mr. Goulburn and his colleagues, the case was very

different with their chiefs. A few days before Mr. Goulburn's letter was

written, Lord Castlereagh passed through Ghent on his way to Vienna. He

found that Goulburn had made a series of blunders, and was obliged to

check him abruptly,[130] writing at the same time to Lord Liverpool,

advising a considerable "letting down of the question."[131] Lord

Liverpool replied on the 2d September, saying that his advice had

already been followed: "Our commissioners had certainly taken a very

erroneous view of our policy. If the negotiation had been allowed to

break off upon the two notes already presented, or upon such an answer

as they were disposed to return, I am satisfied the war would have

become quite popular in America."[132] Mr. Goulburn himself became a

little nervous; he wrote on the 2d September of the American

Commissioners: "Their only anxiety appears to me to get back to America.

Whenever we meet them they always enter into unofficial discussions,

much of the same nature as the conversation with which Mr. Bayard

indulged me; but we have given no encouragement to such conversations,

thinking that they are liable to much misrepresentation and cannot lead

to any good purpose. All that I think I have learnt from them is this:

that Mr. Adams is a very bad arguer, and that the Federalists are quite

as inveterate enemies to us as the Madisonians. Those who know anything

of America or Americans probably knew this before. We await with some

anxiety your note."[133] On the 5th September, only three days

afterwards, Mr. Goulburn's temper, in view of the awkward position he

was in, had become irritable; the American commissioners had never, he

thought, had any intention of making peace: "They gave it out all over

the town (previously even to sending their note) that the negotiations

would end in nothing, and I have never met them anywhere without hearing

their complaints at being detained here, and their wish to leave the

place on the 1st of October at the latest. Some days since they gave

their landlord notice that they meant to quit their house, and two of

their private secretaries set out to make a tour in England before their

note was written, one of whom openly stated to me that, as they were on

the point of returning to America, he wished, first of all, to see

London."[134]

The result of the first round in this encounter was clearly in favor of

the American champions. The unfortunate Goulburn was worsted, and

forced, with very bad grace, to accept the admonitions of his chiefs and

to endure the triumph of his opponents.

Lord Bathurst accordingly undertook to correct the mistakes of his

envoys, and forwarded on the 1st September an argumentative note

calculated to persuade the Americans that nothing could be more becoming

in them than to surrender the lakes to Great Britain and the North-West

Territory to the Indians. The long reply of the American commissioners,

delivered on the 9th September, was mostly written by Mr. Gallatin, and

Mr. Adams candidly says in his Diary: "I struck out the greatest part of

my own previous draft, preferring that of Mr. Gallatin upon the same

points." Its contents were briefly characterized in a short note from

the Foreign Office to the Duke of Wellington, dated September 13: "It

rejects all our proposals respecting the boundary and the military flag

on the lakes, and refuses even to refer them to their government,

offering at the same time to pursue the negotiation on the other

points;" and on the 16th the Duke was notified that: "We mean in our

reply to admit that we do not intend to make the _exclusive military

possession of the lakes a sine qua non of the negotiation_." This was,

however, not the only concession; the new ground which Lord Bathurst now

marked out for his negotiators was still further in the rear of Mr.

Goulburn's first position, and abandoned not only the lakes but also the

attempt to create an Indian sovereignty. The British note was sent in on

the 19th September, and Mr. Adams gives in his Diary a graphic account

of the conflicting feelings it aroused: "The effect of these notes upon

us when they first come is to deject us all. We so fondly cling to the

vain hope of peace that every new proof of its impossibility operates

upon us as a disappointment. We had a desultory and general conversation

upon this note, in which I thought both Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard

showed symptoms of despondency. In discussing with them I cannot always

restrain the irritability of my temper. Mr. Bayard meets it with more of

accommodation than heretofore, and sometimes with more compliance than I

expect. Mr. Gallatin, having more pliability of character and more

playfulness of disposition, throws off my heat with a joke. Mr. Clay and

Mr. Russell are perfectly firm themselves, but sometimes partake of the

staggers of the two other gentlemen. Mr. Gallatin said this day that the

_sine qua non_ now presented--that the Indians should be positively

included in the peace, and placed in the state they were in before the

war--would undoubtedly be rejected by our government if it was now

presented to them, but that it was a bad point for us to break off the

negotiation upon; that the difficulty of carrying on the war might

compel us to admit the principle at last, for now the British had so

committed themselves with regard to the Indians that it was impossible

for them further to retreat. Mr. Bayard was of the same opinion, and

recurred to the fundamental idea of breaking off upon some point which

shall unite our own people in the support of the war.... I said ... that

if the point of the Indians was a bad point to break upon, I was very

sure we should never find a good one; if that would not unite our

people, it was a hopeless pursuit. Mr. Gallatin repeated, with a very

earnest look, that it was a bad point to break upon. 'Then,' said I,

with a movement of impatience and an angry tone, 'it is a good point to

admit the British as the sovereigns and protectors of our Indians.'

