He then came to the question of loans, and expressed the opinion that in

case of war "the United States must rely solely on their own resources.

These have their natural bounds, but are believed to be fully adequate

to the support of all the national force that can be usefully and

efficiently employed;" but it was to be understood that if the United

States wished to borrow money it must pay for it: "It may be expected

that legal interest will not be sufficient to obtain the sums required.

In that case the most simple and direct is also the cheapest and safest

mode. It appears much more eligible to pay at once the difference,

either by a premium in lands or by allowing a higher rate of interest,

than to increase the amount of stock created, or to attempt any

operation which might injuriously affect the circulating medium of the

country;" and he proceeded to show that "even" if forty millions were

borrowed, the difference between paying eight and six per cent. would be

only $800,000 a year until the principal was reimbursed.

These were the chief points of the report, and taken with the tone of

the message they indicate clearly enough that the Administration, now as

heretofore, whatever the private feelings of its members might be, was

prepared to accept any distinct policy which Congress might lay down.

One of the main grounds of attack upon Mr. Gallatin was that he had

habitually alarmed the public with the poverty of the Treasury, and by

doing so had checked energetic measures of defence. The charge was so

far true that Mr. Gallatin had never concealed or attempted to color the

accounts of the Treasury. On this occasion he probably aimed, as was

always his habit, at furnishing Congress with as favorable an estimate

as the truth would permit, with a view to obtaining united and cordial

co-operation between the Executive and Congress. His only mistake was in

accepting the estimates of war expenditure then current. He himself

could not wish for war, and still hoped to avoid it; he knew that the

Treasury, in its present situation, could not stand the burden, but he

had suffered too much from the charge of attempting to direct

legislation, to allow of his again exposing himself to it without

necessity.

The President and the Secretary of the Treasury were therefore in

perfect accord; they did not recommend war, but they recommended

immediate and energetic preparation. The President advised Congress to

provide troops; the Secretary recommended increased taxes and a loan of

$1,200,000, to pay these troops and support them. This was the extent of

their recommendations, and it remained for Congress to act.

Congress did indeed act; within a very short time it was clear that Mr.

Madison had no control over its proceedings. To Mr. Gallatin the action

of Congress was merely a sign that, as his influence in the Senate had

long since vanished, his influence in the House had now followed it, and

that for the future he could expect no friendly co-operation from the

Legislature. At first, indeed, the proceedings of both bodies were in

outward accord with the Executive recommendations; the reports of

committees, and the House bill introduced in pursuance of them, were

such as Mr. Madison had suggested; the only warlike measure proposed was

that of permitting merchant vessels to arm. The Senate, however, very

soon returned to its old tactics. Mr. Madison, as was well understood,

asked only for an army of ten thousand men, and his recommendations were

referred to a committee, of which Mr. Giles was the chairman, who

immediately reported a bill for raising twenty-five thousand men, and in

a speech on the 17th December fairly took the ground that his principal

motive was to annoy the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Giles declared

himself a friend of peace; no man more deprecated war; but "if war

should now come, it would be in consequence of the fatal rejection of

the proposed measures of preparation for war." The only reason for

rejecting them he averred to be "the decrepit state of the Treasury and

the financial fame of the gentleman at the head of that Department." He

launched into a bitter attack upon Mr. Gallatin, thoroughly in the

spirit of Duane and the Aurora. Considering that he was playing with

such tremendous interests, and that the national existence, to say

nothing of private life and fortune, was dancing on the edge of this

precipice of war at the mercy of Mr. Giles's personal malignity towards

Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Madison, and Mr. Monroe, there is actually something

dramatic and almost classic in the taunts he now flung out. "Until now

the honorable Secretary has had no scope for the demonstration of his

splendid financial talents." "If, then, reliance can be placed upon his

splendid financial talents, only give them scope for action; apply them

to the national ability and will." "All the measures which have

dishonored the nation during the last three years are in a great degree

attributable to the indisposition of the late and present Administration

to press on the Treasury Department and to disturb the popularity and

repose of the gentleman at the head of it." In order to give sufficient

occupation to the splendid financial talents of the Secretary of the

Treasury, Mr. Giles had done all that was in his power to do; he had

thwarted every plan of policy; wasted every dollar of money; struck from

the hands of government every resource and every financial instrument he

could lay hold on; and all this was not enough. The Secretary still had

reputation; he had popularity; he had, if not repose, at least dignity.

The Senator from Virginia was equal to the occasion; there are few

oratorical taunts on record which echo more harshly than this, that as

yet "the Secretary has had no scope for the demonstration of his

splendid financial talents;" war alone could do those talents justice,

and war the Secretary should have.

Mr. Giles carried his bill through the Senate; Clay and Lowndes carried

it through the House. The war spirit meanwhile was rapidly rising;

resolutions poured in from the State Legislatures; Congress hurried into

further measures. What Mr. Madison thought of these is shown in a letter

of his to Mr. Jefferson, dated February 7, 1812: "The newspapers give

you a sufficient insight into the measures of Congress. With a view to

enable the Executive to step at once into Canada, they have provided,

after two months' delay, for a regular force, requiring twelve to raise

it, on terms not likely to raise it at all for that object. The mixture

of good and bad, avowed and disguised motives accounting for these

things, is curious enough, but not to be explained in the compass of a

letter."

Although Mr. Gallatin had lost his old control in the House, he still

preserved his influence with the Committee of Ways and Means and its

chairman, Ezekiel Bacon, of Massachusetts. To this committee the annual

report of the Secretary of the Treasury was referred, and when it became

clear that war was really imminent, the committee, early in December,

requested Mr. Gallatin to appear before them to discuss the question of

war taxes. Mr. Gallatin at once complied, and gave his opinions

explicitly and emphatically: "I do not," said he, "feel myself

particularly responsible for the nation being in the position in which

it now finds itself; it might perhaps have been avoided by a somewhat

different course of measures, or the ultimate issue longer deferred.

But, placed as it is, I see not how we can now recede from our position

with honor or safety. We must now go on and maintain that position with

all the available means we can bring to bear on the enemy whom we have

selected, and we should in my judgment resort immediately to a system of

taxation commensurate with the objects stated in my annual report and by

the President in his message at the opening of the session."[110] Very

soon afterwards, on December 9, the committee, through its chairman,

wrote Mr. Gallatin a letter asking for a written statement of his views,

and a month later Mr. Gallatin sent in a paper, which was to all intents

and purposes a war budget.

This was a remarkable--for Mr. Gallatin's calm temper, almost a

defiant--document, written, said Mr. Bacon, "to the great disobligement,

as we had reason to know, of some of his strong political friends at

that time," and intended to force Congress into an honest performance of

its financial duties. This intent was marked by a defence of his own

course which could not but read as a severe criticism of the course

pursued by Congress.

[Sidenote: 1812.]

"It was stated," said Mr. Gallatin, "in the annual report of December

10, 1808, that 'no internal taxes, either direct or indirect, were

contemplated even in the case of hostilities carried against the two

great belligerent powers;' an assertion which renders it necessary to

show that the prospect then held out was not deceptive, and why it has

not been realized.

"The balance in the Treasury amounted at that time to near fourteen

millions of dollars; but aware that that surplus would in a short time

be expended, and having stated that the revenue was daily decreasing, it

was in the same report proposed 'that all the existing duties should be

doubled on importations subsequent to the 1st day of January, 1809.'...

If the measure then submitted had been adopted, we should, after making

a large deduction for any supposed diminution of consumption arising

from the proposed increase, have had at this time about twenty millions

of dollars on hand,--a sum greater than the net amount of the proposed

internal taxes for four years.

"In proportion as the ability to borrow is diminished, the necessity of

resorting to taxation is increased. It is therefore also proper to

observe that at that time the subject of the renewal of the charter of

the Bank of the United States had been referred by the Senate to the

Secretary of the Treasury, nor had any symptom appeared from which its

absolute dissolution, without any substitute, could have then been

anticipated. The renewal in some shape and on a more extensive scale was

confidently relied on; and accordingly, in the report made during the

same session to the Senate, the propriety of increasing the capital of

the bank to thirty millions of dollars was submitted, with the condition

that that institution should, if required, be obliged to lend one-half

of its capital to the United States. The amount thus loaned might

without any inconvenience have been increased to twenty millions. And

with twenty millions of dollars in hand, and loans being secured for

twenty millions more, without any increase of the stock of the public

debt at market, internal taxation would have been unnecessary for at

least four years of war, nor any other resource been wanted than an

additional annual loan of five millions, a sum sufficiently moderate to

be obtained from individuals and on favorable terms."

Leaving Congress to reflect at its leisure upon the criticisms implied

in these remarks, the Secretary went on to lay down the rules now made

necessary by the refusal to follow his previous advice. After doubling

the imposts and reimposing the duty on salt, he could promise a net

revenue of only $6,000,000 for war times. The committee assumed that

annual loans of 110,000,000 would be required during the war, which left

an annual deficiency, to be provided for by taxation, amounting to

$5,000,000, calculated to cover the interest of the first two loans

only, after which additional taxes must be imposed to provide for the

interest of future loans.

Five millions a year, therefore, must be raised by internal taxes, and

Mr. Gallatin proposed to obtain three millions by a direct tax and two

millions by excise, stamps, licenses, and duties on refined sugar and

carriages. A few remarks on loans and Treasury notes closed the letter.