Gallatin's countenance brightened, and he said in a tone of perfect good

humor, 'That's a non-sequitur.' This turned the edge of the argument

into mere jocularity. I laughed, and insisted that it was a sequitur,

and the conversation easily changed to another point."

Mr. Gallatin was right, and he drafted the reply to the British note

accordingly. There was a somewhat warm discussion over his draft, but

his influence was now so decisive that Mr. Adams declares opposition

useless; unless Gallatin voluntarily abandoned his point, he was

uniformly sustained. This note, while refusing to admit the Indians into

the treaty in any manner that would recognize them as independent

nations, offered a stipulation that they should retain all their old

rights, privileges, and possessions. It was signed and sent on the 26th

September; on October 1 the news of the capture of Washington arrived.

The following letters give some conception of what was passing in the

United States while the American commissioners were forcing Great

Britain to abandon one position after another:

MRS. MADISON TO MRS. GALLATIN.

28th July, 1814.

... We have been in a state of perturbation here for a long time. The

depredations of the enemy approaching within twenty miles of the city,

and the disaffected making incessant difficulties for the government.

Such a place as this has become! I cannot describe it. I wish for my own

part we were at Philadelphia. The people here do not deserve that I

should prefer it. Among other exclamations and threats, they say, if Mr.

M. attempts to move from this house, in case of an attack, they will

stop him, and that he shall _fall with it_. I am not the least alarmed

at these things, but entirely disgusted, and determined to stay with

him. Our preparation for defence, by some means or other, is constantly

retarded, but the small force the British have on the bay will never

venture nearer than at present, twenty-three miles....

JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON TO MRS. GALLATIN.

BALTIMORE, 4th September, 1814.

MY DEAR MADAM,--...You have of course heard of and grieved over our

disasters at Washington. You have heard, too, of the disgraceful

capitulation of Alexandria. Baltimore was at one time certainly prepared

to pursue the baneful example, but the arrival of Rodgers, Porter, and

Perry, the manly language which they held to our generals, and the great

number of troops which are now here, have inspired more confidence. If

the enemy had acted wisely they would have marched directly from

Washington to this place, and would have found it an easy prey. If they

come now, which we look for daily, or rather nightly, they will have a

fight, but I am not quite sure that it will be a hard one. Our militia

are so raw and so totally undisciplined, and our commanding generals so

entirely unqualified to organize them, that I have very little

confidence of success. The command has been taken from General Winder

and given to General Smith. The latter assumed it in the first instance

without authority at the request of some of our citizens, and the

usurpation has since been confirmed at Washington. There is some

derangement of the Administration which I do not understand. General

Armstrong is here, and says he is no longer Secretary of War; but every

one who comes from the city says he is still considered so there. He

explained the thing to me in this way. Mr. Madison had been waited on by

a deputation from Georgetown, of whom A. C. Hanson was one, who told him

that they would not agree to defend the place or to make any resistance

if General Armstrong was to have any control over them. That Mr.

Madison, in consequence of this and much other remonstrance of a similar

nature, proposed to Armstrong that he should do all the business of the

War Department except that which related to the District; that Armstrong

immediately answered that he must do the whole business or none, and

tendered his resignation, which was not accepted. He added, however, in

his conversation with me: "I am here, and the President is in

Washington." He said, too, he was going immediately to New York; but he

has remained several days, and is here yet. I had thought it probable he

was waiting for a recall, but he said yesterday he should go to-day, and

expressed some satisfaction at being again in private life. This seemed

to relate altogether to his pecuniary concerns. He speaks with no

irritation of the Administration, and it is certain that either he or

Mr. Madison, or possibly both, have yielded to a contemptible faction in

a contemptible village, at a most critical moment for our country. This

is the precise language in which I expressed myself to him, but he said

he washed his hands of it.