This communication startled the House, and even produced an excitement

of no ordinary nature. Congress suddenly awoke to the fact that the

Secretary was in earnest, and that, if war came, Congress must learn to

take advice. The faction that followed Mr. Giles and General Smith were

not quick in learning this lesson, and fairly raved against the

Secretary. What so exasperated them may be gathered best from a speech

by Mr. Wright, of Maryland, one of the most extreme of the Smith

connection. On March 2, 1812, he spoke thus:

"Sir, at the last session, when the question for rechartering the odious

British bank was before us, we had to encounter the influence of the

Secretary of the Treasury.... Now at this session he has told us that,

if we had a national bank, we should have no occasion to resort to

internal taxes; thereby calling the American people to review the

conduct of their representatives in not continuing that bank, and

thereby to fix the odium of these odious taxes on the National

Legislature. Now a system of taxes is presented truly odious, in my

opinion, to the people, to disgust them with their representatives and

to chill the war spirit. Yet it is, under Treasury influence, to be

impressed on the Committee of Ways and Means, and through them on the

House. Sir, I, as a representative of the people, feel it my duty to

resist it with all my energies.... Sir, is there anything of

originality in his system? No! It is treading in the muddy footsteps of

his official predecessors in attempting to strap round the necks of the

people this odious system of taxation, adopted by them, for which they

have been condemned by the people and dismissed from power.... And now,

sir, with the view of destroying this Administration; with this sentence

of a dismissal of our predecessors in office before our eyes, a sentence

not only sanctioned, but executed by ourselves, we are to be pressed

into a system known to be odious in the sight of the people, and which,

on its first presentation in a letter from the Secretary of the Treasury

to the Committee of Ways and Means, and by them submitted to us,

produced such an excitement in the House."

The "invisibles," however, were not the only class of men upon whom the

war-budget fell with startling effect. Mr. Gallatin's old friends with

whom he had acted in 1792, when at the unlucky Pittsburg meeting they

had united in declaring "that internal taxes upon consumption, from

their very nature, never can effectually be carried into operation

without vesting the officers appointed to collect them with powers most

dangerous to the civil rights of freemen, and must in the end destroy

the liberties of every country in which they are introduced;" men like

William Findley, his old colleague, were so deeply shocked at the

reintroduction of the excise that they would not vote even for the

printing of this letter. They looked upon Mr. Gallatin as guilty of

flagrant inconsistency. They did not stop to reflect that, if

inconsistency there were, it dated as far back as 1796, when, in his

"Sketch of the Finances," Mr. Gallatin had taken essentially the same

view of the excise as now;[111] and again in 1801, when he had refused

to recommend the repeal of the internal taxes.

It was assumed that the Secretary of the Treasury could discover unknown

resources; the Aurora dreamed of endless wealth in the national lands;

but in point of fact this letter of Mr. Gallatin's erred only in calling

for too little. He began by accepting the committee's estimate that

loans to the extent of $50,000,000 would carry on a four years' war.

The war lasted two years and a half, and raised the national debt from

$45,000,000 to $123,000,000, or at the rate of somewhat more than

$30,000,000 a year, nearly three times the estimate. Had Mr. Gallatin

foreseen anything like the truth in regard to the coming contest, his

demand for resources would have appeared absurd, and he would have lost

whatever influence he still had.

For once, however, Gallatin was master of the situation. He could not

force his enemies to vote for the taxes, but he could force them to vote

for or against, and either alternative was equally unpleasant to them.

The honest supporters of war found little difficulty in following Mr.

Gallatin's lead, but the mere trimmers, and the men who supported a war

policy because the Administration opposed it, were greatly disturbed.

Mr. Bacon brought in a report with a long line of resolutions, and

seriously proceeded to force them through the House. Nothing, one would

think, could have given Mr. Gallatin keener entertainment than to see

how his enemies acted under this first turn of the screw which they

themselves had set in motion. It was a sign that government was again at

work, and that the long period of chaos was coming to an end; but the

struggle to escape was desperate, and it was partially successful. At

first, indeed, Mr. Gallatin carried his point. On the 4th resolution,

for a tax of twenty cents a bushel on salt, the House rebelled, and

refused the rate by a vote of 60 to 57, but the next day the whip was

freely applied, and Mr. Wright and his friends were overthrown by a vote

of 66 to 54. This settled the matter for the time, and the House meekly

swallowed the whole list of nauseous taxes, and ordered Mr. Bacon's

committee, on the 4th March, 1812, to prepare bills in conformity with

the resolutions. This was done, but the bills could not be got before

the House till June 26, when there remained but ten days of the session.

As it was out of the question to get these taxes adopted by the House

and Senate in that short time, Mr. Gallatin was obliged to consent to

their going over till November. Congress, however, was quite ready to

authorize loans, and promptly began with one of eleven millions, which,

small as it was, Mr. Gallatin found difficulty in negotiating, even with

the active and valuable assistance of Mr. John Jacob Astor, who now

became a considerable power in the state.

The attitude of the Administration towards the war during the winter of

1811-12 seems to have been one of passive acquiescence. Nothing has yet

been brought to light, nor do the papers left by Mr. Gallatin contain

the smallest evidence, tending to show that Mr. Madison or any of his

Cabinet tried to place any obstacle in the way of the war party. That

they did not wish for war is a matter of course. Their administrative

difficulties even in peace were so great as to paralyze all their

efforts, and from war they had nothing to expect but an infinite

addition to them. The burden would fall chiefly upon Mr. Gallatin, who

knew that the Treasury must break down, and upon the Secretary of War,

Eustis, who was notoriously incompetent. Yet even Mr. Gallatin accepted

war as inevitable, and wrote in that sense to Mr. Jefferson.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, 10th March, 1812.

DEAR SIR,--...You have seen from your retreat that our hopes and

endeavors to preserve peace during the present European contest have at

last been frustrated. I am satisfied that domestic faction has prevented

that happy result. But I hope, nevertheless, that our internal enemies

and the ambitious intriguers who still attempt to disunite will

ultimately be equally disappointed. I rely with great confidence on the

good sense of the mass of the people to support their own government in

an unavoidable war, and to check the disordinate ambition of

individuals. The discoveries made by Henry will have a salutary effect

in annihilating the spirit of the Essex junto, and even on the new focus

of opposition at Albany. Pennsylvania never was more firm or united. The

South and the West cannot be shaken. With respect to the war, it is my

wish, and it will be my endeavor, so far as I may have any agency, that

the evils inseparable from it should, as far as practicable, be limited

to its duration, and that at its end the United States may be burthened

with the smallest possible quantity of debt, perpetual taxation,

military establishments, and other corrupting or anti-republican habits

or institutions.

Accept the assurances of my sincere and unalterable attachment and

respect.

* * * * *

Nevertheless there has always been something mysterious about Mr.

Madison's share in causing the final declaration. This letter of Mr.

Gallatin, dated March 10, shows that he already considered war to be

unavoidable. On the 3d April, only three weeks later, Mr. Madison wrote

to Mr. Jefferson that the action of the British government in refusing

to repeal the orders in council left us nothing to do but to prepare for

war, and that an embargo for sixty days had been recommended. The

embargo was accordingly imposed, and on June 1 Mr. Madison finally sent

in his message recommending a declaration of war against Great Britain,

which took place on June 18.

The Federalist party, however, always maintained that Mr. Madison was

dragooned into the war by a committee of Congress. The assertion is that

the President, though willing to accept and sign a bill declaring war,

was very far from wishing to recommend it, and that to overcome his

reluctance a committee headed by Clay waited upon him to announce that

he must either recommend the declaration or lose the nomination for the

Presidency which was then pending; that he yielded; received the

nomination on May 18, and sent in his message on June 1.

This story, openly told in Congress soon afterwards, and as openly and

positively denied by Mr. Clay and his friends, has crept into all the

principal histories, and in spite of contradiction has acquired much of

the force of established fact. It has even been supported by an avowal

of James Fisk, a prominent member from Vermont, that he was himself a

member of the committee. The charge, such as it is, has been the

principal stain on the political history of Mr. Madison, and also by

consequence upon that of Mr. Gallatin, who, according to Mr.

Hildreth,[112] "clung with tenacity to office" and "did not choose to

risk his place by openly opposing what he labored in vain by indirect

means to prevent," at a time when Mr. Gallatin would probably have been

only too happy to find any honorable way of escaping from office.

The papers of Mr. Gallatin, like those of Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe,

are quite silent upon this subject. On the other hand, the papers of

Timothy Pickering supply at least the authority on which the charge was

made. The two following letters tell their own story, and, although they

affect Mr. Gallatin's reputation only indirectly, they have a

considerable negative value even for him.

TIMOTHY PICKERING TO ABRAHAM SHEPHERD.

CITY OF WASHINGTON, February 12, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--At the last autumn session, Mr. Hanson, noticing the manner

in which the war was produced, in addressing Clay, the Speaker, spoke to

this effect: "_You know, sir_, that the President was coerced into the

measure; that a committee called upon him and told him that if he did

not recommend a declaration of war, he would lose his election. And then

he sent his message recommending the declaration."

Now, my dear sir, I learn from Mr. Hanson that Colonel Thomas

Worthington, Senator, on his way home to Ohio, gave you the above

information, and mentioned the names of Henry Clay, Felix Grundy, and

some other or others who composed the committee. This is a very

important fact, and I pray you will do me the favor to recollect and

state to me all the information you possess on the subject; at what time

and from whom you received it.

ABRAHAM SHEPHERD TO TIMOTHY PICKERING.

Near SHEPHERDSTOWN, February 20, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--I received your favor of the 12th instant, and observed the

contents. Some time in the beginning of April, 1812, General Worthington

came to my house from the city to see Mrs. Worthington and children set

out for Ohio; he continued part of two days at my house, within which

time we had considerable conversation on the prospect of war. He

insisted war was inevitable. I condemned the folly and madness of such a

measure. He then told me that Mr. Bayard would first be sent to England

to make one effort more to prevent the war; that Mr. Madison had

consented to do so; and that Mr. Bayard had agreed to go; that he had

used every means in his power with some more of the moderate men of

their party to effect this object, and that he had frequent

conversations with Mr. Madison and Bayard on this subject before it was

effected, and that I might rely upon it that such measures would be

adopted. He left my house and returned to the city. After the

declaration of war and rising of Congress, General Worthington, on his

way home to the State of Ohio, called at my house and stayed a night. I

then asked him what had prevented the President from carrying into

effect this intended mission to England, and observed I was very sorry

it had not been put in execution. He answered he was as sorry as I

possibly could be, and that he had never met with any occurrence in his

life that had mortified him so much. He said as soon as he returned to

the city from my house he was informed of what had taken place by a set

of hot-headed, violent men, and he immediately waited on Mr. Madison to

know the cause. Mr. Madison told him that his friends had waited upon

him and said, if he did send Mr. Bayard to England they would forsake

him and be opposed to him, and he was compelled to comply, or bound to

comply, with their wishes. I then asked General Worthington who those

hot-headed, violent men were. He said Mr. Clay was the principal. I

cannot positively say, but think Grundy was mentioned with Clay.