The loan is taken in part only at $80 for $100, and, I believe, a small

part. If Congress do not act immediately with vigor, the nation, I fear,

is lost.

Did you feel very, very sorry at hearing that your old house was burnt?

I did, really, I had spent so many happy hours in it.

* * * * *

A short correspondence with Mme. de Staël, then a power in diplomacy,

claims also a place here.

MADAME DE STAËL TO GALLATIN.

Ce 31 juillet, 1814.

COPPET, SUISSE, PAYS DE VAUD.

Vous m'avez permis de vous demander si nous avons quelque succès heureux

à espérer de votre mission. Mandez-moi à cet égard, my dear sir, tout ce

qu'il vous est permis de me dire. Je suis inquiète d'un mot de Lord

Castlereagh sur la durée de la guerre, et je ne m'explique pas pourquoi

il a dit qu'il était de l'intérêt de l'Angleterre que le congrès de

Vienne s'ouvrît plus tard. C'est vous Amérique qui m'intéressez avant

tout maintenant, à part de mes affaires pécuniaires. Je vous trouve à

présent les opprimés du parti de la liberté et je vois en vous la cause

qui m'attachait à l'Angleterre il y a un an. On souhaite beaucoup de

vous voir à Genève et vous y trouverez la république telle que vous

l'avez laissée, seulement elle est moins libérale, car la mode est ainsi

maintenant en Suisse. Aussi les vieux aristocrates se relèvent et se

remettent à combattre, en oubliant, comme les géants de l'Arioste,

qu'ils sont déjà morts. J'espère que la raison triomphera, et quand on

vous connaît, on trouve cette raison si spirituelle qu'elle semble la

plus forte. Soyez pacifique cependant et sacrifiez aux circonstances.

Vous devez vous ennuyer à Gand, et je voudrais profiter pour causer avec

vous de tout le temps que vous y perdez. Avez-vous quelques commissions

à faire à Genève et voulez-vous me donner le plaisir de vous y être

utile en quelque chose?

Mille compliments empressés.

Vous savez que M. Sismondi vous a loué dans son discours à St Pierre.

MADAME DE STAËL TO GALLATIN.

Ce 30 septembre.

PARIS, RUE DE GRENELLE ST. GERMAIN, NO. 105.

Je vous ai écrit de Coppet, my dear sir, et je n'ai point eu de réponse

de vous. Je crains que ma lettre ne vous soit pas parvenue. Soyez assez

bon pour me dire ce que vous pouvez me dire sur la vente de mes fonds en

Amérique. Je suis si inquiète que l'idée me venait d'envoyer mon fils

en Amérique pour tirer ma fortune de là. Songez qu'elle y est presque

toute entière, c'est à dire que j'y ai quinze cents mille francs, soit

en terres, soit en fonds publics, soit chez les banquiers. Soyez aussi

assez bon pour me dire si vous restez à Gand. Mon fils en allant en

Angleterre pourrait passer par chez vous et vous donner des nouvelles de

Paris. Enfin je vous prie de m'accorder quelques lignes sur tout ce qui

m'intéresse. Vous pouvez compter sur ma discrétion et sur ma

reconnaissance,--et je mérite peut-être quelque bienveillance par mes

efforts pour vous servir. Lord Wellington prétend que je ne le vois

jamais sans le prêcher sur l'Amérique. Vous savez de quelle haute

considération je suis pénétrée pour votre esprit et votre caractère.

Mille compliments.

GALLATIN TO MADAME DE STAËL-HOLSTEIN.

GAND, 4 octobre, 1814.