I clearly understood that Clay and Grundy were two of the number that

waited on the President. I did not ask him how he got his information.

As I understood the business, a caucus was held and Mr. Clay and others

appointed, and waited on the President in the absence of Worthington,

which will ascertain when this business took place.

* * * * *

Mr. Pickering seems to have thought that this explanation hardly

supported the charge, and he discreetly allowed the subject to drop. So

far, indeed, as the original charge was concerned, the letter of Mr.

Shepherd entirely disposed of it, and proved that Mr. Hanson and Mr.

Pickering had no authority for asserting that the President was coerced

into sending the message of June 1, or that this message was the price

of his re-nomination. On the other hand, Mr. Shepherd's statement raises

a new charge against Mr. Madison. In his letter of 24th April, 1812, to

Mr. Jefferson, the President said: "You will have noticed that the

embargo, as recommended to Congress, was limited to sixty days. Its

extension to ninety proceeded from the united votes of those who wished

to make it a negotiating instead of a war measure," &c., &c. Of these

Senator Worthington was doubtless one, for the substitution of "90" for

"60" was made by the Senate on April 3, on motion of Dr. Leib, and

Worthington voted for it. There was, then, a party in Congress which

wished to use the embargo as a weapon of negotiation. It is not

improbable that this party may have wished Mr. Madison to send a special

mission to England, and that they may have pressed Mr. Bayard for the

place. It is possible that Clay and his friends may have told Mr.

Madison that in such a step he must not expect their support. This is

all that can be now affirmed in regard to the celebrated charge that Mr.

Madison made war in order to obtain a re-election.

Mr. Madison's Administration wanted energy and force. No one who is at

all familiar with the private history of this party can escape the

confession that the President commanded personal love and esteem in a

far higher degree than obedience. Whether Senator Worthington counted

Mr. Madison and Mr. Gallatin among the active supporters of his proposed

peace mission does not appear, nor is there any clue to the other

friends of that policy; but there can be little doubt that this was

merely one of many suggestions with which the remnant of the old

Jeffersonian democracy struggled in a helpless way to stem the current

of the times. Mr. Gallatin's ears were wearied with the complaints and

remonstrances of his friends, the Macons, the Worthingtons, the

Dallases, the Nicholsons; and the strident tones of John Randolph echoed

their complaints to the public. The President heard, but, both by

temperament and conviction, followed the path which seemed nearest the

general popular movement, without a serious effort to direct it or to

provide for its consequences. Even Mr. Worthington believed war to be

inevitable. Yet had they known that only the utter disorganization of

the British government now prevented a repeal of the orders in council;

had there been an American minister in London capable of seeing through

the outer shell of politics and of measuring the force of social

movements, war might even yet have been avoided. Nay, had Mr. Madison

thrown himself at this decisive moment into the arms of the peace party;

had he, on the 1st April, 1812, sent to the Senate, together with his

embargo message, the nominations of Mr. Bayard and Mr. Monroe or Mr.

Gallatin as special commissioners to England, the war could hardly have

happened, for the commissioners would have found the orders in council

revoked before negotiations could have been seriously begun.

This, however, Mr. Madison did not know, and, perhaps, even had he known

it, the fate of John Adams might have seemed to his gentler spirit a

warning not to thwart a party policy. His action was founded on the

official utterances of the British government and the temper of our own

people; it was perfectly consistent from beginning to end, and there was

no disagreement in the Cabinet on the subject. It is true that until

Congress met he was in doubt what course was best to pursue; his message

did not directly recommend war; but from the moment Congress assembled

and showed a disposition to support the national dignity, Mr. Madison

and his Cabinet accepted the situation and needed no outside compulsion.

To use his own words, as written down by a celebrated visitor in the

year 1836, "he knew the unprepared state of the country, but he esteemed

it necessary to throw forward the flag of the country, sure that the

people would press onward and defend it."[113] He had been ready to do

this in the winter of 1808-09. He had urged measures almost equivalent

to war in every following session, so far as Congress would allow him

to do so. He had wished to maintain peace, but he had been quite aware

that government must have the moral courage to resist outrage, as a

condition of maintaining peace. It is not to be denied that his party

was far behind him, and that, as a consequence, the whole foreign policy

from February, 1809, to June, 1812, was one long series of blunders and

misfortunes. France made a dupe of him and betrayed him into a

diplomatic position which was, as regarded England, untenable. To use

his own words in a letter to Joel Barlow, his minister at Paris, dated

August 11, 1812: "The conduct of the French government ... will be an

everlasting reproach to it.... In the event of a pacification with Great

Britain, the full tide of indignation with which the public mind here is

boiling, will be directed against France, if not obviated by a due

reparation of her wrongs. War will be called for by the nation almost

_una voce_." But the diplomatic mistake did not affect the essential

merits of the case, and the factiousness of Congress merely prevented

the possibility of a peaceable solution. Neither the one nor the other

offers the smallest evidence of inconsistency in Mr. Madison or in his

Cabinet. Even Mr. Gallatin, to whose success peace was essential, had

never wished and did not now wish to obtain it by deprecating war.

The real trouble which weighed upon the mind of Mr. Gallatin was not the

war; he accepted this as inevitable. His difficulty was that the

government wanted the faculties necessary for carrying on a war with

success, and that Mr. Madison was not the person to supply, by his own

energy and will, the deficiencies of the system. Mr. Gallatin knew,

what was known to every member of Congress and every newspaper editor in

the land, that both the Navy and Army Departments were wholly unequal to

the war. With regard to the navy, this was of the less consequence,

because the subordinate material was excellent, and our naval officers

were sure to supply the lack of energy in their official head; yet even

here the mere fact that Governor Hamilton wanted the qualities necessary

to a Secretary of the Navy in war times diminished the confidence of the

public and the vigor of the Cabinet. In regard to Dr. Eustis and the War

Department the situation was far worse; this had always been the weak

branch of our system, for the army was wanting in very nearly every

element of success derived from efficient organization. Complete

collapse was inevitable if the situation were prolonged.

The weight of government now fell almost wholly upon Mr. Monroe and Mr.

Gallatin; it is believed that even the Act for the organization of the

army at the beginning of the war was drawn up by Mr. Gallatin. The

Cabinet broke down first of all, and this helplessness of the War

Secretaries, as they were called, has led to a strange mystification of

history in regard to the first achievements of our navy in 1812. Long

afterwards, in the year 1845, Mr. C. J. Ingersoll published a history of

the war, in which he dealt his blows very freely upon Mr. Madison and

Mr. Gallatin, and charged them, among other things, with having meant to

dismantle our frigates and convert them into harbor defences. This

attack drew a paper from Commodore Stewart, who gave another account of

the affair. His statement was that he and Commodore Bainbridge arrived

at Washington on the 20th June; that on the 21st they were shown by Mr.

Goldsborough, chief clerk of the Navy Department, a paper containing the

orders, which had just been drawn, for Commodore Rodgers not to leave

the waters of New York with his naval force; that on the same day the

Secretary of the Navy informed them that it had been decided by the

President and the Cabinet, to lay up our vessels of war in the harbor of

New York; that they had an interview with the President on the same day,

in which the President confirmed this decision; that on the 22d the two

commodores presented a joint remonstrance; and that the subsequent

orders, under which the vessels went to sea, were the result of this

remonstrance. A letter of Mr. Goldsborough to Commodore Bainbridge,

dated May 4, 1825, confirmed the fact of the joint remonstrance, and

added some details in regard to the transaction.

This statement of Commodore Stewart drew from Mr. Gallatin a reply,

which will be found in his printed Writings.[114] He asserted that he

had no recollection of any such scheme for laying up the frigates; that

he was confident no such Cabinet council was ever held as was referred

to by Commodore Stewart; that the President, under the laws, had no

power to make such a disposition of the navy; that Congress had never

contemplated anything of the sort; and that the orders previously or

simultaneously given contradicted such an idea.

His remarks upon the Secretary of the Navy, however, show the situation

as it then existed: "Owing to circumstances irrelevant to any question

now at issue, my intercourse with Mr. Hamilton was very limited. He may

have been inefficient; he certainly was an amiable, kind-hearted, and

honorable gentleman. From his official reports he appears to have been

devoted to the cause of the navy, and I never heard him express opinions

such as he is stated to have entertained on that subject. Yet his

official instructions of 18th June and 3d July, 1812, to Commodore Hull,

which I saw for the first time in Mr. Ingersoll's work, evince an

anxiety bordering on timidity, a fear to assume any responsibility, and

a wish, if any misfortune should happen, to make the officer solely

responsible for it."

Mr. Ingersoll and Commodore Stewart, though in different ways, both in

effect charged upon Mr. Gallatin this scheme of laying up the navy; it

was, according to them, his influence in the Cabinet which had almost

deprived the nation of its maritime glories. This is one of those

curious echoes of popular notions which so often bias historians, and

was founded partly on his old hostility to the navy, partly on his known

indisposition towards the war. There was, in fact, no truth in it. Mr.

Gallatin has himself, in the paper quoted above, recorded his feelings

about the navy at this time:

"For myself I have no reason to complain. Commodore Stewart, in

mentioning my name, only repeats what he heard another say, and he

ascribes to me none but honorable motives and opinions, which, as he

believed, were generally those of the public at large. He says, indeed,

that out of the navy he knew at Philadelphia but one man who thought

otherwise. My associations were, however, more fortunate. From my

numerous connections and friends in the navy, and particularly from

conversations with Commodore Decatur, who had explained to me the

various improvements introduced in our public ships, I had become

satisfied that our navy would, on equal terms, prove equal to that of

Great Britain, and I may aver that this was the opinion not only of Mr.

Madison, but of the majority of those in and out of Congress with whom I

conversed. The apprehension, as far as I knew, was not on that account,

but that by reason of the prodigious numerical superiority of the

British there would be little chance for engagements on equal terms, and

that within a short time our public ships could afford no protection to

our commerce. But this did not apply to the short period immediately

subsequent to the declaration of war, when the British naval force in

this quarter was hardly superior to that of the United States. The

expectation was general, and nowhere more so than in New York, where the

immediate capture of the Belvidere was anticipated, that our public

ships would sail the moment that war was declared. In keeping them in

port at that time the Administration would have acted in direct

opposition to the intentions of Congress and to public opinion."

Commodore Stewart replied in rather indifferent temper to Mr. Gallatin's

very mild statement,[115] but in doing so he printed the sailing orders

of June 22, 1812. An examination of the Madison papers in the State

Department at Washington also brings to light the following note, and by

placing the note of Mr. Gallatin side by side with the sailing orders

sent by the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Rodgers, it will be

easily seen who was responsible for sending Rodgers to sea.

GALLATIN TO MADISON.

[No date. June 20 or 21, 1812.]

DEAR SIR,--I believe the weekly arrivals from foreign ports will for the

coming four weeks average from one to one and a half million dollars a

week. To protect these and our coasting vessels whilst the British have

still an inferior force on our coasts, appears to me of primary

importance. I think that orders to that effect ordering them to cruise

accordingly ought to have been sent yesterday, and that at all events

not one day longer ought to be lost.

Respectfully.

SECRETARY HAMILTON TO COMMODORE RODGERS.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, 22d June, 1812.

... For the present it has been judged expedient so to employ our public

armed vessels as to afford to our returning commerce all possible

protection. Nationally and individually the safe return of our

commercial vessels is obviously of the highest importance, and, to

accomplish this object as far as may be in your power, you will without

doubt exert your utmost means and consult your best judgment.... Your

general cruising ground for the present will be from the Capes of the

Chesapeake eastwardly. Commodore Decatur, ... having the same object in

view, will, for the present, cruise from New York southwardly.... You

are now in possession of the present views of the government in relation

to the employment of our vessels of war....

* * * * *

These two documents establish beyond question the curious fact that it

was Mr. Gallatin who fixed the policy of the Administration in regard to

the navy in 1812; that it was he who urged the President and the Navy

Department up to their work; and that it was he who should have had the

credit, whatever it may be, of sending Rodgers and Decatur to sea. These

orders of June 22 were the actual cruising orders which settled the

policy of the navy for the time, and took the place of temporary orders

issued to Rodgers on June 18, in which he was directed to make a dash at

the British cruisers off Sandy Hook and return immediately to New York.

In the face of these incontrovertible pieces of evidence, one is left to

wonder what can have been the foundation for the circumstantial story

told by Stewart and Bainbridge that they read on June 21, 1812, in the

chief clerk's room at the Navy Department in Washington, orders which

had just been drawn at the instance of Mr. Gallatin for Commodore

Rodgers not to leave the waters of New York with his naval force; orders

issued, as the Secretary of the Navy then and there explained, because

it had been decided by the President and Cabinet, also at Mr. Gallatin's

suggestion, to dismantle the ships and use them as floating batteries to

defend New York harbor; and that the cancelling of these orders and the

reversal of this policy were due to the vehement remonstrances of these

two gallant naval officers, who won a victory in the President's mind

over the blasting and fatal influence of Mr. Gallatin. It is a new

illustration of the old jealousy between arms and gowns.

GALLATIN TO JOSEPH H. NICHOLSON.

WASHINGTON, 26th June, 1812.

DEAR SIR,--I am just informed that you are in Baltimore. If it be true

that your Legislature has authorized the banks to lend a portion of

their capital to the United States, can you ascertain what amount may be

obtained from them all either by taking stock or by way of temporary

loans reimbursable at the expiration of one or more years? We have not

money enough to last till 1st January next, and General Smith is using

every endeavor to run us aground by opposing everything, Treasury notes,

double duties, &c. The Senate is so nearly divided and the divisions so

increased by that on the war question that we can hardly rely on

carrying anything....

* * * * *

War being now declared, Mr. Gallatin was condemned to do that which, of

all financial work, he most abhorred; to pile debt upon debt; "to act

the part of a mere financier; to become a contriver of taxes, a dealer

of loans," and, in the inevitable waste of war, to be the helpless

abettor of extravagance and mismanagement. These were not the objects

for which he had taken office; they were, in fact, precisely the acts

for which he had attacked his predecessors, had driven them from power,

and appropriated their offices and honors, and no one felt this

inconsistency more severely than Mr. Gallatin himself, although five

years of painful effort and constant failure had taught him how feeble

were party principles and private convictions in the face of facts. He

was compelled to go on and to see worse things still. Every part of the

administrative system, except one, collapsed. The war was miserably

disastrous. The Act for raising 25,000 men had not become law until the

11th January, 1812; the selection of officers was not completed until

the close of the year; the recruiting service was not organized in time;

the enlistments fell short of the most moderate calculation, and the

total number of recruits was so small as to make impossible any decisive

movement on the line of Lake Champlain, although Montreal was almost

unprotected. No sufficient naval force was provided on the Lakes, and in

consequence an American army at Detroit was surrounded and captured by a

mere mob of Canadians and Indians, who, inferior in every other respect

to their opponents, had the inestimable advantage of a brave, energetic,

and capable leader. Bad as this experience was, it hardly equalled the

military performances at Niagara, where the commanding generals showed a

degree of incompetence that descended at last to sheer buffoonery. The

War Department in all its branches completely broke down, and if it had

not been for the exploits of those half-dozen frigates whose

construction had been so vehemently resisted by the Republican party

under Mr. Gallatin's lead, the Navy Department would have appeared

equally poorly. The control of the Lakes was in fact lost, and only

partially regained in 1813; the whole gun-boat system, on which millions

had been wasted, went to pieces; even the frigates were mostly soon

captured or blockaded, and, but for the privateers, England, at the end

of the war, had little to fear on the ocean. Amid this general collapse

of administration, Mr. Gallatin might have found hope and comfort had

Congress shown capacity, but Congress was at least as inefficient as the

Executive. Nothing could induce it to face the situation; with the

exception of an Act for doubling the duties on importations, it passed

no tax law until more than a year after the declaration of war, and it

was not till the public credit was ruined and the Treasury notes were

dishonored that Mr. Dallas, then Secretary of the Treasury, succeeded in

bringing the Legislature to double the direct tax, to increase the rate

of the internal duties and add new ones, immediately before the

peace.[116]

A thorough reorganization of the Executive Departments was necessary,

and should have been undertaken by the President before the war was even

declared, but energy in administration was not a characteristic of Mr.

Madison. He hesitated, delayed, postponed, and at length, as in the case

of Robert Smith, he was dragged at the heels of men and events. Hardly a

month had passed since the declaration of war, and Congress had

adjourned on July 6 to meet again on the 3d November; Mr. Gallatin had

just started for New York to seek for money, and the President had set

out for his farm at Montpelier, when an express arrived with the news

that General Hull had surrendered Detroit. What Mr. Gallatin thought of

this affair may be inferred from the following extract of a letter to

his wife:

GALLATIN TO HIS WIFE.

WASHINGTON, 31st August, 1812.

... Hull has in unaccountable manner surrendered all his troops (about

1800) prisoners of war to an inferior force. We have no direct accounts

from him, but the fear of Indians for himself and the inhabitants is the

probable cause of his not having extricated himself by retiring and

abandoning the country. Proper measures for repairing the loss will be

adopted; but how they will be executed by Eustis, no one can say....

* * * * *

The disaster at Detroit made a change in the War Department inevitable,

but the change was not yet made. Mr. Gallatin pressed it as necessary

from a financial point of view. When he found that the army and navy

estimates would require a loan of $21,000,000 for the year 1813, he

wrote to the President as follows: "I think a loan to that amount to be

altogether unattainable. From banks we can expect little or nothing, as

they have already lent nearly to the full extent of their faculties. All

that I could obtain this year from individual subscriptions does not

exceed $3,200,000. There are but two practicable ways of diminishing the

expenditure: 1, by confining it to necessary objects; 2, by introducing

perfect system and suppressing abuses in the necessary branches. 1. In

the War Department, to reduce the calls for militia, and, above all, to

keep the control over those calls and other contingent expenses; in the

Navy, to diminish greatly the number of gun-boats, and to strike off all

supernumerary midshipmen, pursers, sailing-masters, and other

unnecessary officers. 2. System requires skill in forming and decision

in executing. But the preparing and executing such plans must rest

almost exclusively with the heads of the Departments. I have no doubt

that knowledge and talents would save several millions, and the

necessary business be better done."

This letter was written towards the end of October, 1812. Already on the

11th of that month, as appears from a brief note written by Mr. Gallatin

to the President,[117] some exchange of places had been suggested by Mr.