Ce n'est que hier, my dear madam, que j'ai reçu votre lettre du 23

septembre; celle que vous m'aviez fait le plaisir de m'écrire de Coppet

m'était bien parvenue; mais malgré la parfaite confiance que vous m'avez

inspirée, il était de mon devoir de ne rien laisser transpirer de nos

négociations; et j'espérais tous les jours pouvoir vous annoncer le

lendemain quelque chose de positif. Nous sommes toujours dans le même

état d'incertitude, mais il me paraît impossible que cela puisse durer

longtemps, et je vous promets que vous serez la première instruite du

résultat. Malgré les fâcheux auspices sous lesquels nous avions commencé

à traiter, je n'avais point perdu l'espérance de pouvoir réussir. Il

faut cependant convenir que ce qui s'est passé à la prise de Washington

peut faire naître de nouveaux obstacles à la paix. Une incursion

momentanée et la destruction d'un arsenal et d'une frégate ne sont

qu'une bagatelle; mais faire sauter ou brûler les palais du Congrès et

du Président, et les bureaux des différente départements, c'est un acte

de vandalisme dont la guerre de vingt ans en Europe, depuis les

frontières de la Russie jusques à Paris et de celles du Danemarc jusqu'à

Naples, n'offre aucun exemple, et qui doit nécessairement exaspérer les

esprits. Est-ce parceque à l'exception de quelques cathédrales,

l'Angleterre n'avoit aucun édifice public qui pût leur être comparé? Ou

serait-ce pour consoler la populace de la cité de Londres de ce que

Paris n'a été ni pillé ni brûlé?

Tout en vous disant cela, je ne me plains point de la conduite des

Anglais, qui, si la guerre continue, loin de nous nuire, n'aura servi

qu'à unir et animer la nation. Sous ce point de vue, la manière dont on

nous fait la guerre doit pleinement rassurer ceux qui avaient des

craintes mal fondées sur la permanence de notre union et de notre

gouvernement fédératif. Et il n'y a qu'une dissolution totale qui puisse

renverser nos finances et nous faire manquer à nos engagements. Je

comprends cependant fort bien que lorsqu'on n'est pas Américain, l'on

désirerait dans ce moment avoir sa fortune ailleurs que dans ce pays là;

je puis avoir des préjugés trop favorables et ne voudrais aucunement

vous induire en erreur. Mais il me semble que vendre vos fonds à 15 ou

20 pour cent de perte serait un sacrifice inutile. Ils tomberont

probablement encore plus si la guerre continue, mais les intérêts seront

toujours fidèlement payés et le capital sera au pair six mois après la

paix. Nous nous sommes tirés d'une bien plus mauvaise situation. À la

fin de la guerre de l'indépendance nous n'avions ni finances ni

gouvernement; notre population ne s'élevait qu'à environ trois millions

et demi, la nation était extrêmement pauvre, la dette publique était

presqu'égale à ce qu'elle est actuellement; les fonds perdaient de 80 à

85 pour cent. Nous n'avons cependant pas fait faillite; nous n'avons pas

réduit la dette à un tiers par un trait de plume; avec de l'économie et

surtout de la probité, nous avons fait face à tout, remis tout au pair,

et pendant les dix années qui avaient précédé la guerre actuelle nous

avions payé la moitié du capital de notre ancienne dette. Au milieu de

toutes nos factions, n'importe quel parti ait gouverné, le même esprit

les a toujours animés à cet égard. Le même esprit règne encore; nous

sommes très-riches; nous étions huit millions d'âmes au commencement de

la guerre, et la population augmente de deux cent cinquante mille âmes

par an. Si je n'ai pas entièrement méconnu l'Amérique, ses ressources et

la moralité de sa politique, je ne me trompe pas en croyant ses fonds

publics plus solides que ceux de toutes les puissances européennes.

Si cependant vous avez peur, attendez du moins la conclusion de nos

négociations; vous n'avez pas le temps de faire vendre avant cette

époque. Je serai au reste encore quinze jours au moins à Grand et

donnerai avec grand plaisir à M. votre fils tous les renseignements en

mon pouvoir s'il passe par ici en allant en Angleterre. Je suis

très-sensible à tout ce que vous avez fait pour être utile à l'Amérique;

je sens encore plus combien je vous dois; vous m'avez reçu et accueilli

comme si j'eusse été une ancienne connaissance. Avant de vous connaître

je respectais en vous Madame de Staël et la fille de Madame Necker, aux

écrits et à l'exemple de qui j'ai plus d'obligation que je ne puis

exprimer. Mais je vous avouerai que j'avais grand peur de vous; une

femme très élégante et aimable et le premier génie de son sexe; l'on

tremblerait à moins; vous eûtes à peine ouvert les lèvres que je fus

rassuré, et en moins de cinq minutes je me sentis auprès de vous comme

avec une amie de vingt ans. Je n'aurais fait que vous admirer, mais

votre bonté égale vos talents et c'est pour cela que je vous aime.

Agréez-en, je vous prie, l'assurance et soyez sûre du plaisir que me

procurerait l'occasion de pouvoir vous être bon à quelque chose.