Madison, perhaps between Eustis and Monroe, but the suggestion was

condemned by Gallatin as more open to criticism than almost any other

course that could be adopted. So far as can now be guessed, it is

probable that Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Monroe wished to reorganize the

Cabinet throughout; Mr. Monroe would then have become Secretary of War,

Mr. Gallatin would have succeeded him as Secretary of State, and

possibly William H. Crawford would have taken the Treasury; an

arrangement which would have given great strength to the government and

eliminated many causes of weakness. To this, however, Mr. Madison would

not consent, probably from the belief that it would infallibly be

defeated in the Senate. In this state of suspense the Administration

stumbled on until the end of the year; then Dr. Eustis resigned of his

own accord, and Mr. Monroe assumed temporarily the duties of his office,

as he easily might, since the war had made the Department of State a

sinecure. Governor Hamilton also resigned of his own accord, and

immediate action by the President thus became necessary.

GALLATIN TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, 18th December, 1812.

... The series of misfortunes experienced this year in our military land

operations exceeds all anticipations made even by those who had least

confidence in our inexperienced officers and undisciplined men. I

believe that General Dearborn has done all that was in his power. The

conduct of Hull, Rensselaer, and Smyth cannot be accounted for on any

rational principle. It is to be hoped that Mr. Eustis's resignation will

open brighter prospects. For, although those three disasters cannot with

justice be ascribed to him, yet his incapacity and the total want of

confidence in him were felt through every ramification of the public

service. To find a successor qualified, popular, and willing to accept,

is extremely difficult.

* * * * *

It was just this moment that Mr. Josiah Quincy, hottest of all

Federalists, chose for his once celebrated attack on the Administration:

"It is a curious fact," he said, in his speech of 5th January, 1813,

"but no less true than curious, that for these twelve years past the

whole affairs of this country have been managed, and its fortunes

reversed, under the influence of a Cabinet little less than despotic,

composed, to all efficient purposes, of two Virginians and a

foreigner.... I might have said, perhaps with more strict propriety,

that it was a Cabinet composed of three Virginians and a foreigner,

because once in the course of the twelve years there has been a change

in one of the characters.... I said that these three men constituted to

all efficient purposes the whole Cabinet. This also is notorious. It is

true that during this period other individuals have been called into the

Cabinet; but they were all of them comparatively minor men, such as had

no great weight either of personal talents or of personal influence to

support them. They were kept as instruments of the master spirits; and

when they failed to answer the purpose, or became restive, they were

sacrificed and provided for; the shades were made to play upon the

curtain; they entered; they bowed to the audience; they did what they

were bidden; they said what was set down for them; when those who pulled

the wires saw fit, they passed away. No man knew why they entered; no

man knew why they departed; no man could tell whence they came; no man

asked whither they were gone."

In this description there was truth as well as oratory; but Mr. Quincy

did not add that this despotism had been tempered by faction to an

extent which had left in it very little of the despotic. Even while Mr.

Quincy was charging the mysterious three with the design of making Mr.

Monroe "generalissimo" in order to perpetuate their power, the three

were in a quandary, as much perplexed as any of their neighbors, and

actually deciding to accept General Armstrong as the least of their

evils. Not one of them had any confidence in General Armstrong; they

knew him to be no friend of theirs; to belong to a family--the

Clintons--which had for twenty years or thereabouts acted without

reference to them; one of whose chiefs, George Clinton, had, as

Vice-President, given infinite annoyance to the Administration, while

another, De Witt Clinton, had, within three months, run a mad race to

get himself elected President by the Federalists in opposition to Mr.

Madison; they knew that Armstrong had been through life a master of

intrigue, and that his ambition was only checked by his indolence; but

they knew that he had ability and that he had loyally supported the

government. General Armstrong, therefore, became Secretary of War, while

the Navy Department was given to William Jones, of Philadelphia, an

active merchant and politician, who, in other days, had served as

lieutenant under Commodore Truxton.

Meanwhile, Mr. Gallatin had in his own department cares enough to occupy

all his energies. When Congress met in November, 1812, the House was

still less disposed to support the Secretary than it had been in the

spring. Langdon Cheves, of South Carolina, was now chairman of the

Committee of Ways and Means. The Presidential election was over and Mr.

Madison was secure in his seat, but the House had less appetite for

taxation than before; it refused even to support the Secretary in other

money measures. The first trial of strength, in which Mr. Gallatin was

worsted, came in an embarrassing form. When the British government on

June 23, 1812, revoked its orders in council, the declaration of war

being then unknown in England, great quantities of British merchandise

were at once shipped to America on the faith of the Act of Congress of

March 2, 1811, which promised a renewal of intercourse whenever the

British orders should be revoked. Even after the declaration of war

became known, these shipments continued, protected by British licenses

from British cruisers. All these vessels and cargoes were of course

seized on arriving in American ports. The next step was to release such

property as was owned in good faith by Americans, the Treasury taking

bonds to the value of the cargoes, and, owing to the great rise in

prices consequent on the war, the owners made very large profits, in

some cases even to the whole amount of the bonds. Mr. Gallatin,

unwilling to assume the responsibility of remitting or exacting the

forfeitures, referred the subject to Congress, and in doing so expressed

the opinion that in the peculiar circumstances of the case a reasonable

compromise would authorize the remission of one-half the forfeitures,

due to the collectors, and the exaction of the other half, or its

equivalent, due to the government. The amount of property involved was

about $40,000,000, including the importers' profit. Mr. Gallatin's

proposition would have assumed a forfeiture to the amount of about

$9,000,000. The regular duties, if the forfeitures were wholly remitted,

would amount to about $5,000,000.

On this question there arose a sharp battle in the House, and Mr. Cheves

led the Federalists in a vigorous assault upon the Secretary. Perhaps

this attack was more honest and less spiteful than the attacks of Mr.

Giles, but it was hardly less mischievous: "I would rather see the

objects of the war fail; I would rather see the seamen of the country

impressed on the ocean and our commerce swept from its bosom, than see

the long arm of the Treasury indirectly thrust into the pocket of the

citizen through the medium of a penal law. We might suffer all these

disasters and our civil liberties would yet be safe. That principle of

our government would still be preserved which subjects the purse of the

citizen to no authority but a law so plain that he who runs may read.

How are the exigencies of the government for the next year to be

supplied? That portion of them which is provided is rather the result of

accident than forecast. Is the deficiency to be derived from taxes? No!

I will tell gentlemen who are opposed to them, for their comfort, that

there will be no taxes imposed for the next year. It was said last

session that you would have time to lay them at this session, but I then

said it was a mistake. You now find this to be the fact. By your

indecision then, when the country was convinced they were necessary, you

have set the minds of the people against taxes. But were it otherwise,

you have not time now to lay them for the next year."

Jonathan Roberts, of Pennsylvania, a member of the Committee of Ways and

Means, led the debate in defence of Mr. Gallatin, but in the end Mr.

Cheves, aided by the Federalists and by Calhoun, Lowndes, Macon, and

other very honest men, carried his point, and the forfeitures were

entirely remitted, by a very close vote of 63 to 61. Mr. Gallatin's hold

even on the Committee of Ways and Means was now lost.

At this point of the war, within four months of its declaration, the

Treasury was threatened with a collapse more fatal than that which had

overwhelmed the War Department. The circulating capital of the United

States was concentrated in the large cities chiefly north of the

Potomac, and more than one-fourth of this capital belonged to New

England. Not only did New England lend no aid to the Treasury, but her

whole influence was thrown to embarrass it. Of loans to the amount of

$41,000,000 paid into the Treasury during the war, she contributed less

than three millions. This was not all. A large importation of foreign

goods into the Eastern States, and an extensive trade in British

government bills of exchange, caused a drain of specie through New

England to Great Britain. The specie in the vaults of the Massachusetts

banks rose from $1,700,000 in June, 1811, to $3,900,000 in June, 1812,

and to $7,300,000 in June, 1814, all of which was lost to the government

and the Treasury. Even the most prejudiced and meanest intelligence

could now understand why the destruction of the United States Bank

threatened to decide the fate of the war and of the Union itself. The

mere property in the bank, important as this was, counted for

comparatively little in the calculation, although seven millions of

foreign capital, invested in its stock, were lost to the country by its

dissolution and had been remitted to Europe shortly before the war. This

was the "British gold" of which Mr. Giles and Mr. Duane were so jealous,

and which, had it been allowed to remain, would have probably doubled

the resources of the government in fighting British armies and navies,

for, setting aside the useless wealth of New England, it is doubtful

whether the country contained $7,000,000 in specie in 1812 as the basis

of its entire currency system. This, however, was not the most serious

loss. The State banks, with a capital of something more than

$40,000,000, took up the paper previously discounted by the United

States Bank, to the amount of more than $15,000,000. Then came the war,

and Mr. Gallatin applied every possible inducement to borrow for

government the means of the State banks. Those of New York,

Philadelphia, and Baltimore responded to the call; they subscribed

directly to the loans, and they enlarged their discounts to such of

their customers as subscribed; in doing so they necessarily exceeded

their resources and were obliged to enlarge their issues of bank paper.

Meanwhile, in order to fill the chasm made by the dissolution of the

United States Bank, new banks were created in the States; a bank mania

broke out; in four years one hundred and twenty new banks were

chartered, doubling the banking capital at a time when commerce was

annihilated and banks were less needed than ever. They created no new

capital and withdrew what would otherwise have been lent to the

government. Governor Snyder, in Pennsylvania, was forced to veto a bill

making a wholesale creation of new banks. Finally, since, in the absence

of a national bank, the government had no means of controlling the

issues, these rapidly increased to an amount greatly in excess of the

requirements, until a suspension of specie payments and hopeless

confusion of the currency became inevitable. This took place in 1814,

and it was Mr. Gallatin's opinion, as it must be the opinion of every

financier, that if the United States Bank had been in existence the

suspension might have been delayed for a considerable time, while the

terrible disorganization of the whole system of internal exchanges, by

which the government was very nearly brought to a stand-still, need not

have taken place at all.[118]

Had Congress been more tractable, something might perhaps have been done

to alleviate the situation; but the Senate was utterly beyond control,

and the House was becoming almost equally perverse. The expedient

adopted by government fifty years later in the face of similar

difficulties, even had it been now thought of, would have had little

chance of general acceptance. Mr. Gallatin could get no action from

Congress. His tax bills of the preceding session had been postponed on

the understanding that they should be adopted before the 1st January,

1813; but, meanwhile, experience proved that these bills, violent as

they had at first been thought, were quite unequal to the occasion, and

that much stronger measures were needed. The five millions which had

luckily fallen in, owing to the enormous British shipments after war was

declared, helped to tide the Treasury over its immediate difficulties,

but it helped also to encourage the inaction of Congress. Mr. Cheves did

not contribute to smooth the path of the Treasury. He wished to force

Congress to raise revenue by abandoning the non-importation system,

which was still maintained as a coercive measure against Great Britain;

this was also Mr. Gallatin's wish, but Congress refused its consent.