* * * * *

Mr. Goulburn, meanwhile, under the instructions of his government, was

condescending to what had some remote resemblance to diplomacy. On the

23d September he wrote to Lord Bathurst acknowledging the receipt of two

private letters, and adding: "You may depend upon our governing

ourselves entirely by the instructions which they contain, and upon my

continuing to represent to the Americans, as I always have done whenever

an opportunity has offered, the very strong opinion which prevails in

England against an unsatisfactory peace with America. Of this Mr.

Gallatin appears to be the only American in any degree sensible, and

this perhaps arises from his being less like an American than any of his

colleagues."[135]

Evidently Mr. Gallatin was doing his utmost to keep the peace, and all

he could do was hardly enough. When the American note of September 26

was received, Mr. Goulburn wrote to his government that he considered

it a rejection of their proposition _sine qua non_, and that to admit

the American offer would be to abandon the principle on which the whole

argument had been founded. He accused the American commissioners of

irritating and unfounded accusations, of falsehood, of misstatement, and

of fraud.[136] Lord Liverpool, however, was in a better temper, and,

after consultation with his colleague, Earl Bathurst, framed an article

which, in effect, accepted the offer of Indian amnesty proposed by the

American envoys; yet so curiously ungracious was the mode of this

concession that the Americans were by no means reassured. Instead of

pacifying Mr. Adams, it irritated him. Mr. Gallatin had still to act as

peacemaker. "The tone of all the British notes," says Mr. Adams, "is

arrogant, overbearing, and offensive. The tone of ours is neither so

bold nor so spirited as I think it should be. It is too much on the

defensive, and too excessive in the caution to say nothing irritating. I

have seldom been able to prevail upon my colleagues to insert anything

in the style of retort upon the harsh and reproachful matter which we

receive." The candid reader of these papers must admit that there is no

apparent want of tartness in the American notes, and occasionally the

retort is perhaps a little too much in the British style; but in any

case the moment when England had yielded, however ungraciously, was

justly thought by all Mr. Adams's colleagues to be not the most

appropriate occasion for reproach. Even Mr. Clay was earnest on this

point, and insisted upon drafting the American reply himself, and thus

disposing of the Indian question. This done, the next step was to call

for the projet of a treaty.

On the 18th October, Lord Bathurst accordingly sent the sketch for such

a projet to Mr. Goulburn. Its most important point was an offer to treat

in regard to boundaries on the basis of _uti possidetis_, an offer not

in itself unfair, but startling in the application which Lord Bathurst

gave to it. He proposed to exchange Castine and Machias, which were held

by the British, for Forts Erie and Amherstburg, held by the Americans,

while Michilimackinac, Fort Niagara with five miles circuit, and the

northern angle of Maine were to become British territory.[137] The

details of this cession were, however, not to be put forward until the

American commissioners had admitted the basis of _uti possidetis_, and

accordingly the British commissioners, on the 21st October, sent a note

to the Americans offering to treat on this ground, and adding that "they

trust that the American plenipotentiaries will show, by their ready

acceptance of this basis, that they duly appreciate the moderation of

His Majesty's government in so far consulting the honor and fair

pretensions of the United States, as, in the relative situation of the

two countries, to authorize such a proposition."

Three days later, on the 24th October, the Americans sent back a very

brief note bluntly refusing to treat on the basis of _uti possidetis_,

or on any other basis than the _status quo ante bellum_ in respect to

territory, and calling for the British projet.

Of all the notes sent by the American negotiators, this, which they seem

to have considered a matter of course and to which they gave not even a

second thought, produced the liveliest emotions in the British

government. Lord Liverpool, on receiving it, wrote at once to the Duke

of Wellington: "The last note of the American plenipotentiaries puts an

end, I think, to any hopes we might have entertained of our being able

to bring the war with America at this time to a conclusion.... The

doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one; that they

will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up

what they lose.... We still think it desirable to gain a little more

time before the negotiation is brought to a close, and we shall

therefore call upon them to deliver in a full projet of all the

conditions on which they are ready to make peace before we enter into

discussion on any of the points contained in our last note."[138] Mr.

Goulburn assumed that everything was over, and merely wished to know

whether they had best break off on this point or on that of the

fisheries, and he showed almost his only trace of common sense by

advising government to select the fisheries.[139] On the British side

it was formally, though secretly, announced through the interior

official circle, that the American war was to go on, and for a time the

only apparent question was how to carry it on most effectively.

Unluckily, however, the more the British government looked at the

subject from this point of view the less satisfaction they found in it.