Meanwhile, the tax bills were untouched. Month after month passed, and

still nothing was done until the session closed on March 3, 1813, when,

since it was universally conceded that these bills must be taken up, an

extra session in May for this express purpose became necessary. All

Congress would do, meanwhile, was to authorize loans, the favorite

resource of incompetent financiers.

Many years later, Mr. Jonathan Roberts, who had been a member of this

Congress, writing to Mr. Gallatin in the garrulity of age, recalled his

recollections of the war. The letter is dated December 17, 1847, and

seems to have been merely a spontaneous expression of old feelings.

"When it was first my fortune to have met you," he wrote, "I found you

to be a ripe and experienced statesman, possessed of the affectionate

confidence of the most eminent and wisest among your compeers. You were

only about ten years my senior, but immeasurably advanced above me in

capacity for usefulness for that small disparity in years. In a very

early period of our intercourse you gave me proofs of your confidence,

of which I felt myself not unworthy, but which I had not been taught to

look for from one who had so long mixed in state affairs.... While I

witnessed an admiration of your character among enlightened and liberal

minds, abundant evidences were not wanting of envy, jealousy, and even

hatred. My sympathies were enlisted in your favor, and my indignation

was roused in witnessing ebullitions of these detestable passions. You

stood the friend of peace in the crisis pending the last war,--an

attitude that called for the exercise of higher moral nerve than the

opposite position; while our friends Madison and Macon, feeling with

you, each in your places, fulfilled every duty with the honest purpose

to seek for peace as the object they most desired.

"You can hardly fail to remember how Mr. Cheves acted towards you as

chairman of Ways and Means, and how Colonel Johnson baffled every effort

to report the tax bills. These men, too, gave their votes for an

extravagant loan bill, which probably [no] man could have raised, even

on the predicate of adequate taxes. At your suggestion I hastened to

visit Governor Snyder, to give him your views of what would be the

effect of the measure of the forty-one new banks on the prospects of

raising loans. On meeting him I found he had negatived the bank bill,

and it only remained for me to leave with him the views you had charged

me with."

[Sidenote: 1813.]

Mr. Gallatin's annual report in November, 1812, had been reticent in

tone, perhaps because he was unwilling to discourage, and yet had

nothing encouraging to say. He simply gave the condition of the Treasury

and announced that a loan of twenty millions would be required. Congress

authorized a loan of sixteen millions and the issue of five millions in

Treasury notes; it would do no more; every other plan or suggestion of

Mr. Gallatin or of the President was defeated or ignored.

Such was the situation when Congress adjourned on the 4th March, 1813.

Mr. Gallatin then opened his loan. The Treasury was nearly exhausted; so

nearly that on the 1st April it was absolutely empty, and must have

ceased to meet the requisitions of the War and Navy Departments; the

Federalists were in high hope that the loan would fail and government

fall to pieces, and they made the most active efforts to force this

result. The crisis was serious, and it was in this emergency that Mr.

John Jacob Astor rendered to Mr. Gallatin and to the country essential

aid; by his assistance Mr. Gallatin was enabled to make his terms with

Mr. Parish and Mr. Girard, and thus three foreigners by birth, Mr.

Gallatin himself being of foreign birth, saved the United States

government for the time from bankruptcy, and perhaps from evils far more

fatal; so, at least, the Federalists thought, and they long vented their

wrath against these foreigners, as they called them, for an act which

was certainly a somewhat bitter satire upon American patriotism.

Just at this moment the Russian minister, Daschkoff, communicated to the

Secretary of State an offer of mediation on the part of the Emperor. His

note bore date the 8th March, and in the situation of our government not

only towards that of Russia, but towards the peace party at home, it had

the gravest significance. There could be no hesitation in accepting the

offered mediation, but there might be a question whether it were best to

accept it before hearing from England. To show over-eagerness for peace

would weaken our position abroad; but the position abroad was of less

consequence than union at home, and sluggishness in meeting peace

propositions would stimulate every domestic faction. The President

decided not to wait, but to send commissioners at once. Mr. Gallatin had

now, by the end of March, disposed of his loan; he could easily arrange

the affairs of his Department so as to admit of his absence, and he

requested the President to let him go to Russia.

So many and so complicated are the influences which must have acted upon

Mr. Gallatin's mind to produce this decision, that they are hardly to be

set forth with any certainty of measuring their precise relative weight;

yet there can be little possibility of error in assuming, as the most

powerful, the conviction which had long weighed upon his mind that his

usefulness in his present position was exhausted, and that Congress

would do better, at least for a time, without him. So accustomed had

Congress become to throwing upon him the burden and the blame of every

measure, that nothing short of his retirement would break the spell

which bound them, and so ineradicable were the enmities which

neutralized all his efforts, that only his self-effacement could

extinguish them. This he had long known, but the President's wishes had

tied his hands. He could not desert the President or the country if his

services were needed; but the situation had now become such as to create

a serious doubt whether his services were not really more necessary

abroad than at home. A year not yet quite elapsed had already brought

the country into a position grave in the extreme; financial collapse and

domestic treason were becoming mere questions of time; another campaign

was inevitable, and it might fairly be reckoned that, if this were not

successful, success was out of our power; diplomacy, therefore, had

become the most important point of action next to service in the field,

and in diplomacy Mr. Gallatin naturally felt that he had a brilliant

future before him. Here he would escape from all his old difficulties

and enmities; to Europe the Smiths, Duanes, Gileses, and Leibs would

hardly care to follow him. The past was a failure; he might fling it

away, and still rescue his country and himself by this change of career.

Mr. Gallatin grew more and more silent with age and experience; he never

complained, and never said what was calculated to wound; but he had now

stood for five years in a position inconsistent with his principles and

grating to his feelings. In deciding to go to St. Petersburg he was well

aware that he would be charged with having deserted his post, and

charged by the same men who for four years had made it impossible for

him to perform the duties of that post, and who still presented an

impenetrable barrier to every attempt on his part at efficient

administration. It is probably true that Mr. Gallatin himself hoped not

to return to the Treasury; if he returned at all, he would have

preferred the dignified ease of the State Department; but these points

he did not and would not attempt to settle in advance; he left it

absolutely in the hands of Mr. Madison to decide for the public interest

what disposition to make of his services. There were two obvious

contingencies; the one, in case the Senate should insist upon his

resignation as Secretary, and, to obtain this, reject his nomination as

commissioner; the other, the case of diplomatic delays that might

prevent his return and compel the President to fill his vacant place:

"Mr. Bayard asked me," wrote Mr. Dallas in the following February,

"whether you had reflected upon the first event as a probable one, and

you merely smiled when I repeated his question to you." Mr. Dallas seems

to have felt a little irritation at this reticence, but a sadder smile

than Gallatin's can hardly be imagined even among the Administration in

these trying times, although it may have been brightened by a touch of

humor at the thought how readily the Senate would fall into that

agreeable occupation, and how willingly he would throw upon them that

responsibility. In any case it was not for him to direct the President's

action; Mr. Madison himself could alone be the judge of what the

occasion required.

Of course it was fully in Mr. Madison's power to retain Mr. Gallatin at

his post. He too seems, however, to have been impressed with the

advantages of sending him to Russia, and the act was carefully

considered and was his own. In the case of negotiations taking place,

America afforded no negotiator comparable to Gallatin; if he were

willing to go, his presence would be invaluable.

With Mr. Gallatin it was at last decided to associate Mr. Bayard, of

Delaware, so that the mission finally consisted of Gallatin, J. Q.

Adams, then Minister to St. Petersburg, and James A. Bayard. Of course

the most rapid action was necessary; Mr. Bayard's appointment was only

decided on the 5th April, and Mr. Monroe then expected the vessel to

sail with Mr. Gallatin within a fortnight. Fortunately, the necessary

business of the Treasury was well in hand. On the 17th April, Mr.

Gallatin wrote a letter to the Secretaries of War and of the Navy,

giving a general view of the fiscal situation for the year and

regulating the drafts which these two Departments might make upon the

Treasury, to the amount, namely, of $17,820,000, to January 1, 1814. The

tax bills were ready for Congress to act upon; a draft for a new bank

charter was prepared and left behind; every contingency, as far as

possible, was provided for. Mrs. Gallatin and the younger children were

to pass their summer as usual in New York, while the eldest son, James,

accompanied his father as private secretary.