Mr. Vansittart, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was very uncomfortable.

Lord Liverpool was quite as uneasy as Mr. Vansittart. On the 28th

October, the same day on which he wrote to the Duke of Wellington, he

sent a letter to Lord Castlereagh, at Vienna: "I think it very material

that we should likewise consider that our war with America will probably

now be of some duration. We owe it therefore to ourselves not to make

enemies in other quarters, if we can avoid it, for I cannot but feel

apprehensive that some of our European allies will not be indisposed to

favor the Americans; and if the Emperor of Russia should be desirous of

taking up their cause, we are well aware, from some of Lord Walpole's

late communications, that there is a most powerful party in Russia to

support him.... Looking to a continuance of the American war, our

financial state is far from satisfactory. Without taking into the

account any compensation to foreign powers on the subject of the

slave-trade, we shall want a loan for the service of the year of

£27,000,000 or £28,000,000. The American war will not cost us less than

£10,000,000 in addition to our peace establishment and other expenses.

We must expect, therefore, to hear it said that the property tax is

continued for the purpose of securing a better frontier for

Canada."[140] A week later Lord Liverpool wrote again to Lord

Castlereagh in a still lower tone: "I see little prospect of our

negotiations at Ghent ending in peace.... The continuance of the

American war will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we

had any idea of.... All our colleagues are coming to town, and we are to

have a Cabinet on the speech to-morrow. Many of them have not yet seen

the American correspondence; but we have got the question into that

state that the government is not absolutely committed, and there will

be an opportunity therefore of reviewing in a full Cabinet the whole

course of our policy as to America."[141]

This Cabinet council hit upon a brilliant idea to extricate them from

their difficulties: the Duke of Wellington should go to America, with

full powers to make peace or to fight, and in either case to take the

entire responsibility on his own shoulders. This scheme was immediately

communicated to the Duke by Lord Liverpool, in a letter dated November

4, the day after the council, and in communicating it the Earl frankly

said: "The more we contemplate the character of the American war the

more satisfied we are of the many inconveniences which may grow out of

the continuation of it. We desire to bring it to an honorable

conclusion."

The Duke of Wellington had some experience in acting as scape-goat for

the blunders of his government; he was a man immeasurably superior to

his civil chiefs, and even his common sense at times amounted to what in

other men was genius. He wrote back, on the 9th November, a letter which

would alone stamp him as the ablest English statesman of his day. He did

not refuse to go to America, but he pointed out the mistakes that had

been made there, and which must be remedied before he could do any good

service; he then told Lord Liverpool very civilly but very decidedly

that he had made a great blunder in requiring territorial concessions:

"I confess that I think you have no right, from the state of the war, to

demand any concession of territory from America. Considering everything,

it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly

honorable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such

as the want of the naval superiority on the lakes, you have not been

able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your

military success and now undoubted military superiority, and have not

even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You

cannot, then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a

cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which

you have in your power. I put out of the question the possession taken

by Sir John Sherbrooke between the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy Bay. It

is evidently only temporary and till a larger force will drive away the

few companies he has left there; and an officer might as well claim the

sovereignty of the ground on which his piquets stand or over which his

patrols pass. Then, if this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the

_uti possidetis_? You can get no territory; indeed, the state of your

military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand

any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground,

which, I believe, their government are looking for, not to break off the

negotiations, but to avoid to make peace. If you had territory, as I

hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the

cession of that province as a separate article than upon the _uti

possidetis_ as a principle of negotiation."[142]

This was plain speaking. The whole British scheme of negotiation had,

moreover, been fatally shaken by the disastrous failure of Sir George

Prevost's attack on Plattsburg. Lord Liverpool immediately wrote back to

the Duke that the question was still open and the Cabinet was disposed

to meet his views on the subject.[143] A few days later, on the 18th

November, he wrote to Lord Castlereagh announcing that government had at

last decided to recede: "We have under our consideration at present the

last American note of their projet of treaty, and I think we have

determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to

continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any

acquisition of territory. We have been led to this determination by the

consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna,

and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France. We have

also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances

and to the difficulties we shall have in continuing the property tax.

Considering the general depression of rents, which, even under any corn

law that is likely to meet with the approbation of Parliament, must be

expected to take place under such circumstances, it has appeared to us

desirable to bring the American war, if possible, to a conclusion."[144]

Thus the second round in this diplomatic encounter closed with the

British government fairly discomfited; Lord Bathurst and Lord Liverpool

had succeeded no better than Mr. Goulburn in dealing with the American

envoys, and had received a sharp lesson from the Duke of Wellington into

the bargain. When the unfortunate Mr. Goulburn received the despatches

containing his new instructions, he was deeply depressed. "I need not

trouble you," he wrote on the 25th November to Lord Bathurst, "with the

expression of my sincere regret at the alternative which the government

feels itself compelled, by the present state of affairs in Europe, to

adopt with respect to America. You know that I was never much inclined

to give way to the Americans; I am still less inclined to do so after

the statement of our demands with which the negotiation opened, and

which has in every point of view proved most unfortunate."[145] The

draught was a bitter one, but he swallowed it.

Meanwhile, the American commissioners, ignorant of all this secret

correspondence and consultation, were busy in framing their projet, and

in disputing among themselves in regard to the extension they should

give to the principle of the _status quo ante bellum_ as applied to

other than territorial questions, and especially to the fisheries and

the Mississippi.

The task of preparing articles on impressment, blockade, and indemnities

was assigned to Mr. Adams; but as these articles were at once declared

inadmissible by the British, and were abandoned in consequence, the

whole stress of negotiation fell upon those respecting boundaries and

the fisheries, which Mr. Gallatin undertook to prepare. On this point

local jealousies were involved, which not only troubled the harmony of

the mission, but left seeds that afterwards developed into a ferocious

controversy between some of its members. This was owing to the fact that

the treaty of 1783 had to a certain extent coupled the American right to

fish in British waters with a British right to navigate the Mississippi.

The British now proposed to put an abrupt end to the American

fisheries, but seemed disposed to retain the navigation of the

Mississippi. To settle the question, Mr. Gallatin drew up an article by

which the two articles of the treaty of 1783 on these points were

recognized and confirmed.[146] To this Mr. Clay energetically objected,

and a prolonged discussion took place. The question what the fisheries

were worth was a question of fact, which was susceptible of answer, but

no human being could say what the navigation of the Mississippi was

worth, and for this very reason there could be no agreement. Whatever

the right of navigation might amount to in national interest, it was

very likely to equal the whole value of Mr. Clay's personal popularity;

and whatever the fisheries might be worth to New England, their loss was

certain to bankrupt Mr. Adams's political fortunes. Mr. Gallatin acted

here not merely the part of a peacemaker, but that of an economist. He

took upon himself the burden of saving the fisheries, and not only

drafted the article which offered to renew the treaty stipulations of

1783, and thus set off the fisheries against the Mississippi, but

assumed the brunt of the argument against Mr. Clay, who would listen to

no suggestion of a return in this respect to the old status. On the 5th

November the commissioners came to a vote on Mr. Gallatin's proposed

article; Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell opposed it; Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Adams,

and Mr. Bayard approved it, and it was voted that the article should be

inserted in the American projet. Mr. Clay declared that he would not put

his name to the note, though he should not go so far as to refuse his

signature to the treaty.

The next day, however, a compromise was made. Mr. Clay proposed that Mr.

Gallatin's article should be laid aside, and that, instead of a

provision expressly inserted in the projet, a paragraph should be

inserted in the note which was to accompany the projet. The idea

suggested in this paragraph was that the commissioners were not

authorized to bring the fisheries into discussion, because the treaty of

1783 was by its peculiar nature a permanent arrangement, and the United

States could not concede its abrogation. True, the right to the

Mississippi was thus made permanent, as well as the right to the

fisheries, but Mr. Clay conceived that this right could be valid only so

far as it was independent of the acquisition of Louisiana.

The reasoning seemed somewhat casuistic; Mr. Gallatin hesitated; he much

doubted whether the provisions of 1783 about the fisheries and the

Mississippi were in their nature permanent; on this point he believed

the British to have the best of the argument; but the advantages of

unanimity and of obedience to instructions outweighed his doubts. Mr.

Clay's compromise was accordingly adopted, but at the same time Mr.

Adams, with the strong support of Mr. Gallatin, succeeded in adding the

declaration that the commissioners were ready to sign a treaty which

should apply the principle of the _status quo ante bellum_ to all the

subjects of difference. Mr. Clay resisted as long as he could, but at

last signed with his colleagues, and the projet sent in on November 10

accordingly contained no allusion to the fisheries or the Mississippi.