Before closing this part of Mr. Gallatin's history and turning to the

new career which was to occupy nearly all his thoughts for sixteen years

to come, the results of his sudden departure upon Congress and upon the

Treasury shall be briefly told. Another extract from the letter of

Jonathan Roberts already quoted will furnish an idea of the immediate

effect of Mr. Gallatin's absence. He sailed on May 9, and Congress met

on May 23. Mr. Roberts proceeds:

"At the called session in May following you had left the seat of

government on the mission of peace. I soon found, however, that you left

nothing undone that made your presence necessary to forward the vital

measure of adequate taxation. You promptly responded to a call early

made for a scheme of revenue that you deemed to embrace every item that

could justify a levy and collection. This was abundantly confirmed by

Mr. Eppes's subsequent trial of watch-tax, &c. Mr. E. was now made

chairman of Ways and Means, but could not attend the committee from ill

health, which both Dr. Bibb and myself thought fortunate for the early

attainment of the object of the session. To almost every item in your

reported list objections were felt in the committee. Bibb himself

disrelished a direct tax, but could not deny its indispensable

necessity. It was soon found there was no alternative. No new project

could be devised, and you were not present to be worried by calls for a

modification. The bills were reported; no opening speech was made, and

no debate provoked. Dr. Bibb conducted the deliberations with successful

address, but I then felt that your absence placed the tourniquet on

Congress. Having finished your duties at home, you accepted the place in

which you hoped to be most useful.... Your real friends felt the vacancy

made by your absence, and hoped for and would have hailed your return to

our home councils as a joyful event. Your place never has been, nor, I

believe, never will be filled."

Before his departure Mr. Gallatin wrote three or four letters, which

contain parting suggestions that, for his calm temper, express unusual

feeling. One of these was to Mr. Monroe, dated the day before he sailed,

to dissuade him from pushing the military occupation of Florida, for

fear of a war with Spain, that would still more exasperate the Northern

States. "You will pardon the freedom with which, on the eve of parting

with you, I speak on this subject. It is intended as a general caution

which I think important, because I know and see every day the extent of

geographical feeling and the necessity of prudence, if we mean to

preserve and invigorate the Union."

The letter to his brother-in-law, James W. Nicholson, explains the

motives that influenced him, at least in part. General Armstrong had

been at his old practices during the short three months he had

controlled the War Department. The National Intelligencer for April 16

had contained the announcement that William Duane was appointed

Adjutant-General in the United States army. All the love and esteem

which Mr. Gallatin felt then and ever continued to feel for Mr. Madison

could not overcome the disgust with which this last blow was received.

GALLATIN TO BADOLLET.

PHILADELPHIA, May 5, 1813.

DEAR FRIEND,--...The newspapers will have informed you of my mission

to Russia. Whether we will succeed or not depends on circumstances not

under any man's control. But on mature reflection, having provided all

the funds for the service of this year, and having nothing to do but

current business during the remainder, I have believed that I could be

nowhere more usefully employed than in this negotiation. I hope that my

absence will be very short, and leave all my family behind, James

excepted.

Ever yours.

GALLATIN TO JAMES W. NICHOLSON

PHILADELPHIA, 5th May, 1818.

DEAR SIR,--You have heard by the papers of my intended mission to

Russia; but I have delayed to the last moment writing to you. Having

provided all the funds for this year's service, and none but current

business to attend to during its remainder, I have made up my mind that

I could in no other manner be more usefully employed for the present

than on the negotiation of a peace. Peace, at all times desirable, is

much more so for two reasons: 1. The great incapacity for conducting the

war, which is thereby much less efficient and infinitely more expensive

than it ought to have been. 2. The want of union, or rather open

hostility to the war and to the Union, which, however disgraceful to the

parties concerned, and to the national character, is not less formidable

and in its consequences of the most dangerous tendency. But in addition

to those considerations I believe that the present opportunity affords a

better chance to make an honorable peace than we have any right

hereafter to expect. England must be desirous at this critical moment to

have it in her power to apply her whole force on the Continent of

Europe, and the mediation of Russia saves her pride; whilst both the

personal feelings of the sovereign, a common interest on all neutral

questions, and other considerations of general policy, give us the best

pledge that a nation can obtain that the mediator will support the cause

of justice and of the law of nations. Finally, provided we can obtain

security with respect to impressments, peace will give us everything we

want. Taught by experience, we will apply a part of our resources to

such naval preparations and organization of the public force as will

within less than five years place us in a commanding situation. This we

cannot effect pending the war, and if this continues any length of time

it will leave the United States so exhausted that they will not effect

the same objects within the same period nor without oppressive

taxation. To keep down the Tory faction at home and ultimately to

secure in an effectual manner our national rights against England, peace

is equally necessary. The Essex-Junto men and other high-toned

Federalists of course fear it more than any other event, as they are

well aware that a continuation of the war must necessarily place

government in their hands before the end of four years.

Whether, however, we will succeed in making peace is another question,

which depends on events not under our control. So far as relates to

myself, I am well aware that my going to Russia will most probably

terminate in the appointment of another Secretary of the Treasury, and

in my returning to private life. If I shall have succeeded in making

peace, I will be perfectly satisfied; and, at all events, I will

acknowledge to you that Duane's last appointment has disgusted me so far

as to make me desirous of not being any longer associated with those who

have appointed him....

* * * * *

The departure of Mr. Gallatin to Europe did not, however, at once close

his career as Secretary of the Treasury, and it was not until a year

later, on the 9th February, 1814, that he ceased to hold that office.

Meanwhile, the Senate had exercised in its full extent that unrestrained

liberty of personal attack which Mr. Gallatin had so contemptuously left

to them. By a vote of 20 to 14 they rejected his nomination to Russia,

on the ground that it was inconsistent with his station in the Treasury.

Their true motive is not a matter of much importance; the oldest and

wisest politicians are most apt to warn their younger associates not to

search for the motives of public men, and this Christian precept rests

on the general fact that human nature often, and nowhere oftener than in

politics, opens into abysses of baseness only to be measured by baseness

equally profound. The doctrine that the post of Secretary was

incompatible with that of treaty commissioner was certainly new and

astonishing as coming from a body which had twice confirmed the

nomination of the Chief Justice to an identical situation; but, apart

from its inconsistency, the new rule was wise and the result good.

Perhaps, however, Senators would have shown more dignity in not

proclaiming quite so loudly their eagerness to confirm Mr. Gallatin if

he could be forced to leave the Treasury.

The following letters tell the story in all its nakedness:

MONROE TO JEFFERSON.

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1813.

DEAR SIR,--From the date of my last letter to you, the President has

been ill of a bilious fever, of that kind called the remittent. It has

perhaps never left him, even for an hour, and occasionally the symptoms

have been unfavorable. This is, I think, the fifteenth day. Elgey, of

this place, and Shoaff, of Annapolis, with Dr. Tucker, attend him. They

think he will recover. The first mentioned I have just seen, who reports

that he had a good night, and is in a state to take the bark, which,

indeed, he has done on his best day for nearly a week. I shall see him

before I seal this, and note any change, should there be any, from the

above statement.

The Federalists, aided by the malcontents, have done and are doing all

the mischief they can. The nominations to Russia and Sweden (the latter

made on an intimation that the Crown Prince would contribute his good

offices to promote peace on fair conditions) they have embarrassed to

the utmost of their power. The active partisans are King, Giles, and (as

respects the first nomination) Smith. Leib, German, and Gilman are

habitually in that interest, active, but useful to their party by their

votes only. The two members from Louisiana, Gailliard, Stone, Anderson,

and Bledsoe are added to that corps on these questions. They have

carried a vote, 20 to 14, that the appointment of Mr. Gallatin to the

Russian mission is incompatible with his station in the Treasury, and

appointed a committee to communicate the resolution to the President.

They have appointed another committee to confer with him on the

nomination to Sweden. The object is to usurp the executive power in the

hands of a faction in the Senate. To this several mentioned are not

parties, particularly the four last. A committee of the Senate ought to

confer with a committee of the President through a head of a Department,

and not with the Chief Magistrate; for in the latter case a committee

of that House is equal to the Executive. To break this measure, and

relieve the President from the pressure, at a time when so little able

to bear it, indeed when no pressure whatever should be made on him, I

wrote the committee on the nomination to Sweden, that I was instructed

by him to meet them, to yield all the information they might desire of

the Executive. They declined the interview. I had intended to pursue the

same course respecting the other nomination had I succeeded in this.

Failing, I have declined. The result is withheld from the President.

These men have begun to make calculations and plans founded on the

presumed death of the President and Vice-President, and it has been

suggested to me that Giles is thought of to take the place of President

of the Senate as soon as the Vice-President withdraws.

General Dearborn is dangerously ill, and General Lewis doing little.

Hampton has gone on to that quarter, but I fear an inactive command.

General Wilkinson is expected soon, but I do not know what station will

be assigned him. The idea of a commander-in-chief is in circulation,

proceeding from the War Department, as I have reason to believe. If so,

it will probably take a more decisive form when things are prepared for

it. A security for his, the Secretary's, advancement to that station is,

I presume, the preparation desired.

Your friend.

I have seen the President, and found him in the state represented by Dr.

Elgey.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE AMERICAN COMMISSIONERS.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 5th August, 1813.

GENTLEMEN,--I am very sorry to be under the necessity of communicating

to you an event of which there was no anticipation when you left the

United States. The event to which I allude is the rejection by the

Senate of the nomination of Mr. Gallatin, on the idea that his mission

to Russia was incompatible with the office of Secretary of the Treasury.

After the appointment of Mr. Jay, when Chief Justice of the United

States, by President Washington, and of Mr. Ellsworth, when holding the

same office, by President Adams, by which a member of a separate branch

of the government was brought into an office under the Executive, and

after the sanction given in practice as well as by law to the

appointment of persons during the absence of a head of a Department to

perform its duties, it was presumed that there would not be any serious

or substantial objection to the employment in a similar service, for a

short term and especial occasion, of a member of the Administration

itself. Although this nomination was opposed in the Senate as soon as it

was acted on, yet it was not believed that it would be rejected until

the vote was taken. At an early stage the President was called on by a

resolution of the Senate to state whether Mr. Gallatin retained the

office of Secretary of the Treasury, and, in case he did, who performed

the duties of that Department in his absence. The President replied that

the office of Secretary of the Treasury was not vacated by Mr.

Gallatin's appointment to Russia, and that the Secretary of the Navy

performed its duties in his, Mr. Gallatin's, absence. After this reply,

which was given in conformity with the President's own views of the

subject, and with those of Mr. Gallatin when he left the United States,

it was impossible for the President, without departing from his ideas of

propriety in both respects, to have removed Mr. Gallatin from the

Treasury to secure the confirmation of his nomination to Russia. It

would have been still more improper to have taken that step after the

rejection of the nomination. The President resolved, therefore, to leave

the mission on the footing on which it was placed by the vote of the

Senate by which the nomination of Mr. Adams and Mr. Bayard was

confirmed. Whatever has been done jointly under the commission given to

the three commissioners by the President when you left the United States

in compliance with your instructions, will not be affected by this

event.

MONROE TO GALLATIN.

WASHINGTON, 6th August, 1813.

DEAR SIR,--To the official communications which you will receive with

this I have little to add. Indeed, as I know that the President intends

to communicate to you in a private letter all the details which could

not be included in a public one, I should not write you this except that

I could not permit Mr. Wyer to sail without bearing this testimony of my

good wishes towards you.

The Senate has got into a strange and most embarrassing situation, of

which the rejection of your nomination and of that of Mr. Russell are

proofs; many others were afforded during the session. The attempt to

control the President, or at least to influence his conduct by a

committee of the Senate authorized to confer with him, thereby placing a

committee on a footing with the Chief Magistrate and without limitation

as to what it might say or demand, was a very extraordinary measure. It

was the more embarrassing as the occurrence took place at a time when

the President was confined with a bilious fever which endangered his

life. The pressure gave him, as you will readily conceive, the greatest

concern, more particularly the rejection of your nomination and the

question which grew out of it, your removal from the Treasury to secure

your confirmation in the mission to Russia. Among the objections to that

step, the sentiments of those friends who supported your nomination were

entitled to and had great weight. They thought that your removal from

the Treasury would operate as a sanction to the conduct of your

opponents and a censure on themselves. Other objections were strong, but

this was conclusive.

I presume that the business on which you and Mr. Bayard left this

country is settled by this time, or will be before you receive this

letter. If Great Britain accepted the mediation with a sincere desire to

make peace, the treaty would have been soon concluded. If she rejected

it, a very short time would have enabled you to conclude a treaty of

commerce with Russia. So that in either event we expect soon to have the

pleasure of seeing you here.

With great respect and esteem, I am, &c.

MRS. MADISON TO MRS. GALLATIN.

29th July, 1813.

... You have heard no doubt of the illness of my husband, but can have

no idea of its extent and the despair in which I attended his bed for

nearly five weeks. Even now I watch over him as I would an infant, so

precarious is his convalescence. Added to this are the disappointments

and vexations heaped upon him by party spirit. Nothing, however, has

borne so hard as the conduct of the Senate in regard to Mr. Gallatin.

Mr. Astor will tell you many particulars that I ought not to write, of

the desertion of some whose support we had a right to expect, and of the

manoeuvring of others always hostile to superior merit. We console

ourselves with the hope of its terminating both in the public good and

Mr. Gallatin's honorable triumph....

A. J. DALLAS TO MRS. GALLATIN.

22d July, 1813.

MY DEAR MADAM,--Our friend Mr. Macon has just written to me that Mr.

Gallatin's nomination has been rejected by a majority of one vote. I

find from another quarter that Mr. Anderson and Mr. Stone voted against

it.

I did not choose to tease you with the agitation of the subject while I

was at Washington. The question turned upon this; if Mr. Madison would

declare the Secretary's office vacant, the Senate would confirm the

nomination; but he firmly refused to do so. The Federalists were very

busy on the occasion; but the malcontent junto of self-styled

Republicans were worse; and Armstrong,--he was the devil from the

beginning, is now, and ever will be. In short, every art has been

employed to defeat the mission, to ruin the Administration, and to

depreciate Mr. Gallatin. In the last object the host of ill-assorted

enemies will fail; but the political mischief that has been done and

will be done is incalculable....

J. J. ASTOR TO GALLATIN.

New York, 9th August, 1813.

DEAR SIR,--By this opportunity you will receive an account of the

strange, if not wicked, proceedings of the Senate. The President has

been led astray by some of its members in the belief of a majority in

favor of the nomination and retaining you at same time as Secretary of

the Treasury. He made this a point on which they split. I came to

Washington some few days after the rejection had passed. It was well

understood that if he would re-nominate with an understanding to appoint

another Secretary, the nomination should be confirmed. It was evident

that he was much at a loss; what from personal attachment to you, not

knowing what might be your wish and your feelings, and what in the

difference of opinion of your own friends, together with a natural

dislike to yield to the Senate, he was in great perplexity and

hesitation. My decided opinion was to have a nomination made, for, from

a letter which you wrote to Mr. Worthington, I was clearly of opinion

that you contemplated what would likely happen in the Senate; but many

of your friends being entirely unacquainted with your ideas on this

subject, there was a difference of opinion between them. I advised Mr.

W. to tell Mr. Madison that he had such a letter from you, and to make

it known to your friends, which if he had done in time, I believe the

President would not have made it a point as he did. I mentioned to him

of the letter, but it was too late, for he began to believe that in

consequence of the armistice on the continent there would be no

negotiation, and, not willing to part with you or to have you withdrawn

from the Administration without your own desire, he determined to hold

on as he did. He may be right, but I think I would have done otherwise.

He certainly suffered much in mind on your account; but I think I should

have let the public good take the lead. He may have many reasons which I

know nothing of; your own feelings were certainly of weighty

consideration with him....

I wonder that you did not impart your ideas to some of your friends; no

one, except Mr. Worthington, seemed to know anything about it. I wish I

had known half as much, and I would have made use of it to effect.

Though I might have run risk to displease you, I should have done good

to the country, unless there be no negotiation, in which case you cannot

return too soon. On every account you are wanting at Washington....

W. H. CRAWFORD TO GALLATIN.

PARIS, 20th April, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--...The French papers of yesterday state that you are added

to the commission to treat at Gottenburg. Mr. Beasley says that Mr.

Adams is also of the commission. I cannot believe that all of you are to

proceed to Gottenburg. If you are going, I presume it is in consequence

of your having vacated your seat in the Cabinet. I hope this conjecture

is unfounded. This is the course which your enemies wished to compel you

to adopt. I agree that the treatment you have received would justify the

measure, but when I know the gratification which Messrs. Giles, Smith,

and Leib will feel from your resignation, I cannot reconcile it to my

feelings. All this mischief has grown out of Brent's mobility or his

thirst. The day before I left Washington I called on a number of the

Senators and insisted on the danger of delay and urged them to decide

the question before they adjourned. They decided every embarrassing

question about 4 P.M., when Mr. Brent, as he says, out of complaisance

to Mr. King, consented to let the nomination stand over till the next

day. They had a decided majority, and Anderson, who voted against them

on all the embarrassing questions, declared he would vote for the

nomination. I have no doubt that he voted against it in the end. The

desire to get Mr. Cheves into the Treasury had some influence upon two

or three Senators. I told Mr. Madison that he would be pressed on that

point....

A. J. DALLAS TO GALLATIN.

14th February, 1814.

DEAR SIR,--If you receive this letter in Europe you will have an

opportunity to hear from Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell all the public news of

this country; and consequently it would be an unnecessary trouble both

to you and to me to enter into a written detail. Your absence has

embarrassed everybody. It is a subject of lasting regret that you did

not confide to some friend your wishes respecting the course to be taken

if the Senate should refuse to confirm your nomination as minister

while you retained the office of Secretary, or if the business and

casualties of the mission should protract your absence so long as to

render it impracticable to keep the Treasury Department open for you.

Mr. Bayard asked me whether you had reflected upon the first event as a

probable one, and you merely smiled when I repeated his question to you.

However, the arrangement is now made in the best manner to evince the

President's attachment and the public confidence by restoring you to the

mission when it became indispensable to treat the Treasury Department as

vacant. I do not believe that during any part of your public life you

enjoyed more general respect and more valuable popularity than at the

present crisis. Indeed, your name being restored to the mission has

revived the hope of its success, which failed when your name was

excluded. I look confidently to your return with additional claims to

public gratitude and honors....

* * * * *

Lovers of historical detail may without much difficulty pick from the

wreck and ruin of Mr. Gallatin's administrative policy such fragments as

survived their originator and became foundation-stones of the ultimate

governmental system. Many such fragments there were, and of the first

importance, but it is not by them that Mr. Gallatin is to be measured.

No one has ever seriously questioned his supereminence among American

financiers. No one who has any familiarity with the affairs of our

government has failed to be struck with the evidences of his pervading

activity and his administrative skill. His methods were simple, direct,

and always economical. He had little respect for mere financial devices,

and he labored painfully to simplify every operation and to render

intelligible every detail of business. It may be doubted whether he ever

made a mistake in any of his undertakings, and whether any work done by

him has ever been found inefficient; but it is useless to catalogue

these undertakings. His system was not one of detached ideas or of

parti-colored design. As their scheme existed in the minds of Mr.

Jefferson, Mr. Gallatin, and Mr. Madison, it was broad as society

itself, and aimed at providing for and guiding the moral and material

development of a new era,--a fresh race of men. It was not a mere

departmental reform or a mere treasury administration that Mr. Gallatin

undertook; it was a theory of democratic government which he and his

associates attempted to reduce to practice. They failed, and although

their failure was due partly to accident, it was due chiefly to the fact

that they put too high an estimate upon human nature. They failed as

Hamilton and his associates, with a different ideal and equally positive

theories, had failed before them. Yet, whatever may have been the extent

of their defeat or of their success, one fact stands out in strong

relief on the pages of American history. Except those theories of

government which are popularly represented by the names of Hamilton and

Jefferson, no solution of the great problems of American politics has

ever been offered to the American people. Since the day when foreign

violence and domestic faction prostrated Mr. Gallatin and his two

friends, no statesman has ever appeared with the strength to bend their

bow,--to finish their uncompleted task.